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AN EMPIRE OF DUST: THOMAS BENTON CATRON AND THE AGE OF
CAPITAL IN THE HISPANO BORDERLANDS, 1840-1921

By
Bryan W. Turo

B.A. History, SUNY Binghamton, 2006
M.A. History, University of Arizona, 2008
Ph.D., History

ABSTRACT
“An Empire of Dust” follows New Mexico’s economic history from the arrival of
merchant capitalism in the early nineteenth century to the maturation of a modern, stateoriented, capitalist economy by the 1920s. Within this scope, I investigate the economic
life of Anglo-Missourian-turned-New-Mexico-robber-baron Thomas Benton Catron as
well as the rise and then collapse of his land-based entrepreneurial empire. Catron was a
lawyer, banker, businessman, and party politician, who entered the Territory of New
Mexico in 1866, and who became entangled in its fate until his death in 1921. During the
Gilded Age, Catron and his cohort employed the tools of the U.S. territorial system, the
legal system, and corporate enterprise to consolidate and control millions of acres of New
Mexico’s private and communal land grants as well as vast stretches of the public
domain. In the process, they alienated the majority population of Nuevomexicanos from
their land and economic power base. But in the end, New Mexico land grants were poor
investments. The speculators who bet on great profits from the monopolization of these
properties generally met a red bottom line. Indeed, the failure of capitalists like Catron
illuminates how and why much of New Mexico never transformed into the modern
viii

industrial landscape they desired. In this history of capitalism in the Hispano Borderlands
of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado, I scrutinize the modes of financial and
corporate capitalism that powerfully transformed the region and then consider how and
why Catron’s particularly aggressive and speculative approach failed to impart prolonged
development or a sustainable economy. Instead, New Mexico’s story of economic
modernization is one of dispossession, stagnation, and exploitation, propped up then, as
now, by a federal landscape. “An Empire of Dust,” therefore, directs scholarly attention
toward an alternative story of American economic development in which failure, perhaps
even more so than success, directed the local relationships with capitalism as it unfolded
across the American Southwest.
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Introduction:
Waddy-Gate, or, Watered Stocks in Arid Lands
From his law office on the Santa Fe Plaza, Thomas Catron received word, on the
afternoon of May 16, 1899, that his long-time business partner and friend Wilson
Waddingham had died suddenly that morning in New York. Upon hearing the bad news,
he had no way of knowing the full extent to which the loss would damage his own affairs
and finances. The message, sent by Ezekiel G. Stoddard of New Haven, Connecticut,
explained that Waddingham had suffered a stroke of apoplexy.1 For Catron, it was more a
stroke of terrible fortune. The family of the deceased later added that the unhappy
incident arose from the great stress that accompanied a meeting between Waddy (as he
was known) and some well-connected potential investors. Indeed, the once-flush
Waddingham had set up the meeting in the first place to put his finances in proper order
after a disastrous decade of New Mexican investments dried up his coffers like so many
southwestern streambeds.2
From New Haven to Santa Fe, the bad news reached Catron by telegram within a
few hours. But Waddy-gate, the imbroglio that developed over Wilson Waddingham’s
estate, lingered on for over a half decade. For Catron, the untimely nature of his partner’s
passing multiplied threefold. The meeting that apparently killed Waddy had not only
presented the chance to fix his own overextended accounts, but Catron’s as well; instead,

1

Ezekiel G. Stoddard to Thomas B. Catron, 16 May 1899, Thomas B. Catron Papers, 1692-1934 (MSS 29
BC), Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico (hereafter referred to
as CP), Series 103, Box 7, Folder 5.
2
Alice Gehring Miskimins, “The Las Vegas Connection: Wilson Waddingham and the Mills Family of
New Mexico,” Password 32 (1987): 77-86, 81.
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Catron’s balance fell farther into the red. The two wheelers and dealers – also the two
largest landowners in the territory – held joint interests in roughly 1.5 million acres of
land in New Mexico and Colorado, owned by several corporations under their direction.
In these affairs, Catron cosigned on some New Mexico bank notes. Waddingham
considered these of little concern. Now the banks looked to Catron for payment. Already
strapped, he was far less sanguine about the prospect. Even worse, the partners had as
recently as 1897 reorganized their corporate finances, changing their company’s official
names and transferring land titles to Waddingham as part of a mutual plan to attract an
infusion of credit, the lifeblood of capitalism.3 The ultimate goal was to transform the
physical enormity of their land-based-assets into a modern incorporated empire of farm,
mine, range, and town. Together, they planned on getting out of the depressed 1890s with
stronger financial standing than that with which they had entered the decade. In the wake
of Waddy’s demise, however, their speculative dreams turned into Catron’s debt-ridden
nightmare.
As Waddy-gate slowly unfolded during the summer of 1899, entrepreneurs and
attorneys from New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City,
Denver, Santa Fe, and Las Vegas, NM, as well as London, England, and Dundee,
Scotland, exchanged an enormous amount of paperwork dealing with the deceased
party’s opaque estate.4 Waddingham’s deep levels of insolvency and illiquidity, which he
successfully hid from creditor and partner alike, involved corporate holdings in Colorado,

3

For corporate asset movement see: Agreement between Southwestern Lumber and Railway Company and
the Eastern Financial Security Company, 2 January 1899, CP, Series 103, Box 8, Folder 2. For an example
of bank note see: John H. Vaughn to Thomas B. Catron, 20 October 1899, CP, Series 103, Box 9, Folder 1.
4
For instance: Joseph H. Reading, Philadelphia, to Thomas B. Catron, 19 May 1899, CP, Series 103, Box
7, Folder 5; Edward P. Baker, New York, to Thomas B. Catron, 7 August 1899, CP, Series 103, Box 8,
Folder 3.

2

New Mexico, Texas, and Missouri, as well as a litany of assets in the form of stocks,
bonds, and fee simple properties, such as his palatial home in New Haven and office
space in New York City.5 In New Mexico, his estate aggregated no less than a whopping
two-and-one-quarter million acres. This included the 520,000-acre Tierra Amarilla Land
Grant owned by the Southwestern Railway & Lumber Co.; the 447,534-acre Armendariz
Grants owned by the Valverde Irrigation Ditch Co.; the 383,856-acre Anton Chico Grant
owned by the Bernal Valley Co.; the combined 754,757 acres of the Pablo Montoya and
Baca #2 grants of the Red River Cattle Co.; and the 163,921-acre Antonio Ortiz Grant.
Through Waddingham’s substantial eastern connections, these corporations, chartered by
an American territory and fully capitalized at over six million dollars, procured first and
second mortgages and issued bonds.6 The limited liability corporations secured these
financial obligations with land grant properties that rarely held near the same value as
they did at the time of initial transaction. As the months wore on and the reality of
Waddy’s dire financial straits bubbled to the surface, his business partners only then
began to recognize the severity of the wounds caused by their overly-watered
capitalizations, speculative designs, and trust in the safety of risking other people’s
money.7

5

Edward P. Baker, New York, to Charles H. Elmendorf, 28 May 1900, CP, Series 103, Box 10, Folder 4.
In this letter, Baker spells out that “[Waddingham’s] property so far has failed to bring the face of the
claims for which it has been pledged, thus leaving deficiency claims, and from the present outlook I very
much doubt if the creditors will get much over 25 cents on the dollar.”
6
Capital Value figures are based on company records and correspondence, to which: The Southwestern
Railway and Lumber Co. represented a capitalization of $1,300,000; the Valverde Irrigation Co.
$2,500,000; the Bernal Valley Co. $925,000; and an estimate for the Red River Valley Co. of at least $1.5
million based on ownership of 754,757 acres. Figures compiled from Thomas B. Catron Papers, Series 103,
105, 305, 306, and 606.
7
Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 310-311. Levy comments with regard to business and risk in the late
nineteenth and twentieth century: “the new liberal ethos of economic freedom and security held great
attraction…not only did the new ethos invite Americans to take risks. It also promised that by offloading

3

1000 Shares of Capital Stock, Southwestern Lumber and Railway Company, Presented to Wilson
Waddingham, 27 July, 1897. Signed by Joseph H. Reading, Secretary, and Wilson Waddingham,
President, Southwestern Lumber and Railway Company, New Mexico. Thomas B. Catron Papers,
Series 305, Box 7, Folder 13, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of
New Mexico.

In the worst-case scenario, Catron’s joint interest in these companies and his
connected ownership of the lands threatened to bring his entire empire crashing down,
and right in the middle of negotiations to sell the Tierra Amarilla grant to New York
capitalists for $1.8 million and to refinance the defunct but range-rich American Valley
Company.8 Because Catron had so severely entangled his assets and liabilities, the legal
titles and therefore the securities for these deals – namely the Tierra Amarilla and the
Bosque del Apache land grants – got held up in probate, blocked or cast suspicion on any
transaction. When the smoke finally cleared, Catron emerged with a plan to shield his

personal risks onto a new corporate financial system self-owning Americans could acquire economic
security.”
8
J.M. Freeman, Riggs House, Washington, D.C., to Thomas B. Catron, 1 February 1900, CP, Series 103,
Box 9, Folder 5; Charles H. Elmendorf, Denis Hotel, New York, to Thomas B. Catron, 14 March 1900, CP,
Series 103, Box 10, Folder 1. For the most comprehensive biography to date, see Victor Westphall, Thomas
Benton Catron and His Era (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973).

4

greater interests at the cost of accepting substantial debts accrued by Waddingham in the
name of their jointly-owned shell corporations. First, Catron successfully pushed forward
negotiations to extricate his Tierra Amarilla holdings from the estate proceedings, even
though the integrity of its corporate ownership and its marketability suffered. Then, in a
deal that he believed would ensure a more robust return than an estate sale, Catron
acquired title to the Anton Chico and Antonio Ortiz grants.9 Foreshadowing no happy
conclusion or simple fix, the grants came packed with corporate debt, back taxes, title
suits, and land contests. For the time being, Catron had saved his empire from collapse
and somehow managed to emerge from the crises with more acreage under his belt than
when he started. But his new obligations weighed heavily on his finances. Instead of
retiring in comfort or magnanimously following the mantra of Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel
of Wealth, Catron spent the majority of his twilight years staving off a form of genteel
bankruptcy while his vast properties accrued no dividends save controversy, debt, and
dust. As a sitting U.S. senator in 1913, for instance, Thomas Catron was powerless to
prevent a county tax sale of his quarter-million-acre interest in the Mora Land Grant. His
unremunerated loss of the Mora grant represents nothing less than a considerable failure
given the forty years he spent toiling over the grant as speculator, attorney, politician, and
rentier.10 Worse yet, the practices that Catron and like-minded capitalists implemented in
the greater project and process of incorporating western places into the global
marketplace so often ended in miscarriage. When things went wrong, capitalists wounded

9

John Knaebel, Denver, to Thomas B. Catron, 16 July 1900, CP, Series 103, Box 10, Folder 5.
Robert D. Shadow and María Rodríguez-Shadow, “From Repartición to Partition: A History of the Mora
Land Grant, 1835-1916,” New Mexico Historical Review 70 (July 1995): 257-298; Clark S. Knowlton,
“The Mora Land Grant: A New Mexican Tragedy,” in Malcolm Ebright, ed., Spanish and Mexican Land
Grants and the Law (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, in cooperation with the Center for Land
Grants Studies, 1989), 59-73.
10
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not only their own credit and finances, but those of the trade areas they came to represent.
In the minds of international investors and eastern stockholders, Catron’s failure doubled
as New Mexico’s failure.
For historians, the Waddy-gate estate fiasco provides extraordinary insight into
the business partners’ corporate arrangements and the relationships that bridged eastern
capital markets with New Mexico’s lands and resources. Though contemporaries
criticized the U.S. Southwest after the American Civil War as an economic backwater,
capitalists there implemented innovative legal and financial techniques in their attempts
to wrest value and profit from their land-based ventures. This was no easy task given the
reality of the largely undeveloped, rural, and distant marketplace under consideration. But
just as it could pose challenges to investors, the territory’s remoteness worked to their
benefit when an absence of state oversight or its inability to enforce regulation allowed
speculators and their informed counsel to manipulate property to their great advantage.11
New Mexico’s postwar economy evolved as part of a larger national project for the
United States. The agents of this agenda received direct and indirect federal subsidization
for their southwestern enterprises through the easily corruptible operation of the
territorial system and land office, as well as the supply and demand created by the U.S.
Army.12 Within this context local merchants and international entrepreneurs alike

11

For discussions on the unravelling of the market over vast core-hinterland spatial settings, see William
Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991),
especially his framing of the city’s reliance upon the country, and vice-versa, referred to by Cronon as
“central place theory” in his subsection on “Reading Turner Backward,” 46-54. For a pointed critique of
the legal and market transformations of Nuevomexicano property under the United States, see Maria E.
Montoya, Translating Property: The Maxwell Land Grant and the Conflict over Land in the American
West, 1840-1900 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
12
Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 1861, 1890, Studies in Colonial Administration
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), xiii; Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest, 1846-1912: A
Territorial History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 131-35; John P. Wilson, Merchants Guns &
Money: The Story of the Lincoln County and Its Wars (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1987).

6

summoned the power of the corporate container, modern financial instruments, and
overlapping directorates to manage the untapped resources and unknown risks of their
landed estates. Such are the circumstances surrounding Wilson Waddingham’s stroke and
Thomas Catron’s ensuing flurry of financial activity. With so much stacked in his favor,
however, Catron’s inability to safeguard his empire illuminates the volatile world of
capitalism that arose in New Mexico during the nineteenth century and the distress that
continued to shape its economic development well into the twentieth.

“An Empire of Dust” follows New Mexico’s economic history from the Santa Fe
Trail to the Santa Fe Style; or, from the arrival of mercantile capitalism in the early
nineteenth century to the creation of a modern state-oriented capitalist economy in the
first decades of the twentieth century. This time, particularly the period from the Civil
War to the end of the First World War, functioned in the Southwest as a prolonged age of
capital.13 Against this backdrop, it analyzes the economic life of Thomas Benton Catron
and the growth of his entrepreneurial empire in New Mexico and the American West.14
Catron was a lawyer, banker, businessman, and party politician who entered the Territory
of New Mexico in 1866 and became entangled in its fate until his death in 1921. I argue
that although New Mexico (and the American Southwest in general), lay at the margins
13

Eric Hobsbawm. The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: Vintage Books, 1975). For historian Eric
Hobsbawm’s European subjects, the years of 1848 to 1875 set the perimeters for the period in which the
movement and application of capital forcefully shaped national development and contestation. For
latecomer New Mexico, the timeframe must be shifted accordingly, so that its “age of capital” aligns more
closely with the period between the U.S. Civil War and the end of the First World War, about the years
1868 to 1920.
14
William H. Sewell, Jr., “A Strange Career: The Historical Study of Economic Life,” History & Theory 49
(December 2010): 146-166; 146; Jeremy Adelman and Jonathan Levy, “The Fall and Rise of Economic
History” Chronicle of Higher Education, 1 December, 2014. In his analysis of the field of economic
history, interdisciplinary scholar William Sewell refers to economic life as “the history of human
participation in the production, exchange, and consumption of goods.” I find this definition quite suitable to
my investigation and analysis of the business networks and decisions of Thomas B. Catron and the very
real impact his economic life had on New Mexico and New Mexicans for over fifty years.

7

of modern industrial capitalism and world systems, the region was by no means isolated
from the forces of capital and state. On the contrary, the political and business networks
of Thomas Catron linked the cities and hinterlands of the territory to the imperatives of
federal governance and transnational financial markets. This project will trace those
networks and demonstrate how Catron’s decision-making and participation in the local
and transnational economic worlds of the late nineteenth century directed New Mexico’s
capitalist economy well into the 1920s.15
Although a latecomer to industrialization, Gilded Age New Mexico presented a
laboratory for the introduction and evolution of capitalist institutions, politics, and
cultures in the American West. Prior to the Civil War New Mexico lacked general
incorporation laws with which to legally charter and finance a business venture. Thirty
years later, a corporate order firmly situated the Southwest within national and
international networks of credit, debt, risk, and reward. Enterprises dictated by boards of
directors controlled the primary trades—extractive industry, animal husbandry, and
agriculture—through their monopoly on the conduits of commercial advancement—
banking, finance, transportation, communication, irrigation, reclamation, municipal
development, regional boosterism, and territorial governance. As this shift toward
corporate domination transpired, other sources of economic livelihood and power in New
Mexico lost legitimacy, namely those that originated from within the village and
communal land grant. To understand the forces steering this transformation, this
In following Thomas Catron’s networks—corporate, financial, political, and social—I look to the recent
work of historians such as Susie Pak, who employed a methodology bridging history, sociology,
economics, and the digital humanities to interrogate the sources of power behind J.P. Morgan and to “study
which relationships were important to the Morgans, to understand the conditions that made them
meaningful, and to identify the work that made them possible.” Susie Pak, Gentlemen Bankers: The World
of J. P. Morgan, Harvard Studies in Business History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), quoted
from 4-5; for her discussion on the use and application of the history of networks, see 222-24.
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dissertation interrogates the entrance and maturation of capitalism in the Hispano
Borderlands, especially as practiced by Thomas Catron and his close affiliates.16 Their
practices maintained many of the broader ideals of American capitalism such as an
emphasis on fee simple private property, collectivized risk, the enforcement of contracts,
and hierarchies of management and control.17 Its implementation in the northern New
Mexico, however, followed a particularly aggressive and speculative model that
leveraged the possibility of terrific short-term gains against the costs of long-term human
and environmental exploitation. The result: an economic cycle of fitful booms followed
by much longer, almost ingrained busts, and ultimately a framework of regional
underdevelopment and dependency.18

16

My use of the Hispano borderlands refers to the region of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where cultural, social, and economic fluidity
characterized this zone of contact as defined in Richard L. Nostrand, The Hispano Homeland (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). In support of Nostrand’s geographic and cultural definitions of the
Hispano Homeland, see Erlinda Gonzales-Berry and David R. Maciel, eds, The Contested Homeland: A
Chicano History of New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000), 3-4; and Charles
Montgomery, The Spanish Redemption: Heritage, Power, and Loss on New Mexico's Upper Rio Grande
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
17
For placement of American capitalism within a more general context, see Michael Zakim and Gary J.
Kornblith, Eds., Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth-Century America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 2-3; and for the underlying corporate components of
American capitalism, Robert E. Wright, “Capitalism and the Rise of the Corporation Nation,” 145-168.
18
The “mercurial economy” of the American West is well documented in scholarship and public discourse
alike. New Mexico and its industry are hardly alone in its history of suffering from cycles of boom and bust
as shown by Patricia Nelson Limerick, William Travis, and Tamar Scoggin, “Workshop Report: Boom and
Bust in the American West” A Report from the Center of the American West, Compiled from the
Presentations and Comments of Workshop Participants (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2002), 1-2.
Still, as situated between the economically more robust states of Texas, Colorado, and Arizona, the degree
of underdevelopment and dependence that has characterized New Mexico, specifically the northern
counties that fan out around Santa Fe (excepting Los Alamos County), indicates a marked difference
between the Hispano Borderlands and other areas of the American West. See, for instance, Richard A.
Bittman, “Dependency and the Economy of New Mexico,” (master’s thesis, University of New Mexico
1955), 8; Kenneth Ray Weber, “A New Mexico Village and the Metropolis: A Study of the Economy and
Social Organization of a Rural Satellite,” (PhD diss., University of Oregon, 1972); and A Comparison of
the Business Climate of New Mexico and Its Neighbors, Prepared for New Mexico Commerce and Industry
Department (Chicago: The Fantus Company, 1982).
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In this equation, Thomas Catron personified the new energy that entered the
territory in the years following the Civil War, an energy channeled by the mindset of
putting the past behind, of the here-and-now, of entrepreneurship, and of self-interest.19

Portrait of Thomas B. Catron, Law office of Thomas B. Catron, III
Santa Fe, New Mexico

19

The decades immediately following the Civil War witnessed a powerful transformation in the American
West. In the nation’s course of healing and renewal, the West, or westward development, acted as a key
place in the process of American catharsis. The West and the frontier came to symbolize the positive force
that would allow the United States to cast aside its sectional conflict and grow to economic and military
power on an international stage. Historians such as Richard Slotkin, The Fatal Environment: The Myth of
the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-1890 (New York: Atheneum, 1985); Heather Cox
Richardson, West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007); and Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in
American History and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) have drawn upon this
conclusion to organize a range of explanations and interpretations for the development of the West in the
late nineteenth century, the meanings that Americans attached to the West, and the real clashes and
violence that seemed to characterize the region. Historian Matthew Josephson, in The Robber Barons: The
Great American Capitalists, 1861-1901 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), chronicled the
rise of the robber barons in the nineteenth century, pointing to the Civil War as the time and place in which
his subjects applied notions of incorporation to modernize American society and economy. Alongside the
rhetoric of national rejuvenation, capital investment in the West surged in the years following the Civil War
as documented by many, perhaps none better than Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America:
Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); and Gene M. Gressley, Bankers
and Cattlemen: Politics, Investors, Operators From 1870 to 1900 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1966),
12, 18-19.

10

As a defeated lieutenant in the Confederate Army, this opportunistic philosophy served
Catron well. He adeptly utilized the tools at his disposal. Early on, this meant a reliance
on his friends, legal training, and a quick study of the Spanish language. As the territory
evolved, so did he. From master politician Stephen B. Elkins, he learned to embrace the
power of the political machine; from master financier Wilson Waddigham, he discovered
credit and the wonderful world of other people’s money. Brandishing these skills, Catron
rose to regional prominence and unmatched influence in the American Southwest,
leading the way in the consolidation and incorporation of many of the best lands and
deeds in New Mexico into the hands and safes belonging to him and his associates.20
The rapid and rabid incorporation of New Mexico’s market by an aggressive class
of speculators represented a significant, though slow-to-unfold, undermining of the social
and economic foundation for many New Mexicans.21 Although infused with new facets
of merchant capitalism starting under Mexico in the 1820s, subsistence production drove
much of the territory’s economy as it had under Spain and Mexico before.22 By the time
of U.S. conquest, New Mexico already had a history of maligning economic reports, but a
20

Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 93. In his chapter devoted to “Friends,” White asserts that “Friendship
became the preferred mode for a whole set of homosocial relationships in business and public life.”
Although White develops this discussion with regards to the directors and financiers of the transcontinental
railroads, the concept applies to Thomas Benton Catron, his business and political education, and his
network of associates in and out of New Mexico from the 1860s until the twentieth century. In his
correspondence Catron was often a bellicose man, but in writing to him, most everyone referred to him as a
friend. Even in Spanish language correspondence, the sender of the letter often began with the salutation,
“Mi Amigo Catron.”
21
Sarah Deutsch, No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-Hispanic Frontier in the
American Southwest, 1880-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). As Deutsch accounts, the
process of dispossession began in the years following the Civil War, but did not reach apex until the early
decades of the twentieth century.
22
William J. Parish, The Charles Ilfeld Company: A Study of the Rise and Decline of Mercantile
Capitalism in New Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 35-36. Economist William Parish
defines merchant, or mercantile, capitalism as a system of free-market buying, selling, and trading in which
a sedentary merchant class connected a distant region to the sources of finance and production. Its success
depended upon three foundations: “the ability to acquire scarce monetary exchange acceptable for the
purchase of foreign goods, the absence of an efficient system of indirect lending of capital, and the
necessity for hauling purchases over vast stretches of water or sparsely settled land.”
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usual gloss also made sure to note that few went starving.23 A majority of the inhabitants
of the territory labored at stock raising or small-scale agriculture. Nuevomexicanos made
do. Beginning in the 1820s a class of Hispano ricos and Euro-American merchant-traders
helped to channel the subsistence production of the region’s vecinos (villagers) through
the Santa Fe Trade and into international capitalist networks, effectively connecting
northern New Mexico with St. Louis, Baltimore, New York, Amsterdam, Germany, and
England.24 Within this system the laboring class depended upon its attachment to the soil
and range, usually in the form of land grants conferred by the Spanish and Mexican
governments. As the Santa Fe Trade matured in the 1830s and 1840s, the output of
families living on these lands – be it hides, wool, corn, wheat, or home-manufactured
goods – could be bartered with local merchants, who dispensed consumer goods and
credit. When the first transcontinental railroad, completed in May 1869, linked the
commercial networks of the East and West coasts, New Mexico’s economy still existed
under this mercantile arrangement. Thus, two decades of American possession had not

Here I look to Official Reports concerning New Mexico’s politics, economy, and society under Spain and
Mexico including those found in: H. Bailey Carroll and J. Villasana Haggard, compilers and translators,
Three New Mexico Chronicles: The Exposición of Don Pedro Bautista Pino, 1812; the Ojeada of Lic.
Antonio Barreiro, 1832; and the additions by Don José Agustín de Escudero, 1849, The Quivira Society,
Vol XI (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: University of New Mexico Press, 1942); Simmons, Marc. “The Chacón
Economic Report of 1803” New Mexico Historical Review, 60 (January 1985): 81-88; David J. Weber,
editor and translator, Arms, Indians, and the Mismanagement of New Mexico, by Donaciano Vigil (El Paso,
Tex: Texas Western Press, 1986).
24
During the 1820s and 30s New Mexico also increased its trade within Mexico, establishing new routes to
Alta California, Tejas, and down the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro towards Chihuahua, Durango, and
ultimately the young nation’s capital in Mexico City. For the context of New Mexico’s economic
development by the mid-nineteenth century see Ross Frank, From Settler to Citizen: New Mexican
Economic Development and the Creation of Vecino Society, 1750-1820 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000); Susan Calafate Boyle, Los Capitalistas: Hispano Merchants and the Santa Fe Trade
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997); David Alex Sandoval, “Trade and the ‘Manito’
Society in New Mexico, 1821-1848,” (PhD diss., University of Utah, 1978). Frank’s use of the terms ricos
and vecinos help to qualify not only these people’s participation in primarily Spanish and the Mexican
society, but also to what general class they belong. I will also use pobladores as a general synonym for
vecinos. For New Mexico’s Mexican-era connections to the market and state forces emanating out of the
United States, see Andés Reséndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico,
1800-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
23
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fundamentally altered the social and economic landscape of New Mexico. But then, in
the flurry of speculation that reached critical mass in the American West after the Civil
War, the game changed at an unprecedented rate.
An important caveat that differentiates the Hispano borderlands from other
(though not all) western places, is that the process of consolidation and incorporation that
so fundamentally shifted the basis of land ownership and economic control from Hispano
to Euro-American hands was set in motion prior to the entrance of the railroad and
substantial populations of white immigrants. The quintessential example of the
combination of political and business interests that ran amuck after the Civil War is seen
in the transcontinental railroads and the sweeping change they brought to the economy of
the West. This project will question some of the preconditions necessary to bring about
these alterations.25 The social, economic, and political inequalities that thrived in Gilded
Age New Mexico were just as much the product of the system of territorial
administration and U.S. jurisprudence as of the industrializing force of the “iron horse.”
As such, the mechanisms of state power remain central to my discussion.26 In New
Mexico and much of the West in the late-nineteenth century, capitalism’s unfolding
occurred in direct connection with the presence and activity (or lack thereof) of the
federal government. Because most money came from the East or from Europe, and
because the capitalists that invested in western projects and development recognized the

Alongside Richard White’s Railroaded, the significance of the railroads in generating change is agreed
upon by historians of the U.S. West and Southwest alike.
26
By premising state power as central to the economic evolution of New Mexico and the American West, I
build upon works such as Howard Lamar’s Far Southwest (1966); Earl S. Pomeroy, The Pacific Slope: A
History of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, and, Nevada (Las Vegas: University of Nevada
Press, 2003); and Gerald Nash’s The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century
West (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999).
25
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high risk-to-reward quotient, capital followed the military, the land office, territorial
governments, and other federal agencies that could lessen investors’ peril.27
New Mexico, as a territory, fell in line as politically subordinate to and dependent
upon the federal government. The highest offices including the governor, secretary,
Supreme Court justices, attorney general, Indian agents, and military commander owed
patronage not to a local constituency of voters and taxpayers, but to the President of the
United States, to their party, and to the Departments of State, Justice, War, and the
Interior. Within this territorial framework, even Post Office positions stemmed from
appointments, creating an environment that empowered political machines to curry local
favor, reward local complacence, and punish detractors. The centralization of state power
in Washington, D.C., organized by political puppeteers, allowed a minority population of
Euro-Americans to amass a majority of the fruits of political benefaction and economic
growth.28 U.S. courts and law upheld this relation by discriminately favoring EuroAmerican traditions of property rights and conventions of ownership over those of
Hispanos or Native Americans. Historians, social scientists, and legal scholars have
documented a litany of abuses perpetrated on Nuevomexicanos and their lands as well as
the various precedents and protections afforded Euro-American politicians and
capitalists.29 In this regard, Catron strategically grew his influence by developing
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Historians have recognized the cross-currents of state, military, and market in the conquest and
colonization of the Southwest for some time, though these narratives do not seem to bleed into discussions
of capitalism and free markets that continue to find expression in American history and society. See, for
instance, Chris Emmett, Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest (Norman: Oklahoma University
Press, 1965); Howard Lamar, The Far Southwest 1846-1912: A Territorial History (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966); and John P. Wilson, Merchants Guns & Money: The Story of the Lincoln County
and Its Wars (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1987).
28
Pomeroy, Territories and the United States; Montoya, Translating Property, 108.
29
For the discussion how the U.S. legal system favored American precedents over those of their Mexican
and Spanish antecedents in New Mexico see Laura Gomez, Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican
American Race (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 8; Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and
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connections to national politics and the national Republican Party as well as to territorial
governance, territorial courts, and the New Mexico Bar Association.
For New Mexico and most of the Rocky Mountain West, this translated to a form
of capitalism that never evolved without interference from governmental hands.30 And
yet, the West looms large in the national narrative of prosperity for those plucky
entrepreneurs who, steeped in freedom, individualism, and industriousness, conquered
nature and the market.31 It is in this vein that postwar western robber barons promoted
economic liberalism and the ideology of free labor, while in practice they did everything
in their power to use political means to fabricate an uneven, but stable and low-risk
playing field.32

The Speculators Game
This is not the usual story about New Mexico’s territorial period. It is a story
about a corporate landscape, not a wild one. In many ways it fits more squarely with
histories of Gilded Age excess and the increasingly global reach and transformative
consequences of capital. It prioritizes new technologies that sculpted the post-conquest
development of the West—not guns, rails, or wires (though they were surely influential),
Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994); and Maria
Montoya, Translating Property, 158.
30
Leonard J. Arrington, “The Changing Economic Structure of the Mountain West, 1850-1950” Utah State
University Press Monograph Series X (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1963).
31
Misunderstood and misappropriated social Darwinism led to the conflation of nature and market so that
many Americans considering them one and the same. This confluence allowed many Americans to view
the West as the place in which they could rise to the highest calling of Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian ideals
simultaneously. Gerald Nash, The Federal Landscape, x.
32
See Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1950); Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the
North American West, 1880-1930 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and once again, Richard
White’s Railroaded shows all too clearly the mismatched capitalist theory and practice that grew mile-bymile alongside the transcontinentals. My story has come to similar conclusions and represents another
building block in the greater argument that asks us to reconsider our historical understanding of capitalism
in the American West.
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but rather limited liability corporations, collateralized bonds, and commission-oriented
“option” contracts. This is not to say that the violence and rough-and-tumble world of the
southwestern towns, mines, and ranges of the late nineteenth century occurred as part of
some other story, but that the main actors in this history stood aloof from the worst of this
frontier excess.33 While their hired ranchers and prospectors conducted the daily labor of
trying to make something of the land and its resources, rentiers like Catron worked
mostly in law offices, fraternal parlor rooms, and judges’ chambers, almost always
behind closed doors, to make deals, execute paperwork, and distribute spoils.34
For this cast of characters, New Mexico was hardly the stereotypical “land of
mañana.”35 Instead, based on a speculative risk-calculus that stood at the foundation of
the Gilded Age, investors in New Mexico made decisions under a rubric of short-term
returns characteristic of capitalist endeavors and mentality throughout much of the

I have continually been amazed by Thomas Catron’s involvement in so many aspects of New Mexico’s
frontier past. But, as I have pulled the threads, his connections grow less palpable and instead he appears
almost always from behind closed doors. He and his Santa Fe Ring cohort, for instance, played a part in the
Colfax County War, Lincoln County War, Albert Fountain murder case, Francisco Chavez murder and
retaliation, and the rides of Los Gorras Blancas. Catron augmented his interests through infusions of social,
political, or monetary capital and only stepped from out of the shadows when necessary to make a play.
John P. Wilson, Merchants Guns & Money: The Story of the Lincoln County and Its Wars (Santa Fe:
Museum of New Mexico Press, 1987); David Caffey, Chasing the Santa Fe Ring: Power and Privilege in
Territorial New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014); William A. Keleher, The
Fabulous Frontier: Twelve New Mexico Items (Santa Fe, N. Mex: The Rydal Press, 1945).
34
Recent scholarship on the history of capitalism has brought the economic class of “rentier” back into
historical understanding as a person who obtains a great amount of their wealth through the collection of
rents, royalties, and social capital. See, Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the
World (New York: Penguin Press, 2008); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014).
35
The booster literature on New Mexico gave the territory and later the state numerous nicknames that
shaped outside perceptions of the region. The “Land of Mañana” mentality characterized a Euro-American
stereotype that Nuevomexicanos existed in a world of torpor and inactivity toward economic pursuits. Two
significant originators of promotional literature include the New Mexico Bureau of Immigration and the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, both of which published broadly on New Mexico for the purpose of
encouraging settlement, agriculture, business, and tourism. Chris Wilson, The Myth of Santa Fe, 81,87;
Marta Weigle and Barbara A. Babcock, eds., The Great Southwest of the Fred Harvey Company and the
Santa Fe Railway (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996).
33
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American West.36 Still, the boom and bust economic cycles common to the West and its
chief industries tested the mettle of many western entrepreneurs as well as the patience
and pocketbooks of their eastern stockholders.37 Long-term projections and financial risk
management received life in the late nineteenth century, followed by Progressive Era
notions of managerial order cast as a panacea for Americans’ feeble control of nature,
market, and society. But from the vantage of New Mexico, no level of planning could
prevent capitalism from acting spastically, in fits and starts, and with great sensitivity to
forces outside Catron’s ability to control or even moderate. Moreover, the high highs and
low lows that dominated the economy occurred in direct relation to the rounds of wild
speculation that set them in motion. The movers, shakers, and policy-makers stationed in
Santa Fe, Denver, Washington, and New York often took such a carefree and even
bellicose attitude toward the land and its peoples that they instigated overly-simplistic
and overly-optimistic periods of regional development. When failure loomed on the
horizon, as it regularly did for Catron and investors of all stripes, he and his peers found
plenty of opportunity to pass the blame and avoid introspection regarding their
speculative model.38
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Gene M. Gressley, West by East: The American West in the Gilded Age, Charles Redd Monographs in
Western History, no. 1 (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1972), 4-6.
37
Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 310. Levy argues that the Gilded Age represented a heyday for his freaks of
fortune and that when the “Freaks” are allowed to take control, capitalism becomes very risky as an
economic system because “Capitalism cannot adequately stabilize itself through financial risk management.
Risk management inherently breeds speculative risk-taking and manufactures new forms of insecurity and
uncertainty.” Placed in conversation with historians of the U.S. West who characterized the economy of the
region in the late-nineteenth century by its cycles of boom and bust, we start to see the processes at work
that led to the growth of terrific fortunes and equally terrific failures. Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune
and None of My Own”: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1991), 267-68, 296.
38
Capitalists and entrepreneurs found any reason to pass the buck regarding failure as a problem of those
with low moral standing and insignificant personal industry or drive. Scott Sandage’s final chapter on the
cultural evolution of failure after the U.S. Civil War offers a particularly useful model for my work to
discuss the ways that businessmen in the American West could offload their failures as the shortcomings of
others or the land itself, and definitely not connected to their personal involvement or decision-making.
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Within the broader context of competitive markets and international capital flows,
New Mexico represented little more than another distant location to be tapped for its
latent natural wealth. British capital, for instance, flowed to the railroads, mines, and
especially the ranches of the Southwest for the very same reasons that it flowed to South
Africa, Australia, Argentina, or the Sandwich Isles (Hawai’i)—for return on investment.
After surging into the territory from 1869 to 1873 and again in the early 1880s, the fact
that British capital turned (and stayed) soberly conservative toward the region points to
the comparative market weakness of New Mexico’s lands and industry.39 The reality of
an expanding world of options for those capitalists looking to use money to make money,
alongside a history of slow and uncertain returns from New Mexico, meant that even bigfish Thomas Catron, with his empire of grant lands and web of small-pond networks, was
often turned away by lending houses in the eastern United States and Europe.
In this story of capitalism’s fitful and incomplete incorporation of the Hispano
borderlands, Thomas Catron, his networks, and his business practices serve to link the
processes of economic evolution to the setting of New Mexico. His relatively early
arrival (as compared to other Euro-Americans) and wholesale adoption of the territory as
his home allowed Catron to wear the sometime mantle of social and cultural emissary
between older and younger generations and mixed populations. More often, however, he

Scott A. Sandage, Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2005); Gressley, West By East, 5-6.
39
Regarding British capital in the American West, see some rich mid-century works including: Herbert O.
Brayer, William Blackmore: The Spanish-Mexican Land Grants of New Mexico and Colorado, 1863-1878.
Volume I, A Case Study in the Economic Development of the West (Denver: Bradford Robinson, 1948);
Herbert O. Brayer, “When Dukes went West” in Westerners Brand Book, Dabney Otis Collins, ed.,
(Denver, the Westerners, 1948): 55-76; Clark C. Spence, “When the Pound Sterling Went West: British
Investment and the American Mineral Frontier,” Journal of Economic History 16 (1956): 482-492; Oscar
Winther, “Promoting the American West in England, 1856-1890,” Journal of Economic History 16 (1956):
506-513; and Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of
Industrial America, Revised Edition (New York: Harper Torchbooks, The Academy Library, 1961), 47.
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served as an agent for the extension of U.S. political and economic interests, even U.S.
empire, through his base of operation astride the Santa Fe Plaza. From his station as the
nefarious leader of the Santa Fe Ring in the 1870s and ‘80s to that of one of the state’s
first senators in the 1910s, Catron powerfully influenced New Mexico’s development. He
achieved great success as a crony-turned-land-baron in the late nineteenth century
through the acquisition of numerous Spanish and Mexican land grants and public domain
entries, especially in combination with other members of the informally-organized but
effective political machine.40 By the 1880s, members of the Ring exploited the U.S.
Office of the Surveyor General as well as the legal system to lay claim to immense
sections of grant lands for minimal outlays of capital. Catron was at the forefront of these
schemes. He used his position as district attorney and then U.S. attorney for New Mexico,
in conjunction with artful networking among local Nuevomexicano communities, to
acquire interests in numerous grants. He then acted in concert with his friends to
manipulate his individual holdings into the ownership of entire grants, followed by the
creation of joint stock companies to promote, finance, or develop the tracts.
One of the qualities that made Catron stand out in this process was his
understanding of how to translate property into credit through the instrument of the
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For characterizations of the Santa Fe Ring see Lamar, Far Southwest, 137-39; David Caffey, Chasing the
Santa Fe Ring: Power and Privilege in Territorial New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 2014); David Lavender, The Southwest (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 229-230; David H.
Stratton, Tempest over Teapot Dome: The Story of Albert B. Fall (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1998), 33; and a contemporary account by Simeon H. Newman III, “The Santa Fe Ring: A Letter to the
New York Sun,” Arizona and the West 12 (Autumn 1970): 269-288.
Although the record of Thomas Catron’s ownership is complex and often vague, his biographer
Victor Westphall places his possession of part or whole of individual grants at thirty-four (I have confirmed
at least four more). Westphall, Thomas Benton Catron, 71. This list includes: Alamitos, Agua Negra, Anton
Chico, Armendariz, Baca Location No. 1, Baca Location, No. 2, Bartolome Fernandez, Beck, Bosque del
Apache, Canada de Cochiti, Caja del Rio, Canada del los Alamos, Canon de Chama, Canon del Agua,
Cebolla, Cebolleta, Eaton, Estancia, Gabaldon, Huertas, Juana Lopez, La Majada, Lamy, Los Luceros,
Mora, Nicolas de Chavez, Ojo del Espiritu Santo, Ortiz, Piedra Lumbre, San Pedro, Sangre de Cristo, Santa
Teresa, Tecolete, and Tierra Amarilla.
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corporation. On innumerable occasions he put pen to paper, and in so doing, converted
the communal lands of northern New Mexico into stocks, bonds, and equities.41 But,
Catron also faced one fiasco after another in his attempts to turn his early speculations
into marketable windfalls. On paper, his empire seemed immense and secure, but proved
rather frail when placed under scrutiny. One result was that to keep his ventures afloat, he
relied on infusions of capital that garnered high interest and left him constantly juggling
his assets, equities, and finances, so that loans, mortgages, stocks, and bonds – and the
physical land they represented – circulated through numerous hands, vaults, and trustees
both within and outside the territory. Just as his landed empire linked him to the local
New Mexican context, the process of revolving credit and debt connected Catron to
capitalists, speculators, and schemers throughout the United States and abroad and, in
turn, caught up New Mexico’s lands and resources within the centripetal forces of state
and market.
It is perhaps necessary here to briefly discuss the nature of the basic units of
Thomas Catron’s entrepreneurial empire—the limited liability corporation (LLC). First, it
is essential to note that all LLCs were not created equal.42 Many of the corporations

The core of Thomas Catron’s ability to “translate” property was his masterful knowledge of not only the
U.S. legal precedence towards ownership, but that of Spain and Mexico as well. After he passed the bar in
New Mexico in 1867, Catron slowly and steadily learned the nuances of land law in the territories. To build
his knowledge base, Catron tracked down and purchased just about any book, manual, map or encyclopedia
that he could get his hands on. The result was a massive library in which Catron spent a great amount of
time and energy. If knowledge is power, then it is no surprise that he rose to such a high level in the
Southwest.
42
For a basic corporate typology that differentiates between size and industry, see George Heberton Evans,
Jr., Business Incorporations in the United States, 1800-1943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
(Baltimore, Md: Waverly Press, 1948), 42, 50. While historians have not treated corporations in general as
static units, nor have they adopted an approach that recognizes the great nuance within the world of
incorporation. Many of Thomas Catron’s corporations followed the legal process of incorporation, making
sure to address the letter of the law with regards to the presentation and wording of their charter and the
holding of necessary meetings, but besides that, did not produce tangible commodities, perform any
saleable service, or add employment opportunities to the local labor force. As such, many of the
corporations discussed in the pages that follow represent speculative or shell corporations.
41
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chartered in the Southwest acted from the outset as speculative financial tools rather than
sound business platforms. Organizers set superficially high capital valuations and
legitimized doing so by deeding over lands with superficially high assessments.
Moreover, New Mexico’s corporate law stated that capital stock should be subscribed to
in currency and was nonassessable, but it is not clear that southwestern corporations and
their investors put in the necessary cash and credit to match the value of the total stock
subscription.43 Instead, capital stock appeared at a strategically fictional price point for
speculative design and stood happily nonassessable when the tax collector came calling.
Corporations chartered in this way not only held personhood under the law, but money
invested (real or imagined) added valuable stock to entrepreneurs’ assets and potential
equity, while safeguarding them from liability and the tax rolls. In terms of the “property”
of said corporations, usually large tracts of land equalized at low value, the owners once
again garnered little in the form of tax obligations.44 This method led to the creation of a
slew of corporate entities designed for the purpose of amassing credit and wealth. Then,
under leadership of insular directorates, corporate funds tended to wisp away into the
pockets of partners, friends, and politicians—whoever could best help the company make

For New Mexico’s corporate law see: [William G. Ritch], A Complete Business Directory of New
Mexico, and Gazetteer of the Territory for 1882 (Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing and Publishing
Company, 1882), 214; and Charles F. Kanen, Kanen’s New Mexico Corporation Laws: Containing the
Compiled Laws of 1897 and All Subsequent Session laws, Including 1909, with Amendments and Repeals
(Albuquerque, N.Mex.: Press of the Morning Journal, 1910). The legal definition of corporations was not
static across my time frame, but is best clarified by the 1886 case of Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Company in which the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that corporations are subject to
due protection of the law as individuals as based in the Fourteenth Amendment.
44
When the lands did not receive low assessments from the Territorial or County Board of Equalization,
Thomas Catron and his cohort pulled the strings of their political machine to reduce valuations or evade
payments. This tactic proved quite effective during the heyday of the Santa Fe Ring and the Gilded Age in
New Mexico, but as the territory entered the twentieth century, and especially after statehood, the lobby-ordodge schema resulted in much less success as evidenced by Catron’s loss of the Mora Grant in 1913.
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something from nothing.45 This business calculus produced heavily watered corporate
schemas like those Waddingham and Catron organized around their land grants.46
At the capitalist heart of the land grant game was the potential to purchase an
undefined piece of land that was nominally worth little, for a low price, and then transfer
ownership of that land to a corporation that declared the same land to have a very high
value, thus creating an input of capital stock that represented a nonassessable form of
equity. The speculators, with professional prospectuses, reports, and surveys in tow,
would then dangle enormous acreage with unknown resources in front of potential
investors. This type of mystery-box of the American West enticed even the shrewdest
operators. And so, waves of capitalization rolled over New Mexico’s vast mineral and
pastoral lands. However, a relentless undertow prevented those funds, once invested,
from remaining in the territory for long. A historical dearth of hard currency and long
repayment periods meant that bankers tacked high interest rates, often between 10-18%,
on monies entering the territory. Then, at the time of transaction, middlemen in the form
of mortgage and real estate brokers from places like Chicago, Denver, or other urban
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Overlapping directorates with powerful friends could, of course, employ this strategy to great success as
proven time-and-time-again in the history of the American West. See for instance, Michael J. Makley, The
Infamous King of the Comstock: William Sharon and the Gilded Age in the West (Reno: University of
Nevada Press, 2006); Stratton, Tempest over Teapot Dome, 1998; and perhaps the clearest presentation of
this concept in Herbert O. Brayer, William Blackmore: Early Financing of the Denver & Rio Grande
Railway and Ancillary Land Companies, 1871-1878. Vol. II. A Case Study in the Economic Development of
the West (Denver: Bradford-Robinson, 1949).
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In June 1900, over a year into the arbitration of Waddy-gate, Edward P. Baker of New York wrote
disparagingly regarding the valuation of the New Mexico lands Catron and Waddingham relied upon to
secure their substantial debts. With matter-of-fact certainty, Baker explained to Catron that “If [Cassius
Gilbert] would put a little less water in the stock of the company and more on the land that would be
better.” Edward P. Baker, New York, to Thomas B. Catron, 19 June 1900, CP, Series 103, Box 10, Folder
4. Baker’s criticism of New Mexico and its corporate economy could not have been more prescient at the
turn of the twentieth century. The very language of asset management that was used to characterize
southwestern lands as illiquid is all too apropos, and the experience that, financially, land grant companies
were often “under water” from the get-go is just too perfect given the aridity and other environmental
factors that precluded their successful operations and dictated capitalists’ reliance on quantity rather than
quality.
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markets, charged steep commissions and so sapped available resources at the source.
Without real alternatives, conducting business in New Mexico necessitated a reliance on
outside bankers and agents such as these, which added short and long-term costs to the
basic financial and contractual relations of an increasingly capitalist world.47 Interest and
commission posed just two of the means by which capital flowed outwards, causing New
Mexicans from top to bottom to remain in debt and often in default.
Put simply, New Mexico land grants, in purely economic terms, represented poor
long-term investments. Unless flipped quickly, the prolonged litigation, local
contestation, and operational expenses exceeded any annual income such land might
generate. Like the hollow securities at the heart of the Great Recession in the twenty-first
century, land grant dealers were underwater from the beginning, and managed to finance
their way to legitimacy only at the price of the public welfare.

Capitalism and Economic Borderlands
This is not a story about hapless Nuevomexicanos outflanked and overawed by
the cycles of American conquest. For these actors, just like Catron, this history attempts
to contextualize their opportunities and choices as framed by their perspectives and their
local conditions.48 Nuevomexicanos led “economic lives.” They too are representative of
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New Mexico and New Mexicans were not in fact alone in this equation. Companies involved in the
western cattle industry felt similar pressures and constraints as they relied upon borrowed capital—financed
likewise through bankers and commission firms—to keep their businesses afloat. Gene M. Gressley,
Bankers and Cattlemen: Politics, Investors, Operators From 1870 to 1900 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska, 1966), Chapter 6 “Financing the Company,” 145, and Chapter 7 “The Commission Firm & the
Banks,” 183-84.
48
As documented by land grant scholars, a generalized notion of Nuevomexicano alienation and
diminished social power fails to give due course to current issues of inequality that hardly represent the
product of bygone worlds and bygone conflicts. David Correia, Properties of Violence: Law and Land
Grant Struggle in Northern New Mexico, Geographies of Justice and Social Transformation (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2013); William deBuys, Enchantment and Exploitation: The Life and Hard
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American capitalism, albeit, on the borderland. For my purposes, recognizing a Hispano
borderland as defined by cultural and economic categories rather than the presence of an
international boundary allows me to develop lines of inquiry that focus on the entrance of
capitalism into the region, the contested nature of its application, its nonlinear trajectory,
its overlapping varieties of practice, and its uneven results for robber baron and poblador
(villager) alike.49
This dissertation has been greatly influenced by the field of borderlands history,
which has traditionally been dominated by a focus on the fluidity that surrounds
international boundaries, especially the U.S.-Mexico border where the best-laid plans and
policies of both nation-states come undone.50 While the Hispano borderlands central to
my story are hardly representative of the U.S.-Mexico border area (though the border was
Times of a New Mexico Mountain Range (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985); and
Shadow and Rodríguez-Shadow, “From Repartición to Partition,” 1995.
49
One of the promises of the renewed attention to the history of capitalism is that as economic actors, we
find agency in populations previously imbued with no such power. For the recent scope and tenor of the
history of capitalism, see: Sven Beckert, Angus Burgin, Peter James Hudson, Louis Hyman, Naomi
Lamoreaux, Scott Marler, Stephen Mihm, Julia Ott, Philip Scranton, and Elizabeth Tandy Shermer,
“Interchange: The History of Capitalism,” Journal of American History 101, no. 2 (September 2014): 503536.
50
A very brief list of borderlands scholarship that has inspired my thinking on the matter includes: Richard
White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815,
Cambridge Studies in North American Indian History Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991); Michiel Baud and Willem Von Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands” Journal
of World History 8 (Fall 1997): 211-242; James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and
Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Andrès
Resèndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Tiya Miles, Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in
Slavery and Freedom, American Crossroads Series, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005);
Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2006); Karl Jacoby, Shadows at Dawn: A Borderlands Massacre and the Violence of
History (New York: Penguin Press, 2008); Katherine Benton-Cohen, Borderline Americans: Racial
Division and Labor war in the Arizona Borderlands (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009);
Anthony Mora, Border Dilemmas: Racial and National Uncertainties in New Mexico, 1848-1912 (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2011); and Sam Truett and Pekka Hämäläinen “On Borderlands,” Journal of
American History Vol. 98 (Sept. 2011), 338-361.
For the substantial overlap of subject, scale, time, and place found in the histories of borderlands
and other trans-or-extra national spaces, two edited volumes lead the way: Samuel Truett and Elliot Young,
eds, Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico Borderlands History (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2004) and Andrew Graybill and Benjamin Johnson, eds, Bridging National Borders in North
America: Transnational and Comparative Histories (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
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not that far away), northern New Mexico and southern Colorado represented an
expanding cultural and economic borderland during the nineteenth and early twentieth
century. 51 Inhabitants here participated in multiple, overlapping economies, so that
mercantile and corporate capitalism found practice simultaneously with and spatially
adjacent to raid-trade exchange networks, subsistence production at the family and
village level, and barter-oriented systems of credit and debt. Regional residents
conducted business through sign language and symbolic gift-giving, as well as through
spoken word and written contract.52 Social capital rooted in the land and in kinship
networks, as much as cash money, shaped individuals’ economic options and helped
Nuevomexicanos and natives respond to and offset the harshest impacts of capitalism for
much of the nineteenth century.
Beginning with the imperial missions of the North and South during the American
Civil War, which culminated in New Mexico with an aggressive campaign to subdue
Native peoples and incorporate the territory and its markets, the alignment of social
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For growth of the Hispano Borderlands during the nineteenth century see: Deutsch, No Separate Refuge,
and Charles Montgomery, The Spanish Redemption: Heritage, Power, and Loss on New Mexico's upper
Rio Grande (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). There is certainly plenty of room for scholars
to consider how new markets read like so many economic borderlands, sometimes fleeting as capitalist
control quickly established its supremacy, but just as often turning fugitive as investors, speculators, and
entrepreneurs struggled to come to terms with local conditions and local orientations of power. For
extended discussion on the unfolding of capitalists forces in the American West and the importance of local
contexts, see: William G. Robbins, Colony & Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994); Truett, Fugitive Landscapes; Andrew Offenburger, “When
The West Turned South: Capital and Culture in the US-Mexican Borderlands, 1880-1930,” (PhD diss.,
Yale University, 2014).
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Together, the following works present a rich foundation with which to argue for the existence of
overlapping economies in New Mexico and the Southwest. See: William J. Parish, The Charles Ilfeld
Company: A Study of the Rise and Decline of Mercantile Capitalism in New Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1961); David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest
Under Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus
Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1991); James Brooks, Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship,
and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002);
Andrès Resèndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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power steadily shifted in favor of the capitalists. This subtle movement of the tide,
represented by the land speculation that descended upon the mostly-Mexican-era land
grants and the significant alienation of title that it produced, turned full sea-change by
1904 in the wake of the Court of Private Land Claims (CPLC, 1891-1904). By this time
the forces of capitalism, the state, and the court operated in concert to reduce
Nuevomexicano land grant holdings by upwards of eighty percent. Add in the violent
pacification and economic dependency forced upon Native populations as well as the
environmental degradation fueled by old and new economic models alike, and the
equation showed dwindling possibilities in the face of increased pressures.53 The
territorial government, looking to shake its debtor status in the build up to statehood,
intensified efforts to levy and collect taxes. Meanwhile, the federal government
unleashed the CPLC and the Forest Service on New Mexico in its progressive response to
the latent disorder of the territory’s lands and to mismanagement of its resources.
Ultimately, this meant less land, more taxes, and new bureaucratic hurdles for
Nuevomexicanos who, more than ever in the first decades of the twentieth century felt
the pinch of the market in combination with more limited options. But while squeezing
the residents of the Hispano borderlands for rents and royalties, land monopolists such as
Catron felt themselves and their own options constricted as well. Their speculative
designs toward a western empire, as organized during the Gilded Age and focused on
flush returns from extractive industry, dried up, as did their life-lines of credit. Facing
steeper taxes and out-of-control operational expenses, the profit potential on land grants
diminished, leaving Catron with little but desiccated corporate corpses to show for
53

The decline of agricultural and especially pastoral lands was a daunting factor in the economic malaise
that much of New Mexico experienced from the 1920s through the remainder of the twentieth century. See
DeBuys, Enchantment and Exploitation, 255-257.
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decades of speculation and legal-financial manipulation. His shortcomings, as well as
those of his crumbling land grant empire, helped set the stage for the final act of this
history of capitalism in the Hispano borderlands.
If not for his appointment as one of New Mexico’s first U.S. senators, Thomas
Catron would likely have viewed the first years of statehood with frustration and
contempt. Having worked toward that goal since the 1870s, leading the charge in the
1880s and 1890s, and reclaiming some of his string-pulling talent before, during, and
after the Constitutional Convention in 1910, he happily relocated to Washington, D.C., in
1912 to take his seat alongside Albert Fall in the sixty-second Congress. Beside his
political aspirations, Catron’s enormous output of energy in the name of statehood
stemmed from his belief that it would bring about a wholesale rise in land values and
alleviate the worst of the territorial status that plagued him and his entrepreneurial
empire. But statehood brought no real relief to Catron as land baron and businessman; by
its late start most of his lands actually decreased in value on the international
marketplace. With the promises of statehood upended, capitalists in northern New
Mexico pulled an about face. For many territorial leaders who spent decades combatting
anti-statehood propaganda by white-washing New Mexico and preaching its modernity
and latent potentials, the rise of regional tourism necessitated a rhetorical turn. No less
corporate than its land-based, extraction-oriented predecessors, the tourism industry in
northern New Mexico represented a new life for capitalism in the state. This time, capital
sought returns from the expendable income of Americans and Europeans who wished to
glimpse into the ancient world of the pre conquest Southwest. Led by interstate corporate
giants, such as the Santa Fe Railroad and the Fred Harvey Company, this shifting
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capitalist economy maintained an outward flow of capital at the highest levels alongside
the exploitation of human capital in new ways that embedded the state’s Hispano and
Native American residents in fresh layers of economic dependency.54

Thomas Catron’s Cage
With regard to my principal biographic subject, the ever-industrious and equally
wily Thomas Benton Catron, some early comments are now in order. First, this
dissertation does not mean to present a full biography of Catron’s life and times. Much of
his personal life, his family life, his political affairs, and his legal persona find only brief
mention in the following pages. Instead, this dissertation places Catron’s economic life at
center stage as representative of the business climate in the Hispano Borderlands of New
Mexico and Colorado in the late nineteenth century. Regarding this focus, I should add
that I came into this project under the assumption that I would be writing about an
unscrupulous but efficacious robber baron of territorial New Mexico. More recently, I
have come to see him in a harsher light, so that instead of rationalizing my scholarly
attention towards another “great man” of history, the story documented throughout the
next five chapters is really that of a flawed man who with great reliance on his acumen,
ambition, and associates found a way to fail right to the top of New Mexico’s political

For critical analysis of New Mexico’s tourism industry and its relation to Native American and
Nuevomexicano residents, see: Charles H. Montgomery, “History as Culture: The Making of Spanish
Heritage in New Mexico, 1883-1940,” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1995), 132-33 and 162-163; Leah
Dilworth, Imagining Indians in the Southwest: Persistent Visions of a Primitive Past (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996); Sylvia Rodríguez, “Fiesta Time and Plaza Space: Resistance and
Accommodation in a Tourist Town,” The Journal of American Folklore 111 (Winter 1998): 39-56; Hal
Rothman, The Culture of Tourism, the Tourism of Culture: Selling the Past to the Present in the American
Southwest (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003); Hal Rothman, Devil's Bargains:
Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Andrew
Leo Lovato, Santa Fe Hispanic Culture: Preserving Identity in a Tourist Town (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 2004).
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and economic ladder. Furthermore, I came to this work after consulting a wide body of
literature covering the life and times of Thomas Benton Catron.55 It would be impossible
for this scholarship to have left no impression on my mind as to his character and
personality as a historical figure. Gruff, corrupt, greedy, bellicose, and self-interested:
these words immediately come to mind alongside more positive attributes such as
confident, trusting, studious, industrious, and resolute.
Ultimately I do not believe the job of this project is to psychoanalyze Thomas
Catron, nor to enter his actions and deeds into plus or minus columns. Nor do I feel that I
could do so from an unbiased position. My wide-ranging research into Catron’s life and
environment—thorough consultation with his personal archive; correspondence that
offers the voices of his family, friends, enemies, and associates; the very vocal
contemporary print media; and a plethora of related corporate records—gives me some
perspective with which to make an assessment. Victor Westphall, after his extensive
archival research into the life of Catron, felt the same way, and argued in his biography
for a reconceptualization of the man from a documentary basis that, for him, exonerated
Catron from much of the worst criticism.56 Westphall’s defensive posture does not
accordingly stand the test of time. In fairness, the portrayal of Catron as the nefarious
55
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leader of the Santa Fe Ring also falters under scrutiny. This type of two-dimensional
casting obscures the reality of a deeply complicated man who at moments stood up for
New Mexico and its diverse populations with a vigor rarely matched by his fellow EuroAmericans, and at others knowingly manipulated the law, the courts, or the circumstances
for his own benefit.
As a local or regional entrepreneur, Thomas Catron found his most fertile
stomping grounds in the Territory of New Mexico; as a national politician and
international capitalist, it was more like his cage. From this vantage, the dissertation
seeks to investigate Catron’s social networks to derive some insight into the capitalist
world of New Mexico as it evolved across the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and
then to point to the embedded inequalities that emerged in New Mexico and the
Southwest as products of capitalism’s reign.
In Chapter One, “The Continental Currents of Market and War,” I set in motion
the world of mercantile capitalism and its historical contexts for Missouri and New
Mexico during the first twenty-five years of Thomas Catron’s life. Forces of the market
and the state were central to the development of both of these environments, especially in
the Santa Fe Trade that connected the settled regions of Missouri and New Mexico to
international networks of trade and commerce. But the onset of the Civil War, its social
disruption, and the aftermath of Reconstruction most potently transformed Catron, New
Mexico, and the relationship between Americans and the West. To tie these two themes
together—that is, the nation’s relationship to the southwestern territories and the local
processes at work in New Mexico—this chapter will conclude with an examination of
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Thomas B. Catron as an agent of U.S. expansion who quickly cast aside his older
regional alliances to gain wealth and power in his new territorial home.
In Chapter Two, “Integrity & Veracity: Lessons of Political Economy in Gilded
Age New Mexico,” I argue that Thomas Catron rose to power within the territory through
his participation in the Santa Fe Ring, a political machine that mastered the art of control
during the late nineteenth century. Within this framework Catron built an eclectic
network of “friends” that included territorial politicians, land officers, bankers,
publishers, commercial agents, financiers, Freemasons, and elite Hispanos. At the center
of the Ring’s power was not only an intimate geography of membership focused on the
Santa Fe Plaza, but an ability to coerce contributions from otherwise antagonistic parties
and reward them accordingly. With firm grasp on the territorial court system, lucrative
political links to the nation’s capital, and the financial cooperation of leading regional
entrepreneurs, Catron’s cohort of Ring members operated with impunity while lining
their pockets with what amounts to federal subsidies for these territorial schemers. As
such, this chapter presents the essential components of the unethical relationship between
business and politics that Catron – as the chief representative of the Gilded Age in New
Mexico – utilized for personal gain.
While building his social and political power base, Catron’s economic rise
occurred in connection to international networks of speculators and capitalists who
sought to incorporate southwestern lands into eastern markets. Chapter Three, “The Land
Grant Bubble,” details the entrance of new market forces into New Mexico and Colorado
after the Civil War. Spanish and Mexican land grants occupied the heart of this venture,
based on the early successes and huge profits linked to the promotion and sales of the
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Sangre de Cristo and Maxwell land grants. The process of financing and acquiring vast
land grants required the support of the federal government as well as the participation of
thousands of Nuevomexicano men and women. The involvement of Nuevomexicanos in
the sale and transfer of their lands presents a much more nuanced story than simply one
of hapless victims in the face of the market and the state. Thomas Catron and his peers in
the Santa Fe Ring took central stage in the speculation that followed, using their ties to
the First National Bank of Santa Fe and regional capitalist circles to covertly develop
their holdings and effectively move money and deeds.
Building on the growth of his personal fortune in land, Chapter Four, “The Equity
of Empire,” will argue that by the 1880s Catron furthered his business interests in New
Mexico by both adapting his interests in concert with those of the majority population of
Nuevomexicanos and adopting a national corporate culture to his southwestern holdings.
Here, I will describe the transition from the consolidation of southwestern lands to their
legal incorporation by Catron and his partners that occurred in the aftermath of rail
extension into New Mexico. This chapter will discuss the concrete operation of several of
Catron’s businesses from the 1880s to the Panic of 1893, and orient the ways in which
regional competition shaped their growth. In this discussion, this chapter sets Catron’s
activity within the greater context of economic development in the territory and presents
early examples of the myriad obstacles that time and again challenged the success and
profitability of New Mexican enterprise.
As my story moves from the nineteenth to the twentieth century this dissertation
will present Catron’s faltering fortunes alongside his attempts to gain tighter control over
his business and land in New Mexico. Catron owned and controlled more acreage in his
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name during the first decade of the twentieth century than during any other point in his
long career in southwestern land speculation. In direct correlation, he also held claim to
an astronomical amount of debt that linked those hundreds of thousands of acres,
alongside the stocks and bonds of dozens of New Mexican corporations, to capital
lenders around the country and even overseas. Chapter Five, “Fortune and Failure,” will
argue that Catron’s land-based empire offered more risk than reward and even as greater
material progress came to New Mexico, his problems grew more rapidly than his profits.
In response, he attempted to apply progressive notions of order and control to his lands,
only to find these solutions to be too little, too late. Seeking a political answer, Catron
grasped at statehood as an economic panacea, but pessimistic national attitudes toward
New Mexico prevented its full inclusion in the Union and stymied his aspirations until
the 1910s. By then Catron’s empire was in full decline, hemorrhaging securities and
lands on an annual basis. Catron’s fall, however, did not translate to gains for the
Nuevomexicanos he had largely dispossessed. Instead, lands and resources passed to the
federal government, to New Mexico, or to new corporate owners.
In my conclusion, “A Crumbling Empire and Catron’s Capitalist Legacy,” I
reflect back on the significant imprint that Thomas Catron left on the business, political,
and social world of New Mexico during his life and even after his death in 1921. Catron
left behind a landscape transformed by his corporate-inspired presence. While successful
on some levels, such as the opening of hundreds of thousands of New Mexico’s acres to
Euro-American cultivation and commoditization, Catron also left a trail of internal
colonization and dispossession of natives from their lands and economic communities.
Catron’s wake, in this case, is also that of the extractive industry and speculative
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capitalism of the new state’s territorial past. The overextension of market forces during
decades of optimism and arrogance led to a telling retraction after WWI that included a
return to subsistence for many New Mexicans. In a final note, I present a snapshot of
economic activity in and around Santa Fe at midcentury, showing that New Mexico
remained entrenched in its marginal status and dependent economy, perhaps even more
so after a century of capitalism’s entrance into the Hispano borderlands.

Map 1
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Map 2
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Chapter 1
The Continental Currents of Market and War:
Thomas B. Catron and New Mexico from Market Revolution to 1868
Trade carried on with the wild Indians.—It is to be noted that vermilion, knives, biscuit, bread
baked in ovens, gunpowder, awls, and other trifles purchase most valuable furs which may be sold
at great profit, and from which great benefits might be derived if the country were more
enlightened. If there were sufficient demand for the exportation of these valuable and abundant
pelts, which can be secured at very little cost, enough of them could be obtained to load entire
mule trains. What a wide field is open to industry in Mexico! What germs of prosperity are seen
everywhere! Even those remote places occupied by wild Indians offer us rich products with which
we are as yet unfamiliar. Those rivers within its territory which are overpopulated with valuable
beaver! Those virgin and untouched fields, where the soul of nature proudly displays her
grandeur! The moderate climate which offers its powerful influence to vegetation and to the
raising of stock! Those luxuriant sierras and those bright blocks of marble which seem to be
outlining sketches of magnificent cities are certainly powerful stimuli that should make us think
seriously of developing the elements of true happiness which we have at hand! Ambitious
revolutionary men, infernal genii of discord, cast your eyes but once over your country, and,
impelled by the force of furious remorse, you will run and bury yourselves forever in hell! You
shall see that this soil, generously endowed by the loving hand of providence, is inviting Mexicans
with its riches and variety of products which are not enjoyed nor even known because of your
criminal perverse designs.
Lic. Antonio Barreiro, 1832.

The Background of an Empire Builder
The socially disruptive combination of decades of market expansion and five
years of civil bloodletting set the stage for Thomas Benton Catron’s postwar removal to
the Territory of New Mexico as well as the burst of speculation and political machination
that followed. As such, the story of his departure westward is part of the fabric of
American history. Catron belonged to a generation of men and women who never knew a
world without the continental reach of the United States or the transnational spread of
market capitalism. In the years after the Civil War, this same generation sought to do
more than occupy a continental nation; they sought to control it and employ its latent
wealth for the betterment of themselves and country alike. For defeated Confederates like
Thomas Benton, the ambition to once again hold the reins of expansion and empire led
36

them toward the setting sun, while the interventions of businessmen and bureaucrats – the
market and the state – breathed life into the age of capital that flourished in the American
West.1
Growing up in the 1840s and 50s, just thirty miles east of Kansas City along the
Missouri River, Catron likely came in contact with much of the reality of the West. This
included the multiple layers of economic activity that linked western places and western
resources to national arteries of trade and travel, especially the Missouri River with its
continental connectivity.2 Plenty of Americans knew that the great West was in fact
contested terrain; few more-so than the inhabitants of western Missouri. The nationally,
racially, and religiously diverse people who flowed into, out of, and through Catron’s
home town of Lexington embodied this contestation. The bustling towns along the
Missouri River watched as diverse groups of traders, travelers, soldiers, diplomats, and
immigrants made their way west, and east, by caravan trail, wagon road, canoe and
steamboat. White Americans, mostly from the Upper South, put down roots in the region.
They brought their traditions and their black slaves. Waves of European migrants
bolstered their numbers. U.S. soldiers on route to frontier forts plodded through for
patriotism, or at least a paycheck, while Potawatomis from Indiana did so during their
forced march to Indian Territory. Pioneers drove westward through Lexington, either
1
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pulled by the allure of fertile lands and precious metals, such as those seeking Oregon
and California; or pushed out of the East due to religious intolerance like the followers of
Joseph Smith and Brigham Young. The residents of Lexington had substantial contact
with this broad range of people and communities. They understood and acted upon the
idea that control of the West, be it military, economic, political, or social, was still under
dispute.
Hardly any places housed the strata of nineteenth-century contestation as vividly
as New Mexico. This frontier space, marginalized by Spain, Mexico, and the U.S. alike,
dealt with many of the signal tensions of the times. Cycles of political dispute swelled in
New Mexico from the 1810s to the 1840s, relating to nation making, centralization, and
international rivalry.3 Similarly, new economic forces led to big questions regarding the
regulation of trade and commerce as it shifted from the mercantilist designs of imperial
Spain to the market-oriented, transnational stream of goods and finances that evolved as
the Santa Fe Trail connected Missouri with the Camino Real and Chihuahua. Issues of
mobility and taxation attached to the growing trade network were then compounded by
the economic pursuits of Native Americans who surrounded the settled portions of New
Mexico. Native nations powerfully shaped the contours of international contest and the
budding regional economy. The myriad challenges of the Hispano borderlands, with its
contradictory impulses arising from the overlapping world of Euro American, Mexican,

3

For characterization of New Mexico during the first half of the nineteenth century, see David J. Weber,
The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1982); Ramón A. Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away:
Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press,
1991); Ross Frank From Settler to Citizen: New Mexican Economic Development and the Creation of
Vecino Society, 1750-1820 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Calvin A. Roberts and Susan
A. Roberts, New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006); and Marta Weigle,
Frances Levine, and Louise Stiver, eds., Telling New Mexico: A New History (Santa Fe: Museum of New
Mexico Press, 2009).

38

and Native American populations, kept Mexican and then U.S. military, political, and
economic strategists busy, and often uncertain.4 This remained the case in the aftermath
of the Civil War as Catron and his Gilded Age colleagues descended upon New Mexico
and the American West.
Born in 1840, Thomas Catron belongs to a particularly restless generation known
for their innovations to American industry, technology, business, and finance. For better
or worse, they led the way in the geographic extension and cultural evolution of
American capitalism. The most famous of this cohort accrued appellations comparing
them to barons, kings, and imperial magnates, as well as a slew of more nefarious names.
Historians have pointed to the importance of the Civil War in shaping the opportunities
available to them and the paths that they followed to establish their fortunes.5 For
instance, during the war years Andrew Carnegie positioned himself at the intersection of
the Union’s transportation and communication needs and Jay Cooke revolutionized the
marketing of federal bonds and securities. Their energy and innovation directly supported
the northern war effort while spurring the infrastructural change necessary to bolster
America’s industrial and capitalist transformation that surged forward in the war’s
aftermath.6 As a slightly younger member of this generation, Catron’s path took him not
to board rooms or banks, but to battlefields. While he too would partake in the unleashed
world of capitalism following the war, from June 1861 until May 1865 Catron spent his
early twenties fighting for the Confederacy.
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Catron’s involvement in the Civil War played a formative role in shaping his
outlook on the world and on his prospects for the future. These two veins intersected in
the West, which took on a host of meanings to Americans from all walks of life. It came
to represent rebirth, rejuvenation, and progress. It captivated the attention of pioneers and
settlers who quickly learned of the oft-ignored pitfalls that came with a “virgin land.”
Artists, authors, and photographers reveled in its grandeur or immensity, while investors,
financiers, and confidence men from all over the world envisioned empires of precious
metals, grass, timber, and water. It even developed as the quintessential (though often
imaginary) backdrop to American ideas of individualism, where a fresh start awaited the
industrious and energetic migrant. And yet, its reliance on the federal government
continued to mature.7
The Civil War had origins in the West, was decided in the East, and transformed
everything in-between. In the West the war was less about slavery, more about empire,
and was critically coupled to the question of what segment of American society would
dictate the terms of national expansion.8 In places like the Southwest, the war resulted in
a new wave of territorial consolidation as approached from military, legislative,
executive, and legal logics. During the period from 1860 to 1868 the federal government
intervened in New Mexico and the West in a number of transformative ways. These
included increased oversight regarding the territorial system; the extension of military
posts and forts; experimentation with different styles of Indian warfare, pacification, and
7

Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001); Jules David Prown, Nancy K. Anderson, William Cronon, Brian W. Dippie,
Martha A. Sandweiss, Susan Prendergast Schoelwer, and Howard R. Lamar, Discovered Lands, Invented
Pasts: Transforming Visions of the American West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Heather
Cox Richardson, West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America After the Civil War (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2007), 5.
8
Heather Cox Richardson, West from Appomattox, 5; David R. Goldfield, America Aflame: How the Civil
War Created a Nation, 1st U.S. ed (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 13.

40

the reservation system; the orientation of new territorial borders; the passage of
legislation to subsidize and regulate transcontinental railroads, homesteaders, education,
and banking; and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
When he arrived in New Mexico, Thomas Catron strode in as an agent of the
nation’s postwar obsession with the incorporation of the trans-Missouri West and the
cause of American empire.9 Of course at the time, Catron was more concerned with
fitting in so he could rise up to take hold of a small empire of his own. In a sense, the
West evolved as a shifting set of personal empires that in aggregate helped to incorporate
the resources of the various regions of the West, consolidate power in the national system
and further the course of a collective national empire.10 Thomas Catron fully participated
in this process, affecting New Mexico’s evolution in some not-so-ambivalent ways. As an
empire builder, he served his country, his party, his family, and himself, seemingly with
an emphasis on the latter. This too, indirectly resulted from the Civil War that in so many
ways altered the substance of American life.11

Thomas Catron, Lexington, and the Market Revolution along the Missouri
Prior to the traumas of war, no fortune tellers would have predicted Thomas
Catron’s hugely influential future in New Mexico. But, as the geographic center of
9
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Catron’s early life, the conditions in and around Lexington, Missouri are important to
understanding his postwar decisions and the path that led him to New Mexico. Founded
on a bluff overlooking the Missouri River, the history of the town, especially during the
decades of national and market expansion of the mid-nineteenth century, focuses on its
connectivity—to the West, to commerce, and to the political tensions of the antebellum
period.12
Lexingtonians, as well as their neighbors in the surrounding towns of Lafayette
County, heard the beating drummers of the market revolution loud and clear.13 They
looked to the East and the West, the North and the South, to figure out their place in the
rapidly changing nation. Economically and socially the region compared favorably to
agricultural districts in the states of the Upper South, reinforced by settlers with roots in
Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Politically the county split between
Democrats and Whigs. But its station along the wide and wandering Missouri gave
Lexington a special relationship to the increasingly continental movement of goods and
capital. Commerce flowed southwest to New Mexico, northwest to the Rocky Mountains
and Oregon country, and eastward to St. Louis where it then traveled either to New
Orleans via the Mississippi River, or to Atlantic port cities such as New York,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore. But these generalities fail to present Lexington in all its
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depth, especially regarding the lived experience of its residents amidst the turbulent
decades of the antebellum period.
By October 8, 1840, when Mary Catron gave birth to her fourth child, Thomas
Benton, the town of Lexington stood as a bustling center for settlement, trade, education,
and agriculture. The county of Lafayette, in which Lexington was the largest individual
township and county seat, had grown substantially since its initial years of white
settlement in the 1810s. Its frontier roots were still apparent as well. Like most of their
neighbors, John and Mary Catron were not born in western Missouri, having relocated to
the area with their families around 1818.14 Their Welsh and German backgrounds and
their links to Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee fit the pattern of most willing
immigrants.15 Because of the fertile soil along the river in western and central Missouri,
counties such as Lafayette, Saline, Chariton, and Boone lured folk from the Upper
South.16 These migrants proved adaptive to the new conditions but also maintained
continuity with their previous homes. Specifically, they employed slave labor to grow the
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staple crops of the region: tobacco and hemp. Migrants also arrived from across the
Atlantic, especially from the British Isles and Germany.17
Wherever they came from, the new inhabitants of western Missouri shared a
pioneering spirit and a pattern of large families. The Catrons were no exception. After
marrying in 1833 John and Mary had a total of nine children, although two never lived to
adulthood.18 In 1830 Lafayette County tallied only 2,418 whites and 429 slaves within
the space of four hundred thousand acres.19 Profits from the expansion of slavery into the
lands along the Missouri River, the slow degradation of lands throughout the Upper
South, and the logistical benefit of the river for transportation brought in a steady tide of
new immigrants. These settlers bolstered the area’s population, which more than doubled
over the next ten years so that in the year of Thomas Benton’s birth, the county had 4,799
whites, 2,016 slaves, and twenty-six free blacks.20 Lexington, as a port and the largest
town in the county benefitted the most from this growth to the extent that by 1845 its
population of 1,697 inhabitants made it the third largest town in Missouri.21
On the bluffs of the Missouri, Lexington’s continental connectivity provided for a
diverse local economy. The city grew into a regional center for commerce, outfitting, and
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transportation.22 But agriculture, namely the cultivation of hemp, tobacco, and garden
crops, remained the most common occupation. These staples gained recognition not only
because they grew well in the alluvial soils of western and central Missouri, but because
ready markets existed for their sale.23 Demonstrating the expansive power of the
antebellum marketplace, the region’s products found buyers in completely opposite
directions. Tobacco grown in Lafayette County found its way westward to the polyglot
assortment of traders, trappers, and soldiers of the Rocky Mountains, or the Hispano and
Native American people of New Mexico. Hemp, on the other hand, first traveled
eastward. A growing local manufacturing industry could not yet support the entirety of
the hemp crop, so it was often transported first to St. Louis for weaving into burlap sacks
and then down the Mississippi River to New Orleans where it was used to wrap bales of
cotton for export to the North and Europe.24 The trade of two regional staples shows how
Lexingtonians participated in an interwoven commercial community with goods and
credit moving along continental and international pathways.
The movement of people through Lexington also transpired on a continental scale
and made possible the contact between Missourians and groups from a host of
geographic, racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Alongside the rising tide of
riverboat traffic that took port at Lexington, the National Road led pioneering families
through town. Beginning in the 1820s this thoroughfare connected Missourians to new
conduits of trade, including the Oregon Trail and the Santa Fe Trail.25 And so over time
Lexington witnessed a range of commuters from gold seekers en route to California,
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Mormons to Deseret, and soldiers to frontier forts. In 1838 eight hundred Potawatomi
Indians camped on the opposite bank of the Missouri while on their “trail of death” from
Indiana to Kansas.26 Add to this the stream of Mexican traders proceeding back and forth
to New Mexico and the fur trappers of French, English, and American origin headed to
the Rocky Mountains and the scene becomes a veritable kaleidoscope of activity.
Wetmore’s Gazetteer of Missouri published in 1837 commented that:
Lexington is one of the towns from which outfits are made in merchandise, mules,
oxen, and wagons for the Santa Fe or New Mexico trade. The fur traders who pass
to the mountains by land make this town a place of rendezvous, and frequently are
going out and coming in with their wagons and packed mules, at the same period
of going and coming that is chosen by the Mexican traders. Lexington is
therefore, occasionally, a thoroughfare of traders of great enterprise, and caravans
of infinite value. The dress and arms of the traders, trappers, and hunters of these
caravans, and comparison of the horses and mules they ride, present as great
diversity as the general resurrection itself of all nations and ages can promise for
the speculation of the curious.27
Indeed, the rise of the Santa Fe Trade accounted for a significant component of
Missouri’s burgeoning economy. Some illicit traffic and exchange existed between
Americans and the inhabitants of Spanish New Mexico (Hispano and indigenous) during
the first decades of the nineteenth century. The conclusion of Mexico’s decade-long
struggle for independence in 1821, however, followed by the successful round trip of
Captain William Becknell that same year, led to the establishment of an annual caravan
trade linking Missouri with New Mexico and Chihuahua.28 By mid-decade U.S.
merchants solidified a routine that involved gathering along the river in western Missouri
before their late spring departure across the plains. After travelling over 1,600 miles, the
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800 Potawatami Indians being forcibly removed from Indiana camped on the river bank opposite
Lexington. They ferried the river on October 27 and were marched on to northeast Kansas.”
27
West Central Missouri Genealogical Society and Library, History of Lafayette County, Mo., 282.
28
Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico’s Royal Road: Trade and Travel on the Chihuahua Trail (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 57-59.
26

46

traders returned with enlarged mule trains and precious cargoes of Mexican silver. The
specie was especially welcome in western Missouri where hard currency had grown
scarce in the aftermath of the Panic of 1819. Similar to conditions in New Mexico of
Catron’s day, the lack of money led to a greater reliance on credit and trade in kind by
Missourians, as well as constant issues of debt and default for even established mercantile
houses. The seasonal influx of silver acted as a boon for regional development and
enticed a greater volume of commerce to start out each year toward Santa Fe.29
As more and more Missouri families and firms participated in this business, state
leaders like Senator Thomas Hart Benton lobbied for federal support and protections,
both from Native Americans and the Mexican government.30 Establishing a right-of-way
across hundreds of miles of native territory presented one such priority for merchant and
federal government alike. Senator Benton’s interest in defending the commercial interests
of his constituency led him to persuade Congress in 1825 to survey and construct a
military road between western Missouri and Santa Fe.31 That summer a government party
spent several months surveying the trail and though no road materialized, they
successfully negotiated safe passage with some of the powerful Native American nations,
including the Osage and Comanche. Even without an established road, the federal
government remained an active supporter of the international commerce. Politicians and
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diplomats in Washington, D.C., St. Louis, Santa Fe, Chihuahua, and Mexico City
traveled back and forth in negotiation of protection agreements, tariff schedules,
regulations, and restricted items. The Congressional passage of the Drawback Act in
March 1845, a measure lessoning the duties applied to goods imported from Europe
intended for re-export to Mexico, reflected the federal backing of Missouri’s expanding
markets.32
The Catron family did not have to leave town to catch up on the recent news from
over the trail. In 1822, the year that authorities platted Lexington, the merchant and trader
John Aull located a store and warehouse along its riverfront docks to engage in the
growing southwesterly enterprise. The following decades saw Aull’s business prosper
enough to bring in brothers James and Robert, who established mercantile branches in
Independence, Liberty, and Richmond, Missouri.33 The Aull brothers established
connections for merchandise and financing in cities such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, and New Orleans, while also developing a network of associates amongst the
Mexican elite in Chihuahua City.34 Their business indicates many of the perils that faced
frontier merchants in Missouri during the 1820s and 30s, such as high transportation and
insurance fees on their goods, lengthy waiting periods on all ends, information gaps, and
a reliance on credit. Though Robert and James travelled the trail themselves, more often
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their business focused on providing the material goods to caravan traders, usually asking
twenty-five percent down payment and the remainder from installments that carried ten
percent interest. Many situations could—and did—prevent payments from arriving on
time leading to prolonged cycles of indebtedness that filtered upwards from their
customers, to the Aulls, to their creditors.35 Nevertheless, like many entrepreneurs of the
Santa Fe Trade, the Aulls participated in an expanding international flow of goods that
introduced fragments of mercantile capitalism to the settled regions of the American
West.
By 1845 Lexington could make a claim to be one of these settled places. That
same year it gained an official city charter as well as a branch of the State Bank of
Missouri. The new city accommodated a growing population, at least six churches of
different denominations, and a local chapter of Freemasons who met at the Lafayette
Lodge.36 Masonic affiliation offered the residents some substantial benefits. After the
anti-Mason movement of the 1820s and 1830s, membership in the fraternal society rose
again in the U.S. as lodges planted roots in new communities. While some of Lexington’s
earliest arrivals were members, the city did not form its first lodge until June 3, 1840.
Afterwards, masonry developed rapidly and counted some of the leading citizens of
Lexington in its ranks. The Aulls garnered local prestige as members and looked to the
society for commercial networks.37 John Catron, as a long-time resident and prominent
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townsperson was likely a Freemason.38 In 1847 he worked with Robert Aull to build a
new court house in Lexington and later sent Thomas Benton to a Masonic college.
Furthermore, by 1847 the city of Lexington and County of Lafayette had grown into the
“Masonic center of Missouri” with every Monday represented as “Masonic Night.”39
With no little foreshadowing, this environment of Freemasonry had a substantial impact
on the young Thomas Catron.
The presence of established schools in Lexington also shaped the young man.
John Catron had little formal education, but understood the benefits it brought to his
children. Of his seven siblings, John and Mary picked out Thomas Benton as especially
studious and so enrolled him in the local Masonic College.40 In 1857 the school taught a
total of 144 boys, almost all of whom came from Lexington or the surrounding towns in
Lafayette County.41 One student, Stephen Benton Elkins of Westport, Missouri, sat in the
preparatory class that year. Elkins, born in 1841 in Ohio, moved to Westport with his
family when only three, so that his upbringing in western Missouri paralleled that of
Thomas Benton.42 The two boys met while at the college and planted the seeds of a
lifelong friendship. They rose to the top of their classes and gained notoriety for their
sharp minds and debating skills. In 1859 the pair left Lexington to attend the University
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of Missouri at Columbia.43 They went on to graduate together in 1860 and then both
sought employment as teachers.
As friends, roommates, and classmates, Catron and Elkins developed a strong
intellectual relationship. In Missouri in the 1850s this meant discussions of slavery, its
place in the nation, its constitutionality, and its expansion farther west. Most specifically,
the question over the spread of slavery or the movement of private property to the
territory of Kansas generated vociferous public discussion and action. The families of
both boys maintained a proslavery ideology. But, like the communities surrounding them,
Catron and Elkins split their opinions. They displayed their differences in 1858 for
instance, while on the debate team at the Masonic College. In the process of developing
their skills of oration and argumentation, the two team leaders led opposing sides in a
rehash of the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Thomas Benton defended Stephen Douglas and
the mantra of popular sovereignty and Stephen Benton argued in favor of Lincoln’s
interpretation of U.S. statute.44 Their friendship withstood this political dispute and even
their participation on opposing sides during the Civil War.
Catron’s acceptance of and defense of the institution of slavery is no mystery. His
father was a staunch Democrat and a long-time supporter of Senator Benton. Their family
owned valuable property in slaves and economically benefited from unfree agricultural
labor.45 In school too, Thomas Benton found a majority of his teachers and peers
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(Stephen Elkins aside) stood in line with the South. Even at his commencement from the
University of Missouri, which took place on Independence Day, the guest speaker
encouraged this rationale. Ex-Governor Sterling Price presciently explained to the
graduating class that war was in their future, and that it was each student’s duty to side
with the South.46
In the 1850s the river counties of western and central Missouri held the largest
concentration of slaves in the state. On the eve of the Civil War, Lafayette County
counted 6,374 slaves, representing just under one-third of the total population of
20,062.47 Lexington, as the county seat, established itself as a center of proslavery
agitation. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, activity in defense of
slavery in and around the city intensified. Residents of the town enacted a resolution to
stop steamboats from carrying abolitionists up river. Then, from July 12 to July 14, 1855,
Lexington hosted a statewide proslavery convention with twenty-six counties sending
226 delegates. The attendees publicly declared their views by passing a list of ten
resolutions that emphasized their state’s rights platform and the danger and disharmony
that a free Kansas would create. The very first resolution presented their position in the
stark terms of slavery or disunion.48 The following year, Lexingtonians met to denounce
abolitionists again and (with no little hypocrisy) to do their part in fomenting dissolution

sentiment, lost heavily in slaves.” Thomas Catron comments on their ownership of slaves in “Senator
Catron Dubbed Prophet. James B. Morrow Writes about the Gentleman from New Mexico,” Washington
Herald, 6 September, 1914, Volume 3, Catron Scrapbooks, Personal Collection of Catron Family, Santa Fe.
46
Oscar Doane Lambert, Stephen Benton Elkins (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), 5.
Col. Sterling Price commanded the regiment of Missouri Volunteers in New Mexico during the
Mexican-American War. He led the suppression of the Taos Uprising in 1847 and the razing of Mora.
Coincidentally, but indicative of Missouri’s nineteenth-century influence on New Mexico, Price’s reconquest of the Rio Arriba region included violent confrontations in many of the same places that Thomas
Catron would come to own or control.
47
Duffner, “Slavery in Missouri River Counties,” 10.
48
Ibid., 166-168; Lafayette County Historical Society, Continuing the History of Lafayette County, 6.

52

by organizing a company of men from Lafayette County to travel to Kansas and fight,
literally, for the cause of the South. At the meeting leaders circulated a handbill titled
“War in Kansas,” meant for distribution throughout the County.49 In it, the authors
warned of the dire circumstances that existed in Kansas and the terrible future in store for
Missourians if they did not prevent the abolitionists from controlling the territory. For if
the northerners prevailed, the handbill explained, “Kansas is lost to the south forever, and
our slaves in upper Missouri will be useless to us, and our homes must be given up to the
abolition enemy.” And so, to help rescue their cause and their way of life, the authors
appealed “Up, men of Lafayette! Meet at Lexington on Wednesday, at 12’o’clock,
August 20. Bring your horses with you, your guns and your clothing—all ready to go on
to Kansas.” The men of Lafayette County did not disappoint; a company met at
Lexington at the prearranged time and marched to Kansas.50 The Catrons may not have
directly participated in the conventions or the campaigns to Kansas, but they certainly
socialized with people that did and that supported the slave cause. The proximity of direct
hostility over the question of slavery and its expansion must have had a deep impact on
the young Thomas Catron.
In the big picture, the environment of Lexington shaped Thomas Catron’s early
life and helps to inform our understanding of not only his decision to fight in the Civil
War, but also his transformation afterwards. The substantial increase in chattel property
and the concentration of wealth in the slave holding class made for a stark lesson in the
inequities of life and likely set the tone for Catron to hold himself above others. His

49

Lafayette County Historical Society, Continuing the History of Lafayette County, 6.
West Central Missouri Genealogical Society and Library, History of Lafayette County, Mo., 285. It is
even possible that they participated in the skirmish at Osawatomie between four hundred Missourians and
forty abolitionists led by John Brown.
50

53

education at the University of Missouri added to this impression while also orienting his
fiercely competitive understanding of fraternity and friendship. The connection of
Lexington to major arteries of western commerce, including the Missouri River and the
Santa Fe Trail, clearly influenced his perceptions and postwar choices. But all of these
formative impulses could not compare to the enormous fault that split the country, and so
many Missouri communities, after the 1860 presidential election.

Market Revolution in the Hispano Borderlands
New Mexico was far from a stagnant world. It witnessed significant change
during the first half of the nineteenth century, beginning in earnest during the years of
Mexican sovereignty. The primary driver of this transformation was not the state, but the
market. Despite its peripheral geography with regards to both Mexico City and
Washington, D.C., traders from both countries and Europe brought mercantile capitalism
to New Mexico, and in so doing, connected the communities of the Rio Arriba and Rio
Abajo, one caravan at a time, to the market revolution.51 From the 1820s until after the
U.S. Civil War commerce proved New Mexico’s most stabilizing force. Of crucial
importance here is the participation of Nuevomexicanos within the trade network.
Members of the class of ricos that gained most from the new currents of goods and
money entering the area also helped to produce conditions in New Mexico that facilitated
the expansion of market practices. While the emergence of capitalism stemmed from
transnational forces not necessarily tied to a single country, the merchants that operated
51
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in New Mexico worked to not only extend the influence of their businesses, but in this
case, of the United States as well. Missouri merchants, such as Josiah Gregg, John Aull,
and James Magoffin, brought American goods to New Mexico, but they also brought
New Mexico into the U.S. sphere of influence.52
Market forces powerfully shaped New Mexico’s economic conditions, and in time
its political conditions as well. Historians have located the culmination of this
commercial process in the American conquest of Mexico’s northern frontier.53 For tens of
thousands of New Mexicans, however, a more life-altering result of the market’s
penetration into their distant world came in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War. Yet the
infrastructure that supported the later rounds of speculation and dispossession of the
Gilded Age predated both of these eras, emerging in New Mexico while still under
Mexican sovereignty.
According to official accounts, the northern province of New Spain entered the
century without much fanfare and lagged behind much of the rest of Spanish colonial
America. Instructed by his superior in Chihuahua to compile an account of New
Mexico’s agriculture, industry, manual arts, and trade, in 1803 Governor Fernando de
Chacón submitted a rather bleak report of almost all facets of the regional economy.54
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Chacón explained in forthright language that agriculture in the province was deficient due
to inadequate knowledge and know-how; that metals existed in abundance but went
unmined; that arts and crafts simply did not exist in absence of guilds and proper
apprenticeships; and that even the wealth of skins, furs, and wool was under-utilized and
manufactured (in the case of wool) solely for home use. The one bright spot for New
Mexico’s economy was its annual export of 25-26,000 sheep, though Chacón then also
mentioned that cattle, swine, and horses remained negligible, in part because of the
continued presence of hostile Indians that encircled the settled areas. Commerce with
Mexico, he explained, took place but once a year and involved the export of sheep, oxen,
course wool, raw cotton, hides, pinon nuts, and wines. These items represented the
mainstay of New Mexico’s efectos del pais through the first half of the century. Worse
yet, he reported that the internal commerce
is in the hands of twelve or fourteen [local] merchants who are neither properly
licensed nor well versed in business matters. Of these, only two or three are
operating with their own capital. Among the rest everything they handle or bring
into the Province is on credit. And they distribute and sell in the same way from
one year to the next, with the result that only once a year do they get money in
hand. And there are many losses and arrears in the collection of credit accounts,
since these are regularly extended to the poorest people and at excessive rates. All
of this is exacerbated by the lack of money in circulation which has begun to be
experienced over the last three years.55
Governor Chacón concluded somewhat optimistically that despite the subsistence living
and the severe deficiency in knowledge, education, and development, conditions were not
so bad and no New Mexicans went starving. He was not the first, nor the last, to
the viceroyalty of New Spain originated with a royal order of Charles IV, dated 21 June 1802. The figure
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recognize the Nuevomexicanos as humble, adaptive, and self-sufficient. From the
viceroyalty’s perspective this may have made them great pioneers, but the annual
shortfall of the province’s treasury frustrated colonial administrators to no end.
New Mexico maintained its status as a debtor province throughout the nineteenth
century. In attempt to bolster its internal revenue, in 1821 newly independent Mexico
relaxed restrictions on commerce, allowing local authorities to permit the flow of goods
between New Mexico and Missouri, as well as California, Utah, Texas, the eastern U.S.
and even Europe. This began shortly after independence when Governor Facundo
Melgares, invited William Becknell to sell his wares in New Mexico instead of turning
him away or arresting him as had been the practice under Spain.56 The region’s
inhabitants welcomed the importation of goods and tools while the Mexican central
government assessed duties on the goods to cover the costs of governance and
maintenance for its northern territory of Nuevo Mexico.57 In this respect, Mexican
nationals understood the Santa Fe Trade as a complement to the already extant commerce
that joined Santa Fe to Chihuahua via the Camino Real. Chihuahua City merchants
figured to profit from new imported American wares as well as to continue their
monopoly in efectos del pais originating in the Rio Arriba and Rio Abajo, while the
Missouri traders would largely foot the bill for upkeep of the region. Still, New Mexico
remained a debtor state, due to a range of factors, including fraud, bribery, and tax
dodging that cut into custom receipts, a monopolization of profits by Chihuahua
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merchants, and the high costs of either waging war or sustaining a purchased peace with
independent and often hostile Native American nations.58
Just as in towns throughout the United States, the 1820s and 30s brought elements
of market revolution to Mexico’s far north. By the end of the first decade of the Santa Fe
Trade, Missourians, Nuevomexicanos, and Chihuahuan merchants found success enough
to expand operations. After offloading merchandise in New Mexico, many Americans
grew their business by continuing down the Camino Real to Chihuahua. The rapid
saturation of New Mexico’s home market presented one reason for the enlargement of
trade radius, but the bigger inducement came from the access to Mexico’s internal
markets through Chihuahua and the ability to receive payment there in silver. By 1830
over half of all cargoes that left western Missouri represented through traffic.59 As natural
middle-men in this commercial current, Nuevomexicanos found new opportunities to
participate at all levels of the growing trade.
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1849, The Quivira Society XI (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: University of New Mexico Press, 1942); Sandoval,
“Trade and the ‘Manito’ Society,” 1978; Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1982; David Weber, Bárbaros:
Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); and
Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, Lamar Series in Western History (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2007). According to Enrique Cárdenas in “A Macroeconomic Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century
Mexico,” in Stephen Haber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic History of
Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 65-92, the Mexican national
economy suffered a crippling blow in the two decades surrounding independence (1810s-1820s) and only
started to recover in the late 1830s. The destabilizing effects of capital movement out of Mexico after
independence mirrors the scarcity of capital and currency in New Mexico during these same years, perhaps
aggravating the debtor status of this province in Mexico’s far north. Furthermore, the decline in the overall
mining economy of Mexico in the 1820s and 1830s likely presented a double-dip economic downturn for
New Mexico and its most direct connection with Chihuahua merchants who acted as the essential brokers
in the network that connected the Rio Arriba and Rio Abajo to Chihuahua City, the mining districts of
central Mexico, and Mexico City along the Camino Real.
59
Crass, “Economic Interaction on the New Mexican Military Frontier,” 7. As expressed by Max
Moorhead in New Mexico’s Royal Road, 3-4, the Missouri-Chihuahua trade actually represented the
backbone of this international enterprise and that by the 1840s a majority of goods moved through, rather
than to, Santa Fe and New Mexico.
58

58

One prospect for Chihuahua and Rio Grande comerciantes concerned following
the trail northward and eastward across the plains, exporting Mexican goods and silver to
the United States. Once there, they also developed new lines of supply and financing.60
This activity resulted in a mercantile network that spanned thousands of miles of arid
lands (and then additional miles of river, canal, ocean, and rail) and produced profits for
participants both locally and internationally. Nuevomexicanos played a vigorous role in
this business, especially the wealthy and well-connected Baca, Chávez, Delgado, Perea,
Ortiz, Otero, and Sena families.61 Furthermore, los capitalistas recognized their position
and developed more sophisticated approaches to managing the trade, like the 1841
organization of “La Junta de Fomento Comercial y de Instrucción de Santa Fe.” This
commercial body planned import and export schedules and set prices for the group so as
not to undercut each other when negotiating with sharp-dealing merchants from the U.S.
or Chihuahua.62 Arrangements such as “la Junta” helped Nuevomexicanos to gain control
over about half of the total trade by the mid-1840s.63
Beside the Missouri-New Mexico-Chihuahua commercial complex,
Nuevomexicanos reopened the Old Spanish Trail to connect to settlements in Alta
60
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California. Historians credit Antonio Armijo, in particular, for setting out from Abiquiu
in 1829 and reaching the mission at San Gabriel. The 1830 publication of Armijo’s diary
describing the route motivated an annual caravan trade as well as a path for westward
migration.64 The route that Armijo popularized signified a patchwork quilt of localized
knowledge that wove together the geographies of colonial Spain with those of
international fur trappers and powerful native nations of the Great Basin.
Nuevomexicanos likely recalled that a very old Spanish trail traversed the region, but the
abandoned route lacked specifics and required substantial updating. To this end, trapping
parties, who spent much of the early century exploring the Rocky Mountains for
untapped rivers and streams, facilitated much needed intel. Their knowledge of the
navigable trails through the basin and range country, including critical details about
friendly and hostile tribes, provided Armijo with a basic oral roadmap.65 His party’s 1829
departure and successful return the following year represented a significant Euro-centric
shift in the potentials for Rocky Mountain mobility and trade, including new cooperation
and conflict with the native nations of the Great Basin country.
The main objects of exchange between Nuevo Mexico and Alta California
focused on hoofed animals. Nuevomexicano arrieros (pack train freighters) travelled by
foot alongside their sheep and pack mules, the latter carrying wool, cotton, hides, and the
necessary provisions for the long overland journey. They returned from Alta California
with horses, cloth, and abalone shells. While both provinces gained in the process,
authorities in Los Angeles quickly grew wary of their distant compatriots who developed
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the habit of smuggling extra horses out of California on their return trip.66 By the 1840s
the two provinces instituted a more formal system of passports and regulations to govern
the trade, highlighting both its continuity over the 1830s as well as the distrust and
pattern of illicit conduct carried on along the Old Spanish Trail. Moreover, as the
commercial connections of New Mexico grew in breadth and complexity, authorities
worked to police interactions with Native Americans and clamp down on the smuggling,
fraud, and bribery that ran rampant across the trade network.67
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For New Mexico, the entrance of mercantile capitalism produced an assortment of
results. In general, vecinos gained a modest elevation in their standard of living through
their access to imported products. Next, this period witnessed an expansion of Hispano
settlements directed outwards from the Rio Arriba as well as the general growth of New
Mexico’s population. These rural townspeople also proved adaptive to the burgeoning
transportation industry, finding in it new opportunities for work and social betterment.
Indeed Nueomexicano arrieros gained recognition for their skill and endurance from
Americans and Californios alike.68 The benefits pretty much end there, however. Most of
the wealth from the growing trade system channeled to the class of ricos, who were
themselves dominated by the ranching families of the Rio Abajo. The table lands of
Bernalillo and Valencia counties supplied the Otero, Chávez, Sandoval, and Perea clans
with thousands of acres with which to run their sheep and horses.69 The business of
tending these animals and providing for their safety fell to a class of peones, who far
from benefitting from the incipient market forces, found in them the potential for
increased subjugation. In Mexican law, a person could enter into a state of peonage by
contracting a debt owed to their jefe or patron. Because most vecinos lived a subsistence
lifestyle, even a small debt could lead to a state of lifetime peonage that was transferrable
to the next generation. One result of this system was a permanent underclass of peones
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who provided the necessary labor to expand the livestock and trade networks of
Nuevomexicano ricos.70
As the Santa Fe Trade matured, so did its physical presence in New Mexico. In
the early years of the trade merchants traveled from town to town, carrying their
merchandise with them and offloading little-by-little. While successful at first due to the
dearth of goods then available to most families, traders soon found that New Mexico did
not supply a large enough home market with ready enough capital to match the rising
amount of inventory.71 Missourians first attempted to supplement their sales by
expanding their reach down the Camino Real to El Paso and then Chihuahua City.
Increased participation by Nuevomexicanos fostered the development of another system,
however, by which partnerships between merchants and local ricos established local
stores in the small communities of the Rio Arriba and Rio Abajo. In this manner, the
traveling brokers of the Santa Fe Trail could distribute their wares via wholesale to
locally owned and operated retailers while covering a wider area with greater economy of
scale. Merchants also benefited from the increased stability that stores brought to their
risky endeavors. By the 1840s these stores represented the backbone of the mercantile
capitalist system that infiltrated New Mexico and rooted most Mexican communities to
the continental currents of the market revolution.72 Due to their importance to the
development of New Mexico’s economic and social landscape, the local store requires
some elaboration.
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Far from the transitory nature of the early drummers, who vended their wares in
the Hispano borderlands but once a year, the sedentary mercantile store came to represent
a form of market stability for the rural inhabitants of New Mexico. Alongside the basic
role of warehousing and retailing goods and commodities for the local population, these
stores also acted as centers for trade, barter, and the extension of credit.73 Because of a
lack of hard currency, most Nuevomexicanos found alternative ways to make purchases,
linking the raw products of their labor to the broader market. The partido system
exemplifies this relationship. For lack of ready payment a rico could offer credit to the
buyer in exchange for the promise of compensation of the sum, usually in crop or animal
yields. While on the surface the partido system seems to represent a boon to the largely
subsistence class of New Mexicans who otherwise would have a difficult time procuring
the imported goods and tools, the system more often led to a monopolization of the local
surplus by the merchant elite and lifelong debt or peonage for those in need of the
credit.74 While in the 1820s and 1830s Mexican ricos owned and controlled most local
stores, the 1840s witnessed an influx of foreign merchants, especially a network of
German-Jews who developed substantial mercantile operations in New Mexico’s largest
towns. Foreign traders, of European and American background, established significant
in-roads to the markets of New Mexico and in turn, influenced its political orientation
right up to the eve of U.S. conquest. Their partnerships with local elites and lack of direct
governmental connections helped these mercantile capitalists gain a degree of
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permanency during the years of political instability that lasted from Mexican
independence to the beginnings of Reconstruction.75
For indigenous and Mexican communities alike, participation in a continental
proto-capitalist system was not the only means to gain access to new markets or goods.
New Mexicans also participated in an equally complex, albeit unsanctioned, raid-trade
based economy with the Navajo, Apache, Ute, and Comanche.76 Under Spanish rule the
vecinos of the Rio Arriba and Rio Abajo kept tenuous relations with the indigenous
peoples who occupied over four-fifths of New Mexico. A policy of gift-giving and
communal defense against shared enemies helped to keep the (often capricious) peace
between the gente de razon and the indios bárbaros, but this system suffered from a
range of political, social, and environmental factors.77 Following independence, Mexico
altered course and reduced its commitment to providing gifts, instead choosing primarily
military options to prevent Indian depredations. This strategy proved an even greater
drain on the Mexican economy, especially along its northern frontier as raids increased in
number and geographic scope.78
Native Americans, far from treating all Mexican possessions as parts of a unified
whole, adopted varying strategies. Comanches, for instance, maintained generally
friendly relations with the Hispano communities situated to the east of the Sangre de
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Cristo Mountains. The two groups met annually to participate in the illicit trade of
foodstuffs, buffalo robes, guns, horses, and captives.79 The captive trade highlights the
complexity of the Mexican-Native economy and offers an alternative perspective on
market penetration into the southwestern borderlands. Bands of Comanches developed
extensive raiding networks that targeted villages from Texas to central Mexico for the
acquisition of horses, material goods, and captives. When they arrived in eastern New
Mexico, these same Comanches bartered with Nuevomexicanos, who had themselves
participated in the enterprise of raiding, usually targeting Apache, Ute, or Navajo
communities.80 Alternatively, traffic along the reopened Old Spanish Trail led to both
new trade and new antagonisms between the Mexicans and the Navajo and Ute. An
October 1835 commerce law, for instance, specifically made it illegal to deal in firearms
or ammunition with “naciones bárbaros” while establishing the requirement of official
licenses for all persons involved in the Indian trade or desirous of trapping beaver.81
Hostilities remained high, however, evidenced by intermittent campaigns against the Ute
in 1841, 1843, and 1845. Illicit business, including an economy in Indian slaves, persisted
in the Southwest after U.S. occupation. Laws passed in Utah between 1852 and 1855
banning aspects of the trade indicate as much.82 The purpose here is not to outline the
intricacies of Nuevomexicano commerce and relations with all of its native neighbors,
but to suggest the existence of a far-reaching shadow economy in which captives from
the Great Basin could be bartered for captives from southern Chihuahua or Texas,
alongside tools, weapons, animals, textiles, and foodstuffs.
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The presence of this shadow economy, parallel to that of the burgeoning Santa Fe
Trade, provides immediate relevance for the aggressive national changeover of the
Southwest during the 1840s. As historians have recently shown, the growth of indigenous
power adjacent to New Mexico had a tremendous impact on the ability of Mexico to meet
the defensive needs of its northern frontier.83 What appeared to be a general lack of
interest or negligence by Mexico City in providing for the safety of person and property
in New Mexico helped some ricos and vecinos to question the efficacy of the Mexican
state. Paradoxically, others grew incensed over the centralizing designs of President
Santa Ana’s regime in Mexico City, specifically the appointment of non-resident Albino
Perez as Governor and a tax policy calling for payment in currency, rather than in efectos
del pais. The frustrations came to a head during the Chimayó Rebellion of 1837, which
provides the clearest example of such dissatisfaction as acted upon by inhabitants of the
Rio Arriba.84 Coupled with their distrust of the Mexican central government, some New
Mexicans found in the Santa Fe Trade a potential for stability and even profit. They had
come to appreciate the strand of American capitalism that rewarded individual
enterprise.85 In this vein, enough members of the local elite had entered into trade and
finance arrangements with Americans to feel economically secure in the case of U.S.
conquest. Furthermore, Missouri merchants performed the roles of diplomats in the days
immediately preceding General Kearney’s advance towards Santa Fe and helped to
ensure that the military takeover of New Mexico occurred without a simultaneous
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breakdown in the lucrative economy that linked the Southwest with the Middle West and
East.86
The Mexican-American War and the resultant Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
signed in 1848 shifted possession of New Mexico to the United States. A new political
orientation, however, did not mean an immediate transition to democratic rule and local
governance. Instead, a military government organized under the Kearney Code of 1846
kept watch over New Mexico until Congress organized it as a territory as part of the
Compromise of 1850. Even then, competing interests vied for control. Questions of civil
versus military rule and inter-sectional disputes led to a political incoherence (not for lack
of political participation) that lasted until the domination of the Republican Party during
the period of Reconstruction.87
As a United States Territory, the local politics in New Mexico continued to follow
the prearranged patterns set under Mexican sovereignty. First, leadership was still
dominated by officials appointed by a distant capital. These officials often prioritized
national and personal benefit over that of their isolated and variable constituencies.88 On
the local level, politics remained doubly factious; schisms existed between the several
institutions of U.S. governance as well as between disparate elements of the
Nuevomexicano and Native American communities that made up a sizeable majority of
the population. Local problems remained marginal to the interests of the distant central
government. New Mexican vecinos viewed the U.S. government with ambivalence, just
86
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as many of them had its Mexican predecessor.89 In part, they were right to do so, and
right to question the new American order that in a little over a decade would tear itself
apart. For their part, American politicians viewed New Mexico as a piece of a larger
puzzle that, when complete, would reveal a continental nation. In the process of
assembling all of these pieces, however, New Mexico (as well as most of the West for
that matter) grew entangled in regional competition over the control of its political and
economic spoils.
Beginning prior to conquest, sectional and partisan interests influenced U.S.
control of New Mexico. Even the legal framework for the military occupation, the
Kearney Code, was directed in part by the commercial aspirations of Missouri
merchants.90 Threats to the wellbeing of the Santa Fe Trade, such as those made by
Texans who coveted New Mexico’s territory east of the Rio Grande, met joint efforts by
Missouri traders and politicians. Senator Thomas Hart Benton fought repeatedly against
Texan schemes of pulling Santa Fe away from St. Louis and Kansas City and into the
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orbit of Dallas and San Antonio.91 After the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
this contestation over political and commercial control of New Mexico climaxed as part
of the national debate regarding the status of new U.S. possessions (especially
California), their boundaries, and the overlapping issues related to the expansion of
slavery and the fugitive slave act. Congressional claims by Texans to all territory east of
the Rio Grande particularly aggravated Missourians and Nuevomexicanos alike. As the
dispute spilled over into the crossfire of national politics, the specifics of New Mexico’s
boundaries and status entangled with the debate over slavery and the future of the nation.
Of significance for Missouri, New Mexico, and Thomas Catron, the Congressional
Compromise of 1850, as negotiated by Stephen Douglass, established New Mexico as a
U.S. Territory and protected its eastern border with Texas, while also granting California
statehood, intensifying the fugitive slave laws, and instituting “popular sovereignty” as
the nation’s ad-hoc policy toward the slave question.92
On the local level, U.S. policy focused on maintaining a status quo between the
roughly sixty-thousand Mexicans and the twelve hundred American and European
migrants.93 Once again economic activity, which proliferated during the 1850s (see table
below), provided the surest common ground.94 The longtime staple of ranching grew
increasingly profitable as new markets established roots in the territory, led above all else
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by the U.S. army as directed through its forts and outposts organized across the vast area.
Eleven such forts existed by 1853, manned by twenty-two companies of soldiers.95 While
their economic potential grew, most Nuevomexicanos who tried to manage the political
direction of the territory had little leverage to enact meaningful legislation that would
safeguard their long-term rights and interests. In short, New Mexico was swept up by the
tide of empire, secured by U.S. conquest and a stable military presence, and incorporated
into the capitalist economy (however incompletely at the time).

Corn (bushels)
Wheat (bushels)
Cattle (head)
Sheep (head)
Value of Livestock ($)

1850
365,411
196,516
32,977
377,271
$1,500,000

1860
709,304
434,309
88,729
830,116
$4,500,000

Table 1: Growth in Productive Output of New Mexico, 1850-1860. Figures found in Robert
Frazer, Forts and Supplies, 186-187.

Dreams of a continental nation and aspirations of empire helped to define
sectional attitudes towards New Mexico in the 1850s. In general, southern Democrats
controlled the offices and appointments in the territory, coaxing it into line with southern
aspirations. Northerners, however, argued that the institution of chattel slavery was ill fit
to the arid Southwest. Southern sympathizing presidents Pierce and Buchanan filled most
territorial appointments with southern men who in 1859 passed a law in the Territorial
Assembly permitting slavery in the New Mexico.96 They also considered a bid for an allweather transcontinental railroad that would extend the South’s sphere of influence to the
Pacific. This campaign led to the decision to annex the Gadsden Purchase, adding towns
such as Mesilla and Tucson to the territory, but failed until the 1880s to furnish any rail
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traffic.97 The climax of these competing claims for empire occurred in the aftermath of
secession.98

Transformations of War
At twenty years of age Thomas Catron was not yet legally permitted to vote in
1860 during the presidential election that so profoundly shaped his life. He spent the first
half of the year at the University of Missouri, perhaps debating the merits of each
candidate with his classmates, and then returned home to Lexington for the remainder of
the year. After helping around the farm for a summer, Catron learned an early lesson in
networking when he gained employment at a nearby school built on land conveyed to the
school board by his father.99 That fall, as he taught at the small school close to home,
rumblings of discord creased the nation. For the people of Lafayette County, like much of
the Upper South, the disagreement revolved around slavery, not disunion. Election
returns for the county showed overwhelming support for the compromise candidates John
Bell of Tennessee and Stephen Douglas of Illinois. Together they received over eightyfive percent of the county’s votes. Lincoln received less than one percent.100
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The State of Missouri, an outlier in the election, cast its nine votes for Stephen
Douglas and the symbolic ideology of popular sovereignty.101 On the national scene a
fissure separated the North from the South, allowing a plurality of the Electoral College
to vote for Abraham Lincoln. His victory sparked immediate dissatisfaction throughout
the South so that on December 20, 1860 South Carolina formally left the Union.
Secession followed for Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas, and
by June, 1861 the Confederate States of America also included Virginia, Arkansas, North
Carolina and Tennessee.
Back in Missouri, the state, counties, communities, and even families split over
the question of secession and allegiance. Few parts of the country witnessed the dreadful
degree of infighting and civilian guerilla war that transpired in Missouri. Ultimately, over
one-hundred thousand Missourians fought in the armies of the Union; only about thirtythousand fought for the South.102 The situation in May and June of 1861 had not yet
escalated to those levels, but some small-scale street fighting between civilians and proUnion forces set off a call-to-arms for both sides. The generally pro-Confederate
Missouri Legislature reacted by passing a bill requiring all able bodied men to serve in
the State Guard under the pretense of peace-keeping.103 In Lexington, Union supporters
held a rally that June. The event ended in violence when pro-Confederate residents
stormed the meeting.104 Thomas Catron’s school year had recently ended and so, free
from his teaching obligations, he enlisted for service in the Missouri State Guard. The
101
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third son of a slave-holding farmer, not yet twenty-one years old and unmarried, it is
likely he considered it his duty, and that his father and brothers encouraged him. His first
assignment was to Captain Hiram Bledsoe’s battery of light artillery at the rank of 2nd
Lieutenant.105
In June of 1861 few people expected the conflict to go on more than a year.
Catron’s initial term of service was to last but ten months. Under Captain Bledsoe his
early engagements took place in Missouri, Arkansas, and western Tennessee. At the
Battle of Hemp Bales in Lexington that September, Catron got to participate in the
defense of his home. In the fields just outside town, the Missouri State Guard arranged
wet hemp bales to create a rolling breastwork that they used to advance upon federal
lines. The resulting surrender by the Union forces led to celebration within the
Confederate ranks, though it was short lived. By the end of the month federal troops
retook Lexington and held it for the remainder of the war. 106 Most formal warfare in
Missouri followed a similar path. After early victories by Confederate armies in 1861 the
North controlled the state for the rest of the war. Guerilla fighting persisted, but the major
theater of operations shifted southward along the Mississippi. Bledsoe’s battery went
south as well, so that April 1862 found Catron stationed in Memphis, Tennessee.107 There
he re-enlisted, this time for the duration of the war, gaining the rank of 1st Lieutenant in
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the process.108 Confederate success on the battlefield may have led him to believe that the
fighting would end sooner than later. For whatever reason, Catron doubled-down on the
South and committed himself to another three years of grueling, rotten war.
Catron’s experience after re-enlistment and promotion lacks the romance and
idealism of his first ten months. No longer would he fight on Missouri battlefields and
defend his home town. Instead, during a consolidation of the Missouri State Guard, he
was assigned to Captain Schuyler Lowe’s Company of artillery and travelled south with
them. He distinguished himself over the summer, gaining another promotion to Senior 1st
Lieutenant that September. Through the following winter and spring, Lowe’s artillery
fought on. The following May they camped near the cemetery in Vicksburg,
Mississippi.109 During the forty-day siege that ensued, the Confederates at Vicksburg
defended their positions, but food for citizens and soldiers grew scarce. Disease and
malnutrition took a heavy toll. Through the hardship, Lowe’s battery fought on.110 Then,
on July 4, 1863, the Confederate leadership at Vicksburg surrendered to General Grant.
Catron and almost thirty-thousand confederate soldiers became prisoners of war.111 A
logistical predicament for General Grant, who lacked the time, manpower, and rations to

108

The elevation to 1st Lieutenant came with a commission of $100 pay every month. Pay Vouchers, July
1862 to December 1862, Confederate Records of Thomas B. Catron, Compiled Service Records of
Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Missouri, NARA, RG109, Roll 0089,
Fold3. http://www.fold3.com/image/#105597559.
109
Schuyler Lowe to Capt. W.T. Rigby, August 4, 1904, Thomas B. Catron Papers, 1692-1934, MSS 29
BC, Series 115, Folder 1, Correspondence File on Lowe’s Missouri Battery, University Libraries,
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque; Historic Roll, Not Dated, Confederate Records of Thomas B.
Catron, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of
Missouri, NARA, RG109, Roll 0089, Fold3. http://www.fold3.com/image/#105597559. The entry for
service on this Historic Roll for T.B. Catron reads: “Engaged Carthage, Oak Hills, Dry Wood, Lexington,
Elkhorn, Farmington, Iuka, Corinth, Hatchie Bridge, Bakers Creek, Pt Gibson, Big Black Bridge and
Vicksburg and various skirmishes. Now in command of the Battery.”
110
Thomas B. Catron to Ed. W. Strode, Esq., 22 October 1904, CP, Series 115, Folder 1.
111
Role of Prisoners of War, Confederate Records of Thomas B. Catron, Compiled Service Records of
Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State of Missouri, NARA, RG109, Roll 0089,
Fold3. http://www.fold3.com/image/#105597559.

75

hold so many POWs. Grant decided to parole and exchange the confederate soldiers
instead. So on July 9, 1863 (in what would not be the last time) Thomas B. Catron signed
his name to a loyalty oath.112 With the rest of the Missouri 3rd Artillery, he walked to
Demopolis, Alabama, where Lowe’s battery consolidated once again. They were back on
the move by October.113
For the remainder of the war, Catron served as the commanding officer in his
light artillery division, moving frequently in and around Alabama and Mississippi.114 The
Missourians continued to fight in skirmishes and pitched battles, continued to march for
days on end, and continued to die for the cause. If they received letters from their friends
and families, they would have known about the Constitutional Convention held in
Missouri and the ordinance passed on January 11 that abolished slavery in the state.115
Whether they preserved any hope of victory is doubtful; by the spring of 1865 their only
goal was survival.
The oath stated “That I will not take up arms against the United States, nor serve in any military, police,
or constabulary force, in any Fort, Garrison, or field work, held by the Confederate States of America
against the United States of America, nor as guard of prisons, depots or stores, nor discharge any duties
usually performed by Officers or Soldiers, against the United States of America, until duly exchanged by
the proper authorities.” Parole Oath, Vicksburg Mississippi, July 9, 1863, Confederate Records of Thomas
B. Catron, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers Who Served in Organizations from the State
of Missouri, NARA, RG109, Roll 0089, Fold3. http://www.fold3.com/image/#105597559; Parole under
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Regardless, Thomas Catron endured the burden of war until the bitter end. He
even served for twenty-five days after the ninth of April when General Robert E. Lee
surrendered to U.S. Grant at Appomattox. Finally, on May 4, 1865, the Confederate
commander of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana issued a
formal surrender. Catron’s battery yielded at last.116 For the second and final time, Catron
signed his name to a loyalty oath and promised never again to take up arms against the
United States.117 Underneath his name an ominous statement lurched. “The above named
officer will not be disturbed by the United States’ authorities, as long as he observes his
parole, and the laws in force where he resides.”118 This made for a difficult return to
Lexington, where the laws in force limited his employment options.
For Catron and tens of thousands of paroled Confederates, home could never be
the same. Still, he tried to make something work. He began studying law and as was his
studious nature, he took to the subject well. But the Missouri legislature passed a series of
statutes that limited employment for Catron and all ex-Confederates. These laws included
restrictions against work as a teacher or a lawyer.119 Without these avenues, the defeated
Catron had little to be hopeful about. He could continue to study law and work on the
farm, but the new social order was a daily reminder of a bygone world.
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Thomas Benton’s experience in the Civil War left him cynical. How could he not
be? He was not yet twenty-one when he entered the war, and likely did so with a sense of
idealism and honor. But just four years later all was for naught. The Union stood
victorious, the people of the South were broken, and the slaves, emancipated. And,
although Catron survived, the carnage that he witnessed hardened his character and his
resolve.120 In spite of the post-war order, his defeat became strength. But to harness it, he
required a fresh start.121 So barely a year after his parole, Catron picked up and moved
over eight hundred miles to the Territory of New Mexico.

For New Mexico and the Southwest, the Civil War and its aftermath led to a
significant transformation. To this day, most historians of the American Civil War have
included narratives of the West with regards to its important role in the sectional crisis as
well as some of the fighting that occurred in the intermountain West. But more attention
needs to be paid to how the war, in all its influence, developed separate (though
connected) missions in the East and the West, especially regarding the relationship
between the Civil War and the incorporation of western lands and peoples.122 While a
focus on legislation has linked the West with the federal government through the
Homestead Act, Transcontinental Railroad Act, and Morrell Land Grant Act, a spotlight
on the decisions that emanated from the executive, judicial, and military branches of
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government buttress a perspective that the Union carried out an imperial mission in the
West with prescient foresight toward the postwar needs of the growing nation.
To understand the totality of the Civil War’s impact on the West, and on New
Mexico in particular, historians may do well to consider the war in two main phases. The
first phase involved the clash between North and South, between Grey Texans and
Blue(ish) Californians, Coloradans, and New Mexicans. Southern leaders harbored plans
for a continental Confederacy including all or portions of New Mexico, Arizona,
California, Colorado, and Utah. By the fall of 1862, however, Union strength in New
Mexico halted the Confederate’s western advance and waylaid southern dreams of
mineral riches or a Pacific port. Instead of fading in importance by 1863, however, the
North instigated a second phase of the war based on the subjugation of local populations
and the extension of federal powers.
With an ongoing war effort in the East, the Union sought to reinforce the political
attachment of state and territorial bodies through a more streamlined flow of power
emanating out of Washington D.C. to the West, with local capitals (i.e. Denver, Santa Fe,
Prescott) to act as transmitters. To help do so, the federal government under Lincoln
altered the boundaries of Utah, Wyoming, Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Arizona.123 This reorganization illuminates one means by which Union leadership sought
to make sense of western space and to integrate it into the nation. The federal government
also developed a greater role in the extension of capitalist practices into the West.
Transportation and communication, two essential components of economic development,
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grew in the West due to direct governmental intervention.124 All-in-all the extension of
federal power into the West signifies the proliferation of a northern political and
economic position with antecedents in the Whiggish tradition of state-supported
economic growth through internal improvement and fiscal management.125 Historians
have discussed this as the spread of “free labor” ideology; in part, it is.126 What needs to
be clarified though is that free labor developed in tandem with the (often violent, forceful,
or legal-manipulative) subjugation of the West’s prior inhabitants, and that it spread by
federal largess and corruption as much as individual energy or enterprise.
During the years of fighting between North and South the territorial government
of New Mexico functioned in what can best be defined as a holding pattern.127 Military
necessity dictated the course of governance.128 Early in the war this translated to a focus
on establishing loyalty within the territory and combating the Confederate force moving
northward out of Texas and Mesilla.129 Whereas all federal appointees had to swear an
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oath of office, starting in 1861 territorial officials found the traditional oaths replaced
with those that prioritized allegiance to the Union. In New Mexico, many of these oaths
were conducted in Spanish and made sure to include special language that did not punish
Mexican Americans for any hostility towards the United States that occurred prior to the
signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 130 The process of administering these
symbolic ties to the nation may have helped some New Mexicans to feel connected to the
Union, but the invasion of a mostly Texan Confederate force as far north as Santa Fe
proved far more convincing. A longstanding animosity towards Texans coupled with a
pragmatic Union stance that allowed for the enlistment of Mexicans to territorial militia
and “Home Guard” companies turned out to be the surest strategy for fostering northern
allegiance and had the added benefit of fixing much of the population to the Republican
Party.131
From its birth as a U.S. Territory in 1851 until the Civil War, New Mexico
encompassed its modern state boundaries as well as all of Arizona and portions of
southern Colorado and Utah. Maintaining order across this enormous territory, already
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plenty difficulty under normal circumstances, was near impossible during war. Southern
sympathy and Confederate leanings in the southern portion of the Territory was
especially worrisome to Lincoln and the Republican administration. A convention held in
Mesilla in 1860 illustrated that any federal anxiety was well placed. The Texans and
Mesilleros who attended the convention established the Territory of Arizona complete
with a constitution that permitted slavery. By March the next year Arizona officially
seceded and the following January was recognized by the Confederate Congress in
Richmond.132 This territory spanned the entirety of the southern third of New Mexico,
over 670 miles long, with its capital at Mesilla and a second hub at Tucson. Until July of
1862, the Confederate capital at Mesilla stood in direct confrontation to the Union
authority in Santa Fe and Las Vegas, presenting a direct challenge to the Union’s hold
over the West and to a monolithic continental empire.
After a combination of Colorado and New Mexico volunteers forced a Texan
retreat from northern New Mexico, and ten companies of California volunteers marched
through Confederate Arizona to Mesilla, the South aborted any plans for maintaining a
military presence in the region or capturing any Pacific ports. Once again in charge of the
entirety of New Mexico, the federal government set about to strengthen its position in the
Southwest.133 In February 1863 Congress passed and President Lincoln signed an organic
act for the creation of the Arizona Territory. Instead of the Confederate organized
boundary that followed near the 34th parallel, the new border bisected New Mexico at the
107th meridian. Alongside cutting off the line of southern sympathy that ran from Mesilla
Kellogg, “Lincoln’s New Mexico Patronage,511-533; Larson, New Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 84.
Ralph Y. McGinnins, and Calvin N. Smith, eds., Abraham Lincoln and the Western Territories
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1994). Colorado sectioned off February 28, 1861. Arizona organized as
a territory February 1863. Utah greatly diminished in land area with most of the proceeds going to
Colorado, Wyoming, and Nevada. Nevada declared a state October 31, 1864.
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to Tucson, Congress established Arizona’s first territorial capital at Prescott, a Unioncontrolled mining town. The Republican administration immediately began the task of
selecting appointments for the new territorial government, making sure to prioritize a
strong Union position and party allegiance over other qualifications.134
With the removal of Confederate troops and the organization of the Arizona
Territory, a new phase of the Civil War era opened in the Southwest. The enlarged
military presence in the region provided the means for a fresh round of aggressive Indian
warfare intended to pacify the region, subdue Native communities, and create an
infrastructure for western incorporation. The need for heightened security was felt by
New Mexicans due to federal disregard of Indian relations in the early years of the war.135
As trade and diplomatic gifting fell-off, groups of Navajo, Apache, and Comanche
Indians increased the practice of raiding to supplement their diet and population. In a
“Memorial” to President Lincoln and the Secretary of War, the New Mexico Legislative
Assembly felt that even after federal forces secured the territory, an enlarged troop
presence was needed to combat Indian depredations. Their letter, dated January 26, 1863,
stated that recent raiding had led to the death of over fifty persons with another thirtyfour wounded and over three-hundred and forty thousand dollars of stolen property and
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livestock.136 True to form, New Mexicans found both a source of relief and of renewed
political infighting when General James Carleton, named commander of the military
department of New Mexico, made it his business to deal with the Indian Problem.
Beginning in 1863 Carleton initiated a series of destructive attacks against the
indios bárbaros of New Mexico. He utilized a mixed army of Colorado and New Mexico
volunteers led in the field by the old scout Kit Carson to reduce these Indians, especially
the Navajos and Apaches to a state of dependence.137 To do so meant launching an
aggressive campaign into the heart of the enemy homeland and carrying out a strategy of
scorched-earth to diminish their ability to sustain a war effort or even the health and
morale of their families. Paired with the destruction of Indian crops, trees, horses, houses,
and people, Carleton also established new defensive forts and posts, as well as one of the
first attempts at an Indian reservation situated under the thumb of Fort Sumner.138
The Bosque Redondo experiment, though abortive, represents the ways in which
this second phase of the Civil War in New Mexico shaped the territory and its relation to
the federal government and regional economy. The requirements of providing for the
reservation and over eight thousand dependents led to an increase in federal money and
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oversight in the territory. Annually, the bill topped one million dollars. A majority of
these funds were paid out to military personnel and to independent contractors, who
benefitted the most from the federal largess.139 This influx of money into the local
economy shifted its gravity towards those who could supply foodstuffs to the reservation.
During the Bosque Redondo’s existence, prices for staples in New Mexico such as corn,
wheat, and beef increased, leading locals to complain of higher costs while contractors
filled their pockets with federal money in sales to the reservation. The practice of
hoarding food, especially grains, for higher prices in the winter months in combination
with corruption and discrimination in awarding contracts created a situation in which the
U.S. military maintained a steady hold on New Mexico’s economy.140 In General
Carleton’s attempt to assimilate Native Americans, he also sought to utilize federal
authority to incorporate southwestern space and people into a national culture and
economy. This proved only as effective as the amount of resources he could muster.
As signaled by the return of the Navajo to the Dinetah, 1868 marks the end of the
second phase of the Civil War in New Mexico. Although Carleton’s project reversed the
trend of declining federal interest in the territory by pumping millions of dollars into
Bosque Redondo, the reservation itself proved a failure.141 The experiment did offer some
lessons for those who paid attention. For one, the Navajo came away from the reservation
experience a changed people, with both a new understanding and animosity towards the
United States. Enterprising Euro Americans could find a different message: that the
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federal government could create economic growth, and that partnering with the
government could be very lucrative indeed. For many merchants, farmers, and ranchers,
Bosque Redondo was merely a precursor to years of federally-induced capitalism in the
Southwest. The sheer increase in the size and presence of the U.S. army, coupled with its
attempted role as provider for subjugated Native Americans, created new viable markets
at army posts and forts across the region. Military garrisons, such as Fort Union, acted in
the truest sense of creative destruction as they violently opened the mountains and plains
of New Mexico and then generated commercial activity in the conquered space.
Alternatively, after 1868 the army’s direct political involvement in territorial governance
waned even as its involvement in exploring and expanding local markets continued.142

Catron Travels the Trail
Like thousands of his compatriots in the years following the Civil War, Thomas
Catron’s choice to move westward is not surprising. Even his decision to try his luck in
New Mexico follows a contemporary logic. By the mid-1860s, Missourians were the
Americans most familiar with New Mexico, its economy, politics, and people.143 At the
heart of this familiarity was the Santa Fe Trade, of which over one million dollars in
merchandise and currency traveled annually. Catron even had palpable connections to
mentors, friends, and family that lived or traveled in the territory. The much respected
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General Sterling Price, ex-president of the University of Missouri and acquaintance of the
young Thomas Catron and Stephen Elkins, had served as military Governor of New
Mexico during the Mexican-American War. A cousin, William J. Catron, may have
planted the idea of moving to the territory in Thomas Benton’s mind when they met up at
a parole camp in Demopolis, Alabama. As a freighter for the company of Russell,
Majors, and Waddell, based out of Lexington, William Catron had made several trips to
and from New Mexico.144 But Thomas Catron’s old pal and classmate, Stephen Benton
Elkins, played the most influential role in steering him to the Southwest.
Just like during their time spent arguing opposite sides of the Lincoln-Douglas
debate, Catron and Elkins opposed each other as soldiers in the Civil War (not that it
would come between them later). Conditions for the two during the war could not have
been more different. While Catron traipsed southward along the Mississippi, fighting in
numerous battles and skirmishes along the way, Elkins, a captain in the Eastern Missouri
Militia, spent most of his short time in the army on guard duty with infrequent action. By
July 3, 1863, the final day of the Battle of Gettysburg and just as Catron and the
Confederates at Vicksburg ate their last meager rations of mule meat and prepared for
surrender, Elkins had enjoyed a removal from his post and an end of service in the war.
That fall Elkins connected with some Republican appointees headed to the newly
organized Territory of Arizona. For lack of sufficient funds, he never quite made it.
Instead, Elkins found employment in Mesilla, New Mexico as a quartermaster’s clerk.
Soon, the witty and energetic Elkins passed the bar in New Mexico, and gained the
appointment of assistant justice for the territory’s third judicial district.145 Subsequently,
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Elkins gained the appointment as district attorney for the third district, followed by his
election to the Territorial House of Representatives from Doña Ana County. This all
transpired before Catron even made it home to Lexington following the war.
From the time of his first political appointment, Stephen Elkins set a new standard
for power-seeking territorial transplants. Catron would in fact follow the very path
pioneered by Elkins. This involved several steps; the first of which simply involved
siding with the Republican Party. Although no strict correlation between local and
national politics existed in New Mexico during its first decade and a half as a U.S.
Territory, southern secession and the Union maintenance of its western possessions
resulted in new political opportunity for those willing and able to further the interests of
the Republican Party, even if only in name.146 Not until the 1870s would a political
machine dominate New Mexico’s executive, legislative, and judicial agenda, but Elkins’
wartime record of appointment and election foreshadowed its evolution. He combined a
working knowledge of the Spanish language (learned while in New Mexico), political
nepotism, and “friend” networks, especially through ties to Missouri and Freemasons. By
the end of the war Elkins had adroitly worked his way up the local Republican ranks, as
evidenced by his relocation to the center of regional power in Santa Fe.147 From the
territorial capital, Elkins began to plot his future.
In the spring of 1866, Elkins plans necessitated a visit to western Missouri. He
stopped by his home of Westport as well as the neighboring towns of Wellington and
Lexington. In Wellington, Elkins married Sarah Jacobs. In Lexington, he reacquainted

146
147

Gonzales, Política, 29.
Lambert, Stephen Benton Elkins, 29.

88

with his old friend Tom Catron. Both returned with him to New Mexico.148 They set off
for Santa by mid-June and arrived in the city in late July, taking nearly six weeks to make
their way along the Santa Fe Trail. Prior to his time as a Confederate Soldier, this
westward trek would have easily presented Catron with the longest journey of his life.
After years of marching and fighting with insufficient rest or food, and as part of a
civilian wagon train accompanied by friends, Catron’s first venture across the Great
American Desert probably felt more romantic than daunting.149 On the trail Catron and
Elkins, both still in their mid-twenties, discussed plans for the future, including their
desires to become U.S. senators. They placed their faith in the Territory of New Mexico
to help them achieve this goal.
Whereas Elkins provided the necessary contacts within New Mexico’s post-war
order to help Thomas Benton obtain a political appointment, the ex-Confederate’s first
relations in the territory were decidedly economic. Before heading west, John Catron
supplied his son with two wagons laden with flour and sixteen mules.150 The selection
represents an astute understanding of environmental and market conditions in New
Mexico. First, by choosing mules, rather than oxen, John Catron observed the common
knowledge of the Southwest, which was that the mule was still by and far the most
efficient beast of burden for the arid landscape. Second, he had access to the prices of
common goods in New Mexico and knew that because of drought, grasshoppers, and the
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supply needs of the U.S. government, that flour could earn ten dollars a sack.151 Other
than an increase in the numbers of federal soldiers in New Mexico during the Civil War
and the following Indian wars, General Carleton’s new reservation system also required
substantial imports of meat and grains to supply the Native American people subjugated
into dependence. The result was an increased reliance for foods from outside the territory
and inflated prices for flour in Santa Fe.152 Thomas Catron’s wagons contained enough of
the latter to help him settle into his new home.
It was still the middle of the summer when Catron arrived in Santa Fe. There he
began his introduction to New Mexican law and politics. For his first position he worked
with attorney Merrill Ashurst but soon fell in as a scrivener for Kirby Benedict who
served as the Chief Justice to the New Mexico Supreme Court from 1858 until early
1866.153 A colorful character, Benedict had lost the use of one of his hands in duel. He
was also one of the most knowledgeable jurists in the territory, having worked on the
bench for over a decade and serving on the commission to revise and codify New
Mexico’s laws as recent as 1865.154 Finally, he was the first Supreme Court Justice to
write an opinion on land grant rights from a U.S. court.155 As an ex-Confederate, Catron
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was fortunate to receive this educational position with Judge Benedict, an ardent Union
man.156 Their mutual friend and fellow Freemason, Stephen Elkins, whom Benedict
worked with in the Third Judicial District, probably set up the arrangement. For his part,
Catron was no fool; he was wise enough to recognize the political pragmatism and social
importance of being a Republican in the post-war era. He also understood that in the
territories, party allegiance had flexible qualities and that who you knew often trumped
what you believed. So, after only five months in New Mexico, the newly-minted
Republican received his first appointment as district attorney for the Third Judicial
District. By January of 1867, Catron relocated to Mesilla.
Similar to Elkins before him, Catron’s two years in the Third District served as a
seasoning period for the newcomer. It was the largest district geographically speaking,
but had the smallest population, and stood farthest from the center of power in Santa Fe.
Mesilla, the seat of Doña Ana County and the largest town in the district, had just over
four thousand inhabitants, most of them Mexican.157 Spanish was without a doubt the
most common language used in the courts and town halls. While serving as district
attorney, Catron continued his study of law and passed the New Mexico bar on June 15,
1867.158 During this time he also improved his handle of the Spanish language, a subject
that he approached much like his other studies, with earnest vigor. He also engaged with
the local network of masons in southern New Mexico, for which the neighboring town of
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Las Cruces acted as a hub.159 There Catron likely initiated his relationship with territorial
politicians and businessmen such as Colonel William L. Rynerson, with whom Catron
continued to work with until the 1890s.160 The web of personal networks that Catron
started to build in his formative years in New Mexico, and the important role that
Republican and Freemason connections had to this affect, proved increasingly important
as the territory progressed into the Gilded Age. In the mid-1860s, however, New Mexico
was not yet there. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the western territories
were still trying to find their footing in the post-war order.
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Chapter 2:
Integrity & Veracity:
Lessons of Political Economy in Gilded Age New Mexico
I, William Breeden, clerk of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico, upon oath state
that I have known Thomas B. Catron the present Attorney General of said Territory for fifteen
years, and during a considerable portion of that time I have been very intimately associated with
him, and have always had entire confidence in his integrity and veracity. I know him to be an
honest, honorable, and truthful man and that any statements he may make under oath or
otherwise, on whatever subject, are entitled to the highest respect and the fullest faith and credit.
Signed, Wm. Breeden, Clerk of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, February 16, 1872

Kirchner’s Folly—the Lessons of a Santa Fe Scandal
For historians of the Gilded Age, stories abound of shady dealing, corrupt
behavior, and the intimacy between business and government.1 As they unfolded across
the American West these practices upheld neither the ideal of an expansive agrarian
republic, nor those of a truly liberal and free market. While surely unethical and
sometimes strictly illegal by twenty-first century standards, the years after the Civil War
witnessed an acute confluence of partisan and capital networks. The total domination of
the Republican Party over the policy and bureaucracy of the federal government allowed
it to function at times as a national political machine. An ideology of free men and free
labor may have fueled its engine, but once running, the Republican machine turned
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around to manufacture spoils at an unprecedented rate. The western territories, which
doubled in number during the 1860s, developed in direct relation to the system of
rewards (and sometimes punishments) handed out to partisan stalwarts and black-sheep
brother-in-laws from mostly Union states like Indiana, Ohio, and New York. As a result,
political machines arose in most of the territories, grafting themselves to the federal
government on one end and to the local populace or economy on the other.2 In the
parlance first applied to Boss Tweed and his Democratic machine run out of Tammany
Hall, these networks were the “rings” of the American West, full of steadfast machine
politicians who often doubled as agents of market capitalism. They cultivated
relationships with local and regional business interests, and served as middle-men to link
eastern capital and political prestige with western ventures and opportunities ripe for
speculation.3 American empire expanded in this process, one insider network at a time.
Stephen Elkins, Thomas Catron, and their cohort built personal fortunes on the
foundations of those same national networks, entrenching their position by replicating the
system of patronage and ward politics. From this split national-local outlook, they grew
their power through circles of family, fraternity, friendship, and finance; a set of bonds
with roots in the Old World and branches reaching out toward the future.4 By 1869, when

For discussion of different “rings” that cropped up in the West, see: Gressley, West by East, 7; David
Caffey, Chasing the Santa Fe Ring: Power and Privilege in Territorial New Mexico (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2014), 11-14, and Appendix B “Profiles of Alleged Ring Participants,”
241-245; and Ronald H. Limbaugh, Rocky Mountain Carpetbaggers: Idaho's Territorial Governors, 18631890 (Moscow: University Press of Idaho, 1982).
3
While ring politics and insider cliques imposed authority over their own miniature empires in much of the
West during the Gilded Age, the Sante Fe Ring remains unique in its longevity and its ability to manipulate
the politics and economy of New Mexico from 1871 through the turn of the twentieth century. Even Boss
Tweed’s ring lasted under a decade. Alexander B. Callow, Jr., The Tweed Ring (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), 3.
4
Gene M. Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen: Politics, Investors, Operators From 1870 to 1900 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska, 1966), 142-43; also see White’s chapter in Railroaded on “Friends” in the late
nineteenth century, especially with regards to his discussion of networking (96) and the way friendship
2
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a frenzy of land grant speculation really set in, Catron gained appointment as attorney
general for New Mexico and moved to the center of the action—Santa Fe, a city already
steeped in ring politics. For Catron the capital city became his keystone, helping to unite
and uphold his many networks.5
Along their way to the top, a vocal opposition brought public attention to the
wanton misbehavior of the capitalists, railroaders, lawyers, bankers, cattlemen, and civil
servants of the Gilded Age who offended the public trust. Headlines blared with invective
to inform the people of the scandalous actions and policies of these schemers, castigating
robber-barons and land-monopolists and then the general populace for putting up with
them.6 The fact remained however, that the Catron-esque figures of the generally poor
and rural West held the very mechanisms of power in their hands and exercised it through
strategic networking.7 The public knew that they were self-serving, greedy, and corrupt.

functioned as a cultural connection between the personal, political, and business relationships of the Gilded
Age (100-101).
5
A “ring” was first said to be in control of New Mexico affairs out of Santa Fe in 1866, though the
mechanisms of ring rule developed early after the U.S. conquest of New Mexico and its organization as a
territory. For first mention of “ring” activity, see “Gov. Mitchell,” New Mexican (Santa Fe, N. Mex.), 1
December 1866, p. 1.
In the language of social network analysis, Thomas Catron found his deepest level of
embeddedness through his networks centered in Santa Fe. It was also the place where his connections
allowed him to most effectively move between cohorts to broker alliances for business or political gain. For
discussion on embeddedness and the ability of middle-men to powerfully shape cross-network interaction,
see: John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 14001434" The American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1259-1319.
6
Some rather fun headlines attacking Catron and the Santa Fe Ring include: “Rump Stake. That’s What
Valdez Wanted and He Got It. A Few Remarks about Catron’s Asylum,” Las Vegas Daily Gazette (N.
Mex.), 27 March 1884, p. 4; “Oh! No: Mr. Catron is a patriot; a lover of the poor native-Americans, a man
full of charity, with a heart full of the milk of human kindness - - every two years?” Las Cruces Democrat
(N. Mex.), 28 September 1892, p. 2; “Catron’s Character. John R. McFie Authority for the Assertion That
He Is a Scoundrel,” Independent Democrat (Las Cruces, N. Mex.), 3 October 1894, p. 3; “Grabbed! Or
That Land Would Have Been by T.B. Catron But Not For the Government Land Officers,” Santa Fe Daily
New Mexican, 5 October 1894, p. 4; “Mr. Catron under a Cloud. The New Mexico Congressional Delegate
Accused of Crooked Work,” Kansas City Star (Missouri), 21 August 1895, p. 8.
7
John Wilson, Merchants, Guns, and Money: The Story of the Lincoln County and Its Wars (Santa Fe:
Museum of New Mexico Press, 1987), 63. In his economic-oriented account of the violence that took place
in Lincoln County, historian John Wilson represented Henry Tunstall, the ill-fated Englishman whose
murder set off a vengeful cycle of gunplay, as fully appraised of the way power operated in New Mexico.
In 1876, Tunstall described his outlook and his plan in a letter to his father that matter-of-factly explained

95

In the mid-1870s few New Mexicans would bat an eye at hearing about the mischievous
feats perpetrated in the territory’s government, courts, or land offices. Moreover, under
Ulysses S. Grant the federal government came under fire from no less than twelve
scandals.8 What is so fascinating about this arrangement is that even in an age in which a
little cheating was expected (under the caveat that you did not get caught), the schemers
of the U.S. West seemed totally unable to keep out of trouble. Over bumpy roads, their
coinciding business and political networks represented sturdy shock-absorbers to ringmen
like Catron and Elkins who maintained positions of power and authority with covetable
longevity. With inside track and untrammeled energy, their speculative edge likewise
served the short-term goals of the federal government as the nation looked to expand its
influence throughout, grow new markets within, and exploit the riches of the West.
Perhaps this is best portrayed with a story of scandal and intrigue set in Gilded
Age city of Santa Fe.9 On Monday, January 1, 1872 Thomas Catron ambled across the
dusty streets of the historic Santa Fe Plaza sometime after three in the afternoon and
entered the butcher shop of August Kirchner. That day, Catron served as the mouthpiece
for a small coterie of Republican appointees and officials who wished to secure the
cooperation of Mr. Kirchner. They wanted him to influence two representatives in the
New Mexico legislature. After asking the proprietor to speak with him in a private

“Everything in New Mexico that pays at all (you may say) is worked by a “ring.” There is an “Indian ring,”
the “army ring,” the “political ring,” and “legal ring,” the “Roman Catholic Ring,” the “cattle ring,” the
“horse thieves ring,” the “land ring,” & half a dozen other rings. No “to make things stick” to do any good
it is necessary to either get into a ring or make one for yourself. I am work[ing] at present making a
ring….”
8
Jeffrey D. Schultz, Presidential Scandals (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000), 135154. See the particularly long entry on Ulysses S. Grant, 1869-1877. The worst of these included the
Whiskey Ring, the Credit Mobilier investigation, and issues of graft and nepotism that included his family,
his Vice President, and his Cabinet members.
9
“Optic Digs up History,” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 2 November 1896, p. 2; Simeon H. Newman, III,
“The Santa Fe Ring: A Letter to the New York Sun,” Arizona and the West 12, (Autumn 1970), 269-288.
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backroom, Catron explained that his friends desired Kirchner’s help. They needed to
stack the legislature to absolutely make sure that it had no chance of overriding a veto
signed by Governor Marsh Giddings that prevented the Assembly and Council from
moving Chief Justice Joseph G. Palen from the first to the third judicial district.10 But, the
legislature could still override it with a two-thirds majority vote. Stephen B. Elkins,
William Breeden, and Judge Palen hastened to prevent that very result; so they sent
thirty-one year old Tom Catron.11
To go along, all Kirchner had to do was to cross the plaza, collect five hundred
dollars left in his name at the First National Bank of Santa Fe (of which Elkins was the
President and Catron a director), and use this money to help secure the votes of two
representatives, one each from Santa Fe and Rio Arriba County. Nominally, whatever
money was left over after the purchase of these votes was to be considered Kirchner’s
cut, alongside the friendship and good will that would flow his way. But any pretense of
easy-wheeling stopped there; Kirchner refused to participate in the political charade and
Catron left in a huff. The next morning Elkins sent a written invitation to Kirchner in
attempt to bring the butcher on board by sweetening the deal. The answer was still no.12
Now August Kirchner was no stranger to the practical application of grease to
keep the wheels of politics and business moving in proper order. His established position

10

Affidavit of August Kirchner, Territory of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, 1 February 1872;
Manderfield and Tucker, “The Assignment of Judges,” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 2 January 1872, p. 1.
11
“The Veto,” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 5 January 1872, p. 1. The argument used by the Democrats to
remove Palen involved the fact that the Third Judicial District was terribly mismanaged due to its sheer
size, the lack of rapid and safe transportation, and the inability of agents of the court to effectively serve
subpoenas and warrants. The docket of cases to be heard in the third district had grown much faster than
the justice assigned to that district could attend to, so Democrats charged that Judge Palen, if he was indeed
such a great justice, would be able to bring this district to good order. Of course, their actual goal was
simply to remove him from the first district to prevent the Elkins clique from controlling the courts of the
most populous district in the territory.
12
Affidavit of August Kirchner, Territory of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, 1 February 1872.

97

in Santa Fe arose in correlation to his own networks such as his ties to the U.S. military,
to Nuevomexicano stockraisers, and to the merchants of his city, especially the
significant German-Jewish community who formed an important element of the
territory’s social and economic terrain. Although Kirchner worked in town to sell beef,
pork, and mutton to local consumers, his real income came from lucrative contracts with
military forts to supply them with fresh beef.13 These contracts were extremely
competitive (most infamously shown in the build-up to the Lincoln County War later in
the decade) and relied upon the prompt delivery of sufficient amount and quality of meat
at a government set price that factored-in overhead and profit to the supplier. To ensure
that contracts such as these were consistently met and renewed required ranchers,
suppliers, financers, and military sutlers to all do their part.14 This was most often
accomplished through a mixture of friendship, finesse, and mutual profiteering. It is not
likely that Kirchner declined Elkins entreaties for purely moral motives, then, but rather
because of his affiliation with an opposing party and the contested political landscape of
Santa Fe in 1872 to which we now turn.
The next act of this southwestern saga went down in the Territorial Legislature
and the surrounding streets of New Mexico’s capital city. On the day of the vote to
reassign judicial districts over the veto of Governor Giddings, Democrats and
Republicans swarmed the streets around the legislative hall and into any free space within
the chambers. Democrats from San Miguel County were especially incensed over the
“turning” of one of their representatives through a bribe offered by Stephen Elkins.15

Ibid; “[Probst and Kirchner],” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 30 May 1873, p. 1.
Wilson, Merchants, Guns, and Money, 27.
15
According to the Las Vegas Optic, Elkins bribed Pascual Baca of Las Vegas by offering to cancel a $780
mortgage that he held over Baca and his family. (This is akin to the cancellation of a $15,000 debt in 2010)
13
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Because the crowd in Santa Fe was known for getting out of control during tight political
contests, two companies of U.S. troops under the command of Gen. Gordon Granger
entered Santa Fe and kept watch over the events that day. The Republican faction under
the leadership of Elkins anxiously awaited the results of the vote as well; should the
legislature override the veto the measure would hamstring his local interests while if the
vote failed, there was reason to believe that the crowd could quickly turn on Elkins,
Catron, Breeden, or Palen.16 In an attempt to delay the matter, the Republican clique
utilized stalling parliamentary tactics such as the removal of the Speaker of the House
from the premises to prevent the body from taking up any business. Elkins moniker of
“Smooth Steve” proved accurate on this occasion as he deftly navigated the legislature
into inactivity until it adjourned. By the time the vote actually came to pass on the
morning of January 12, the clamor in Santa Fe had settled. Elkins had managed to secure
enough votes to kill the measure and keep Judge Palen in their home district where his
reputation for skullduggery continued to grow.17
Local Democrats bristled at the way Elkins and his deputies outmaneuvered them.
Kirchner, who apparently was not as necessary to buy votes as Catron led on, took to the
offensive on the first day of February by filing an affidavit with the Probate Court. He
charged Elkins and Catron with attempted bribery and vote buying for the purpose of
keeping Judge Palen in the first district.18 But Kirchner did not stop there; probably
because he was well aware of how ineffectual his affidavit would be if left to the Santa
Fe courts. He sent the affidavit to territorial newspapers for publication and to the U.S.
“Optic Digs up History,” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 2 November 1896, p. 2.
Ibid.
18
Affidavit of August Kirchner. The charges set forth in this affidavit confirm his attempt to use Kirchner
to buy votes in January 1872. The charges leveled against Elkins stemmed from his attempt to bribe
Kirchner with a sure victory in the local courts related to some unspecified land in northern New Mexico.
16
17
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Attorney General and U.S. Chairman of the Judiciary as ammunition against the Elkins
clique of Republican appointees. To give his position authority, Kirchner included
personal endorsements from powerfully connected local Democrats including Felipe
Delgado, Charles P. Clever, S. Seligman, the Spiegelberg Brothers, Mayer Kayser,
Guttman, Friedman & Co., and Z[adock] Staab & Co. These prominent politicians,
traders, and merchants attested to Kirchner’s unquestionable “integrity, truth and
veracity.”19 Good ol’ honest August Kirchner likely believed that the clear evidence of
unethical behavior by territorial appointees would help to remove them from office.
Instead, it brought the ire of the Republican controlled justice system down upon him and
any publishers that broadcast his affidavit, including one Simeon H. Newman III, editor
of The Mail of Las Vegas.
In a typical case of territorial politics, Elkins countered Kirchner’s affidavit with
one of his own filed on February 16 in the Supreme Court of New Mexico. And, since
Kirchner had supporters to attest to his truthiness, so did Elkins who had William
Breeden and Judge Palen inscribe court affidavits as to their full confidence in the
“integrity and veracity” of Thomas Catron. 20 Locally, Attorney General Catron brought
suit against Kirchner and Newman for criminal libel. In Washington, D.C., Elkins’
affidavit and its supporting documents added to the pile of territorial griping and sniping
that constantly ran across the desks and into the folders of Department of State and
19

Endorsement by Probate Judge Felipe Delgado, Territory of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, 14
February 1872; C.P. Clever, S. Seligman & Bro., Spiegelberg Bros., Mayer Kayser, Guttman, Friedman &
Co., and Z[adock] Staab & Bro., Merchants to Lymon Trumbell, U.S. Chairman of the Treasury, 14
February 1872.
20
Affidavit of Stephen B. Elkins, Territory of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, 16 February 1872;
Affidavit of William Breeden, Territory of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, 16 February 1872. The
affidavits that attest to Catron’s respectful and truthful character come across like the testimony of so many
“goodfellas” in support of one of their own. The court agent that notarized Elkins’ affidavit was in fact
William Breeden. For Breeden’s affidavit in defense of Elkins and Catron, their friend Judge Palen served
as the notary.
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Department of Justice bureaucrats. The national capital was already enveloped with
political-business scandal of its own. For top officials to bother with what appeared to
them to be so much noise emanating from Santa Fe was unlikely when it was much easier
to let the crony-laden local branch of the Republican Party maintain its status quo.
For August Kirchner, the non-response from Washington and the lack of public
groundswell against the Elkins faction left him with few alternatives. Instead of trying to
successfully defend himself in the First District Court (fully controlled by Palen, Catron,
and Breeden), Kirchner agreed to file a second affidavit denying all truth to the charges
contained in the first.21 No statements as to his integrity and veracity needed accompany
this retraction; including such statements would only raise the pitch of their hollow ring.
Elkins and Catron dropped the suit against him. Simeon Newman, however, refused to
make up with the Santa Fe clique for publishing information about their scandalous
activities. The district court rewarded him with a one-hundred dollar fine and sixty-four
days in jail.22 The message supplied by this sentence blared: open fighting against the
ring of friends on their home turf (local courts, press, and even legislature) was foolish.
Washington upheld their authority and locally their influence-bearing pockets ran deep.
Although they did not self-proscribe to such a name, the group of Elkins, Catron, Palen,
and Breeden represented a core membership of what its opposition in New Mexico would
come to refer to as the “Santa Fe Ring.”23
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Newman, III, A Letter to the New York Sun, 273-74.
Ibid., 274.
23
The exact genealogy of the moniker Santa Fe Ring remains unclear, but can be traced to its opponents as
a proscribed name for the group. Members, such as Stephen Elkins, Thomas Catron, William Breeden,
Henry Waldo, William Griffin, Joseph Palen and Samuel B. Axtell never self-identified with the title.
Instead, they fought being called a “ring” in the press and periodically denied any kind or form of collusion
within the top echelons of New Mexico’s political, legal, and business strata. Whether the ringmen called
themselves such is decidedly beside the point; their actions belied their public denial and their activities fit
within the national standards of a political machine or special interest group.
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August Kirchner learned to accept and to play along with this powerful clique of
ringmen. Simeon Newman did not. He spent time in the local penitentiary only to be run
out of the territory to Colorado after his release. Kirchner on the other hand, along with
his Mexican wife Doña Refugio, won accolades for their strong work in Rio Arriba
County during the election for Delegate to Congress in 1873 that went to none-other-then
Stephen B. Elkins.24 In 1872 Kirchner tried to have Elkins and Catron kicked out of
office for their unethical actions. In 1873, he and his wife lobbied for their empowerment
by sending Elkins to Washington, D.C. Within the space of eighteen months, in fact, the
ring attracted the support of the general network of German-Jewish merchants and traders
of Santa Fe, the same group who supported Kirchner in his original attack on Elkins and
Catron.25 For Kirchner, his butcher shop grew its business after 1873. The Santa Fe Daily
New Mexican, a thoroughly Republican and ring-friendly paper, supplied him and his
business with plenty of favorable advertisement and even editorial commentary as to his
good market and good reputation.26 Maybe he was aware of the changing political and
economic environment prior to these events; maybe he only meant to poke the bear;
either-way, by 1873 August Kirchner surely understood the new orientation of power and

“Good Workers,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 5 September 1873, p. 1.
Ibid. Supporters that gained mention in the cause of electing Elkins to office as Delegate to Congress
include several of the endorsers for Kirchner against Elkins and Catron in early 1872. The article
specifically mentions “Mr. Probst, James L. Johnson, Charles M. Conklin, Sheriff Nicolas Quintana, David
A. Cataanch, A. Staab, Sam Eckstein, M. Ilfeld, L. Spiegelberg, and Joe Kaier” who supposedly all turned
from Democrats to Republicans during the 1873 campaign in support of Elkins.
26
August Kirchner added the machinery for a brewery for instance, shipped in from Granada, so that along
with the contracting of meat sales, he could also make profit on his competitive advantage regarding the
small amount of beer found in the territory. “[Probst and Kirchner]” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 22
November 1873, p.1; “[Messrs. Probst and Kirchner]” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 28 January 1874, p. 1;
Other signs of positive business and collaboration can be found in basic advertisements and complimentary
reviews of the Probst and Kirchner shop that were printed in the ring-controlled newspaper throughout the
election season of 1873. [Probst and Kirchner],” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 30 May 1873, p. 1;
“[Epidemic of Improvement]” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 16 October 1873, p.1.
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the cluster of lawyer-politicians who controlled it from their reputable positions in Santa
Fe.

Harnessing the Power of the Gilded Age
Kirchner’s folly presents a compelling example of how the Gilded Age permeated
New Mexico and the ways that it framed the territory from the aftermath of the Civil War
through its first decade of statehood. Of the highest importance was the fact that the
world of business and politics often coincided and that their practice at the time was
intensely personal. Friends and enemies alike were familiar with each other; they knew
each other’s places of business, political leanings, family, social circles, vices and often
even their handwriting. In this interpersonal dynamic of the day, money changing hands
could make new friends at least as often as its transaction was the result of friendship.
While this is especially true of the Gilded Age town of Santa Fe, small as it was in 1870
with a population of 4,756, it is true in general of business relations in the late nineteenth
century that grew first and foremost on the bonds between friends and family members.27
When Catron strolled into Kirchner’s shop he came not only to make a deal, but to make
a friend; when Kirchner filed his first affidavit, he not only made public notice of
Catron’s tactless behavior, he publicly rejected Catron and the Santa Fe clique. Kirchner
came around, of course, as did many others when faced with the reality of Ring rule. 28

William J. Parish, “The German Jew and the Commercial Revolution in Territorial New Mexico, 18501900,” New Mexico Historical Review 35 (1960): 1-29, 15; Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 63-65;
White, Railroaded, 93.
28
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political machine as captained by Elkins and then Catron, I capitalize Ring. For a majority of the other
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The about-face of Kirchner and the German merchants of Santa Fe highlights
another theme. For New Mexico and the other western territories, the years following the
Civil War witnessed a high tide of appointee politics that both hardened the political
divisions between Republican and Democrat and softened their ideological edges. In this
way Thomas Catron, a strict Democrat by upbringing (not to mention a slaveholder and
Confederate veteran), could remake himself into a bulwark of the Republican Party in
such a short time. Like Catron, as the friends of nepotism and cronyism channeled into
territorial and Foreign Service posts, these appointees tended to direct their allegiance
toward the party or individual person who helped them to gain their position. In fractal
fashion, the network of patronage cascaded downward from the President and party
leaders at the top, to territorial governors and justices, to sheriffs, post officers, and court
clerks at the local level.29 When ideological differences did get in the way, there were
almost always inducements to help lubricate the system.
The nature of political ideology during the Gilded Age in general favored
pragmatism over static ideals. Because of the intensity of sectional dogma that led up to
the Civil War much of this attention seems to have shifted in the post-war years (at least
outside of the seething South) to focus on “progress,” itself a deeply ambiguous and
contested term.30 A central contradiction of progress was itself the ideological rift
between free competition and monopoly and which of these best structured the
29

Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States, 1861-1890; Studies in Colonial Administration
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 2-3; and Howard R. Lamar, "Carpetbaggers Full of
Dreams: A Functional View of the Arizona Pioneer Politician," Arizona and the West 7 (Autumn 1965):
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30
“Traditional language had no words to describe the business activities of the new leaders after the Civil
War, no words to define the function of their institutions. Traditional politics could not cope with their
demands, nor could traditional law harness them to social welfare. In place of the old canons, they imposed
the rule of the jungle upon a willing people who worshiped at the altar of “Progress.” I take this excerpt
from Cochran and Miller, Age of Enterprise, 129, to summarize the feelings of the time, especially the way
in which progress turned into a secular religion for ambition-oriented Americans.
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economy.31 In the West, the rhetoric about and culture of “progress” was especially
potent. The western capitalist overflowed with the possibilities of regional development;
perhaps more than any of their eastern peers did they understand that development and
progress inherently meant the privileging of one class of people above the rest. Their
booster papers and pamphlets attest to this by claiming again and again that the West
only needed the energetic immigrant, capable, hard-working, industrious—white—and
that this would bring about development and with it, progress.32 There was little need for
strict political ideology in this process. In Gilded Age New Mexico few figures fit the
description of pragmatism better than Thomas Catron. He not only joined the Republican
Party after serving as a Confederate, but engendered a complete transformation of his
political self with a keen eye towards the trends in national power and local politics. He
proved ready and willing to accept new ideas that benefitted him and was equally as
happy to eschew friendships or platforms that caused more pain than profits. At the end
of the day, I do not think it unjust to claim that Catron’s strongest ideological attachment
was to the power of the almighty dollar.
The territorial courts functioned not only to settle legal matters and interpret
territorial statute, but also served as a tool to achieve political and business agendas.33
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When filled with ringmen at all levels, the courts in New Mexico stopped working under
any mask of justice and instead operated for the enjoyment of the Ring and its allies.34
Democratic antagonism to Ring control of the court was exactly what set Kirchner’s story
in motion. Catron made this perfectly clear in the butcher shop when, in a moment of
frustration, he disclosed that it would be ruinous to them if the legislature reassigned
Palen away from the first district.35 August Kirchner understood Catron’s plea and likely
estimated that he could help produce that very outcome. He knew that as long as Judge
Palen, Attorney General Catron, and Court Clerk Breeden controlled the first district
court, he had no hope of a fair shake. His initial step, however, of composing an affidavit
and having it recorded in the courts, was not insignificant. Even if plagued with collusion
and favoritism the court still behaved as a legitimizing institution. With documentation
on record, Elkins and Catron could not ignore Kirchner’s accusation or quietly rebuff it.
Their rather official response, including filing their own affidavit with their own
supporting documentation makes this clear. Furthermore, Catron harnessed the power of
the courts and the law in bringing the attack back to his accusers. By threatening Kirchner
and Newman with criminal libel, the ringmen placed the abstract power of the judicial
system at their disposal.
Although the Santa Fe Ring did not continue to maintain such encompassing
influence over the courts as it did in the 1870s, during that decade Catron and friends
found plenty of self-serving use for the austere judicial body. The actions of the courts,
34
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for instance, during the “wars” that took place in Colfax and Lincoln Counties, as well as
in the many land and election suits showcases a monopoly of state power and state
violence centralized in Santa Fe and upheld by federal authority.36 As Simeon Newman
learned the hard way, violence, or the threat thereof, was an active ingredient in territorial
politics. Instead of safeguarding the populace against the threat of violent repression, the
strategic positioning of ring members allowed them to use the courts to conspicuously
suppress their enemies. An “omnibus law” passed by the New Mexico legislature even
gave the leading lawyers and judges increased power and discretion by establishing a
process for prosecuting “all crimes for which there is not statute provision.” The law
thereby provided members of the Ring with a limitless arsenal of charges to levy against
any real or imagined opposition.37 Until the Lincoln County debacle in 1878 led to
federal special agent Frank Warner Angel’s investigation into the role played by the
territorial governor and certain agents of the court, the Santa Fe clique dominated the
judicial system of New Mexico.38
Finally, the story of August Kirchner and his eighteen month turn-around from
fighting against to working for Elkins and Catron demonstrates the dexterous code of
ethics practiced at the time and how it actually functioned to connect local interests with
national interests in an effective manner.39 While historians often have trouble casting the
actions of their subjects as unethical because of “the times they lived in,” I have no such
hesitance. Westerners knew that offering bribes for votes fit within the realm of the
unethical. That is why Catron asked to converse with Kirchner in a back room in the first
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place. Afterwards, when Elkins and Catron countered Kirchner’s affidavit with one of
their own, their attempt to cover their tracks and deny all involvement indicates that they
knew their behavior could have them formally censured or even removed from office.
They took the proper steps to prevent any harm from coming their way not because they
held some false idea that they were right in their initial course of action, but because they
knew exactly what they had done and why it was worth it, regardless of the potential
consequences. When no punishment came down to them and instead they set the law and
the courts on their accusers, Elkins and Catron presented an unmistakable argument to the
Kirchner’s the West. No clear benefit existed to the ethically inflexible. Kirchner and his
support network had learned that there was no good reason to fight the house when its
proprietors offered a cushy seat at the table and a fat steak.
While plenty of opposition fought the Santa Fe Ring over the years, the Ring’s
genius came in its flexible membership and its endless inducements to participate with,
rather than battle against, its objectives.40 Many of the Ring’s participant members
originated from the ranks of its opposition. For instance, when the Maxwell Land Grant
and Railway Company attempted to remove squatters from its claimed land in the early
1870s, Melvin W. Mills fought against the company. And yet, by 1876 Mills acted as a
trusted agent for the Ring by purchasing the MLGRC at a foreclosure auction for
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$16,479.46 and then surreptitiously redirected ownership to Catron.41 To understand this
change, the deposition of another Colfax County resident and company affiliate, Frank
Springer, provides an insightful gaze into the rings’ machinations.
When asked by a federal agent in 1878 about the existence of the Santa Fe Ring,
Springer evaded a direct response. Though he worked for the Maxwell Company and
likely knew much about its business, Springer did not admit to any clear knowledge
regarding the Rings’ operation. Instead, he provides an example of how he understood it
to function, and who pulled the strings. He explained to Frank Warner Angel: “In 1873,
M.W. Mills who had been a prominent opponent of the Maxwell Company and of the
men who controlled it was elected a member of the Territorial Legislature. Very soon
after this he became very intimate with Dr. Longwill, whom he had before strongly
opposed, and after he went to Santa Fe to attend the session of the Legislature, he wrote
to Longwill, in which he informed him that ‘by a little sharp figuring’ he had ‘got in with
the big side.’42 Springer identified Dr. Robert H. Longwill of Cimarron, one of the
original investors in the grant, as the Rings’ local agent, and that from December 1873
onward, “Mr. Mills became and continued to be very intimate with Longwill, as well as
with Messrs Elkins and Catron, and represented them in business and political matters in
the County to a very large extent, at least their intimacy and harmony of interests was
very apparent to outside observers and in 1875 when Mills was again a Candidate for the
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Legislature and Longwill for Probate Judge, all their powers were exerted to promote his
election…”43 The ringmen were persuasive friends indeed.
To produce a harmony of interest, the Ring could also employ more devious
means. When the Secretary of the Territory William G. Ritch attempted to gain the
appointment as Governor in 1875, Elkins blocked the nomination and helped gain the
position for Samuel B. Axtell, who became a fast friend of the Ring and an even faster
detriment to New Mexico. Once again filling the Secretary’s seat, Ritch grumbled. When
his griping turned into obstinacy, the Ring leaned on some friends in Washington, D.C. to
have him removed from office.44 Catching wind of the maneuvers through his own D.C.
connections, Ritch understood the message and its implications and so promptly toed the
line thereafter. When Axtell came under fire the following year, Ritch authored a petition
supporting the governor, sending it to Secretary of State Carl Schurz.45 Ritch had grown
quite helpful and was trying to help tie up the mess left in the aftermath of another
believed ring-led endeavor, the murder of Reverend T.J. Tolby in Colfax County in 1875.
When placed under interrogation, two suspected Nuevomexicanos gave the authorities
four names of the people who paid them to commit the crime: Griego, Mills, Donohue,
and Longwill. Though the two suspects had confessed, Catron and William Breeden
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defended them in court and won their acquittal.46 In these ways, the Santa Fe Ring of the
early Gilded Age gained new followers as least as often as it made new enemies.
A more reliable means utilized by Catron and his fellow ring-mates to stifle
opposition and induce cooperation involved their affiliation to fraternal organizations,
especially the Ancient Free and Accepted Masons. The role of the Order of the
Freemasons within the ranks of the Santa Fe Ring remains shrouded by the secrecy that
accompanied the Masonic institution in general.47 Throughout the American West,
freemasonry provided a welcome social space for recent Anglo American immigrants to
fraternize in respectable social circles outside of the saloons, game halls, or brothels. In
Santa Fe, Las Vegas, and other established New Mexican towns, the lodge became a
substitute for the middle-class parlor or smoking room of the East. Other than the
monthly meetings, members congregated for amusement, relaxation, and education.48
When the Montezuma Lodge of Santa Fe met the first Monday of every month on the
northeast corner of the Plaza, its members did not all arrive with nefarious schemes in
mind. It is hard to believe, however, that the appearance of so many freemasons within
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the territorial government and on the board of directors of New Mexico’s largest
corporations was merely a coincidence.49
In New Mexico, the history of the Free and Accepted Masons began prior to U.S.
conquest. The same flow of trade and commerce that emerged along the Santa Fe Trail
brought Euro American freemasons into Mexico.50 After the U.S. conquest in 1846 the
old Missouri-Santa Fe connections included many the new leaders of the fledgling
territory such as Charles Bent, Ceran St. Vrain, Christopher “Kit” Carson, General
Sterling Price, Henry Connelly, Joab Houghton, Merrill Ashurst, Kirby Benedict, and
Solomon Spiegelberg. They operated under the direction of the Grand Lodge of Missouri,
a Masonic body that expanded its jurisdiction liberally over the settled portions of the
U.S. West. Although the organization started out as traveling soldier’s lodges, by 1851
members officially chartered the Montezuma Lodge No. 1 in Santa Fe.51 Many of
Catron’s early friends and advocates in New Mexico held the position of Worshipful
Master of the Montezuma Lodge. These men included the judges and lawyers who
provided for his legal training in the late 1860s and the spoilsmen who inculcated Catron
to the world of frontier banking and speculation in the early 1870s. Elkins, a practicing
freemason, introduced Thomas Benton to the New Mexico scene soon after the young
Catron moved to Mesilla and again upon his relocation to Santa Fe. Without a doubt,
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Catron’s Masonic affiliation opened doors otherwise closed to ex-Confederates and
helped him to build a strong fraternal connection in the territory based on his Missouri
heritage. When the New Mexico masons created an independent department in 1877, the
Montezuma Lodge in which Catron held membership represented the single largest
Masonic body in the territory.
The Grand Lodge of Masons in New Mexico officially organized at Las Vegas on
Tuesday, August 7, 1877, for the stated purpose of forging “friendship” and
“brotherhood” amongst the Masonic community of the territory. At the time, only three
lodges, Santa Fe, Las Vegas, and Las Cruces, and one-hundred and sixty-five members
embodied that community.52 This close-knit group included many of the best connected
land owners, merchants, politicians, and lawyers in New Mexico. Of the officers,
William W. Griffin, William Rynerson, Henry L. Waldo, and Thomas B. Catron directly
represented Ring interests. Almost the entire directorship of the Maxwell Company and
the First National Bank of Santa Fe stood within Masonic ranks, including Stephen
Elkins, Samuel B. Wheelock, John Pratt, and Miguel A. Otero. Governor Samuel B.
Axtell, Ring member, friend of the Central Pacific Railroad, and Ohio freemason, led as
Master of Ceremonies at the induction ceremony.53 The editors of the ring-friendly Santa
Fe New Mexican and fellow masons William Manderfield and Thomas Tucker used their
paper to inform the public of the day’s events and later to publicize upcoming
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gatherings.54 Regardless of whether Santa Fe ringmen brought outsiders into the Masonic
fold or if they made friends through lodge meetings, the overlap of members and interests
abounds.
The combination of the Santa Fe Ring and the Montezuma Lodge allowed
substantial latitude to pull the strings of governance and local development. When they
attempted to do so on a territory-wide level, however, other component parts of the New
Mexico Grand Lodge fought back. Until the summer of 1877 the direction of the
Missouri Grand Lodge constrained overt centralizing actions by the Santa Fe freemasons,
instead privileging connections to Missouri interests over those of a specific town or
county within the territory. At the first Annual Communication of the New Mexico Grand
Lodge held in January 1879, the Grand Master William Griffin clarified the new powers
of the local body and its full jurisdiction over the territory and all of the lodges found
within its borders. In response, Democratic freemasons from Silver City rebuffed
Griffin’s declaration. The Silver City group argued that it maintained its allegiance to the
Missouri lodge and that the ring-laden leadership from Santa Fe could not induce
members from Grant County to submit to Ring rule.55 William Rynerson, the newly
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elected Grand Master of the New Mexico Lodge, disagreed. In 1880 he arrested the
Masonic charter of the Silver City lodge, attached penalties to their leadership, and
directed correspondence to national leadership to induce Missouri to fully recognize New
Mexico’s sovereign jurisdiction.56
At the following years’ communication, held at Las Vegas, both sides continued
the feud. The Worshipful Master of the Silver City lodge wrote a scathing letter that he
published in the Grant County Herald. He argued that the Silver City Lodge owed its
origins to the Grand Lodge of Missouri and should remain under its care. He went on to
state “that the Grand lodge of New Mexico, having adopted the Santa Fe Ring doctrine of
“Rule or Ruin,” has been a positive detriment to the cause of Masonry, and by her course
towards Lodges in our Territory that would not “bend the pliant hinges of the knee” to
her, has rendered herself a stench in the nostrils of all good Masons….”57 In defense of
his Santa Fe friends, Rynerson retorted against the insolence of Silver City and pushed
for new action to be taken against both the Grant County freemasons and the Missouri
Grand Lodge. By 1883 the Grand Lodge of New Mexico won its jurisdictional dispute,
forcing Silver City to pay back dues and Missouri to acknowledge its lack of sovereignty
in the territory.58 But, even as the mid-80s brought newly centralized power to the New
Mexico Grand Lodge, the recent construction of railroad mileage throughout the territory
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and an influx of Euro American immigration led to a sustained rise in Masonic
membership and a diffusion of power by the entrance of new lodges and new generations
of freemasons.59

Political Economy of Santa Fe and its Ring
As a Gilded Age city, Santa Fe was both representative and unique. In a time
characterized by opulence, little by eastern standards could be found. The boosters’ birdseye-view lacked those elements usually found in cities promoting themselves as
modern.60 Despite its humble appearance, leading Santa Feans sought to secure their
city’s status as a hub of southwestern commerce, politics, and power. To do so, they
recognized the need to integrate the surrounding hinterlands, their products, and their
resources into a scheme organized around and through Santa Fe. For the acquisitive
Americans, this was an inherently competitive affair. Catron and his friends knew that all
too well. With great optimism, and even greater trust in their ability to game the system,
they were poised to centralize the forces of the market and the state in Santa Fe. As the
1860s came to a close, the emerging leadership of the Ring had good reason to believe
that their ambitious goal stood within reach.
First and foremost, Santa Fe operated as the political headquarters for New
Mexico. As the designated capital this may seem obvious enough, but it is very important
with regards to the flow of power from Washington, D.C. to the county and municipal
level in the territory. In this sense Santa Fe acted as a political borderland with its gaze
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set upon the nation and the local needs of New Mexico. This is represented clear enough
by Santa Fe’s housing of the Governor who was almost always a carpetbagger appointed
in D.C., and the Territorial Legislature made up of elected officials with a
Nuevomexicano majority in control of the lower house (Assembly) and upper house
(Council) for most of the nineteenth century.61 Alongside these branches of government,
Santa Fe inhabited the First Judicial District, the judge of which was also the Chief
Justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court. Other agents of the court, including the New
Mexico attorney general and U.S. District Attorney for New Mexico held office in Santa
Fe, though these positions required a substantial amount of travel throughout the
territory.62 Under the controlling grasp of the Radical Republicans in Congress and
General U.S. Grant in the White House, Santa Fe’s political orientation favored the
Republican Party, which propped up its influence there through the spoils of
appointments and concessions. Elkins and Catron carved out powerful positions for
themselves within this party-oriented geography.
During the Gilded Age the merchants and bankers of Santa Fe operated to make
the capital the territory’s economic nucleus as well. Prior to the emergence of chambers
of commerce as formal think-tanks and treasuries for city development, Santa Feans built
an economic base on a combination of private and public resources. To their immediate
benefit, Santa Fe housed the one Federal Repository for the territory, valuable in that it
acted as the nerve center for shipments and disbursements of U.S. currency, which was
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often in short supply.63 For major civic projects, ringmen and non-partisan promoters
alike looked to the federal government to help furnish the means. Through direct
legislation or the efforts of the Delegate to Congress, the Santa Fe crowd lobbied for
federal monies (while decrying federal oversight, of course). These public funds paid for
construction projects and city improvements such as capital buildings, the Territorial
Penitentiary, and the road system. And, just like investment capital, federal finance came
ensconced in regional competition, real and petty, as other sections of New Mexico
petitioned for public works that would enrich their own networks and constituencies.
Private growth developed mostly through the connection of Santa Fe to extant
business networks. Kinship and ethnic background provided one such point of access,
helping the Spiegelberg, Seligman, Staab, and Ilfeld families to link their mercantiles on
the Santa Fe Plaza to finance and supply lines in New York and Europe.64 By extending
credit in the form of small loans and partido contracts, both of which garnered payment in
efectos del pais, these stores also tied the bustling plaza to the agricultural and range
lands that fanned out around Santa Fe.65 Before the operational start of the First National
Bank of Santa Fe in 1871 and the Second National Bank of Santa Fe in 1872, GermanJewish merchants made up the most significant group of economic lenders in the
territory.
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The opening of the First and Second National Banks and their connections to
powerful cliques of politicians, lawyers, and merchants cemented Santa Fe’s strategic
position within New Mexico’s economy. Even as financial institutions evolved across the
territory, the First National of Santa Fe (FNSF) remained a rock of New Mexican
banking.66 The directorship of the bank, as filed with the U.S. Comptroller of Currency in
1871, included Elkins, Catron, William W. Griffin, James L. Johnson, John Pratt, Samuel
B. Wheelock, Jose L. Perea, Francisco A. Manzanares, and Miguel A. Otero.67 It is
important to note that one-third of the directorship came from the elite ranks of the
Mexican community. The ring-led bank pursued an active relationship with the majority
population of the region, and through its directors, accomplished this goal. Together, the
bank’s leadership brought together a dynamic group of interests that connected the bank
to an informal association of friends and family as well as overlapping leadership with
the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Co., the Rio Grande Railway and Telegraph Co.,
the Palace of the Governors, the New Mexico Bar Association, and the Order of the
Freemasons. These were exactly the types of intersections that gave Elkins and Catron
the combined economic and political power that they built on starting in the early
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1870s.68 It is even suggested that the seizure of the bank acted as the single event that led
to the designation of Elkins’ clique as the “Santa Fe Ring.”69
After Elkins finalized the takeover of the FNSF and moved the bank to the Santa
Fe Plaza where he opened the doors for business on April 18, 1871, the ringmen initiated
work along two fronts. The first involved the growth of the bank itself – its business,
profits, and dividends – as a distinct entrepreneurial venture. The group worked diligently
to put the bank in proper order, electing new officers in May, including Elkins as
president, Perea as vice-president, Griffin as cashier, and Wheelock as assistant cashier.
These men aggressively sought out new business in deposits and loans so that the FNSF
already took in over $20,000 and lent out over $33,000 by the end of June. Because of his
ability among Nuevomexicanos, the officers purposed Catron to distribute a circular
“explaining the bank to the Mexicans” whose business the bank desired to cultivate.70
The Santa Fe men nurtured new allies in places like Cimarron and Las Vegas,
expanding their network of political and business supporters that helped to suppress local
opposition and upheld their interests in district probate courts. They used the services of
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the bank to entice friendship and direct a favorable confluence of interests within their
immediate business environment. For outsiders, gaining access to capital required an in
with one of the members of the clique. As William Griffin told a Las Cruces man seeking
a loan, “It will be useless to offer men as security who are not known here, no difference
how good they may be.”71 Still, the directors “knew” plenty of people in the Southern
Rockies. By January 1872 the bank had to refuse loan requests, even by the Maxwell
Company, because it reached its legal limit in “discounted paper” (loaned money).72
Taken together with the seven percent dividends awarded in 1872, under Elkins’
leadership, the business of the FNSF rewarded its directors well.
As the First National gained a secure foothold in the regional economy, the
directors started to expand their reach and their control over territorial growth.
Necessarily, this meant entering the twin pillars of New Mexican economic activity:
ranching and mining. When century-old mines around Silver City and Pinos Altos
resumed excavation of large quantities of silver and gold in 1872, the bankers swept in to
make sure the flow of bullion passed through their office. Two “friends,” John E.
Wheelock and Henry M. Porter, directed the precious metals to Santa Fe where the First
National then forwarded them via overland express to Wall Street for assay and credit.
The two men did not represent random business acquaintances; rather, Wheelock was the
brother of one of the bank directors and Porter was himself a director of the Maxwell Co.
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as well as a prominent regional capitalist with operations in Colorado, New Mexico, and
Arizona.73 The two agents on the ground in Silver City sent weekly correspondence,
news, and updates to their associates in Santa Fe. This relationship, and the valuable
information (as well as profit) it generated, gave the bank considerable autonomy in
managing the flow of capital and transportation between the Silver City district and
financial markets in Denver and New York City.
Simultaneously, the bank nurtured its relationship with sheep and cattlemen. To
do so, its Nuevomexicano directors helped to bridge the cultural and personal gap
between elite stock raising families of the Rio Abajo and the bank of Santa Fe. These
families became some of the most stable clients of the FNSF in its first decade of
existence. The directors also attempted to begin their own livestock operation when they
incorporated the Consolidated Land, Cattle Raising and Wool Growing Company in
October 1872, one of the first cattle corporations in the territory. Alongside Griffin,
Elkins, and Catron as representatives of the bank, the company included the territorial
governor Marsh Giddings and the newly designated surveyor general James K. Proudfit.
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They split offices between their home in Santa Fe and the site of their expansive ranch
lands near Fort Bascom.74
For his part, Thomas Catron gained interests in ranching business throughout the
territory, from his initial involvement in the Consolidated Land, Cattle Raising and Wool
Growing Company and investments in Lincoln County during the 1870s to future activity
and enterprise in Tularosa and the American Valley later in the century. He built upon his
esteemed position with the First National Bank to affix his name as security for numerous
notes made by Lawrence G. Murphy and then James J. Dolan, both embroiled later in the
decade in the Lincoln County War.75 Their main source of profit came from the sale of
cattle to the U.S. Army at forts or on Indian reservations. By the mid-1870s, Catron and
the First National learned to adroitly navigate the trade in government contracts, Indian
vouchers, and territorial warrants that they acquired as securities from their business with
New Mexico stockmen. For instance, Catron collected $20,961.85 from turning in
collateralized Indian vouchers on October 3, 1877 and then in a letter to Jose L. Perea on
May 5, 1879, Catron explained that he was able to repay a note of $10,000 due to a
collection on a government contract through the Mescalero Agency.76 This not only
indicates that Catron received at times substantial sums through his manipulation of the
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government contract market, but also the pattern of debt juggling that he mastered as an
agent for the bank.
While growing their business locally, directors also looked to strengthen the
bank’s regional and national reputation. A step in the right direction came in 1876 when
Elkins borrowed the necessary capital from his wealthy new father-in-law to finally gain
for the bank the status of U.S. Federal Depository for New Mexico. This standing
brought increased stability to the bank, as well as an enlarged supply of currency and
hearty dividends.77 In connection with its new status, the First National found an added
advantage in that it received subsidized advertisement through its official mention in
territorial and regional gazettes, booster pamphlets, and business circulars, including the
promotional materials generated through the New Mexico Bureau of Immigration. These
types of published information helped to build confidence in the bank and included a list
of the officers and directors to help spread their good reputations as well. By acting
creative ways, Catron and the leadership of the FNSF developed a centripetal force that
drew the economic activity of New Mexico into the orbit of their Santa Fe clique.
Of course, during its Gilded Age development, the bankers attempted much more
than just drawing business their way; they outright stacked the deck in their favor
whenever and wherever possible. Almost all of the directors used their positions to obtain
work for friends and family members. If done correctly, these placements brought added
benefits to an individual director or the bank in general. Samuel Wheelock, the assistant
cashier, sent his brother John to Silver City to act as a miner and agent. William Griffin
obtained a surveyor position for his brother, as did Elkins, whose brother John filed the
final survey for the Maxwell Grant confirming its size at 1.7 million acres. From the
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Maxwell Grant circle the First National also brought R.H. Longwill and Louis Sulzbacher
within its ranks to make sure the two institutions’ interests overlapped for the bank in a
profitable way.78 When the bank needed a new assistant cashier, Elkins hired Rufus J.
Palen, the son of ringman Chief Justice Joseph Palen. As expected, Catron tried to play
this game as well, albeit with rather poor results. After the Murphy-Dolan partnership
defaulted on its loans made to Catron and the First National Bank, Catron gained control
of their Lincoln County ranch and general store in foreclosure. He sent his brother-in-law
Edgar A. Walz to manage these operations, but grew increasingly distressed as Walz
bumbled his way out of business and left Catron with a stinging loss. As an important
lesson that went unlearned throughout his life, the Gilded Age system of friendship was
only as honest and remunerative as the friends one kept.79
As the bank grew, so did Catron’s presence in its balance sheets and at directors’
meetings.80 He proved quite resourceful in attending to banking business of all stripes.
When legal limits and questionable securities choked the First National’s ability to bring
in new clients or extend credit to influential patrons, Catron served as a private lender
through FNSF channels. In this way, Catron used the institution of the bank for his own
private interest while acting as a loan source in situations that would not quite meet
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national banking standards, situations which were plentiful in the Southwest at the time.81
By loaning out the money of individual directors from their personal accounts, the bank
kept its records in legitimate standing while offering assistance to New Mexicans and
allowing the interest accrued to line the pockets of ringmen such as Catron. That these
informal transactions occurred under the purview of the FNSF, and were in fact condoned
by its officers and directors, testifies to the presence of varying degrees of capitalists
practices that endured in territorial New Mexico and the ways in which entrepreneurs and
pobladores shaped its economic development.
As a director and lender, Thomas Benton grew heavily involved in the financial
operations of elite Nuevomexicanos. He borrowed from and lent to men such as
Francisco A. Manzanares, Miguel A. Otero, [Ambrosio] Armijo, Francisco Abreu, Jose
L. Perea and Pedro Perea.82 These transactions helped to ingratiate Catron within the
Nuevomexicano community, or at least link his finances to theirs, and not only the welloff members. He gained a reputation for giving small loans to poor Mexicans, a practice
that curried great favor towards Señor Catron.83
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The leaders of the First National Bank built upon not only the latent economic
potential of the post-Civil War Southwest, but upon the budding networks and
technologies of information. By harnessing knowledge – bureaucratic, legal, market, and
personal – Elkins, Catron, and other spoilsmen of the Gilded Age converted news,
official memoranda, archival documents, and land records into social, economic, and
political power.84 By 1873 Santa Fe connected with Denver to establish one of the few
telegraph offices in the territory. The newspapers of the city, including The Daily New
Mexican and El Nuevomexicano, included substantial reporting carried over from eastern
papers via the Associated Press.85 Published in English and Spanish, news from New
York and Washington, D.C. helped to connect New Mexicans to a national imagining and
kept them informed as to national political trends.86 Of course for the purposes of the
ringmen, newspapers functioned to produce knowledge just as often as to broadcast it.
They more successfully monopolized a different sort of data, however; land records from
Spain, Mexico, and the United States. Between the Office of the Surveyor General, the
84

Niall Fergusson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (New York: Penguin Press,
2008), 122.
Niall Fergusson discusses this common phenomenon as “asymmetrical information” that companies could
maintain on the local level, but had to rely on others in remote locations. He goes on to comment that in
business, asymmetrical access to and use of information is a constant, but that in a speculative bubble, it is
especially prone to fraudulent behavior and manipulation. This rings true for the land grant speculation
bubble of New Mexico. Interested parties applied localized information in a range of ways, only to realize
by 1873 that their local knowledge could not save them from the exogenous shocks of the panic that set in
that year.
85
For discussion of New Mexico’s territorial press see: Porter A. Stratton, The Territorial Press of New
Mexico, 1834-1912 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969); and Doris Meyer, Speaking for
Themselves: Neomexicano Cultural Identity and the Spanish-Language Press, 1880-1920 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1996).
86
As formulaic and transparent as many New Mexican newspapers were in the late-nineteenth century,
because of the sharing of articles through the associated press, they often followed national concerns
closely. Readers in New Mexico could keep up with political campaigns, the workings of Congress, recent
scandals, and economic trends with only a slight lag in access. For instance, the New Mexico Scrapbooks
of William G. Ritch, held at the Huntington Library, include numerous entries and clippings regarding the
territory that originally published in outside papers and found way to territorial printers via the associated
press. For newspapers and print-media as an important backdrop to a national culture and self-imagining,
see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(London: Verso Books, 1991), 44.

127

Territorial Archives and Library, and the Government Land Office (GLO), Santa Feans
had direct access to the documentation most needed to identify and complete complicated
land transactions.87 Even after the GLO lost its monopoly in 1875 when Las Cruces
added an office, public domain and especially land grant records for the entire territory
attracted the lawyer-capitalists of the Southwest to Santa Fe.88 Not surprisingly, the Santa
Fe clique often included the Surveyor General within its ranks to ensure admittance to the
information and the insider influence they required.89
As informed participants in the rampant land grant speculation and early attempts
at colonization, the cohort of Santa Feans also cared to attract railroads to the Hispano
borderlands. Of course, not all their data was accurate and no railroad actually built to
New Mexico at this time, but several companies, including the Atlantic & Pacific, the
Texas Pacific, the Denver & Rio Grande, and the New Mexico and Gulf publicized early
plans.90 In the summer of 1872, most boosters of the Rio Arriba expected to see rail
traffic in just a few years, and with it, increased land values and available capital to
develop local resources. Mining, ranching, and townsite companies organized what can
only be looked at now as excessively optimistic charters and abstracts under the belief
that they only had to survive a temporary incubation period before the windfall brought
about by railroads and statehood. In just a short time, speculators assured themselves and

87

Westphall, Public Domain, 1, 13.
Clipping, “New Mexico in the 43d Congress,” [Santa Fe New Mexican], 16 March 1875, in Volume 6,
New Mexico Scrapbooks 1864-1904, Huntington Library Rare Books, Henry Huntington Library, San
Marino.
89
Westphall, Public Domain, 21-32.
90
Arny, W. F. M., Interesting Items Regarding New Mexico Its Agricultural, Pastoral and Mineral
Resources, People, Climate, Soil, Scenery, Etc. (Santa Fe: Manderfield & Tucker, printers, 1873), 8.
88

128

their sources of investment, the inchoate territory of New Mexico would blossom into full
economic maturity.91
By interlocking themselves with national and international companies, the Santa
Fe capitalists sought to expand their interests while also pulling money towards the
territory’s capital. This meant that already by the early 1870s, well before Catron rose to
any significant leadership role in New Mexico, his presence and activity with the ring
helped him to gain placement on the boards of directors of The Rio Grande Rail Road
and Telegraph Company (1870), the First National Bank of Santa Fe (1871), the Willison
Silver Mining Company (1871), the United States Central railway (1871), the
Consolidated Land, Cattle Raising and Wool Growing Company (1872), the Missouri
Valley Insurance Company (1873), and the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company
(1873). These companies had offices and officers in New Mexico, Colorado, Missouri,
Kansas, and in urban centers along the eastern seaboard.92 For the development of the
city of Santa Fe itself, however, these national networks refrained from investing to a
great extent.
Alongside these roles, Santa Fe also acted as a cultural and social capital of the
territory. One promoter went so far as to write that “Santa Fe and New Mexico are
identically one,” a position furthered city boosters, but maligned by others outside the
91
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capital.93 Several institutions grew with Santa Fe as their epicenter. The Catholic Church,
for instance, under the watchful eye of Bishop Lamy, strove to consolidate religious
authority under the Arch Diocese of Santa Fe. As a physical representation of this power
and of the significant role of the Catholic Church in New Mexico, St. Francis Cathedral,
which began construction in 1869, towered over the gilded-age city.94 With less obvious
dominance, the Montezuma Lodge No. 1 served as the fraternal capital of the territory. It
provided social space for both the Order of Free and Accepted Masons and the Order of
Odd Fellows, two social institutions of the territory that powerfully shaped lines of
friendship and networking. In less institutional ways Santa Fe acted as a social center for
New Mexico as well. Its bailles and society gatherings represented important sites for the
blending of Mexican and American traditions.
The intimate geography of Santa Fe allowed for Thomas Catron to pull from
several sources of power and influence without leaving the Plaza district.95 For instance,
one day in September 1874 he could sit at his new roll-top desk (gifted to him by James
K. Proudfit, the surveyor general) at his office in the Palace of the Governors when the
appointed territorial governor Marsh Giddings could call him in to discuss plans of the
Republican Central Committee. Their conversation may have turned towards joint
business interests concerning New Mexico lands, leading Catron to head down the hall to
the library and archive also quartered in the Palace. His friend Samuel Ellison, a land
lawyer and the Territorial Librarian, could direct Catron to recent land title documents or
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a range of extant records from the Spanish and Mexican governments. Catron could then
walk to the west end of the Plaza to visit his fellow director and business partner William
Griffin, cashier of the First National Bank of Santa Fe, to ask for funds to purchase land
grant interests found through the Territorial Archive or the Office of the Surveyor
General. Perhaps Catron and Griffin successfully made a deal; they could then walk
across to the northeast corner where they might enjoy lunch with the company of other
freemasons at the Montezuma Lodge where Griffin held the title of Worshipful Master,
the highest position within the lodge. There they could safely discuss intentions for land
deals or other investments. If over lunch they decided to counter some negative press, all
Catron had to do was to walk downstairs to the office of The Santa Fe New Mexican
where his friends, fellow freemasons, and editors William Manderfield and Thomas
Tucker would gladly publish some affable exposition of Catron’s exploits. From there, he
could stop by the telegraph office and send a message to Elkins in D.C. before returning
to their separate law office on the east side of the Plaza to compose the appropriate paper
work.96 Or, to return to the opening story of the chapter, he could stroll into August
Kirchner’s butcher shop to try to make a new “friend.” The small world of Santa Fe
placed political, economic, and social power at the Ring’s doorstep.

Engineering Politics with “Smooth” Steve Elkins: Or, Good Years for Team Players
Stephen Elkins arises through the literature as the pivotal personality that brought
together politicians, lawyers, capitalists, and merchants to work in unison. He

96

The location of these offices on the Santa Fe Plaza is constructed mostly from business advertisements in
the Santa Fe Daily New Mexican and from territorial reports such as [William G. Ritch], A Complete
Business Directory of New Mexico, and Gazetteer of the Territory for 1882 (Santa Fe: New Mexican
Printing and Publishing Company, 1882).

131

successfully tied the interests of international investors to the lands and resources of the
Southwest.97 Access to sources of money created its own gravitation pull so that Elkins
attracted new “friends” with each project he engaged. As his law partner and deputy,
Thomas Catron grew to understand the fine art of friendship and spoils. Early on, he even
seemed to understand exactly where his talents were best deployed. This included his
ability as a precinct manager, not just in Santa Fe County but across northern New
Mexico where he made inroads with the Nuevomexicano electorate by conspicuously
extending patronage. Local elections in New Mexico remained hotly contested and
deeply personal, fully organized around the two-party system from 1871 onward. As
Republicans and Democrats, Nuevomexicanos squared off over issues of local and
national concern.98 Like the Tweed Ring, Elkins and Catron recognized the power of
ward politics as they spread their Republican mantle across the small villages that dotted
the Hispano borderlands.99
An important boon for the Santa Fe crowd occurred in the autumn of 1873 when
Stephen Elkins won the election for Territorial Delegate to Congress. This non-voting
congressional seat came with great local favor and prestige. Since his arrival in the
territory just over a decade earlier, Elkins had already established himself as a key
manager of people and money in business, legal, and political circles. He held the
positions of attorney general, U.S. district attorney, president of the First National Bank
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of Santa Fe, and president of the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company.100 Once in
Washington, D.C., Elkins applied his charismatic ways to grow close with prominent
congressmen, including James G. Blaine, a Republican from Maine and Speaker of the
House under President Grant.101 He had recently remarried (after the passing of his first
wife) to Hallie Davis, the daughter of a Republican Senator from West Virginia. Elkins
surely understood how to move up within the Gilded Age political system. His major
interests while delegate involved statehood for New Mexico, attracting railroads to the
territory, and lobbying for the swift confirmation of patents on land grants.102
Unsurprisingly, all of these interests sought to benefit his local business concerns and if
successful, would have made him and his cohort even wealthier. In his new role as a D.C.
politician, Elkins quickly realized that he required a reliable and resourceful partner in the
territory. He had to look no further than his old pal, law partner, bank partner, and
political ally.
In connection with Elkins reputation as a “smooth” manager of myriad interests,
Thomas Catron served as his closest friend and ally, building a foundation of power for
himself as a behind-the-scenes fixer. Whatever an opponent felt about Catron personally,
they had to respect that he had plentiful smarts and guts as well as the vocabulary and
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linguistic artistry to deal in legerdemain or sophistry, both in English and Spanish. He
attended to political maneuvering, legal manipulation, and the defense of speculators’
interests—as long as these did not interfere with his agenda or draw the public spotlight
upon his behavior in an unflattering way. When it did, he leveraged his position with the
press to fire out harsh retorts.103 When problems arose for the First National Bank of
Santa Fe, such as loans that fell due or money trails that needed to be clouded, Elkins and
the directors looked to the wily Catron for creative methods to deal with their troubles.
He provided legal help for the bank and its affiliates (including the Maxwell Land Grant
and Railway Company), relying upon the ring-laden courts of New Mexico to ensure
otherwise injurious suits were swept under the rug with little or no burden upon the bank
or their friends. When it came time for elections, he worked diligently to bring out
Republican voters and stop-up Democratic machines. When the ringmen required land
purchases, he showed great skill at locating the owners and finding the right inducement
to strike a sale. For Catron, Elkins’ move to Washington represented a new stage in his
territorial existence; he now had a close ally with a seat at the national table and with new
powerful friends. In New Mexico Catron used Elkins’ absence to emerge from the
shadows and become a dominant force within the territory. Over the next half-century,
Catron remained a constant power in New Mexico politics, business, law, and society.
Although he found himself on the outs on multiple occasions, Catron displayed tireless
energy, guile, and strength of will to remain relevant and influential.
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This was no more apparent than when Elkins ran for Delegate in 1875 against
Democratic candidate Pedro Valdez. During the disputed election Elkins relied greatly
upon the work of Thomas Catron due primarily to the fact that Elkins was busy traveling
in Europe at the time trying to market land grant securities.104 Other than providing
assistance by managing their Santa Fe based political machine, Catron acted as Elkins’
lawyer following the election when Valdez attempted to officially contest the results.
Similar to the earlier case of Mr. Kirchner, the political pugilists fought each other with
legal arguments, both employing attorneys to present each side with excessively juridical,
complicated, and otherwise dense legal language.
Pedro Valdez and his lawyers James S. Robinson and R.H. Tompkins initiated the
assault with a published notification to the Honorable Stephen B. Elkins. The crux of
Valdez’s contest was simple enough: that Elkins, a carpetbagger, used “irregularity,
illegality, and fraud” to obtain a majority of votes and therefore illegally won the seat of
Delegate.105 Valdez’ claims of misbehavior during the election ran deep. Elkins political
allies extended to the Boards of Registration, the Judges of election, the Probate judges,
the Board of Canvassers, and finally to the Secretary of the Territory who, as a personal
friend of Elkins, improperly counted the final returns from each county and fraudulently
awarded the contest to the Republicans. The attorneys for Valdez then published another
twelve type-written pages of general and specific charges. Moving county by county,
precinct by precinct, Valdez’ legal team pointed out the irregularities, such as Precinct
No. 7 in San Antonio, Socorro County, where the judges and clerks were improperly
[“For Delegate to Congress Stephen B. Elkins: Hon. Stephen B. Elkins Renominated.”], Volume 6, New
Mexico Scrapbooks 1864-1904, Ritch Papers, Huntington Rare Books; Larson, New Mexico’s Quest for
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sworn in making that precinct void; the illegalities, including illegally cast votes, illegally
counted votes, or the destruction and/or replacement of non-Elkins votes; and outright
fraud in voter registration, the amount of votes cast, and the counts of votes provided by
county probate judges. The charges are so ubiquitous throughout his published contest
that it is difficult to determine where one charge ceases and the next begins. Signs of
irregularity, illegality, and fraud overlapped appreciably in many precincts. For instance,
in Precinct No. 1 of Bernalillo, Bernalillo County, the total number of votes tallied fortyseven, but somehow the number for Elkins stood at 221. Similarly, the village of
Manzano in Valencia County only counted sixty qualified voters with fifty-six placing
votes for county candidates and a whopping 713 voting for Elkins. Alongside these more
specific charges, Valdez also included general allegations such as the fact that the
precincts of Don Fernando de Taos were entirely under the control of the Republican
party and Elkins’ friends and so held no legal basis for being counted by the Secretary of
the Territory.106
In closing, Valdez asserted his every right to officially contest Elkins’ election
and the very idea of ring power in New Mexico. With a determined attitude, he sought to
expose the Santa Fe Ring as a disgrace to the people of the territory. Calling upon his
privileges as a U.S. citizen and his experience as a forty-year resident of New Mexico,
Valdez claimed to be the equal of Elkins in “everything that constitutes a man, and your
superior in the late elections…at least as well acquainted with the wants of the people of
this Territory, and as capable of asking Congress for them…” The only reason Elkins
won, he explained, was through the “suppression of the public will brought about by his
106
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pliant tools, in places of power.” 107 With a final plea to the federal government, Valdez
emphasized that “the late canvass for Congress in this Territory was in fact Ring and
Anti-Ring. I represented the latter against what the people of this Territory know to be the
most unprincipled, unscrupulous, corrupt and despotic Ring that has ever existed in the
United States, and I regard the result of this election as proclaimed at the polls by the
people to be a request to the government of the United States clearly expressed, to
remove from place and power the officers who constitute this Ring.”108
Instead, Elkins and friends held on to their seats and 1876 proved a prosperous
year for team players. Not to let Valdez’ charges go unanswered, Elkins’ legal team of
William Breeden, Henry L. Waldo, and Thomas Catron fired out their own forty-three
page “Answer of Respondent” in which they flatly denied all wrongdoing, denied that an
improper certification took place, and even denied that Valdez had the right to contest the
election.109 Elkins’ attorneys argued that Pedro Valdez had not brought suit within thirty
days of the September election and so therefore had run afoul of the statute of limitations,
also claiming that his notice lacked certainty, definiteness, and sufficient information to
even require a response; though they proceeded to respond anyway, at length. After
denying each charge leveled against Elkins, the attorneys turn to the offensive to present
on the record all of the fraudulent and illegal means Valdez acquired votes in different
precincts. If a fair count was truly made, they argued, Elkins would have won by another
3000 votes—rising to 5000 by the end of the document! The lawyers, led by Catron, went
on to list all precincts where they deserved more votes or those precincts where for many
107
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of the same reasons laid at them, votes for Valdez were illegal and fraudulent. They went
so far as to explain that no legal elections even took place in most Democratically
controlled counties for a range of spurious reasons.110 The Santa Fe ringmen relied upon
their tried-and-true battle plan of deny wrongdoing, parry charges, attack back, and bog
down. Elkins, Breeden, Waldo, and Catron’s opponents did not stand a chance against the
barrage of political, bureaucratic, and legal maneuvering at the Ring’s disposal.
The very fact that Elkins was not in New Mexico during the months leading up to
the election points to the Santa Fe clique’s organization and its maintained effectiveness
with Catron at the helm. If either of the contestants or their lawyers are to be believed, the
entire election system of New Mexico overflowed with illegality and fraud in the mid1870s. The only difference seems to be the organization of the irregularity and fraud.
Elkins’ political friends more clearly held the reins of territorial function in their hands
and were more adept at creating the results they desired. Catron proved that he could
manage territorial affairs to both get absentee Elkins elected and to defend his methods.
With that success came Catron’s share in the Ring’s spoils for 1876. As early as January,
Catron gained a position on the board of directors for the U.S. Land and Colonization
Company, a corporation valued at $2.5 million, based in Denver and Las Vegas, with
speculative goals backed by a coterie of regional and international capitalists. Later in the
year the Surveyor General’s office awarded the Mora Grant, owned by a pool of investors
including Elkins and Catron, an official patent. Then in October the First National Bank
of Santa Fe, the financial bastion of the Ring, earned the distinction of Federal
Depository for New Mexico, which helped to bring in greater deposits and strong
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dividends for its directors, including once again, Elkins and Catron.111 Pedro Valdez
could only look on in frustration as his political enemies enriched themselves while
working under the tacit approval of Washington, D.C.

Defending and Expending Political Capital
For such an elastic power broker, the Santa Fe Ring rarely maintained the level of
cohesion that it enjoyed in the 1870s. Its strength of purpose arose from the intertwining
interests of its leadership, namely Elkins, Catron, and Breeden, who owed its endurance
to their fusion of national, regional, and local networks. At its most visible, the Ring
performed as a well-oiled machine to dictate election results, determine court decisions,
acquire land, push local development, and bully opponents. Most of the time it functioned
in less tangible ways, however, making it a hard target for those who fought it. Its many
opponents could do little more than use rhetorical devices to point out the Ring’s selfserving aims and undemocratic means. Nevertheless, factors of territorial growth,
municipal competition, administrative change over, and personal animosity chipped away
at Catron’s keystone—his power base in Santa Fe. The political contests of a growing
territory forced the capital crowd to defend their position at key moments in the 1880s
and 1890s. To properly do so required Catron and his clique to expend political capital
and thereby undermine ring control with every bout.
Already by the late 1870s a virulent strain of anti-ring and anti-corporate attitude
congealed in New Mexico. Much like the rest of the U.S. West, the sentiment arose as a
backlash against the blatant corruption and inequity fostered by the general attitude of
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“Grantism” that flowed from Washington to Santa Fe. Individual scandals, such as those
surrounding Crédit Mobilier of America, the Whiskey Ring, or in New Mexico, the “war”
in Lincoln County, gained national attention as newspapers publicized the high degree of
insider dealing that connected elected officials to business enterprise.112 The
transcontinental railroads set a pretty high bar as the targets of public condemnation.
These too-big-to-fail businesses of the Gilded Age created new markets, as well as new
hostility, with every mile of track they laid. The feelings of anger and discrimination held
by white Americans towards monopolistic corporations spread beyond the railroads to
whatever corporate containers held the regional reins of power.113 In New Mexico, this
meant company owners of enormous land grants, ranch lands, mining claims, and above
all, the Santa Fe Ring, which symbolized a wholesale embodiment of the rampant
corruption and cronyism not only perpetrated by, but incubated within the territorial
government and its chief officers.
The press took a central role in attacking the Santa Fe Ring and presenting it as
real, powerful, and dangerous. Publishers such as N.V. Bennett of The Las Cruces
Borderer, R.A. Kistler of the Las Vegas Weekly Optic, or Alva C. Lowrey of The
Kingston Clipper editorialized at length about the abuses of the Santa Fe Ring with spikes
of negative reporting concurrent with legislative sessions and election cycles.114 These
papers surely influenced their readership’s opinions within the territory, helping to
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cement regional camps in opposition to Santa Fe and its leading lawyer-politicians.
Simeon H. Newman, the editor punished by the Ring in 1872 for refusing to retract a
whistle-blowing editorial, recognized the need for greater attention to the problem.
Feeling particularly acrimonious, Newman took aim at the group by publishing harmful
articles in the New York Sun, West Las Animas (CO) Leader, and Las Cruces Borderer.
Under the headline “A Most Audacious Ring: The Petty Despotism Which Exists in New
Mexico, Personal Government With a Vengeance – A Chief Justice Who Suspends the
Writ of Habeus Corpus in Libel Cases,” Newman took aim at Elkins, Catron, Breeden,
and especially Chief Justice Joseph G. Palen.115 The ringmen could do little to the
publishers of The Sun or The Leader other than block them from entering the territory or
destroying copies in circulation. The publication in the Las Cruces Borderer, however,
led to a heated exchange between the editors in Las Cruces and Santa Fe.116 The voice
piece of theR, The Daily New Mexican, printed a constant stream of vitriol against its
opponents as well as outright denials of the existence of the Santa Fe Ring or any such
conspiratorial organizations. One article authored by William Breeden presented both of
these stances. In an article simply titled “The Ring,” Breeden waved off criticisms,
expressing that:
The word “ring” has of late years grown into very common use, and is applied
very generally and liberally. It is used generally to designate any combination or
association of men, for any and whatever purpose. It is a favorite word with
disappointed aspirants for political favor, sore heads, unsuccessful place seekers,
Simeon H. Newman, III, “A Most Audacious Ring: The Petty Despotism Which Exists in New Mexico,
Personal Government With a Vengeance – A Chief Justice Who Suspends the writ of Habeus Corpus in
Libel Cases,” New York Sun, 16 August 1875, found in Simeon H. Newman, III, “The Santa Fe Ring: A
Letter to the New York Sun,” Arizona and the West, 12 (Autumn 1970) 269-288, 280-83.
Whereas many of the attacks against the Santa Fe Ring refrained from giving specific names and
activities in the press, probably for fear of legal retribution, Simeon H. Newman’s editorial in the New York
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chronic michief [sic] makers and fault finders, and noisy demagogues. It is
especially a pet word with ambitious outs who are impatient to get in, and above
all, with fellows who having lately held office, have been found incompetent or
unworthy and been kicked out. It has been the fashion of the classes above named,
and even of a more reputable class of Democratic politicians, to talk a great deal
of what they term “a Santa Fe ring” for some time past. To the influence of this
imaginary power, which has no existence except in the distempered brain of fussy
demagogues and hungry place hunters, all the evils of whatsoever character,
which the Territory or her people suffer, or have suffered, are attributed.117
The Santa Fe Ring, he suggested, was nothing more than New Mexico’s Gilded Age
boogey man; a figment of the “distempered brains” of the slighted and spiteful cast of
territorial losers. Now if only he had an affidavit attesting to his integrity and veracity!
Despite their hand waving, leading Santa Feans felt deeply anxious about the
city’s geopolitical standing, growing more so during the economic upswing of the early
1880s. Their concern for the future of Santa Fe was not entirely delusional or paranoid.
The late nineteenth century witnessed fierce regional competition between budding cities
and settlements.118 Dreamers, schemers, and speculators set upon western cities and
towns with the same ferocity and confidence that they brought to nearby extractive
resources. In the Mountain West, cities like Santa Fe, Salt Lake City, Cheyenne, and
Denver clashed over access to transportation, communication, information, and money
markets.119 In this contest Santa Fe quickly lost step with other Rocky Mountain hubs
after the construction of the transcontinental railroad linked them to the East and to the
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Pacific. Denver quickly outpaced the historic capital for regional dominance over the
southern Rockies, while El Paso pulled the products of southern and eastern New Mexico
into its orbit. The “ancient capital,” once the center of a distant Spanish colony, watched
as its historic hinterlands shifted toward new commercial axes.120 Then, when the
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe railway decided to bypass Santa Fe, citing prohibitive
construction costs, the city’s dreams of commercial stardom and continental connectivity
faded, causing its leaders to lean more and more on reserves of political power and local
networks. Instead, less than sixty miles away, Albuquerque’s superior access to railroads
enabled it to grow into New Mexico’s largest urban and industrial hub.121
Even within New Mexico the dominance of the capital city of Santa Fe came
under attack. Locales such as Las Vegas, Albuquerque, Las Cruces and Silvery City
instigated legislation and press campaigns to separate Santa Feans from some of their
access to federal power.122 One effort brought about by citizens of the Rio Abajo
involved the removal of the capital from Santa Fe to a more central location that did not
prioritize the Rio Arriba over the southern, eastern, or southwestern part of the territory
where new – and mostly white – centers of population arose.123 As part of an
Albuquerque-led attempt to dislodge the capital in 1884, for instance, Catron shifted his
political machine into overdrive, quickly aligning the necessary interests in lock-step with
his own. The Catron faction then bulldozed the proceedings of the territorial legislature
120
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while it successfully maneuvered the passage of federal appropriations to construct a new
capital building and state penitentiary in Santa Fe. Though victorious in protecting their
turf, the heavy-handedness of the Ring combined with its sudden burst of open activity to
engender a fresh volley of criticism and insult from the substantial opposing press. 124
Catron usually sidestepped the worst of the skewering, but Grover Cleveland’s
presidential election that year initiated a series of reforms to be carried out by his
Democratic appointments. It is notable here that when Cleveland took office in 1885 it
marked the first time since Catron’s arrival to New Mexico that a Democrat held the
executive office and therefore the first time that his party lost its grip on the spoils spigot.
An organized assault on the Ring, including its members, its land-based economic
interests, and its levers of power occurred as an unintended result of the Santa Fe
machine’s success in 1884.125 Similarly, when Republicans steamrolled a statehood bill
through the territorial legislature and through convention in 1889 and 1890, its partial
triumphs on a public stage metamorphosed into the tangible ammunition coveted by the
growing ranks of detractors. Catron loomed large during the push for statehood at the
time, returning to his most effective role as a caucus builder and party whip. He was
perhaps even too successful in shaping the constitution to his interests, particularly as an
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attorney for several railroad corporations and as a large landholder, because the general
populace found it too partisan and too clearly geared toward business interests. When
New Mexicans voted down the land grant and corporate interest-laden constitution in
1890 it marked a sea change for the old ring.126 The resulting failure of the constitution
and the statehood campaign stung Catron for the next twenty years. Catron and his crony
politics still held a dominant place in New Mexico, but they no longer monopolized state
and market power as they did in the early Gilded Age.
Indeed, by the 1890s power diversified in the Southwest. The Santa Fe crowd
maintained its most effective networks, but expended a great deal of its energy and
influence trying to remain relevant (and keep Santa Fe relevant too). As the ranching
boom of the 1880s fizzled, as federal monetary policy shifted to favor the gold standard
and international finance over the subsidization of silver interests and the populist planks
of the South and West, the overwhelming optimism of the Gilded Age soured, causing
the Ring to falter on its most blatant stimulus—the unabashed promotion of its members
and their interests. Catron and his clique slowly lost the ability to make good on political
inducements. No longer could they easily absorb the ranks of their enemies or even
redirect their attention. The years of bad blood caught up with Catron, reaching a boiling
point in 1895 when, in the aftermath of his shady role in tampering with the court system
during his defense of the Borrego brothers, his enemies joined forces to take him down
with a disbarment suit.127 Instigated by charges filed by District Attorney Jacob H. Crist,
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Catron found himself under attack for actions going back to the early days of Ring rule.
And yet, in this exposed moment with his integrity and veracity on the line, instead of
unceremoniously tearing him down, many stood with him in his defense. Frank Clancy,
Frank Springer, and Neill B. Field, all of who had a checkered past with Catron, served as
his counsel, won his acquittal, and then helped to elect him President of the Territorial
Bar Association in a landslide.128 Those who stood with the ringleader, such as Springer
and Field, fared well. The Bar Association made them New Mexico’s delegates to
national conventions. For those that worked against him, like Edward A. Fiske and Jacob
H. Crist, their reward was an abrupt loss of status followed by a lifetime of spite.129 That
evening, Catron held a party at his home at 210 Grant Ave in Santa Fe, replete with a
brass band and the obligatory speeches.130 As the refreshments flowed and the host spoke
in venomous barbs against his detractors, some of his “friends” likely questioned if they
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had just made a deal with the devil. What else could they do? Even as the discreet
mechanisms of the Santa Fe Ring declined in power and relevance, Thomas Catron
remained too-connected-to-jail.
This final point represents how Catron maintained his position of authority well
into the 1910s while his home base and his ring diminished in significance. The
demographic shifts in the territory and the bypassing of Santa Fe by the railroad made it
abundantly clear to the ringmen that an insular focus would be ruinous. Instead, they best
represented their interests through the promotion of New Mexico and the region of the
Southwest as a whole. Through his affiliation with the Montezuma Lodge and the
territory’s community of Freemasons, the First National Bank of Santa Fe, the New
Mexico Bar Association, the Territorial Republican Committee, and a plethora of
overlapping corporate boards, Thomas Catron created interlocking webs of support that
entangled friends and enemies alike. Having learned the art of political machines from
“Smooth” Steve, Catron employed his territorial ring to profoundly expand his networks
throughout much of the territory so that by the time Santa Fe started to really show its
declining share of regional power, he had already developed a capitalist infrastructure in
the Southwest with which to continue to grow his personal empire.
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Chapter 3
The Land Grant Bubble:
Speculation in the Hispano Borderlands, 1869-1885
Probably never in the annals of just civilization can there be found instances of such patent,
palpable, and barefaced lawlessness, thieving, plundering and robbing of the people under the
cloak of law, as can be here presented in New Mexico to-day.
“New Mexico’s Officials,” The Kingston Clipper (N. Mex.), March 8, 1884.

Dedication. Elias Brevoort, New Mexico, Her Natural Resources and Attractions, 1874.

Speculating on Empire with Thomas Catron
Many a fortune arose from the extractive resources of the West; Thomas Benton
Catron’s grew from his acquisition and consolidation of the titles to old Spanish and
Mexican land grants. These grants sat at the heart of economic activity for much of New
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Mexico and southern Colorado, especially in the years following the Civil War. The
completion of the transcontinental railway in 1869 unleashed a speculative land boom in
the Rocky Mountain West with capitalists and boosters making every attempt to predict
or direct further railroad growth and tap into the lucrative government subsidies or
private enterprise that came in tow. To properly do so meant a significant expenditure of
money, energy, and influence.1 Investors new to the region placed faith in a relatively
simple equation: western lands (rich with resources and enormous in acreage) acquired at
low prices, plus rail access, equaled terrific profits either through the exploitation of those
resources, or even better, by repackaging the land to resell at a premium. The implicit
idea that western lands came without prior inhabitants or prior titles stood at the heart of
this (mis)understanding. Speculators assumed that they would be acquiring interests in
land with fee simple title and ownership. For those who purchased, developed, and sold
southwestern land grants, the fiction of free and clear land made for factual difficulties in
managing their interests and realizing profits. And yet, in the economic windows open
from 1869 to 1873 and from 1876 to 1885, speculators like Thomas Catron and Wilson
Waddingham bought, sold, and promoted New Mexico and Colorado land grants as
saleable commodities. Through the instruments of the corporate form, their joint stock
companies transformed grant lands – including those already lived upon and those under
usufruct right – into securities that changed hands in cities including Santa Fe, Denver,
New York, London, and Amsterdam.2

1

Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 2011), 95-98.
2
My understanding of how capitalists transformed land grants into abstract forms of equity builds on the
work of Maria Montoya, Translating Property: The Maxwell land Grant and the Conflict over Land in the
American West, 1840-1900 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 2-3, 81. Montoya also provides
convincing evidence in support of an entrenched legal fiction of unsettled land in the American West and
how territorial courts upheld this fiction in the haphazard process of adjudicating land grants.
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This chapter will track the growth of Thomas Catron’s personal empire in grant
lands through his studious involvement in the southwestern land grant bubble. Beginning
in 1869, the same year Catron made his permanent home in Santa Fe, a diverse group of
lawyers and speculators crisscrossed the mountains and pastures of northern New Mexico
and southern Colorado with a new vigor towards the marketing of land grants. Supported
in fact by Congress, which authorized the surveyor general in 1869 to restart the
machinery of land grant confirmation, and by the mentality of the Gilded Age in the West
and the “heyday” it upheld for the “freaks of fortune,” these capitalists conducted
thousands of transactions among themselves and with the local Nuevomexicano
population.3 Their effort resulted in a significant shift in regional land ownership and land
use, a shift that privileged the enterprising spoilsmen over prior residents and
unconnected newcomers. Five years later, however, the Panic of 1873 burst the land grant
bubble, leaving eastern and international investors reeling in their losses and hesitant to
return. With a tightened money supply and heightened interest rates, capital investment in
For characterization of the economic periods following the U.S. Civil War, see Rendings Fels,
American Business Cycles, 1865-1897 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 84 & 97.
3
Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 310. In Jonathan Levy’s history of risk in the United States, the “freaks of
fortune” represents the tension at the heart of the capitalist system between risk taking and risk
management, and also those people who willingly dove into capitalism’s treacherous waters and returned to
the surface in success or in failure.
I am convinced of the magnitude of land speculation that took place in the 1870s from my
intensive research into the 300 Series of the Thomas B. Catron Papers, Center for Southwest Research,
University Libraries, University of New Mexico. Thomas Catron collected land records and those of the
transactions and transfers of title on a wide scale, including records for those conveyances he was involved
in and many, many records from others that he used to establish chain of title or for other legal matters.
Some of these records include a full accounting of the buying, selling, and general conveyance of land
grant interests from a grant’s origination under Spain or Mexico to the date of its creation. These
“genealogies of title” exist in the Catron Papers for the Tierra Amarilla, Mora, Anton Chico, Antonio Ortiz,
Piedra Lumbre, Eaton (San Cristobal), Mesita de Juana Lopez, and La Majada land grants. Partial abstracts,
sales listings, and deed conveyances exist for others, including but not limited to the Ojo del Espiritu Santo,
Tejon, San Miguel Spring Grant, and Juan de Gabaldon grants, as well as forty-five boxes of documents
pertaining to land grant cases in the Santa Fe Court of Private Land Claims. The full weight of this
documentation complicates the narrative of villains and victims that remains so pervasive in the history of
New Mexico’s land grants by directing attention to the frenzy of transactions and conveyances that took
place between diverse participants who worked towards an assortment of personal interests.
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southwestern lands and resources slowed to a crawl. Instead of waiting patiently,
however, for a better business climate, Catron and his local peers ramped up their
attention toward consolidating grant interests and ballooning grant boundaries. By 1885,
when a call for reforms to the territorial land system altered the tactics of accumulation,
most of the desirable grants had already passed into the hands of Euro-Americans or
international holding companies.4 This period marked a crucial transformation by which
capitalists, bureaucrats, and jurors joined forces to manufacture a speculative market in
the Southwest, the likes of which created little sustainable economic development but
resulted in large-scale Nuevomexicano disempowerment.
For Thomas Catron these years marked a distinctive period of education in the
strategies for obtaining land grant parcels, for legally defending their titles, and for
financing these operations. He participated in complicated land transactions involving
local, eastern, and international pools, increasingly organized into corporate bodies with
limited liability and full personhood in the courts of New Mexico.5 It was in this way that
he first grew involved with veteran capitalist Wilson Waddingham, a beneficial
relationship that Catron nurtured. Early on, he performed local legal services for Waddy,
who in turn profited from Catron’s appointment as Attorney General of New Mexico in

4

The push for land and land grant reform in Territorial New Mexico begun in earnest after the election of
Democratic President Grover Cleveland who appointed Governor Edmund G. Ross of Kansas and George
Washington Julian of Indiana with specific intent of setting a reform agenda. I do not mean to discuss the
nature of this reform at present, but to note the transition in attitude and oversight towards land grants that
signified the end of the speculator-lawyer driven land grant bubble. Howard R. Lamar, The Far Southwest,
1846-1912: A Territorial History (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1970), 170; David V. Holtby, FortySeventh Star: New Mexico’s Struggle for Statehood (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 31;
George W. Julian, “Land Stealing in New Mexico,” The North American Review 145 (1887): 17-31.
5
New Mexico’s corporate law came into existence shortly after the end of the Civil War with its first fully
codified statute arising in 1867 with language and precedence based on that of New Jersey. New Mexico
statute considered corporations as persons, with the same standing in a court of law as individuals, and
foreign corporations as non-residents. William G. Ritch, A Complete Business Directory of New Mexico,
and Gazetteer of the Territory for 1882 (Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing and Publishing Company, 1882),
214-18.
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1869 and United States Attorney for New Mexico in 1872 (which he held until January,
1879). These posts added to Catron’s credibility among serious speculators, imbuing him
with local authority, plenty of occasion for travel throughout the territory, and continued
legal training in the borderland fusion of Spanish-Mexican and British-American legal
traditions.6 Alongside his appointed positions, Catron’s collusion with Elkins’ ring
provided access to key sources of finance, intelligence, and prestige, as well as the
facility to effectively put their plans in motion. In dutifully providing his services to
Elkins and Waddy, Catron participated in some of the largest land deals ever to grace the
U.S. West, including the promotion and amortization of the million-acre Sangre de Cristo
Land Grant and almost two-million-acre Maxwell Land Grant.
In the aftermath of these fantastical land deals, Catron joined the ranks of
southwestern speculators who began to purchase or otherwise acquire land grant interests
with increased speed, greed, and guile. By the time railroad tracks actually arrived in
New Mexico, Catron and his peers had already divested Mexican land grant heirs of
much of the best lands and best access to the region’s predominant resources. Backed by
the overt support of the Santa Fe Ring and the First National Bank of Santa Fe, as well as
the covert support of his growing network of friends, agents, and associates, Catron
rapidly rose to the top of the ranks of the land grant sharks. While other Gilded Age
moguls looked to railroads, steel, or oil as the medium with which to build their personal
empires, Catron’s plan involved the acquisition and monopolization of southwestern
“Thomas B. Catron, Esq.,” Santa Fe New Mexican, 12 February 1872, p. 1. New Mexico jurors like
Catron found that they could manipulate territorial law based on both Spanish-Mexican and BritishAmerican precedence and statute in order to produce outcomes to their liking. This translates to the
purposeful maintenance of legal vagaries by lawyers and politicians for their own aims. See Laura Gomez,
Manifest Destinies: The Making of the Mexican American Race (New York: NYU Press, 2007); Deena J.
González, Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women of Santa Fe, 1820-1880 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999); and Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico, John
Van Ness, ed., New Mexico Land Grant Series (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994).
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lands. In this pursuit his success went unmatched as he grew his holdings steadily until by
the mid-1880s he became one of the largest individual landowners in the United States
with an empire of full or partial rights to millions of acres.7

Land Grants for Sale or Rent: The Bubble Begins
The speculation and sale of grant lands did not suddenly surface after the Civil
War. Under Mexico, the Governors Albino Perez and Manuel Armijo were known for
granting land to political friends and business partners. Early after the creation of the
Office of the Surveyor General in 1854, a cadre of appointed officials acted in harmony
with key Nuevomexicanos to officially file land grant claims. William Pelham, the first
appointment to the post, was dreadfully ill-prepared to deal with the documentation
flooding his desk, made all the worse by its sole existence in Spanish. Speculators gamed
Pelham’s office and then lobbied Congress for confirmation. During the Civil War land
grant interests changed hands at a growing rate, though mostly transacted by local
residents. This included several speculators, such as John Watts and William Gilpin, who
attempted to consolidate interests and turn around the sales of large estates, as well as a
brisk business in hijuelas (deeds, or shares) between Nuevomexicanos buying and selling
land grant plots. Land transfers, as such, were not unusual, and a speculative class already
traded in grant lands prior to the sales of 1870. The momentous change came with the
unleashed intensity of the Gilded Age toward speculation in western lands, much of
which took the form of grants, and of greatest frequency, railroad grants. Between 1850

7

Victor Westphall, Thomas Benton Catron and His Era (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), 36.
Westphall places Catron’s total ownership at 1,602,922.16 acres or roughly the size of Delaware and Rhode
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an exercise in futility.
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and 1871 alone, the federal government turned over 130,000,000 acres of land to the
states and to private enterprise as incentive for construction and expansion of service.8
Speculators, no shortage of which had affiliation with the railroads, conducted business in
federal grant lands in much the same fashion and with equal ferocity to those who dealt in
the grants of the Hispano Borderlands. This activity underscores how the differences
between the Euro American and Mexican understandings of property came down to
economics.9
The sales of the Sangre de Cristo and the Maxwell land grants in 1870 presented
two notable examples of the opportunity that existed for flipping land grants at
outstanding profits.10 For contemporaries paying attention, the details of these two
transactions overlapped enough to make the pattern seem reproducible and
extraordinarily lucrative. To start, seller-speculators claimed that each tract contained
over one million acres situated in New Mexico and Colorado. They went on to claim that
they held or represented full and clear title to the property. The grants’ marketers
distributed persuasive abstracts and advertising bulletins in the East and overseas. If the
relevant data was not enough to sway the financially conservative, promotional materials
assuaged their doubts with endorsements by respected capitalists, surveyors, statesmen,
and war heroes. Both of these transactions involved international pools of marketing and
8

Frank N. Wilner, Railroad Land Grants: Paid for in Full (Washington, D.C.: Office of Information and
Public Affairs, Association of American Railroads, 1984), 2.
9
Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Roots of Resistance: Land Tenure in New Mexico, 1680-1980 (Los Angeles:
Chicano Studies Research Center Publications, University of California, 1980), 97. Ortiz presents this
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investment. Prior to each sale, the negotiating parties adopted a corporate form to
organize the land’s colonization and development as well as to dilute individual liability
and risk.11 These corporate bodies metamorphosed the physical enormity of the Mexican
grants into marketable paper and in the process landowners became shareholders. Amidst
this incredible early success, copycats went ahead with similar plans. They did not
anticipate the lawsuits, land wars, insolvencies, and reorganizations that land grant
companies would regularly face over the next fifty years.12
The nature of the land and title disputes that plagued land grant sales came from
the grants’ origination and confirmation under disparate legal systems and socio-political
cultures of land use and ownership.13 Awarded by Governor Manuel Armijo, representing
the sovereignty of Mexico in 1841 and 1843 respectively, the Charles Beaubien and
Guadalupe Miranda Grant (Maxwell Grant) and the Sangre de Cristo Grant were
designed to reward prominent families and to extend the physical limits of New Mexico’s
11

Brayer, William Blackmore, 85.
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settlement in the face of Native American, U.S., and Texan expansionist pressures.14
Each grantee, whether an individual or a community, obtained no more than eleven
square leagues (about 48,000 acres). This size limitation became a major source of
conflict and consternation for land grant companies until the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in John G. Tamerling v. the United States Freehold & Emigration Company in
October 1876 established that already confirmed and patented grants would not have to
adhere to the Mexican standard.15 The Tamerling decision also placed greater powers in
the office of the surveyor general, itself a federal creation designed to deal with the
complicated matter of land allocation in the territories, specifically the surveying of the
public domain. Under the ad hoc adjudication system that flowed through the office of
the surveyor general, owners applied for confirmation of the Maxwell and Sangre de
Cristo grants in 1856, gained approval in September 1857, and then waited until June 21,
1860 for Congress to push through the confirmations alongside fourteen other grants

Marianne L. Stoller, “Grants of Desperation, Lands of Speculation: Mexican Period Land Grants in
Colorado,” in John R. and Christine M. Van Ness, eds., Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in New Mexico
and Colorado (Boulder: Center for Land Grant Studies and the Colorado Humanities Program, 1980), 2239. See Chart I on page 26 for relatively clear presentation of the six Mexican era grants made within or
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Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits, 206; GAO Report, “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” June 2004, 7173. The ruling in John G. Tamerling v. the United States Freehold & Emigration Company, which begun in
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado in 1874 and then moved to the U.S. Supreme Court in
1876, stemmed from a legal logic that determined Congress’ confirmation of the grant in 1860 represented
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and statute, and therefore, the size of the grant did not need to adhere to the precedence set under Spanish
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T.B. Catron to W.J. Mills, Las Vegas, 8 December 1891, CP, Series 105, Vol. 4. In this letter
Catron requests William Mills to encourage Frank Springer to find a friendly party to bring an ejection suit
against on the Maxwell Grant. This suit would then set court precedence for future ejections. In light of this
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located in New Mexico and southern Colorado.16 The de novo grants included in the mass
approval became the most obvious targets for speculators and their agents, in part
because their early petition and approval in the office of the surveyor general usually
meant that some scheming parties had already begun the process.17 As part of this group,
the Maxwell and Sangre de Cristo grants both gained validation and entered early rounds
of surveying and patenting, although it took the remainder of the 1870s and the
Tamerling decision to produce the final million-acre surveys.
In the period of western economic growth sparked by gold and railroads, the
prospective values for land and resources allowed a highly speculative class of capitalists
to manage land grant sales. In these transactions, agents without prior claim to the
enormous grants closed the final deals transferring title to the new ownership. The system
was itself a wholly capitalist technique by which “other people’s” lands received the
Carnegie treatment—it was always better to profit off other people’s land.18
The legal device utilized by agents to sell what was not actually theirs was most
commonly referred to as an “option.” This “option” boils down to an agreement between
two parties that clearly stipulated what would be sold, what the sales price would be, how
and when payment would be made, what fee was due the agent, and how long they had to
enact the sale. Agents usually negotiated for a flat payment in land, stock, or currency, or
Stoller, “Grants of Desperation,” 26. The sixteen grants that Congress confirmed on June 21, 1860
included: Anton Chico, Armendariz #33, Armendariz #34, Baca Float #1, Baca Float #2, Bosque del
Apache, Mora, Tierra Amarilla, Las Trampas, Nolan, Tejon, San Cristoval (Eaton), Vigil and St. Vrain, Las
Animas, Charles Beaubien and Guadalupe Miranda (Maxwell) and the Sangre de Cristo Grant. The
correlation between this confirmation date and land grant speculation comes close to 100%.
17
G. Emlen Hall, “Giant Before the Surveyor-General: The Land Career of Donaciano Vigil,” in John R.
and Christine M. Van Ness, eds., Spanish and Mexican Land Grants, 64-73.
18
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investments in stocks that Scott had insider knowledge would increase. For Carnegie, the dividends of these
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if the price was somewhat flexible, could agree to take a percentage cut of the final sale
price as commission. The person obtaining the option almost always had to put up a
security deposit or other form of collateral to ensure the owners of their serious intentions
on selling the land. In this relationship, the contract provided the agent with the exclusive
right and necessary powers to advertise the lands and to execute a sale.19
In practice, agents often identified potential buyers before they signed the option
contract, leading to an exaggerated sense of security despite the numerous potential hangups that could and did occur. The speculative design of these optioneers stood at the
forefront of their activity. Their main goal involved the infusion of as little of their own
money as necessary to turn around a land sale for the highest possible sum. The
development of the land remained a secondary consideration, if it received consideration
at all. It figured into the equation as a promotional device and in specific negotiations
regarding terms of payment and transfer of stock.20 In the complex market for western
lands, the option became a mainstay in agents and speculators toolkits.
The Sangre de Cristo and Maxwell Land Grants both found their way to Eastern
and European markets through options obtained by prominent Colorado businessmen and
politicians. For the Sangre de Cristo, William Gilpin of Denver took the lead. He used his
purchase of a one-sixth interest in the grant in 1862 to launch an international effort
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towards the sale of the entire property. With bright eyes and ambition, Gilpin took a loan
for $30,000 from an Eastern banking house, invested this capital in the purchase of other
interests of the grant and began to promote it in the East in hopes of a huge pay-out.21 His
ability to sell the grant in the East was made difficult by the Civil War, but in its
aftermath, the surge of attention towards investing in western expansion helped Gilpin to
gain some new pivotal partners. In 1868 one of Gilpin’s European agents introduced the
ex-governor to William Blackmore, an up-and-coming British capitalist who had gained
recognition (as well as some money to spare) by participating in the promotion the Union
Pacific Railroad. Blackmore, who saw promise in the grant’s extensive pastoral and
mineral lands, brought Ferdinand V. Hayden on board after Blackmore participated in a
Hayden-led geological survey that included much of Colorado’s Front Range. Blackmore
convinced Hayden, then in charge of the United States Geological and Geographical
Survey of the Territories, to survey the Sangre de Cristo Grant. Because of the official
report authored by Hayden, over one million acres of Colorado and New Mexico land
gained credibility in international business circles as an exclusive piece of fee simple
property.22 Its promotion by notable capitalists with standing in the West, the East, and in
Europe as well as the professional and scientific weight given to its boundaries and
potential resources, made the Sangre de Cristo Grant – an unknown, sparsely-populated,
million-acre western property – a truly hot commodity.
Of course, its promoters explained that the window of opportunity would not last
long, and so attracted new investors who themselves added authority to the grant’s name
For William Gilpin’s activity with Colorado Land Grants, see Stoller, “Grants of Desperation,” in
Spanish and Mexican Land Grants, 34-37; Brayer, William Blackmore, 66, 70-71; Guy, M. Herstrom, A
Pygmy Among the Giants (Place of Publication not given: 1960), 254-255.
22
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Environmental Change along the Front Range (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 68.
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and prospects. With Blackmore in the driver’s seat, the network of the capitalists
organized the Colorado Freehold Land and Emigration Company in London and set its
capital stock at £300,000. Within the frenzy of investment that commenced, the new
corporate stature added another layer of legitimacy to the marketing of the grant.
Prominent easterners such as Ambrose E. Burnside (a high-ranking Union General during
the Civil War) and Charles A. Lambard (Director of the Union Pacific Railroad) acted as
trustees and added their good names to the company’s abstract.23 Despite its lack of a
railroad connection, any evidence of modern development or infrastructural growth, or
even a sound patent to ensure its title to the million-plus acres, and coupled with the
existence of prior inhabitants of Native American and Mexican background, shares of the
Sangre de Cristo Grant found their way onto London and Amsterdam trading floors. To
assuage the doubts of potential investors, Blackmore divided the grant between two
estates and formed a new corporate body organized in February 1870 in the Territory of
Colorado. The United States Freehold Land and Emigration Company (USFLEC) gained
the façade of local ownership through the careful utilization of the incorporation process
and its trail of paperwork; the grant’s real ownership and directorship consisted of
wealthy eastern and British capitalists who subscribed to a majority of the companies
$2.5 million in capital stock.24
Six months later, under scrutiny of potential Dutch investors as to the validity of a
corporation organized under the authority of the Territory of Colorado, U.S. Congress
gave life to a nationally-chartered version of the company. But the decision to do so was
23
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not unanimous. Questions of territorial prerogative, the public domain, and corporate
power loomed at the forefront of the debate.25 Did Congress have the right to give
national validation to a corporate association that claimed ownership of territorial lands
that would then be removed from the public domain? Blackmore, Lambard, Gilpin and
others led the lobbying effort in support of the national charter in the split congressional
body. Their central argument hinged on the idea that without Congress’ approval, foreign
investors would not direct money into the West and development would slow to a crawl
amidst metaphors of the new speed of commerce brought about by the advent of
transcontinental railroads. With the capitalists safely navigating the stormy congressional
waters, the new United States Freehold Land and Emigration Company doubled its
capital stock to $5 million and set the valuation of its lands at over $9 million. With
national backing, trading houses in Amsterdam now found the investment to be secure
and so finalized the long awaited sale of the grant. In hindsight, promoters like
Blackmore, Gilpin, and Lambard proved quite shrewd indeed. Blackmore made-out with
fantastic profits in liquid currency, company stock, and over 7500 acres of land.26 The
story of the sale of this grant, from Gilpin’s initial investments of tens of thousands of
dollars to the corporate windfall of millions offered just one example of the terrific
potential for speculating in western lands. It also occurred simultaneously with the
marketing of another Mexican grant of even greater proportions.
Like the Sangre de Cristo, the grant owned by land baron Lucien Maxwell
transitioned from its approval by Congress in June 1860 to its sale to Dutch capitalists at
the end of the decade through the machinations of an international consortium of
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speculators. Led by Jerome Chaffee of Denver who gained an “option” to market the
grant, this group included all of the necessary components to promote almost two million
acres of land in New Mexico and Colorado as a secure investment to stock traders in
Amsterdam. Other than his elected office as Colorado’s Delegate to Congress, Chaffee
also presided over the First National Bank of Denver and owned several lucrative gold
and silver mines along the Front Range. He was to Colorado what Elkins was to New
Mexico, sordid intentions and all.27 Chaffee brought on board other Denverites such as
George Chilcott and Charles F. Holly who also grew involved in banking, mining, and
municipal improvement. The syndicate made room for local New Mexican support by
bringing Dr. R.H. Longwill, Stephen B. Elkins, and Miguel A. Otero on as investors. The
Coloradans acquired a streamlined connection to the U.S. Land Office through Surveyor
General Thomas Rush Spencer and Surveyor William W. Griffin and had help getting
their new association incorporated by New Mexico Governor William Pile and Supreme
Court Justice John S. Watts.28
Together, this group formed the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company and
officially incorporated in the territory of New Mexico on May 12, 1870 with a capital
value of five million dollars. To give the company national and international prestige,
William Jackson Palmer (Brevet Brigadier General, Managing Director of the Kansas
Pacific Railroad, and founder of the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad), William A. Bell
(photographer for the Union Pacific Railroad and founder of Manitou, CO) and Wilson
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Waddingham added their weight to the Maxwell Grant’s list of investors.29 Waddingham
especially helped to promote the grant overseas, adding his own spurious information for
potential buyers including a map of the Maxwell Grant containing audacious visuals of
cotton and steamboats. The 1868 gold rush to Mt. Baldy, centered within the boundaries
of the grant at Elizabethtown, advanced their cause. Finally, the Maxwell Land Grant and
Railway Company sold the company in 1870 for $1,350,000 to John Collinson of
London, who then turned around and marketed the stocks and first mortgage bonds of the
corporation in Amsterdam secured by a $3.5 million mortgage. A well-respected Dutch
mining engineer even went so far as to assess the land’s value at over $90,000,000.30 This
figure was ambitious indeed with New Mexico still almost a decade away from having a
railroad. It would be many years more before the government “pacified” all Native
Americans in the territory. William Bonney was still literally a child. And yet, the
application of corporate shells to reduce liability and attract investment represented the
cutting edge of capitalist technique for opening new and untested markets, whether in the
American West or around the globe.31
By late 1870 Thomas Catron readied himself to move from his front-row seat to
an active member of the traveling circus that carved up western lands with voracious
appetite. New rounds of speculation provided just such an occasion. William Blackmore
29
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and Wilson Waddingham assembled their networks and moved forward with goals for
development, colonization, and new purchases. In these ventures Catron found
opportunity to assert his ability and build his business network. The industrious and
legally nimble Catron impressed Waddingham, who found ready use for the young
attorney. The feeling was mutual, as the two continued to work together until Waddy’s
fateful stroke.
Over the years, Waddingham mentored Catron on the finer points of corporate
finance and debt management. Having worked his way from runaway miner in the
California gold fields to proprietor of a San Francisco saloon in the 1850s, and from
mineral promoter to multi-mine owner in the Rocky Bar district of Idaho in the 1860s,
Waddingham had certainly earned his capitalist chops in the American West. Few
characters seemed to anticipate the Gilded Age, in all of its glory and grime, as
Waddingham—the “Itinerant Tycoon of the Rockies.”32 He had a knack for being wellconnected and hard-to-find at the same time. His departure, for instance, from Rocky Bar,
involved a sudden and covert dumping of his assets, followed by a trip to Mexico. One
biographer commented that his greatest skill may have been the art of extraction, that is,
of knowing when to get out.33 But in reality, Waddingham largely made his own luck. He
knew when to sell because he had insider knowledge of his companies’ finances and
future outlook. When the future looked grim, Waddy knew first and Waddy sold first.
This may sound less like business sense than like moral laxity and corporate fraud, but as
the corrupt backdrop for the Grant Administration set in, the “itinerant tycoon” seemed
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savvy, not shady. With his new office headquarters at the center of Denver’s growing
business district, he began his early speculation in Colorado and New Mexico land
grants. In this process, Waddingham’s easy-wheeling ways helped affix him to crucial
agents, families, and regional networks (including the Santa Fe Ring), that in turn assisted
and abetted his consolidation of millions of acres of private, communal, and federal
lands.34 If Waddingham really had one masterful trait, it was his ability to manage
people, and perhaps more importantly, his reputation, so that his financial flops did not
drag him under. This was the single most important lesson Catron learned (though
incompletely and without introspection) from his masterful sensei of Gilded Age
capitalism.
Catron tagged along as Blackmore and Waddingham developed plans that
included populating the land grants and building transportation that would connect the
new communities with a transcontinental as well as with already settled areas like Denver
and Santa Fe. While their separate colonization companies promoted the agricultural and
pastoral opportunities of the Southwest in the East and in Europe, the next step required
the construction of a railroad. To this end, both Blackmore and Waddingham looked to
William Jackson Palmer who had managed the construction of the Kansas Pacific
Railway in its westward drive to Denver.35 The U.S. Freehold and Emigration Company
that controlled the Sangre de Cristo Grant enticed Palmer to build a line through their
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lands, while the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Company voted Palmer president with
the idea that he would bring the rails their way as well.
William Palmer’s first course of action involved the organization of companies in
New Mexico and Colorado. These corporations acted as pools of interest that could
simultaneously provide the money and influence to move forward plans on the local
level, market stocks and bonds internationally, and lobby U.S. Congress for government
recognition and potential subsidies. In February 1870 Palmer led the way by filing for the
incorporation of the Rio Grande Rail Road and Telegraph Company to do business in the
territory of New Mexico. The stated object of the company was to construct a railway and
telegraph line from the source of the Rio Grande through New Mexico to El Paso and on
to Chihuahua, connecting with other lines at its termini. Branch lines would also tap the
resources of mineral rich areas such as Elizabethtown and Pinos Altos.36 At its outset, the
railroad company claimed a capital stock of $20,000,000 although such an amount
represented a fictional capitalization to match its fictional rails. On paper, however, the
company looked robust and secure. In association with Palmer the corporation mustered
most of the ruling officials of New Mexico including Governor William A. Pile, Chief
Justice Joseph G. Palen, U.S. Attorney Stephen B. Elkins, U.S. Marshall John Pratt,
Army Paymaster and Brigadier General Asa B. Carey, and Attorney General Thomas B.
Catron. This roll of Republican spoilsmen then formed together with a grandiose network
of eastern capitalists, railroad builders, politicians, and family members.37 Palmer carried
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through a parallel formula in the territory of Colorado. He then set about to achieve
congressional verification and to obtain a $6.5 million mortgage against the bonds of his
companies with which to actually begin the grading and construction of the railroad. By
October of the same year, Palmer reorganized and consolidated his interests into a single
corporate entity: the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company.38
In New Mexico, the official creation and early construction of the road leading
southward out of Denver heightened the speculative attention focused on the purchase of
land grant interests throughout the Hispano Borderlands. The rabid pace of railroad
growth after 1869 convinced investors that rails would soon enter the territory and bring
an overnight increase in land values and the potential for resale or resource exploitation.39
Coupled with the profitable ventures of the Maxwell and Sangre de Cristo grants on
European markets, the conditions in southern Colorado and northern New Mexico
appeared ripe for the cheap accumulation of unpatented lands. To this end, buyers
developed a range of methods by which they located, appraised, and purchased individual
“interests” from grant heirs or prior speculators. These strategies necessarily required
contributions by the office of the surveyor general and plenty of work for local lawyers,
especially if they could conduct business in Spanish, the lingua franca of a large majority
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of the local population and grant heirs. It was in this role that Thomas Catron asserted his
usefulness and started to assemble his own network of friends and associates.40

Networks of Speculation in the Hispano Borderlands
During the window of frenetic speculation, the most commonly implemented
method for buying up a grant involved three clear sets of actors. From afar, international
and eastern investors made up the first group. These capitalists provided the currency or
credit that formed the life-blood of their operations. They also leveraged their good
names to obtain favors in Washington, D.C. or upon the floors of powerful trading houses
in the U.S. and abroad. The second set of actors included all of the middle-men who
carried out the actual transactions and associated legal services. Most of this second set of
participants originated from the ranks of western lawyers, politicians, merchants, and
military men. Their ranks included shrewd wheelers and dealers of Euro-American and
Mexican background who held crucial regional ties that gave them local notoriety or at
least a greater sense of permanency. But these same individuals lacked sufficient purse
sizes to undertake the purchase of entire grants and so associated with sources of money
typified by the Eastern or European speculator. With these backers, the second group
could facilitate deals with Nuevomexicano sellers who represent the third group (and will
be discussed in greater detail below). The middlemen functioned as interlocutors at the
nexus of the worlds of finance capitalism and mercantile pastoralism and in the process
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disproportionately affected New Mexico’s development and record of land ownership
after the Civil War.41
At the top of this pyramid, international capitalists like William Blackmore and
Wilson Waddingham continued to participate in schemes for buying up the multiple
interests to grants with the clear object of consolidating ownership and then flipping the
land. Each of these capitalists built several local networks and conglomerate pools within
which members, friends, and competitors acted simultaneously throughout the region. It
was in many ways a small world, navigated on horseback, and communicated in person.
Capitalists expanded their social networks and connected their interests to those of the
growing nation by doubling their efforts as scientific explorers and cartographers, hunting
and trapping parties, surveyors, engineers, and geologic assayers. The efficient settling of
the West required a scientific rigor towards codifying and distributing western lands; far
from a slinking coyote, surreptitiously following these government expeditions in hopes
of easy pickings, agents of capitalism led the way.42 In doing so, they gained early and
unequal access to the rich bounty of the West.
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Development of local resources factored into the plans of these men and their
syndicates only as a promotional tool to attract potential buyers and to raise the value of
their real estate.43 Other than his network derived through the incorporation of the U.S.
Freehold Land and Emigration Co., Blackmore stood at the center of another pool
organized under the moniker New Mexico Trust Lands. It involved a number of moving
parts and participants from the United States and England. This amorphous group
operated in New Mexico and Colorado, methodically accumulating interests in over a
half-dozen grants including the Cebolla, Los Luceros, Mora, Cieneguilla, Sebastian
Martin, Cañon de Chama, and Conejos.44 It was in connection with the Trust Lands
organization that Thomas Catron acquired some of his earliest parcels of grant land.
As with many of Catron’s early business ventures, his relationship to Stephen
Elkins earned him access to the unpatented lands of the Mora Grant. Located in
northeastern New Mexico, the investors claimed that the Mora contained over 800,000
acres and encompassed the lands of Fort Union as well as miles of the well-traveled
Santa Fe Trail.45 Through a common method of gaining title to grant lands, Elkins
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performed legal services in defense of a Mexican client facing criminal charges, who in
lieu of currency paid his attorney in land. The initial gain whetted Elkins’ appetite and led
him to bring Catron on board to help procure subsequent interests. By November of 1870
Elkins and Catron worked assiduously towards the purchase of any and all Mora Grant
lands as part of a private agreement with Colonel Samuel S. Smoot, Captain E.N.
Darling, and surveyor general Thomas Rush Spencer. This sly party then settled upon a
strategy by which one-fifth of their grant purchases would transfer to a consortium
represented by Smoot who was then charged with the international promotion and sale of
the Mora Grant.46 This web of investors, buyers, and agents stopped with William
Blackmore and the New Mexico Trust Lands. Regardless of their place within this
speculative echelon, the cohort shared the understanding that they would be able to
collect all portions of the grant, gain clear title, and market it wholesale or in pieces. Like
so many other grant schemes, however, the clarity of operations on paper belied a
practical quagmire of legal, business, and title complications that unsettled the grant and
Catron’s ownership from its official patenting in 1876 well into the twentieth century.
What started as a trickle of purchases quickly turned into a deluge of eastern
investment in the land grants of the Hispano borderlands. Boosters in the region
embraced the trade and publicized land grants among the other opportunities available in
New Mexico. For instance, alongside a plea for statehood, William Arny published a
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promotional booklet in 1873 defending the land grant industry and praising the capitalists
at its helm. He explained:
It is said by those who ought to know, that there are very few, if any, spurious
grants in the Territory—certainly very few compared with the number brought to
light in California. Some of these grants of land are now held by our citizens,
other grants by large and flourishing communities, and others have been
purchased by capitalists and wealthy companies with a view to their settlement
and application to agricultural, stock growing and mining uses.47
Arny went on to publicly thank the current Surveyor General, James Proudfit, as well as
the clerks and translators in the office, David J. Miller and Samuel Ellison, for furnishing
the office’s annual reports and specific grant information used in the publication. These
same gentlemen happily provided information to Elias Brevoort the following year for his
promotional tract that unabashedly presented the position of land grant business in New
Mexico. Brevoort clearly expressed his self-interest in a preface, affirming for potential
clients, that being a land grant agent (see our card at the end), and being, as we think we are, thoroughly
posted in

all matters and things relating to or in anywise concerning Spanish or Mexican
private land claims in the Territory—as to their locality, extent, character,
capacity and title tenure—and being as we are as a “middle man” ready at all
times to give information concerning any of them or to operate in their purchase
or sale, we desired to enlarge our business in the ample field New Mexico now
affords therefor.48
Like others looking to get ahead in the land grant business, he understood the strategic
placement and integrity of his “middleman” role and the importance of networking. For
those interested parties that actually flipped to the back to read his card, Breevort listed
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his references, including Stephen Elkins, Miguel A. Otero, Santa Fe Plaza merchants
Johnson & Koch, and Bost & Jenkins, a land grant firm based in San Francisco.49
The optimistic and open atmosphere of speculation in the early 1870s led agents
like Thomas Catron to aggressively procure land grant interests. His initial acquisitions in
the Mora Grant and Ojo del Espiritu Santo Grant as well as the indicators that a railroad
and possibly statehood for New Mexico stood within reach led Catron’s cohort to
collectively expand operations. On rare occasion, this did in fact entail outright fraud,
such as in October 1872 when Catron and Elkins attempted to file a claim on the
fictitious Sierra Mosca Grant. The partners initiated this scheme by publicizing
supposedly lost documentation signed by Mexican Governor Armijo. Although they used
their influence to push the claim through the surveyor general’s office, the falsified
document fell far short of convincing bureaucrats in the U.S. Land Office or in Congress,
where bona fide grant documents with Armijo’s true signature shed light on the forgery at
hand.50 Catron received no punishment, though he learned some lessons. Over the next
decade he procured legitimate quit claim deeds to the Mora, Ojo del Espiritu Santo,
Antonio Ortiz, Anton Chico, Juan de Gabaldon, Mesita de Juana Lopez, Beck, Eaton, San
Miguel del Bado and Tierra Amarilla Grants.51 To fund these purchases, however, Catron
needed access to capital and the ability to use it at his discretion. His appointments came
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with a comfortable annual salary, which he added to through his private legal practice.
These positions elevated him to a solidly middle-class standing, but did not remunerate
him near enough to play with the leading capitalists.
Once again, Elkins came to his aid by including Catron on the board of directors
of the First National Bank of Santa Fe (FNSF). In a wholly Schumpeterian twist on
capitalism’s creative destruction, the origins of the bank itself derived from the
marketing of land grant paper on international trading floors.52 In the aftermath of selling
his estate in 1870, Lucien Maxwell used $150,000 of the proceeds to open New Mexico’s
first nationally chartered bank. Within a year, Elkins and other ringmen convinced
Maxwell to sell off the FNSF under the carrot of a quick return on investment and the
stick of bluffed competition.53
On top of the bank’s high interest rates of up to twelve percent (above which rates
were considered usurious and therefore illegal), the FNSF also profited from the assay of
precious minerals; their safe movement to Denver and New York; trading in government
bonds and vouchers; and by charging fractions of a percentile on drafts, exchanges, and
express charges.54 In a relatively short amount of time by southwestern standards, the
bank grew into a profitable enterprise. Beginning in August 1871 with a four percent
dividend, it paid out its profits to its stockholders on a regular semi-annual basis. By the
end of 1879, the FNSF already returned 108% of its original investment. Perhaps due to
52
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the otherwise lamented lack of railroads in New Mexico, the First National barely
stumbled after the panic of 1873, which led to mass bankruptcy and uncollectable paper
throughout the eastern United States. The 1880s proved even better for stockholders, with
the bank returning another 165% on its initial $150,000 capitalization.55 This success
benefited the directors in several ways, offering regional prestige, national connections,
regular profits, and most important for Catron, a ready source of credit and surety.56
As part of the directorship of the bank, Catron helped himself to credit. This
relationship aided him to year-by-year make additional land purchases. In 1872 for
example, he acquired (in his name) fourteen new grant interests, at least five more in
1873, and another nine in 1874. The next year however, he had only two land transaction
on his books, likely due to an overstretching of his funds and the need to reorganize his
finances.57 When the aggressive Catron used up his legally permitted credit, as he was
wont to do every few years, he found friends to take out money for him in their name.
Under FNSF President Elkins (1871-1884), Catron’s signature alone represented all the
security the bank required.
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For the first decade of his land grant operations, Catron relied on the FNSF to
supply him with necessary infusions of capital and to grant him freedom in how he put it
to use. To this end the FNSF directors adapted the bank toward their individual
speculative ends. They financed the purchase and promotion of New Mexico land grants
as well as associated railroad and development companies. In their own backyard, Elkins,
Catron, and Griffin fostered a relationship with the Maxwell Land Grant and Railway Co.
similar in function to the association between the First National of Denver and the U.S.
Freehold and Emigration Co. of the Sangre de Cristo Grant. The FNSF’s first summer of
operation witnessed the movement of thousands of dollars to and from its vaults and
those of the Maxwell Company. Similarly, the FNSF interlocked directorates with the
Consolidated Land, Cattle Raising, and Wool Growing Company, an enterprise that never
actually stocked the range or grew any wool. More impressively, the company purchased
a whopping 754,157 acres for one dollar from Waddingham, who had himself aggregated
the lands of the Pablo Montoya Grant and Baca Float #2.58 The outfit’s corporate shell
proved well suited for the purpose of obscuring ownership and exchanging title, which
transpired within fourteen months of its initial incorporation. In December 1873
possession of the company passed right back to Waddingham who renamed it the U.S.
Land & Colonization Company (USLCC). He desired to build a venerable cattle kingdom
across the open range of eastern New Mexico stocked with English immigrants and
Texas longhorns.59 Catron was along for the ride.
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David Remley, Bell Ranch, 69. Waddingham worked closely with the Santa Fe crowd to gain free and
clear title to the ranch lands near Fort Bascom that would become the Bell Ranch and later Red River
Valley Company. He also moved to control access to the nearby water sources by purchasing at least 70
different parcels along the Canadian River from the U.S. Land Office. It is likely that his connections in
Santa Fe worked in his favor to buy up much of this federal land.
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“Minute Book of the United States Land and Colonization Company,” CP, Series 607, Vol. 1. Original
incorporators include: Wilson Waddingham, Frank Chapman, David A. Moffat, Jr., Alfred Sayre, Trinidad
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Catron’s Empire Takes Shape: Local Growth after the Bubble Burst
Western investors and promoters bet against a large-scale downturn in the capital
markets of the East; their wagers proved shortsighted and their speculations unsecured.
The financial panic originating from the office of Jay Cooke spread westward out of New
York at an alarming pace. What started as a single house’s downfall triggered a
wholesale panic and market downturn that led to mass bank shutdowns, suspension of
business, and extensive bankruptcy across the country. In Colorado and New Mexico,
eastern and foreign investors felt the ruptures of the panic most acutely. Just like the
financial houses and trading floors that supported them, these speculators contracted their
monetary supply and set aside plans for future growth. International capitalists did not
return to the area in quite the same way until the western cattle boom of the 1880s.
Similarly, East-coast investors shunned the markets for almost half of a decade until
motivated by the return of significant railroad growth.60 For English capitalist William
Blackmore, the Panic of 1873 threw his southwestern schemes into a tailspin. Unable to
attract railroads, colonists, or new buyers to his grants, his obligations piled high until
April 1878, when under the weight of imminent bankruptcy and financial embarrassment,
he shot himself in his Salisbury home.61

Romero, and John Henry Stout. The initial capitalization was set at £525,000. Alongside the transfers of the
ranching company and its lands, Wilson Waddingham maintained a regular line of commerce with the
FNSF and kept up a dazzling reputation in regional circles.
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“Record of Incorporation Classified,” 1867-1910, Reel 34, TANM, Records of the Secretary of the
Territory, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico; Lamar, Far
Southwest, 291.
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Brayer, William Blackmore, 318 & 311. William Blackmore committed suicide on April 12, 1878.
Brayer presents Blackmore’s failure as a result of his overextension of landholdings (issues that
Waddingham and Catron would both suffer from later), stating that “The strain of trying to keep his entire
“empire” intact during a period of world-wide depression, together with an unsound policy of increasing
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Although outside sources of capital cautiously avoided southwestern ventures
during the mid-1870s, local investors renewed their interest in land accretion while
seeking to economize on properties already owned. With the attention of the nation
directed elsewhere and a fresh concentration of Republican Party rule in the territory, the
Santa Fe ringmen developed a new boldness toward the management of local affairs.
They utilized their established networks of friends to push the transfer of grant titles
through territorial courts and grant confirmations through the Office of the Surveyor
General. With a vacancy in New Mexican leadership created when Elkins moved to
Washington, D.C., to serve as Delegate to Congress, Catron took a leading role in
managing the Ring’s territorial affairs, including the pursuit of grant lands.
The experience Catron gained through his lesser roles in major land deals gave
him the confidence, the connections, and the wherewithal to branch out his efforts toward
locating and purchasing new interests. As a member of several distinct and often
interconnected pools, Catron already owned portions of the Mora, Antonio Ortiz, Ojo del
Espiritu Santo, Juan de Gabaldon, Agua Negra, and Mesita de Juana Lopez grants and
acted as a silent partner in the acquisition of the Anton Chico, Pablo Montoya, Baca Float
No. 2, Bosque del Apache, and the Armendariz grants.62 After the panic Catron and his

rather than exploiting or developing his holdings, had placed the promoter [Blackmore] in such serious
financial straits that only a miracle could have save the pyramid structure from collapse.”
62
This list is compiled from Series 302-310, Miscellaneous Land Title Records, 1840-1920, Catron Papers.
Especially useful is Series 307, “Index to Deeds and other documents concerned with transfer of land
within New Mexico land grants,” 1897.
Other than his participation in William Blackmore’s New Mexico Trust Lands, or Samuel Smoot’s
Mora Grant group, Thomas Catron grew interested in the Antonio Ortiz Grant of San Miguel County
through a secret partnership organized in 1870 between himself and Stephen Elkins. The two friends
determined to conduct a full purchase of the grant and split all costs and proceeds equally, but that for the
purpose of consolidating the various interests, Elkins put all conveyances in his name with Catron as a
silent partner. Elkins deeded Catron his equal part of the grant in 1885 through a Quit Claim Deed. “Deed,
between Stephen B. Elkins and Hallie D. Elkins of New York and Thomas B. Catron of Satna Fe,” 28
December 1885, CP, Series 305, Box 1, Folder 2. This pool also likely purchased interests in the Agua
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agents resumed the collection of these lands with the goal of accumulating or
representing full ownership for the purposes of negotiating a sale. By 1885 this list also
included partial ownership of the Eaton (San Cristobal), Beck, and San Miguel del Bado
grants as well as full and perfect title to the massive Tierra Amarilla Grant of 594,515
acres. Catron did not stop there. He continued to grow and manipulate his land grant
empire into the twentieth century, though his strategies for obtaining interests changed
over time. For instance, the appointment of George W. Julian as surveyor general in 1885
shifted the tactics of acquisition to favor legal and corporate mechanisms. Prior to this sea
change, Catron and other grant sharks relied most heavily on the simpler and quieter
method of cash and credit transactions.63 This approach required hundreds of individual
negotiations and title transfers for each grant as represented by Catron’s acquisition of the
Tierra Amarilla and Mora estates.
No other single property illustrates both Catron’s success as a lawyer-speculator
and his failings as a marketer-manager like the Tierra Amarilla Grant. From his initial
purchase of a single heir’s interests in 1874, through his controlled manipulation of land
records that led to his victorious suit to quiet title in 1883, and ending with the sale of the
grant in 1909, Tierra Amarilla symbolized the possibilities and the limits of Catron’s –
and in a grand sense, capitalism’s – ability to control development in the rural
Southwest.64 Replete with timber, coal, oil, and pasturage, the almost six hundred

Negra Grant, with record showing ownership by Elkins and Catron as early as 1872. S.B. Elkins per T.B.
Catron to Severiano Martinez, Certificate of Agreement, 27 August 1872, CP, Series 103, Box 19, Folder 1.
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Westphall, Public Domain, 33 & 102-105. A noticeable slowdown in the quantity of land grant
transactions and an increase in corporate or joint parties after 1885 is visible in Thomas Catron’s “Index to
Deeds and other documents concerned with transfer of land within New Mexico land grants,” 1897, CP,
Series 307, Vol. 1.
64
Scholarship regarding the Tierra Amarilla Land Grant and Catron’s involvement in the purchase,
consolidation, management, and later sale of the grant includes Victor Westphall, Thomas Benton Catron
and his Era (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973); Frances Leon Swadesh, Los Primeros
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thousand acres of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado stood as the jewel of
Catron’s land grant empire.
When Catron arrived in New Mexico, the U.S. Congress had already confirmed
the existence of the Tierra Amarilla Grant as the property of the heirs of Manuel Martinez
whose name appeared as the poblador principal on the original documentation from
Mexico. This established the scenario (Catron would later argue in the territorial courts)
that the Martinez family alone held all right and title to the grant. Despite the presence of
other residents of the grant with hijuelas (deeds, or shares) obtained from Martinez heirs
in the 1860s, Catron hatched a plan involving the purchase of only outstanding Martinez
interests, since as he found in the office of the surveyor general, these were the only
names represented on Mexican and United States title documents. So beginning in 1874
with his first cash purchase of land from a Martinez heir, Catron and his agents worked
tirelessly towards the accumulation of the entire grant.65 New Mexico’s surveyor general
Henry M. Atkinson sweetened the prize by contracting a very friendly party to survey the
grant, helping to balloon its boundaries to encompass over 594,000 acres before rubber

Pobladores: Hispanic Americans of the Ute Frontier (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974);
Roxanne Amanda Dunbar, “Land Tenure in Northern New Mexico: An Historical Perspective” (PhD diss.,
UCLA, 1974); Malcolm Ebright, The Tierra Amarilla Grant: A History of Chicanery (Santa Fe: Center for
Land Grant Studies, 1993); Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico, John
Van Ness, ed., New Mexico Land Grant Series (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994); and
David Correia, Properties of Violence: Law and Land Grant Struggle in Northern New Mexico,
Geographies of Justice and Social Transformation (Athens: University of Georgie Press, 2013).
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“Abstract of Title of the Tierra Amarilla Grant in the County of Rio Arriba, Territory of New Mexico,”
1901, typed letter book, CP, Series 305, Box 6. This abstract begins with the granting of Tierra Amarilla to
Manuel Martinez in 1832 under the government of Mexico, its confirmation by Congress on June 21, 1860
to the heirs of Manuel Martinez, and the issuance of a patent signed by the president on February 21, 1881
listing the grant as encompassing 594,515 acres in Rio Arriba County, NM and Conejos County, CO. The
large acreage of the grant, like the Sangre de Cristo and Maxwell grants, traces its origins to the hasty
confirmation in 1860 and the Tamerling Supreme Court case in 1876. The abstract then traces the
genealogy of the titles of all Martinez heirs until they were completely consolidated by Thomas B. Catron.
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stamping the grant on September 30, 1876 with the official approval of his esteemed
office.66
Thomas Catron was not the only party involved in the acquisition of Tierra
Amarilla lands, though he alone (or with his wife Julia) represented the buyer in at least
thirty deals by the start of his quiet title suit. The list of recurring individuals found
throughout the abstract of title include Julian Martinez, Frederick Muller, Henry Mercure,
Joseph Clouthier, Francisco Manzanares, Roque Sanchez, Ramon Salazar, Eliseo Salazar,
Hugh Campbell, Elias Brevoort, Wilmot E. Broad, and Thomas D. Burns.67 Alongside
Catron these individuals bought and traded grant parcels at a frenzied pace, paying
anywhere from one U.S. dollar to two-hundred Mexican pesos to tens of thousands of
dollars, depending upon the size of the interest and the knowledge of the seller.68 Where
Catron rose above the rest on this mixed list of Nuevomexicano and Euro American
buyers and sellers is that he fostered partnerships with those best connected on the ground
at Tierra Amarilla to covertly facilitate the constant transfer of the property to his name.
Thomas D. Burns and Wilmot Broad who lived and worked in Tierra Amarilla
proved especially helpful for Catron.69 These proxies had personal connections to many
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Mortgage to Thomas B. Catron and Julia A. Catron from The Mercantile Trust Company of the City of
New York, 22 July 1882, CP, Series 305, Box 6, Folder 13.
67
“Record of Deeds and Conveyances in the County of Rio Arriba,” Signed by Fernando Salazar, Probate
Clerk and Ex Officio Recorder of Rio Arriba County, 24 July 1882, CP, Series 305, Box 6, Folder 1.
68
In general, a full 1/8 interest sold to an American speculator went for around $8000 while many more
transactions made between Nuevomexicanos or residents of the grant like Thomas Burns involved partial
interests that sold for several hundred pesos or dollars. It is interesting to note that when Mexican sellers
dealt with known land investors like Catron or Brevoort, the price rose substantially compared to the
majority of sales between personally acquainted local parties. Also, many of the deeds that transferred in
the probate books of the territory until the late 1870s were recorded and printed in Spanish, both when the
sale involved multiple Nuevomexicano actors or sales to Euro American speculators. These figures are
taken from a combination of documents found in the Abstract of Title, and Folders 1, 10, and 11 in the
Catron Papers, Series 305, Box 6.
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Thomas D. Burns developed a power base of his own in northern New Mexico from his position in
Nutritas, which changed its name to Tierra Amarilla in 1880. See: Robert J. Torrez, “’El Bornes’: La Tierra
Amarilla and T.D. Burns,” New Mexico Historical Review 56 (April 1982): 161-75.
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of the Mexican inhabitants of the grant, knew the Martinez family, and knew the local
probate clerks. They built lasting relationships with Catron as creditors, debtors, land
agents, and land developers. Thomas Burns alone accounted for over thirty-eight
conveyances of Tierra Amarilla land rights that he then transferred to Catron in 1881 and
1882 as part of two discreet transactions.70 When Wilmot Broad grew indebted to Catron
in the 1870s, Broad partially fulfilled his obligation through the purchase of the collected
interests of Elias Brevoort who had serious resignations about selling the lands to Catron.
Through these often opaque means, Catron methodically obtained the interests of all
Martinez heirs.71 To do so, according to one preeminent scholar of land grants, he ended
up spending over $200,000 of personal and borrowed capital. (According to most
inflation calculators, this equates to almost $5 million in the 2010s). This figure is
substantiated in the minutes of the U.S. Land and Colonization Co. as the amount of a
“first mortgage Deed of Trust” from the Mercantile Trust Company of New York.
Thomas and Julia Catron obtained these funds on July 22, 1882, secured by seven percent
“Land Grant Bonds.”72 His crowning achievement yet to come, however, was the
successful suit to quiet title (legally define and convey ownership) for Tierra Amarilla.
Catron orchestrated the suit to produce a legally binding title to the grant with his name
as the sole owner. Then, he immediately transferred the enormous grant to the
stockholders of the USLCC, a corporation in which he held the offices of vice president
and director.

“Memorandum of the land of T.D. Burns on Tierra Amarilla Grant,” CP, Series 305, Box 6, Folder 1.
Frances Leon Swadesh, Los Prímeros Pobladores: Hispanic Americans of the Ute Frontier (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 84-85.
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Ebright, Tierra Amarilla, 25; U.S. Land and Colonization Co. Minute Book, CP, Series 607, Vol. 1;
Mortgage to Thomas B. Catron and Julia A. Catron from The Mercantile Trust Company of the City of
New York, 22 July 1882, CP, Series 305, Box 6, Folder 13.
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When Catron filed suit in the district court of Rio Arriba County against the
“Unknown heirs of Manuel Martinez,” he crafted an eloquent and salient case around a
main argument that no other residents of the Tierra Amarilla Grant could claim
possession or right to its lands, except those heirs of Martinez.73 This argument and the
mathematical rationality that it produced by which interests could be easily distinguished
as fractions of the whole, presented an important official redefinition of land grant
ownership that Catron and his cohort broadly applied to both private and community
grants.74 His deep knowledge of the Mexican and U.S. land systems in New Mexico
meant that Catron knowingly subverted documentation and precedence that deviated
from his clearly defined legal position. In court, he relied upon the testimony of fellow
speculators and friends such as Eugene Fiske, Thomas Burns, and Wilmot Broad to help
construct his case and to de-legitimize the rights and interests of other parties whether
they held no relation to the Martinez family or simply passed the statute of limitations for
filing their ownership in fee simple in the U.S. courts. Catron likely knew that with his
old friend and ring member Samuel B. Axtell on the bench as Chief Justice of the
Territory, his case would be upheld.75 His legal training, however, led him to want to go
even further than just quieting the title in 1883. Catron’s brilliance at the moment (and
from other perspectives, his wickedness and greed), argued for the setting of a longstanding precedence regarding the Tierra Amarilla Grant so that while other lands
constantly required adjudication to clarify clouded titles and questionable statuses, the
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Thomas B. Catron v. Unknown heirs of Manuel Martinez, 1883, CP, Series 305, Box 7, Folder 1.
Shadow and Rodríguez-Shadow, “From ‘Repartición’ to Partition” 277.
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Thomas B. Catron v. Unknown heirs of Manuel Martinez, 1883, CP, Series 305, Box 7, Folder 1;
Corriea, Properties of Violence, 65.
74

183

New Mexico courts cemented his ownership of almost 600,000 acres and upheld this
ruling on several future occasions.76
In the immediate aftermath of his victorious suit, Catron desired to replicate the
early accomplishments of William Blackmore, Wilson Waddingham, and his good pal
Stephen Elkins. By June 1883, he successfully conveyed his newly established ownership
to the United States Land and Colonization Co., the same corporate entity that replaced
the Consolidated Land, Cattle Raising and Wool Growing Company in 1873 as the owner
of the Pablo Montoya Grant and Baca Float #2. Since its official incorporation in New
Mexico on August 14, 1875, the USLCC stood at the center of a robust network of
southwestern speculator-entrepreneurs including Catron, Waddingham, Frank Chapman,
David A. Moffat Jr., Trinidad Romero, Marcus Brunswick, Michael Slattery, and Charles
Ilfeld. With business offices at Fort Bascom, Las Vegas, Santa Fe, and Denver, and with
an initial value set at $2.5 million, this company positioned itself at the nexus of what its
stockholders hoped would become a sprawling empire of range, mine, timber, and
colony. In payment for the transfer of “a full, absolute, and perfect title in fee simple in
and to” the Tierra Amarilla Grant, the board of directors of the USLCC, of which Catron
was a member, unanimously agreed upon a purchase price of the company’s “entire
capital stock.”77 Taken at face value this insider trade represented a ten-fold return on
investment for Thomas Catron, though it is not clear whether he really obtained all of the
stock of the company or if it was worth anything close to its full valuation on the open
market. Regardless, Catron set to work under the umbrella of the USLCC to arrange for
Catron’s successful defense of his ownership of the Tierra Amarilla Land Grant in 1883 did not prevent
future litigation, but rather provided Catron and his legal teams with sufficient evidence and precedence to
validate his ownership on each occasion. For instance, cases in one form or another attempted to dislodge
Catron’s ownership in 1885, 1889, 1893, and 1901, but never succeeded in overturning the 1883 ruling.
77
CP, Series 607, Vol. 1.
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an international marketing campaign designed to attract new investors and the money to
develop the grant, or even better, to quickly flip Tierra Amarilla as a hot commodity to
the next round of speculators.78
Similar processes led to Thomas Catron’s acquisition of whole or partial interests
on grants such as the Eaton and the Mora, both in northern New Mexico.79 He spent
countless hours researching lists of grant heirs, abstracts of title, probate records, and
legal pretexts that could help establish individual, fee simple ownership.80 While
traveling across the territory to conduct his legal duties as a nationally appointed official
for New Mexico, he doubled as a speculator and land agent. This multiplicity of purposes
allowed Catron to make new friends and associates in the different regions of the
developing territory, but especially throughout the mostly Nuevomexicano communities
that sprawled northward from Santa Fe along the Rio Grande. Once he set his sights on
obtaining part of a grant, he either did so openly and with his own funds, or more often,
found an on-site agent and supervisor to manage the purchase and collection of interests.
This method continued for Catron into the early 1880s, but by mid-decade he started to
shift his focus on the incorporation and development of his grant lands so as to cultivate
more stable profits and less transparent lines of ownership.
78

For instance, Catron paid for the research and publication of a booster report by John McCulloch titled
“Report on the Tierra Amarilla Grant, The Property of T.B. Catron, Esq.” and sent it to James Black of
London on 3 November 1883, CP, Series 305, Box 7, Folder 11. In this optimistic report, John McCulloch
estimated that the Tierra Amarilla Grant would produce annual revenue of around $177,500, mostly from
livestock, but also from timber, coal, and agriculture. The author went on to firmly endorse and recommend
the grant to James Black and his associate investors.
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“Abstract of Disposition of Interests, Mora Grant,” 1898, CP, Series 305, Box 1, Folder 5; “Abstract of
Title, Eaton Grant, Richard H. Hanna, Attorney and Abstractor,” 12 January 1909, CP, Series 306, Box 2,
Vol. 1.
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Catron’s records include hundreds of pages of documents, notes, and indexes gleaned from the Territorial
Archives and the Office of the Surveyor General. Catron and his law partners must have spent an
extraordinary amount of time recording this information themselves, or more likely, hired legal apprentices
who wanted to work in Santa Fe to do it for them. “Index 1: To Wills and General Abstract of Archives in
Sur. Genl. Office,” and “Abstract of documents found in the Office of the Surveyor General,” CP, Series
310, Vols. 1 & 2.
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Nuevomexicanos and the Land Grant Bubble
By the early 1880s the speculative bubble in grant lands and the resultant
dispossession of much of the Mexicano population had already transpired. While the
inequities and injustices of the Court of Private Land Claims had not yet surfaced to
diminish Nuevomexicano ownership of individual and common lands even further, the
period of grant land acquisition by speculator-capitalists had already divested the large
Hispano underclass of much of New Mexico’s best lands and usufruct access to natural
resources.81 Structural forces organized against Nuevomexicanos made for an unequal
system, but not necessarily the inescapable alienation from their land, from economic
power, and from political power.
The fact remains that land grant heirs willingly participated in thousands of
individual transactions.82 For instance a bound volume titled “Abstract of Disposition of
Interests, Mora Grant,” represents a complete genealogy of the ownership of the Mora
Grant through its original seventy-six heirs in 1835 to the time the volume was hand
recorded in 1898. The volume follows each individual grantee from their awarded
possession of a 1/76 share of the Mora Grant in 1835 through the myriad transactions and
transfers with other Nuevomexicanos and Anglo Americans. For many of the grantees
listed in the volume more than ten proceedings were listed representing the fact that each
small part of the Mora Grant was sold, leveraged, and traded on multiple occasions. Most
of the interests of the Mora Grant did at some point pass through the hands of Stephen
Elkins or Thomas Catron, and end in the hands of a non-Mexican, non-heir. This verifies
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Holtby, Forty-Seventh Star, 28-30.
“Abstract of Disposition of Interests, Mora Grant,” CP, Series 305, Box 1, Folder 5.
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the alienation of ownership that occurred during this period, but the sheer amount of
transactions between Nuevomexicano parties obscures the story of unilateral fraud and
malfeasance by Anglo speculators, lawyers, and politicians. Names of prevalent buyers
found in the disposition of interests includes Stephen B. Elkins, Thomas Catron, Julia
Catron, Louis Sulzbacher, Pedro Perea, Jeff Reynolds, Frank Springer, John H. Knaebel,
Robert H. Longwill, Pedro Valdez, H.C. Blythe, and Eugene Fiske; Mexican sellers are
too numerous to list in full, but include families with the surnames Abeyta, Baca,
Carabajal, Chacon, Cruz, Garcia, Gonzales, Gurule, Lopez, Lujan, Martinez, Mestas,
Montoya, Quintana, Pacheco, Rivera, Romero, Sanchez, Tapia, Trujillo, Valdez, and
Vigil. Furthermore, the abstract book includes amounts paid for some (but not all) of the
transactions, showing that different sellers received different compensation for the lands
based on size of interest and their ability to negotiate. This remained true from the
beginning of the Land Grant bubble that began around 1869 and continued right up to the
cusp of the twentieth century. Sales to Catron or to Anglo buyers in the 1890s indicate
that not all Mexican heirs were willing to sell in the 1870s or 1880s but that it took
decades for the American newcomers to convince these owners to divest of their land
grant interests. The overall impression gained from rich sources such as the “Abstract of
Disposition of Interests” for the Mora Grant is that yes, Nuevomexicanos were targeted
by a relatively small group of lawyers and speculators for the titles to their lands, but that
they also actively participated in the onset of capitalism and capitalist practices in the
nineteenth century. To say that these men and women were only victimized is to do them
historical injustice the same as the narrative of backwardness and ignorance that scholars
and writers used to characterize the Mexican community during the first half of the
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twentieth century. Instead, to give the Nuevomexicano people fuller historical agency is
to recognize their participation in the very system of practices – albeit at an unequal level
– that destabilized them as a distinct ethnic population of the American West and led to a
reinvention of the Nuevomexicano people as property-less, migratory wage laborers.83
While buyers such as Thomas Catron with direct access to capitalist networks and
the records of the Office of the Surveyor General readily gained from the power of
information, sellers utilized local knowledge and communicated freely with neighbors
and family to determine going rates and favorable terms. Their acceptance of cash for
land may look shortsighted, but in the currency starved Southwest, the money received
was often more than they could make through a decade of hard work. The money could
immediately find use to pay-off long standing debts that kept them or their families in a
state of peonage or finance the purchase of a small herd for their own use and benefit.
When fraud or falsification occurred, it usually focused on the new legal meanings of
property and sale, especially with regard to communal lands, to which sellers were often
misled to believe that they had continued legal access.84
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This argument is not really new, either. Robert D. Shadow and María Rodríguez-Shadow developed the
same line of reasoning in their 1995 article that focused on the history of land ownership and use rights on
the Mora Grant from its legal creation in 1835 to the aftermath of its court-ordered partition in 1916.
Instead of treating Nuevomexicanos as a “monolithic block,” the authors explicated that “Without denying
the presence and power exercised by outside agents in the struggle for the commons, we would like to
return local peoples to a more central, active, and transformative role in their own history, as well as pay
closer attention to the relationship of internal social differentiation and class stratification in the breakup of
the commons. Local society responded to capitalist expansion, commodity production, and the privatization
of resources not only through resistance but also with opportunism….” Shadow and Rodríguez-Shadow,
“From ‘Repartición’ to Partition,” 264.
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The troubles surrounding Nuevomexicano ownership and access stemmed in large part from the types of
deals organized by Thomas Catron or his agents. Recognizing that the decision to actually remove
Nuevomexicanos from their lands was both impossible to fully implement as well as impolitic to a high
degree, Catron looked to informal contracts and agreements that stipulated that heads of household could
maintain their residence on grant lands, even though full title transferred to outsiders and their corporations.
In so doing, Catron increased his power and patronage while surreptitiously divesting families of land
ownership in ways that only showed the true intent and destabilization years and sometimes decades in the
future.
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For their part, many of the heirs of the Spanish and Mexican grants made for
savvy negotiators regarding the sale of their lands. While speculators certainly duped or
swindled some heirs into low sales prices and poor terms, many of the Mexican grant
owners shared information with neighbors, friends, and family to set more favorable
prices and avoid undercutting their kin. Furthermore, members of the Mexican
community doubled as purchase agents and sources of information about where to find
heirs and where to locate boundaries. Members of the Chavez, Vigil, Otero, Ortiz, Perea,
and Manzanares families participated alongside their Euro American peers in Santa Fe to
help expand their own land holdings and statuses within the territory. Likewise, Nicolas
Pino made himself into an indispensable party regarding Catron’s accumulation of the
Eaton Grant. By 1878 Pino owned over one-third of the entire 81,032 acre grant. He sold
this interest to Catron in 1894 only after the two had partnered together for the purpose of
leading a partition suit through the territorial court to break up the Eaton property into
individual estates.85 Pino’s experience in the land grant buy-up adds complexity to our
understanding of the various options available to land grant heirs during the Gilded Age.
One issue that the mostly Nuevomexicano sellers came across developed due to
the changing culture of oral contracts. Whereas many of the land use agreements initiated
by Nuevomexicanos centered on oral agreements with a local known patron figure, the
rapidity with which land changed hands after 1870 destabilized this system. Allowances
made to Mexican sellers such as the right to continue prior land use arrangements could
and often did fall apart when new owners brought ejection suits. Oral agreements with
previous owners simply lacked the legal protections necessary to combat corporate-

“Abstract of Title, Eaton Grant, Richard H. Hanna, Attorney and Abstractor,” 12 January 1909, CP,
Series 306, Box 2, Vol. 1.
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backed ejections and led to newfound contempt on both sides of the equation. On the
other hand, buyers had a seriously constrained ability to actually remove residents from
their grant lands. Mexicans who sold what they considered to represent only their
individual parcels continued to use common lands well into the twentieth century with a
relative degree of impunity. The new proprietors of land grants could post signs, file
ejection suits, and use violent means to attempt to displace the Nuevomexicanos and
Native American “squatters,” but the remoteness, community support, mobility, and
seasonal lifestyle of many of these inhabitants made owners’ efforts expensive and futile.
Furthermore, the hostility engendered by prolonged challenges to residence and land use
had the opposite effect on development and property values while helping to foment antimonopoly, anti-land grant, and anti-ring feelings throughout the villages and towns of the
region.
Dispossessed Nuevomexicanos and opponents of the Santa Fe Ring increasingly
leveled charges of corruption and foul play against Thomas Catron as the worst
perpetrator of thievery and land-grabbing in the territory. Most of these charges rolled off
his back with little concern. By the mid-1880s he had acquired an immense fortune in
southwestern lands, though the possibility to sell these lands for his idea of their fair
value diminished as statehood remained out of grasp and the strong markets of the
eighties were replaced by depressed markets of the nineties. Instead, as New Mexico
entered the railroad age, Catron took a new stance towards his landed empire. He would
actually try to develop its diverse resources while biding his time until statehood brought
an overnight doubling of land values. One theme remained constant as Catron tried his
hand at the establishment and management of ranching, mining, irrigation, utility, and
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town site companies: all of his new ventures developed a corporate organization. The
now middle-aged Thomas Catron continued to pursue available grant lands, legal
business, elected offices, and national recognition, but as will be discussed in the next
chapter, his participation on the board of directors or as an officer for numerous
corporations worked to pull New Mexico and its hinterlands ever deeper within capital
markets and push the majority of the territory’s population ever further from the land and
the values that they shared just a generation before.
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Chapter 4
The Equity of Empire:
Corporate Growth and Regional Competition, 1879-1893
I am the owner of about 900.00 acres of land worth about $2 Per acre to all of which I hold
perfect titles, the same being Mexican and Spanish grants in this Territory which have been
confirmed by the Congress of the United States. I own in addition to this between two and three
hundred thousand acres of land some of which has been confirmed by Congress and some has not.
I own real estate in the City of Santa Fe of a value to exceed $100,000.00 I have outstanding
indebtedness due me, the greater portion of which I consider absolutely good, amounting to about
$150,000.00. I have $10,000.00, of the First National Bank Stock worth over $20,000.00. I have
personal property to the amount of about $25,000. I have $65,000.00 of the stock of the American
Valley Cattle Company, worth not less than sixty cents on the dollar. I own stock in other
companies and an interest in three mines, neither one of which owes a dollar, and all of them
considered valuable. I owe about $100,000 to Banks and other parties, I have about $7,000.00 on
hand. The only property that I have mortgaged is my dwelling house and $14,000.00 of the First
National Bank Stock. I had given a mortgage to secure $200,000.00 of bonds issued by me, and
which I have given as collateral to secure $100,000.00, this $100,000.00 is not the same
$100,000.00 which I above stated that I owed, but the payment of this $100,000.00 has already
been made or at least is arranged to be made in this way. I sold during last year to Mr. Winter and
Mr. Waddingham of Kansas City real estate to the amount of $140,000.00 and took their notes,
which are due about the present time, they agreed, or at least Mr. Waddingham did, to take up the
$100,000.00 last mentioned out of the proceeds of this sale when it fell due. I understand from Mr.
Waddingham that he has done so. The mortgage has not been satisfied on the record but the debt
has been paid, the balance of that sale is due me.
I have insurance to the amount of $45,000.00 on my house and personal property. I consider that I
am worth at least One million and a half dollars over and above my just debts and liabilities.
Very truly &c., T.B. Catron
(dictated)
P.S. I have an annual income of about $50,000.00 from my real property.
Personal Statement of Value, T.B. Catron to T.O. Vinton, El Paso, Texas, April 22, 1889

American Valley Dreamin’
Thomas Catron must have thought he was getting the better of John P. Casey in
August 1886 when he turned a $6,000 mortgage held by Casey into joint ownership
between himself and Henry M. Atkinson of $132,500 in stock of the newly organized
American Valley Company (AVC). On paper this deal represented a ten-fold increase for
Catron from the initial loan he made to Casey in 1883 to his signing of the articles of
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incorporation three years later.1 The new corporation, fully capitalized at half a million
dollars, presented an amazing opportunity for involvement in the growing cattle industry
of territorial New Mexico. More specifically, the company presided over a range that
newspapers claimed ran sixty by forty miles on the high plains to the west of Socorro.2
The AVC’s monopoly on water rights along Gallo Creek (one of the few regular water
sources in the vicinity) and its control over an enormous range and hill country
represented the pinnacle of many western cattle baron’s ambitions.
For Catron, however, the AVC and its ranch signified little more than a
continuation of his speculative investment in New Mexico, its lands, and its resources.
The company and its property represented tangible equity for Catron that he hoped would
work for him in at least two lucrative ways. First, in determining his personal finances
and accounting, Catron tallied his capital stock in the plus column and often relied upon
these securities to act as the necessary collateral in some other of his myriad business
affairs. Stocks could be especially alluring in this regard because their values were easily
manipulated. On paper, Catron often took on the form of a blowfish. By watering his
stocks he could puff up his personal value and his financial security thus giving him
enhanced access to other pools of capital for exploitation. On the other hand, when tax
season came around stock value was non-assessable and so as a form of equity held no
obligation to the collector.

“Articles of Incorporation of the American Valley Company,” 2 August 1886, Thomas B. Catron Papers,
1692-1934, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico, Series 611,
Box 2. Split evenly and at full face value, Catron’s ownership of $66,250 in stock of the American Valley
Company indicates an impressive 1100% increase on his original loan. Even if we flash forward to January
1894 with stock valued at forty cents on the share, Catron’s manipulation of a personal mortgage into
substantial AVC holdings puts his base gain after eight years at about 440% plus any dividends paid out.
2
“A Big Deal. Consolidation of the American Valley Interests Effected in Santa Fe,” Santa Fe Weekly New
Mexican and Livestock Journal, 19 August 1886, p. 3. A range of 40 by 60 miles represents 2400 square
miles or an area larger than the state of Delaware and easily the size of many American counties.
1
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Second, in the aftermath of railroad construction that crisscrossed the territory,
Catron and his friends in Santa Fe desired to take a leading role in developing the latent
resources of New Mexico to spruce up its economic appeal for eastern investors and
politicians. With overwhelming optimism the string-pullers in the territorial capital
worked to direct growth under the notion that statehood would bring about a significant
rise in land value and political empowerment.3 Catron likely believed that his
involvement with the AVC would pay dividends through his ownership of company
stock, through the increased value of AVC lands with statehood (and the affiliated rise in
AVC stock value), and through the increase in value he would then represent to his
political and social connections. But as Catron and so many others learned time and time
again in New Mexico, equity rarely grew fast enough to outpace debt and so his
southwestern empire swelled more from the latter than the former, requiring constant
infusions of new equity to prevent the scale from tipping over towards insolvency and
that worst of all black mark in the business world, financial embarrassment—bankruptcy.
This chapter will focus on the surge of capital investment in New Mexico after the
entrance of the railroad. While local businessmen and politicians tried to direct the
growth that followed the extension of rail service, fierce competition for regional
incorporation meant that networks from Denver, El Paso, Chicago, and Boston more

3

Self-interest and home rule grew to particular importance to Catron and his Santa Fe cohort during the
aggressive push for statehood during the late 1880s and early 1890s. Following a wave of scrutiny and
reform brought about by President Cleveland’s Democratic administration that produced a shake-up in the
territory, an admixture of ringmen and monied interests sought statehood to safeguard the weighted
political economy of New Mexico that had balanced in their favor from the 1860s to 1885. David V.
Holtby, Forty-Seventh Star: New Mexico’s Struggle for Statehood (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2012), 11-13. Holtby’s clearly defined argument follows: “Catron and the Santa Fe Ring sought statehood
to protect their self-interest, perpetuate their money-making schemes, and reduce popular discontent.”
Without quibble here, I add that statehood represented a money-making scheme in-and-of-itself for Catron
and his peers, and the lack of statehood, or a failed statehood campaign, represented a complex political
and financial risk with tangible injuries to values, cash flows, and business outlook.
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forcefully influenced territorial economic development. Thomas Catron’s corporate
involvement mirrored this pattern and presents a lens through which the historian can
trace the attempts of New Mexican insiders to shape the territory’s economy in
conversation and competition with other capitalist circles vying for control. In a sense,
Catron’s economic fortunes were often tied to those of the Nuevomexicano community.
His investment in New Mexico land greatly relied upon Spanish and Mexican land
grants, and so intertwined his interests with those lands and in no small part, with their
residents. As capital moved into New Mexico, especially during the decades of the 1880s
and the 1900s, it mostly flowed into the “new” parts of cities and towns or newer, more
Anglo-dominated regions of the territory. Concentrations of capital occurred in mostlywhite spaces, marking much of Catron’s empire as marginal, even as the territory and
later state grew more and more connected to international markets. Catron and Santa Fe
ultimately failed to consolidate market forces to their mutual advantage. Their
marginalization likewise resulted in a loss of even the semblance of economic control by
many Nuevomexicanos. Like Catron, Nuevomexicanos depended upon maintaining their
clout in Santa Fe as a strategic source of power. As the capital lost out in the larger
picture of regional development, so too did the Nuevomexicano people of the Hispano
borderland, who found their choices for livelihood more clearly dictated by distant cities
and transnational market forces.
Busier, and perhaps bolder than most, Catron’s business involvement in the 1880s
evolved parallel to the territory’s economic trends. Like so many southwestern capitalists,
his agenda shifted in anticipation of the extension of rail traffic, including targeted local
improvement in strategic towns and cities of New Mexico in combination with a new

195

focus on extractive industry for his rural land grants. His involvement with the American
Valley Company, the Monero Coal & Coke Company, and at least two dozen other
corporate entities speaks to Catron’s modern and comprehensive approach toward
development, his reliance on the institution of the joint stock company, and his
(sometime) ability to organize his interests in synergy with other regional and national
networks. He also characterized the changes under way in the business of land
speculation. Though never out of sight, speculators re-aligned in scope, reasoning that
instead of flipping western lands, which grew more competitive and more clouded since
the early 1870s, they could exploit the land’s latent resources to boost its’ prospective
value, their personal value, and their bottom line in the process. Land owners and their
partners increasingly established mining, ranching, timber, water, and utility companies
with designs to profitably harness, extract, and market natural resources. These
businesses formalized their presence and intent at an accelerated rate in the 1880s
through the process of incorporation. The mechanisms of the limited liability corporation
fit many of the capitalists’ needs concerning southwestern lands. Corporations spread out
individual risk (a relished fact when dealing with overtly risky lands), enabled their
directors to sell securities for infusions of capital, and added to the value of properties
relatively unknown to and untested in Eastern markets.4 Furthermore, property and
improvements were assessable for taxation, whereas in New Mexico and Colorado,
corporate securities were not. And last, but by no means least, overlapping and

4

Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 4. Thomas Catron fits quite well into Jonathan Levy’s characterization of
the new risk-oriented capitalist of the late nineteenth century included his growing dependence upon
financial institutions, markets, and new forms of wealth for his economic security and that he trusted in the
corporate form as an economic and cultural tool to advance his business and personal interests and shape
New Mexico’s development.
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interlocking directorates cushioned competition and extended friendship circles. And yet,
in the case of the AVC, the corporate form seemed to do just as much harm as good.

John P. Casey first came to the area west of Socorro as a homesteader sometime
in 1881 with the intention of ranching cattle on the still open range that he called the
“American Valley.” As rail service brought market penetration to this remote pocket of
New Mexico, others followed Casey and started to pre-empt land entries. Casey’s
ambition was to acquire the vast amount of land surrounding Gallo Peak (now in the Gila
National Forest), especially those parcels with access to Gallo Creek.5 Access to water
was pivotal to controlling the range. Casey had steadily worked alongside Henry M.
Atkinson, Surveyor General of New Mexico from 1876 to 1884, to identify, locate, and
file the proper paperwork for these lands. Atkinson, easily one of the most corrupt
officials in the history of the U.S. territorial system, had developed a cottage industry in
partnering with land sharks to snatch up potentially valuable holdings. In the American
Valley, Atkinson pooled land with Casey and pooled investments with Catron and John
H. Thompson to create and organize the Boston and New Mexico Cattle Company in
January 1882. The sanguine group valued their corporation at two million dollars and set
about backing Casey in his continued effort to buy up land sections and to ward off
newcomers.6 It is likely through his investment in the Boston and New Mexico Cattle Co.
that Catron lent money to John Casey and started to pay attention to the activity taking
place in western Socorro County.

5
6

Victor Westphall, Thomas Benton Catron and His Era (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), 160.
CP, Series 611, Box 2, Bundle 1.
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For a while Atkinson worked diligently in Santa Fe pushing Casey’s acquisitions
through the land office while also keeping tabs on competing land entries. Casey relied
on Atkinson’s insider knowledge to intimidate other homesteaders, including two
families who refused to sell out and leave the American Valley. When the two patriarchs
were found murdered the following May 6, 1883, the resulting investigation led to the
apprehension, trial, and acquittal of five of Casey’s ranch hands. Catron protected his
investment, expertly manipulating the case to be tried outside of its original jurisdiction
and creating plenty of doubt surrounding the events of the past May.7 When it came time
to pay the legal fees, Casey found himself unable to raise the funds and instead entered a
deal with Catron to provide collateral in land of the American Valley. From this vantage
Catron continued to operate as a (mostly) silent partner of Henry Atkinson as they
maneuvered their way into ownership of 4,300 acres of land along the creek. Whatever
became of the Boston and New Mexico Cattle Co. is unclear, but by August 1886, Catron
and Atkinson joined up with Henry L. Warren and William B. Slaughter (who was busily
engaged in similar practices) to consolidate their interests and establish a monopoly
across the American Valley.8 The new partners cut John Casey out of the equation
entirely, earning Catron another long-time enemy in the territory.
Following the zeitgeist of the times, the form taken by their partnership was that
of an officially chartered and contracted limited liability corporation. Though based in
Socorro, the group met at their branch office in Santa Fe (which just so happened to be
Catron’s law office) on the second of August to properly file their corporate name,
compose by-laws, and organize the consolidation. The first two of these items had
7

Westphall, Thomas Benton Catron, 160.
“Articles of Incorporation of the American Valley Company,” 2 August 1886, CP, Series 611, Box 2,
Bundle 2.
8
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become commonplace by the mid-80s, the mundane requirements of capitalism’s
conjoined twin, bureaucracy.9 For the most part the documents followed a stock format
and composition. The ever-studious Catron was fully up to date on the status of corporate
law in the territory and made sure that his LLC’s met all obligations while remaining as
dexterous as possible when it came to their application.10 In the midst of leadership issues
within some of his other companies, Catron even included specific wording meant to
ameliorate the risks caused by an antagonistic directorate.
The third item, a company agreement detailing the specifics of the merger of land
and livestock provides a window into the art of creating value.11 In the contract, Catron
and Atkinson transferred ownership of 4,300 acres of land with all attached water rights,
fourteen hundred head of cattle, and the tools and sundry items then in use at the
American Valley Ranch in exchange for joint ownership of $132,500 of capital stock. For
his part, William Slaughter assigned 4000 acres of land with water rights alongside over
ten thousand head of cattle, eighty horses, four wagons, and complete ranch and camp
outfits in receipt for $367,500 in AVC stock. The consolidation resulted then in the AVC
owning 8300 acres of range land (plus unspecified interests that if added would provide
$16/acre to the deliverer in AVC bonds), over 11,400 head of cattle, and all of the
“Articles of Incorporation” and “By Laws” of the American Valley Company, 2 August, 1886, CP, Series
611, Box 2, Bundle 2. The stated object of the AVC was “to buy and sell real estate, cattle, horses, sheep,
swine, to raise and sell cattle, horses, mules, sheep and swine and to own and cultivate lands, to buy, own
and sell town property, houses, ranches and live stock of all kinds, to lease and rent lands and tenements, to
buy and own all implements and machinery necessary in the carrying on their business. To construct
ditches or conduct in water pipes for irrigating or other purposes, claim or own water rights.” This may be
word for word the same stated objective of the New Mexico Land & Livestock Company, also founded by
Henry M. Atkinson.
10
Ibid. For instance, Article XIV states that “No expense shall be incurred or indebtedness created by this
Company only for proper and legitimate operating and current expense of caring for the live stock and
other property of the Company except by the consent of the holders in writing of not less than three fourths
of the stock of the Company.” While this would make it seem difficult for any stockholder to borrow
against the company, there were only three stock holders and Catron was nothing if not a great manipulator
of friends and credit.
11
“Agreement of August 2nd 1886,” CP, Series 611, Box 2, Bundle 2.
9
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necessary equipment with which to commence operation. Over time the company’s
holdings grew to 12,000 patented acres, though they controlled much, much more.12 For
their part, Catron, Atkinson, and Slaughter became the owners of $500,000 in saleable
and transferrable stock. And, because the three incorporators also filled the roles of
company officers and directors, as well as the majority (only) stockholders for the AVC,
they never really relinquished ownership of the value of the ranch lands and cattle.13 In
this way they created multiple levels of equity that the owners could pull from, including
speculative value in stock, promised value in bonds, or actual real estate and livestock.
Of course, most of these types of values were predicated upon a range of
considerations regarding the markets for securities, for lands, or for beef. Interaction with
these markets also depended upon how efficiently the new company could manage its
ranch operations and its ability to avoid troublesome expenses, especially legal fees that
sapped capital at an alarming rate.14 Unfortunately for the AVC, Henry Atkinson’s death
the following October and the inheritance of his stock by his wife, Ada Atkinson, led to

12

Gene M. Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen: Politics, Investors, Operators From 1870 to 1900 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska, 1966), 83-84.
13
If we consider the $16/acre value for additional acreage to apply towards the land already transferred,
then the 8300 acres equal $132,800 leaving $367,200 to correlate in value to the 11400+ livestock and
outfitting. Any way to make sense of this places the company’s valuation at an exaggerated level that could
not (and did not) maintain its position on the open market.
14
The business of ranching dealt with no shortage of pitfalls and obstacles that cut into stockholders and
ranchers profits, even during the era of the open range and the extensive use of the public domain.
Cattlemen could no more prognosticate the market price on any given day than what the weather would
bring that winter. The result was plenty of congratulations when profits were realized, but more likely,
plenty of finger-pointing and damning when all factors added up to a loss. For a business world that found
its philosophic center in the liberal market – free competition, individualism, government non-interference
– ranchers sure found plenty on which to place the blame as to why they failed and why profits failed to
materialize. Of course, when set upon with blame, few individuals or companies ever consented to being at
fault, contributing in turn to an atmosphere of acrimonious buck-passing. Two histories of western
ranching, Gene Gressley’s Bankers and Cattlemen (1966) and David Remley’s Bell Ranch (1993), provide
comprehensive analysis of the ranch business, with Gressley contributing a clear structure to ranch
organization, management, and finance in the late nineteenth century, and Remley supplying an in-depth
study of a New Mexico ranch from its speculative and Gilded Age origins to its continued operation well
into the twentieth century. Together, these authors characterize a fraught business environment for ranchers
and their stockholders.
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cycles of litigation that helped to drag down the company.15 Interesting to note here is
that a frequently used argument in favor of the LLC was that it provided much better
legal context for dealing with a stockholders’ death or estrangement as compared to
traditional partnerships or business pools. In reality the opposite could easily take place
and often did for Thomas Catron. When the obligations of his business partners
threatened jointly owned corporate property, Catron usually found his only option was to
cosign on the debt and renew the loan. The alternative was to risk losing the very land
that the company came to represent. For Catron, Atkinson’s estate trouble served as a
warm up to the Waddy-gate fiasco thirteen years later.
Whatever the plans of the AVC had been, Atkinson’s death created a serious
problem for his business associates when his estate turned out to be overextended to a
reckless degree. Just like Catron, Atkinson relied upon a constantly growing base of
equity, much of which he mortgaged as soon as possible to help support previous
speculations. His sudden passing that October left some of his American Valley lands
unpaid for and in limbo. Much to Catron’s consternation, the two month-old corporation
faced great risk if he did not move quickly to pay for range land on Atkinson’s behalf,
including $10,000 to John P. Casey. While the company lurched forward under
Slaughter’s care, Catron and Ada Atkinson became embroiled in a legal feud that
continued in time and expense until 1899 when an insolvent AVC entered a period of

A card placed inside the wrapping to bundle 2 reads: “Documents pertaining to the estate matters of H.M.
Atkinson, his wife, Ada I. Atkinson, and their interests in the American Valley Co., and in conflict with
T.B. Catron.” This “bundle” of documents produced by the ongoing case involving Catron and Ada
Atkinson contains a series of snapshots into the financial management of the American Valley Company,
its accounts, and the acrimonious lawsuit between Thomas Catron and Ada Atkinson. CP, Series 611, Box
2, Bundle 2.
15
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corporate reorganization.16 For all of the potential worth that Catron envisioned he would
gain from the AVC, the company rarely exceeded its value as of August 2, 1886, the day
it filed for incorporation.

Railroad Capitalism
The long-anticipated entrance of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad in
1879 spearheaded a new age of capitalist infusion for New Mexico. To the arid
Southwest, the coming of the railroad represented nothing less than a transportation and
communication revolution.17 In spite of the often-cited and foolishly arrogant idea that
the entrance of the Iron Horse would bring about a complete mastery over the forbidding
environment of the Great American Desert, it did solve some troublesome logistics of
southwestern travel and trade.18 In doing so, the railroad age brought about a range of
shifts not only to the economic conditions in the territory, but also its politics and society.
These changes varied widely, including the end (or at least the beginning of the end) of
an expansive and veteran freighting network sixty years in the making, the movement of
16

Frank W. Clancy to Ada Atkinson, 8 February 1890; Neill B. Field to Ada I. Atkinson, 16 January 1894;
T.B. Catron to N.B. Field, 10 December 1896; Neill B. Field to Ada I. Atkinson, 7 August 1898, CP, Series
611, Box 2, Bundle 2. This dispute likely caused a rift in the relationship between Thomas Catron and his
law partner Frank Clancy, who left the partnership of Catron, Knaebel, and Clancy on December 31, 1890.
17
Unlike much of the East, Midwest, South, and even major corridors through the U.S. West, prior
revolutions in transportation dealing with steam power and its ability to allow for greater commerce along
rivers largely impossible in the Southwest, leading to an even greater degree of change when railroads
entered the region. While telegraph lines had entered New Mexico during the 1870s, the spree of new wires
and new telegraph offices allowed for greater communication within New Mexico and between New
Mexico and the outside world like never before. Historians have articulated the revolutionizing aspects of
the change in a number of ways, both positive and negative, in works such as: Lamar, Far Southwest,
“Chapter 7: New Mexico Comes of Age, 1880-1900,” focuses on this period of change as a direct result of
rail service; also David F. Myrick, New Mexico’s Railroads---An Historical Survey (Golden, Colo.:
Colorado Railroad Museum, 1970), 9-10; Nieto-Phillips, Language of Blood, 105-07; and Holtby, FortySeventh Star, 7-8; for railroads role in promoting capitalism, see Kristine Burland and David C. Mowery,
“Technology and the Spread of Capitalism,” in Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., The Cambridge
History of Capitalism, Volume II: The Spread of Capitalism From 1848 to the Present (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87.
18
Barbara A. Babcock and Marta Weigle, eds., The Great Southwest of the Fred Harvey Company and the
Santa Fe Railway (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996).
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market centers from mostly Mexican villages to “new towns,” the beginning of a new
effort to incorporate and assimilate the Southwest into a national market and national
culture, a new era of regional competition and pork-barreling, new potentials for
industrial production and mass consumption, a construction boom, and new waves of
migrants, laborers, tourists, and adventurers.19
Railroad companies were chomping at the bit to enter New Mexico, access its
markets, and continue onward to make continental connections. The territory’s
population in 1880 of 119,565 made it the third most populous in the Rocky Mountains
(see Appendix, Table 7) behind only Colorado and Utah, both of which already contained
extensive rail mileage.20 If market competition was not a sure enough motivator (it was),
in 1878 the New Mexico legislature encouraged construction by offering eight years of
tax exemption on all land and improvements owned by railroads. To push through the
law, ringmen and merchants of the territory worked together, finding common cause in
their lobbying effort. Railroad companies extended their lines into New Mexico with no
mindset of teamwork or collaboration. Instead, construction in the territory progressed
amidst railroad wars and constant competition, which led companies to add mileage at a
crazed pace. A boom of railroad growth began as the AT&SF won the race for the Raton
Pass and by July 1879 arrived in the gateway city to the plains, Las Vegas. The rail
connection between Missouri and Las Vegas marked the death-knell for the old Santa Fe
Trail. From there, the AT&SF built hastily across difficult terrain to beat other potential

19

For changes to merchant economy, see Parish, Charles Ilfeld Company, 109-10; for erasure of
Nuevomexicano political and social power, see Nieto-Phillips, Language of Blood, 107-08 and Deutsch, No
Separate Refuge, 19-21.; for railroad and tourism industry, see Babcock and Weigle, Great Southwest.
20
Colorado population as of 1880 is registered at 194,327 and Utah at 143,963. The Arizona Territory only
confirmed 40,440 residents that year. Census data pulled from Leonard J. Arrington, “The Changing
Economic Structure of the Mountain West, 1850-1950,” Utah State University Press Monograph Series X
(Logan: Utah State University Press, June, 1963), 31, Table IV.
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carriers to the heartland of the Rio Abajo, the territory’s most lucrative market. The line
that would come to represent Santa Fe and the Southwest more than any other business or
entity decided in fact to bypass the capital due to the engineering difficulties and the high
costs involved.21 Instead, after reaching Galisteo Junction (renamed Lamy in 1881),
eighteen miles from the plaza, President Thomas Nickerson and General Manager
William B. Strong convinced the residents of Santa Fe County to approve $150,000 in
seven-percent, thirty year bonds to fund the construction of a spur line. For the city’s
enterprising citizens, the risk of civic debt paled in comparison to the risk of further
marginalization. With capital in hand for building and the county’s promise of interest,
the AT&SF finished the spur to Santa Fe on February 9, 1880.22 Two months later the
AT&SF established its New Mexican hub in Albuquerque’s New Town, and less than a
year later made its first connection with the Southern & Pacific at Deming.23
In 1879 the Santa Fe line may have been the first to build in New Mexico, but by
the summer of 1881 four major carriers offered service to the territory. The Denver & Rio
Grande railway, representing first and foremost the entrepreneurial interests of William
Jackson Palmer and his well-connected network of Denver capitalists, built to Espanola
in 1880 (35 miles from Santa Fe) and across northern New Mexico to the rich mineral

21

Also relevant to the decision of the AT&SF to forego the capital of Santa Fe on its direct line was the
continued litigation between itself and the D&RG with regards to building rights and market competition in
the Southwest. For a concise account of the railroad war between the AT&SF and the D&RG can be found
in Lamar, Far Southwest, 172-74. An interesting addendum to the AT&SF’s decision to forego Santa Fe
concerns the role played by lead surveyor and construction engineer William R. Morley, who as a Colfax
County resident and long-time enemy of the Santa Fe Ring, may have purposefully organized a route that
logically bypassed the capital.
22
James Marshall, Santa Fe: The Railroad that Built an Empire (New York: Random House, 1945), 166;
Chris Wilson, The Myth of Santa Fe: Creating a Modern Regional Tradition (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1997), 64-65; Victoria E. Dye, All Aboard for Santa Fe: Railway Promotion of the
Southwest, 1890s to 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 13-14.
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204

districts of the San Juan Range in southwestern Colorado.24 The Atlantic & Pacific
Railroad (owned and operated by the St. Louis & San Francisco, and so known as the
‘Frisco) brokered a deal with the AT&SF to lay tracks westward out of Isleta, twelve
miles to the south of Albuquerque. In June 1880 the ‘Frisco started building away from
the Rio Grande and crossed into Arizona by March of the following year.25 Finally, the
Southern & Pacific Railway Company of New Mexico, chartered in Santa Fe in April
1879, crossed the southern portion of the territory with new tracks from October 1880
until May 1881 when it reached El Paso.26 The deluge of rail construction inspired
development in multiple sectors of New Mexico’s economy, generally bringing high
times to the territory and feelings of optimism, even in the $150,000-indebted capital of
Santa Fe.
That so much mileage was added to a remote territory, and so rapidly, should
leave room for pause.27 National economic forces and fierce regional competition set off
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Robert Athearn, The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1962), 5-6, 96-100.
25
Myrick, New Mexico’s Railroads, 29 & 34.
26
“Gentlemen; Incorporated Southern Pacific Railway Company” The Mesilla News, 26 April 1879, p. 1.
The incorporation of the Southern Pacific presents a view into some of the overlapping business networks
that connected capitalists and political cronies of the West. The President of the newly incorporated, New
Mexico installment of the Southern Pacific was none other than Charles Crocker (one of California’s Big
Four), while the Vice President was William Breeden, who was affiliated with the First National Bank of
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The sheer amount of failing businesses and strapped capitalists that exist, either with shameless
bravado and documentary largess, or shadowlike in the ephemera of business and corporate archives, are
representative of a rich, though often haphazard, source base, still underutilized by historians. Building on
Richard White’s argument that failure shaped modern U.S. history as much as success, I too find failure
and its forlorn remnants of paramount significance in my understanding of New Mexico’s economic
development and twentieth-century underdevelopment. The railroads of New Mexico present a case in
point. The record shows that by 1900 there were far more railroad companies in New Mexico than there
were railroads. In fact, the Classified Records of Incorporation from the Secretary of the Territory show a
total of 126 “Railroad and Express” companies and another twelve Street Railways that filed for
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evil corporations that could unnaturally influence the market in their own, best, corporate interest, and the
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this avalanche of construction. Two financial panics bracket the period of growth, starting
with the Panic of 1873, which significantly delayed railroad construction in the
Southwest for half of a decade. Then, only about a dozen years after their initiation of rail
service in New Mexico, at least three of the territory’s largest carriers fell into
receivership due to the Panic of 1893 and required rounds of corporate reorganization.28
These economic downturns proved tortuous to navigate for southwestern capitalists and
likely encouraged risky financial behavior by emphasizing short-term windfalls over
long-term investments. If the railroads, the best capitalized and largest corporations in the
territory, with fully functional political networks and legal counsel, could not maintain
solvency and protect their assets, what chance did the average New Mexican – or even
Thomas B. Catron – have as a modern, aggressive, industrial face of capitalism so
sharply altered the territory.
Alongside the changes brought to New Mexico by the railroad, increased
telegraph coverage revolutionized communication and connected cities and towns with
dispatch offices to the growing nexus of news, market reports, and governance. An ugly
situation in Socorro in 1880 helps describe the meaningful adjustment that came with
telegraph service. Three days after Christmas, a posse of undeputized white men made a
citizens’ arrest of five upstanding Nuevomexicanos, including the town sheriff, and
refused to relinquish them to Socorro County authorities. The posse charged the Mexican
men with plotting and carrying out the murder of a white man named A.M. Conkling, and
held them as prisoners in town. The families of those imprisoned gathered the Mexican
community of Socorro together in opposition to this unlawful procedure, leading
railroads proved that they could fail just as easy as anyone else, it was certainly risky business to put all of
your eggs in the basket of New Mexico business.
28
Myrick, New Mexico’s Railroads, 34.
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townsfolk to fear the potential for riot, lynching, or even a local race war. But, in no
small part due to the extension of telegraph service, no violent outcome and no shoot-out
in the streets erupted that December in Socorro.29
By midday telegraphs had already pulsed out of Socorro, informing the
Governor’s Office, the District Judge, the District Attorney, and powerful contacts in
Albuquerque. The dispatcher in Socorro warned of the “great danger of bloodshed +
excitement.”30 One message requested gubernatorial aid and military intervention to keep
the peace and protect property. In Santa Fe, acting Governor William G. Ritch (filling in
for Lew Wallace) immediately dispatched telegrams over military channels to send U.S.
troops to the town, to notify the proper district officials, and to “all the citizens of
Socorro.” Ritch notified them that troops were en route and threatened the townspeople
with harsh consequences if peace was not preserved.31 It is unclear whether Ritch’s note
made any impression on the scene at Socorro and on top of that troops did not arrive for
several hours. It is likely, however, that a telegram from the powerful Nuevomexicano
politician and District Attorney of the Second District, J. Francisco Chavez, sent to Juan
Maria Garcia, the Sheriff of Socorro County, helped to bring about a lawful conclusion.
Chavez authorized Garcia to summon a posse of county citizens to preserve the peace and
to forcefully apprehend the imprisoned Mexicans and properly arrest or free them as
ruled by the Justice of the Peace.32 In this way, concerned Mexican and American
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townsfolk in Socorro, the District Attorney in Valencia Co., the Governor in Santa Fe,
and federal troops all communicated with each other over the course of December 28 so
that by the end of the day tranquility, not racial violence, descended upon the town. Of
course, the telegraph also operated as a technology of state repression and military force,
ominously foreshadowed by Governor Ritch’s attempt to intimidate the townspeople.
Rails and wires brought about ample change to New Mexico’s hinterlands as well.
The entrance of four rail lines to the territory from 1879 to 1881 fueled a decade of
renewed interest in its land and resources from local entrepreneurs as well as new
immigrants and sources of capital.33 Between 1880 and 1890, the total value of property
in New Mexico almost quintupled, an impressive metric of growth. The assessed value
attached to railroads alone (their land, rail lines, rolling stock, depots, etc.), was greater in
1890 than that of all property in the territory ten years earlier.34 Amplified attention to the
public domain occurred as a natural outcome of the growth spurt. Under the special
deposit rule established by Congress in 1862, individuals could place a deposit through
the office of the Surveyor General to initiate the process of surveying and patenting lands
that they wished to file homestead, timber, or desert land entries upon. When an 1879
amendment to this law changed it to allow the certificates of deposit to become
negotiable the system witnessed a spike in traffic and deposits. All deposits prior to 1880
came to $13,432. Over the next five years the General Land Office for New Mexico

Scott Fritz, “Merchants and Modernity: Market Transformation in New Mexico and the Southwest, 18651929,” (PhD diss., Northern Arizona University, 2004).
34
Jim Heath, “A Study of the Influence of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad upon the Economy
of New Mexico, 1878-1900,” (master’s thesis, University of New Mexico, 1955), 72-78. Heath’s specific
figures are as follows: Total Property Valuation for the Territory of New Mexico: 1860 - $20,813,768;
1870 - $31,349,793; 1880 - $49,000,000; 1890 - $231,459,897; 1900 - $268,285,425. The percentage
increase from 1880 to 1890 therefore represents a 472% rise in value. His figure for railroad value in 1890
was $75,469,333, which is indeed greater than New Mexico’s total property value of $49,000,000 in 1880.
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brought in $891,707 in special deposits.35 This represents in real terms a sudden spike in
the market for the public domain, though this should not be conflated with an equally
sharp rise in individual homesteads and family farms. The sheer majority of these entries
trace back to large ranching operations, often with corporate ownership, like Catron’s
American Valley Company. It would not be until the twentieth century that New Mexico
witnessed a rise in homestead entries matching the democratic ambition of original act.36
The entrance of rails brought New Mexico and New Mexicans more forcefully
into the world of industrial capitalism, competitive markets, and Euro-centric business
attitudes. For the Native and Nuevomexicano populations of the territory, many of these
changes further threatened access to social, political, or economic power that had been
maintained with notable continuity since the period of U.S. conquest began.37 As
explained by Sarah Deutsch, this community found adaptive ways to live and work
alongside incoming Euro-Americans until the 1880s when the railroad and a new
corporate-backed, steam-powered jolt of capitalism entered the territory.38 Simply put,
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Victor Westphall, The Public Domain in New Mexico, 1854-1891 (Albuquerque: University of New
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too much of the new influence came from people and capital foreign to New Mexico.
Members of the native population, sensitive to the vulnerability of their situation,
recognized that the railroad could generate this outcome. During the 1870s some
Nuevomexicano politicians stood in plain opposition to legislation favorable to rail
intrusion, but the pro-railway forces, their money, their influence, and their promises of a
bright future, proved too much.39 Nuevomexicanos who had sold or otherwise were
dispossessed of their lands generally found the following decades increasingly difficult.
Some looked to seasonal or migratory labor to maintain their communities. Others
utilized a range of techniques to resist, from “squatting,” to illegally cutting timber or
pasturing livestock, to social banditry and outright political violence.40
Nuevomexicanos approached the changing conditions with a variety of strategies
that represented the vitality of the Hispano borderlands. Though the arrival of the railroad
marked the beginning of a long-term economic challenge to Nuevomexicano wellbeing,
their population and settlement distribution in fact grew during the 1880s and 1890s.41
They extended acreage under cultivation, forests under ax and saw, the number of sheep
and cattle on the range, and the amount of range land under pasture. Signs of cultural
advancement also spread, such as the burgeoning Spanish-language press of the territory
that counted more than one new periodical published every year through the turn of the
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century.42 They also found cultural expression through involvement mutual aid
collectives and with the Brotherhood of the Penitentes, who maintained the practice of
their beliefs and rituals despite being misunderstood and derided by Euro-Americans.
Politically too, Nuevomexicanos continued to exist as the majority population and so
could effectively marshal elective clout on the local stage or press for considerations
regarding territorial law and its enforcement. Though still as factious as ever, members of
the majority population could also unite when they recognized communal interests were
at risk. That stuffy Euro-Americans such as Secretary of the Territory William G. Ritch
interpreted Nuevomexicano political intransigence as a major obstacle to proper growth
and development for the territory seems evidence enough of their ability to sway or block
local legislation.43
In the 1880s, Catron’s relationship with the Nuevomexicano community took on
an increasingly complex bearing. He recognized that as the territory grew his power base
out of Santa Fe became more and more unstable and that to preserve the capital city’s
stature required a careful balancing act. For instance, as part of the Assembly in 1884,
Catron forcefully maneuvered the capital building and penitentiary bills through the
legislature. When it came time to contract these projects, Catron and the Republican
Party made sure that Nuevomexicanos received a share of the work and then also looked
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to their friends in the native population to fill many of these territorial posts.44 Similarly,
Catron employed a number of Nuevomexicanos over his years in Santa Fe in the
construction and upkeep of his properties.45 Other examples can be found in 1889. In this
year Catron busily engaged personal and territorial campaigns in hopes of achieving
statehood and an enormous windfall on his investment in land grants and in New Mexico
itself. That year, other than building his namesake block in Santa Fe, Catron worked to
secretly defeat an education bill that was widely disliked in the Nuevomexicano
communities due to its purpose of shifting power away from the Catholic Church by
requiring all children to go to public schools.46 Also that year he donated the grounds for
a church in Chama, New Mexico, and held a grand party and fireworks show on the
Fourth of July at Santa Fe.47 By the 1890s, Catron had developed an extensive
relationship with the Nuevomexicano people and in some ways managed to mesh their
political and business interests with his own.
In the years following the railroad’s entrance, Catron shifted gears from dealing
mostly with land acquisition to improving and developing his extensive land grant
holdings. His business activity involved participation in railroad projects, irrigation
companies, gas and light utilities, and construction and town site companies. Other
enterprises sought to exploit the extractive resources of his lands including the mining of
coal, zinc, mica, lead, and precious metals; sheep and cattle ranching; and cutting and
milling lumber. His participation with financial services complemented his business
“Rump Stake. That’s What Valdez Wanted and He Got It. A Few Remarks About Catron’s Asylum,” and
“Capital Orgies, Passage of the Capital Bill--$200,000 is the Figure, Santa Fe Celebrates its Passage by
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portfolio, including affiliation with life insurance companies, savings and loan
associations, and commercial banks, of which his most important connection remained
the First National of Santa Fe. This wide array of corporate enterprises put Thomas
Catron in board rooms with very different groups of local and international contributors
and as such, he often served as a middleman between the interests of financial backers
from places like Denver, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Chicago, or Boston, and local interests
from across New Mexico. He and his associates made sure to include the elite
Nuevomexicanos and German Jews who represented the leading business circles of the
territory.
It is in these board rooms and through the enormous amount of communication
generated in between, that I situate Catron’s understanding and practice of business.
During a time in American and Mexican history in which business acumen represented
virtue, honor, strength of character, and manliness, Thomas Catron played to these
strengths whenever and wherever possible.48 To eastern capitalists and underwriters,
awash with official credit reports and ready-made assumptions about the backward state
of affairs along the southwestern frontier, Catron took extra effort to style himself as a
cosmopolitan gentleman and modern businessman of the United States.

Incorporating New Mexico
Compared to the wave of early investment directed toward land speculation in the
1870s, the 1880s witnessed a booming infusion of capital and energy that stimulated

48

For discussions of the role of masculinity, manliness, and manhood with regard to business relations in
the late nineteenth century, see: White, Railroaded, 101 & 132; as well as Mark C. Carnes and Clyde
Griffen, eds., Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1900).

213

business activity in New Mexico.49 New enterprises organized in record numbers, many
filing papers of incorporation as foreign companies with headquarters in places like New
York or Boston, but with branch operations housed in the territory (see Appendix, Tables
2 through 6). Whereas an average of just over 8 companies filed in the territory annually
since the passage of incorporation laws in 1867, in 1880 alone the office of the Secretary
signed 76 new charters into existence. Through the rest of the decade the yearly average
for new corporations stood at over 130, with an average of 25 of those filing as foreign
owned and operated. The data found in the classified records of incorporation for New
Mexico clearly indicates a spike in corporate business growth starting in the 1880s. The
prevalence of mining and livestock enterprises conforms to New Mexico’s main
industries of economic growth for the period.
The territorial records for incorporation organized through the office of the
Secretary of the Territory presents a rich history of the changing business environment
for New Mexico during the 1880s.50 Classified into twenty-four categories and then again
based on whether they were resident or foreign corporations (those chartered outside New
Mexico), the data indicates some major shifts in local enterprise. For instance, in the
immediate aftermath of rail extension, mining, milling, and smelting operations arose in
particular connection to the extension of rail service. Companies with the intended
purpose of profiting from the mineral riches of New Mexico represented exactly half (38
of 76) of those filing for incorporation in 1880. Their numbers for the next few years
Fels, American Business Cycles, 119-21; Heath, “Influence of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad upon the Economy of New Mexico,” 72. Concerning national market cycles during the Gilded
Age, New Mexico’s periods of substantial speculation in land grant land followed by the railroad, ranching,
and mining boom match up to Rendig Fels findings that two major economic spikes occurred in this period,
the first 1869-1873 and the second 1879-1885. These cycles correlate to New Mexico’s bursts of economic
growth, signifying the regional attachment of the West to U.S. national trends.
50
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were even higher, with a notable increase in foreign interest and investment in New
Mexico’s mining sector. All told, mining corporations represented just over forty percent
of all incorporations during the 1880s and over fifty percent of those with foreign
ownership. Even more telling, the sheer majority of these foreign companies entered the
territory within four years of the new rail access, marking a high tide of outside
investment in New Mexico that would not surge again until the early twentieth century.51
Alongside the activity in the mining category, other types of companies grew in
direct result to rail construction in New Mexico. Not that surprising, the groups of
“railroads and express,” “street railways,” and “telegraph and telephone” companies
witnessed a brief spike in the early 1880s. Whether to profit from the boon of the AT&SF
and the Southern Pacific or to develop competing rail and cable networks, these
companies worked rapidly to make gains on the territory’s new infrastructure. Similarly,
from 1880-1882 utility companies (water, light, and gas) witnessed their highest rate of
incorporation in any three-year period found in the territorial records. Likewise,
incorporations for manufacturing spiked from 1881-1884, almost all filing as domestic.
Real estate and townsite companies incorporated at elevated rates as well, although
periods of large-scale immigration produced high levels of activity in this sector of the
economy in the nineties and oughts that easily eclipsed the work of the early eighties.52
The recent immigrants, many who settled in the eastern and southern parts of the
territory, prompted the incorporation of an increasing amount of irrigation companies as
they confronted the reality of making farming pay in the Pecos and Rio Grande valleys.
To this degree the economic growth of New Mexico follows paths seen elsewhere in the
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country and certainly throughout much of the U.S. West. The advance in transportation
and communication allowed by the railroad caused growth and development to echo
through multiple parts of the territory and its economy.
By mid-decade the general rise in mining activity that produced so many new
incorporations leveled off and other sectors of the territorial economy accelerated. For the
industries categorized into livestock and ranching, the 1880s marked much more than a
period of increased stock and range. Cattle (Ganado mayor) and sheep (Ganado menor)
ranches were central to New Mexico’s pastoral economy for generations and represented
much of the wealth of the rico class, especially from the Rio Abajo.53 The major
transformation of the eighties then included the move towards incorporation and official
capitalization of ranching operations, especially by Euro-Americans. Whereas only three
livestock companies filed for incorporation from 1867 to 1880 (two of which were filed
by members of the Santa Fe Ring in connection to grant lands), the period from 1883 to
1887 witnessed the heaviest five years of activity for the whole territorial period.54 In this
time, ninety-seven operations filed for incorporation as resident companies of New
Mexico and another twenty-six filed as foreign companies doing business in the territory.
This swell in the number of ranching companies in New Mexico marks, just as it did in
other parts of the country, a move towards an end to the era of the open range. The fact
that numbers for new companies dwindle in the next five years to half that of this boom
period fits with national trend that in the wake of the devastation of the cattle industry by
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environmental forces during the summer and winter of 1886-87, known as the “Great
Die-Up,” saw the consolidation of range ownership and better breeding practices make
entrance into the livestock market less egalitarian.55
Of course, these official incorporations represent only part of the larger economic
picture for New Mexico. A significant portion of the territory’s business continued to
function through informal arrangement, oral agreements, and barter and credit-based
partido contracts. For the majority of the Nuevomexicano population, daily life and work
continued to follow seasonal and community rhythms.56 Though the 1880s presented a
time of change for this population, the effects of land grant consolidation by outsiders
was not yet so harshly felt in the short term. The speculation-heavy enterprise of the
1870s led to significant fluctuations in land ownership, but not necessarily land
occupancy. The alienation of Nuevomexicano use-rights occurred haphazardly, picking
up steam during the 1890s amidst a newly-placed emphasis on order and management
that cut into the old informal agreements between the grant owners and the old-time
Mexican residents of the land. Alongside the intrusion of corporate capitalism, networks
of mercantile capitalism continued to orient local economies and direct the products of
Nuevomexicanos. The general stores of the Charles Ilfeld Company, for example,
endured as centers for the collection of raw materials and the extension of credit to the
mostly rural population of San Miguel and Mora counties. Enforceable partido contracts
bound the subsistence economy of pastoral Nuevomexicanos to commodity and credit
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networks of the mercantile capitalist and therefore increasingly to the macroeconomic
fluctuations of the manufacturing and industry of the East. In this way, systems of
mercantile and industrial capitalism overlapped and existed side-by-side in territorial
New Mexico.57
True to form, business directories and booster publications, themselves the
offspring of the territory’s growth, overplayed the changing economic environment in the
territory. While promotional tracts existed since the days of the Santa Fe Trail, rail
service attracted a fresh round of regional publicity. New directories and gazetteers
blended information on agriculture, industry, history, geography, culture, and tourism
with a heavy dose of entrepreneurial optimism. Their creation stemmed from the
overlapping interests of corporate sponsors, especially railroads, with publication
companies, and of the Territorial Bureau of Immigration.58 Of course, the Santa Fe crowd
was quick to get in on the action.
The Hotel World Publishing Company of Chicago created an early version of this
type of booster booklet in 1880. Titled “Historical Sketch of Santa Fe, New Mexico,” the
book instead begins with an opening spread featuring the city of Chicago and an
advertisement for the Rock Island & Pacific Railroad with a map indicating the vast rail
network connecting it with the West.59 The Rock Island, via the AT&SF, promised to add
the far southwest into Chicago’s orbit. The lithograph on the following page presented a
“View of the City of Santa Fe” that lacked signs of modern transportation,
communication, or industry. Instead, the “Oldest City in America” featured crudely
57
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constructed buildings of wood and adobe with an American flag prominently placed in
the center. The two images show a striking dichotomy in regional development that is
then supported through the remainder of the book. Exaggerated profit potentials and
claims to A1 commercial status stood in relief against description of Santa Fe as “the
oldest city in America…the last in modern improvements and inventions” The
compilation leaves the reader unsure sometimes whether they are supposed to be attracted
or deterred.60
The pages labeled business directory did not fare much better. Listed businessmen
in the capital consisted of less than one hundred names. The two largest groupings
included merchants and attorneys. Many of the associated names appeared in the
following pages in the purchased advertising space as well.61 The ads speak volumes
about New Mexico’s and Santa Fe’s place in the markets of the West. Secretary of the
Territory William Ritch’s Complete Business Directory of New Mexico, and Gazetteer of
the Territory for 1882 included regional advertisements featuring Kansas City, St. Louis,
and Denver between directory sections. By the end of the decade railroad growth had
connected the territory more clearly to a wider western network. The Southwestern
Business Directory included New Mexico with nine other states and territories to present
the investment possibilities and important cities of each. From the 81 listings found in the
1880 production, by 1890 the city showed slow growth to 189 civic and business listings.
Albuquerque and Las Vegas showed their economic rise by each having over two
hundred and fifty entries.62
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In contrast to the desires of boosters and their implicit support from the business
community, many residents of the territory considered the boom of the early 1880s and
the surge in capital investment and foreign ownership unwelcome. The consolidation and
monopolization of large land grants and much of the public domain only added to this
opinion. As a result, the New Mexico Legislature passed an Anti-Alien Law in 1887,
under the years of Democratic administration and reform led by Governor Ross and
Surveyor General Julian. Specifically, and particularly jarring to Catron, the law made it
illegal to sell New Mexico lands to foreigners. No longer could Catron and his companies
attempt to sell their large grants to foreign investors, a major blow to their promotional
effort. An unintended consequence, however, involved the increased reliance on the
corporate container by large land holders who found new ways to transform their equity
in acres into equity in capital stock. Still, few laws peeved Catron more so than the AntiAlien Law, adding to his desired reasons for wanting statehood.63

Catron, Competition, and Coal in the 1880s
When Thomas Benton Catron entered the decade of the iron horse, he was as
confident as ever. As other carpetbaggers came and went, his presence in the territory
grew larger and firmer. In October of 1880 he turned forty years old. Compared to a
decade earlier, when he was still a relative newcomer riding the Elkins bandwagon to a
place of local power, by the time rail lines arrived Catron had established himself as a
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and Nebraska Railway, Kansas City, Fort Scott and Memphis Railroad, Denver, Texas and Forth Worth
Railway, Texas and Pacific Railway, Denver and Rio Grande Railway, Colorado Midland Railway, And
Atlantic and Pacific Railroad (Denver, Col.: McKenney Directory Company, Publishers, March 1889), the
section for Albuquerque starts on 446 and the section for Las Vegas starts on 466.
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T.B. Catron to J.M. Freeman, Denver, Colo., 20 June 1892, CP, Series 105, Vol. 5; T.B. Catron to O.H.
Platt, U.S. Senator, 18 July 1894, CP, Series 105, Vol. 10.
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leading force in territorial politics and development. He proved to be one of the mostcapable and hardest-working lawyers of Santa Fe and one of the ablest Spanish speakers
of the Euro-American crowd of transplants and appointees. His marriage to Julia Walz
and their settlement in a permanent home in Santa Fe helped. With two young boys, John
and Charles, born in 1878 and 1879, respectively, the Catron family appeared more at
home and more inspired to build up their home than ever before.64
Buttressed by support from Washington, D.C., through the continued rise of
“Smooth” Steve, Catron’s weight in territorial circles admitted him to the offices,
chambers, parlors, and dining tables of influence. For instance, in July of 1880 Catron
met with U.S. Grant during the ex-President’s tour of the West. Then, a few weeks after
his fortieth birthday, he acted on a reception committee for President Rutherford B.
Hayes.65 That these meetings were largely superficial in their tone and agenda did not
likely detract from Catron’s ambitious desires for personal advancement. Of course, the
meetings would also then highlight the major obstacles to the national recognition he
sought, most obviously New Mexico’s territorial status and its reputation as an unsettled
backwater. Catron worked steadily to overcome both of these concerns.
Starting already in late 1879, Catron and his extended network of friends and
associates began organizing new businesses. That November, Catron and fifteen others,
with clear ties to the Montezuma Lodge, incorporated the “The Rio Grande Placer Ditch
Company and Corporation” in Santa Fe.66 Capitalized at $500,000, the company
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proposed a wide-ranging and fairly vague objective “to survey, lay out, construct,
maintain and operate a ditch or Acequia in the counties of Taos and Rio Arriba for the
purpose of irrigation, placer mining, milling and the reduction of ores and for general use
as a water power in all kinds of mining operations.”67 No record exists of this company
actually doing anything. As a shell, the corporation had much greater value for its
organizers, however, because its limited liability gave the company the ability to deal in
land and mining interests without specifically implicating any of its stockholders.
Unsurprisingly, federal appointees and members of the Santa Fe Ring adorned the
incorporation record book with high frequency, often alongside long lists of eastern
investors.68
It is unclear how many of Catron’s new corporations functioned as financial
shells. What is known from the records is that from 1879-1891 he participated in the
official incorporation of at least eighteen new companies through the office of the
Secretary of the Territory. He also bought, transferred, schmoozed, or bullied his way
into officer or director positions with eight others.69 Together, these companies
“Articles of Incorporation for the Rio Grande Placer Ditch Company and Corporation,” 3 November
1879, Slide 152, Reel 33, TANM, 1846-1912, Records of the Secretary of the Territory, State Records
Center and Archives, Santa Fe.
68
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Rail Road Company, 25 February 1880; The Santa Fe Hotel and Building Company, 2 August 1880; The
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broadened Catron’s business circle to include prominent merchants, railroad men, miners,
ranchers, and investors from Missouri, Texas, Kansas, Colorado, Massachusetts, and
Maine, while entrenching his interests in New Mexico through associates in almost every
county and major population center. In this way he tapped into home-grown and imported
investment opportunities, and further enmeshed his interests with those of Santa Fe and
the Southwest.
As such, Thomas Catron played the part of the big fish in the small pond. On a
national or even international level, he was rarely more than a middleman putting
outsider’s capital to use in New Mexico. He hardly managed the personal wealth to buy
his way into eastern board rooms and he lacked the political prestige to influence
development outside of his southwestern jurisdiction. When he did try to intimidate
associates or stockholders in places like Kansas City, Chicago, or Boston, they were not
impressed. That Catron was more often than not effusively courteous when addressing
eastern capitalists leads me to believe that he knew this. But he also knew very well what
he did have, including his network of interlocking directorates in New Mexico and
Colorado, vast tracts of western lands, and some powerful friends. With these, he toiled
in vain to grow an empire in his small pond, overly optimistic that it too, would grow.
The surge of interest in New Mexico’s lands and resources by capitalists and
entrepreneurs also brought about changes in the handling of business in the territory. By
the 1880s the secret ownership pools and land trusts of the previous decades had more
carefully, and clearly, delineated their ownership and management structure through the
becomes majority stockholder and President, October 1884; “Aztec Mining Company,” Catron a director as
of 8 November 1884; “Texas, Santa Fe, and Northern Railway” Catron elected President, c. 24 December
1885; “American Building and Loan Association, Santa Fe Branch” Catron elected President December
1888; “Cerrillos Coal & Iron Company” Catron a director as early as 13 May 1889; “Columbia Building
and Loan Assocation” Catron elected President 17 July 1891.
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process of incorporation. Rest assured; the corruption, collusion, and cronyism of the
Ring continued to operate out of Santa Fe to direct territorial development. But under
Catron’s leadership, the evolving Ring would start to look more like an interlocking
directorate than a secret society of appointed officials and freemasons.70
What’s more is that Catron and the Santa Fe crowd were hardly alone in spinning
interlocking webs of directorates across the territory. Emanating from the capital, Las
Vegas, Albuquerque, and to a lesser extent the Mesilla Valley, developers, speculators,
and civic boosters found common goals and a burst of entrepreneurial energy. 71 This new
railroad-inspired zeal for development, like much of capitalism’s spread in New Mexico,
overextended its influence beyond what the resources and markets could bear.72 The
competing networks of territorial capitalists increased the pace and scope of their
activities. They found the corporation once again to be of great utility through the
creation of dummy companies, usually secured by their own valueless stock, to stake
claims to choice town sites, rights of way, mines, or points of water access.73 New
Mexico’s new stocks rose like a mushroom cloud over the territory, leading some to take
note of modern progress while others grew alarmed at the emptiness of the new
southwestern securities.
70

Caffey, Chasing the Santa Fe Ring, 190 & 197. By the mid-1880s Thomas Catron was undisputedly the
leader of the remnant faction of the Santa Fe Ring, though power grew more diffuse in general, and by
1897 when Miguel Antonio Otero gained appointment as Governor of New Mexico, the schism in the
Republican Party crippled the Ring as an efficient power broker.
71
Lamar, Far Southwest, 164; Lehmann, “Santa Fe and Albuquerque,” 157.
72
Competition of the time drove new business activities that often acted in defensive ways to stem the
intrusion of a competitor. In the process, the defensive company places great stake in steady capital
infusion that often dried up. When this happened the dummy would most often simply cease to be, leaving
creditors to stomach the loss. In this way, many eastern capitalists grew increasingly conservative about
making investments in western securities.
73
Levy, Freaks of Fortune, 309. Levy comments upon the corporate world of the 1980s stating that the
rules had changed sufficiently by then to allow industrial corporations to become “hollowed out” and to
resemble “sieves – porous containers of financial transactions.” Though the author discussed corporations
here with regard to the late twentieth century, I believe that his comments seem to fit perfectly with the
corporate world of the Rocky Mountain West of the late nineteenth century.

224

Catron’s new ventures fit well with the overall picture of business activity
presented in the Territorial Records of Incorporation. He helped to create or was involved
with regional railroad projects, ranching outfits, mining claims, town site developers,
utility providers, and of course land speculators. Compared to his earlier work, many of
the new corporations attempted to directly harness territorial resources for profitable
returns. By the arrival of the railroad Catron and his friends had already secured massive
holdings. Those who did not flip their lands quickly found that the wave of growth of the
1880s brought little clarity to their clouded titles. Instead they found the ownership of
grant lands fraught with increased complication, both legal and political in nature.74
Congress and the federal government asserted its desire to ameliorate the Southwest’s
land troubles, but the situation grew exponentially worse before Congress delivered any
relief. Between 1882 and 1885 alone, at least seven special agents from the Government
Land Office made investigations in New Mexico with regard to boundary and title
issues.75 Then in 1885, the territory’s new Surveyor General George Julian made his
sweeping attack on land grant fraud publicly known.76 One response to these changing
circumstances was to diversify interests by obtaining important parcels of the public
domain, especially along waterways. City real estate deals also made lucrative
investments, especially when paired with insider knowledge of federal contracts. Another
way to manufacture profits was to simply ignore title controversies while continuing
money-making schemes on large grants. Catron involved himself in all of the above.
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The Minotaur at the center of his own incorporated labyrinth, Catron was himself
imprisoned by the formidable business empire that he presided over. Tracking the
activities of each of Catron’s corporations is both exceedingly complex and frustratingly
mundane.77 For those companies that kept clear record or “minute” books the problem
arises of too much information, often of dubious character and with little means for
substantiation. The detailed balances of account ledgers contain their own silences in
between the red and black of the bottom line. Worse yet is the inconsistency of
accounting styles, usually the result of personnel changes or improvisation. Other
enterprises appear as mere glimpses in the archival collections and like so many mirages
leave the researcher with many more questions than answers. And then, there is the
difficulty in keeping all of the distinct companies in order, while their activities actually
intertwined with regular frequency. With overlapping directors, mutual interests, and
secretive business arrangements, the full extent of Catron’s fortune and failing remains
murky.
Like many of his business endeavors, Thomas Catron’s involvement in the
Monero Coal & Coke Company stemmed from the overextension of his lending
practices. According to Frank W. Clancy (filling the office of company treasurer), far
from an entrepreneurial interest in the coal industry, Catron only took on a leading role in
the MCCC because of the failure of one of his debtors. With the happy decision to accept
watered MCCC stock or nothing at all on a bad debt, Catron plunged headfirst in October

For instance: “Account Ledger for the Aztec Mining Company, 1884-1889,” CP, Series 603, Vol. 1;
“New Mexico Land & Live Stock Co., Minute Book, 1883-1904,” CP, Series 606, Vol. 1; and “Tularosa
Land and Cattle Company Minute Book, April 3, 1890-June 17, 1891,” CP, Series 608, Vol 1.
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of 1884 into the rough seas of coal mining.78 While economic data might here present a
picture of continued interest and output in New Mexico’s mining sector, the story of the
Monero Coal & Coke Company continued to follow failure and debt with more failure
and debt.
The MCCC began with what looked like sound logic by Wilmot E. Broad,
Catron’s trusted agent (and of all his agents, perhaps the most trustworthy) on the Tierra
Amarilla grant. The Denver & Rio Grande Railway built to Espanola and Chama by the
end of 1881 to harness the mineral riches and potential agricultural markets of northern
New Mexico.79 To induce the line to build on their property, Catron and the U.S. Land &
Colonization Company provided the D&RG with a right of way through his expansive
TA grant in proximity to large timber stands and immediately adjacent to the Monero
mines.80 With the intention of servicing the railroads rising coal requirements, Broad and
another partner, Pascal Craig, incorporated the Monero Coal & Coke Company in 1883.
The partners found ready sources of funding in the Northeast led by a past President of
the AT&SF, Thomas Nickerson, who financed the project by commissioning his son-in-
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law to sell subscriptions for MCCC stock.81 Encouraging initial reports on the grade and
quantity of coal at Monero likely added to the eastern investors’ faith that selling coal to
an expanding railroad would turn a steady profit. The MCCC established a company
town with direct rail access to the D&RG and the owners of the TA grant provided
further inducements such as water use rights to lesson costs and promote increased
railroad activity.82 Surely this was a recipe for success.
And yet, hints that running the company would not go smoothly should have been
apparent from the start. Distance and competing lines of favoritism immediately created a
rift between MCCC president, Catron, and the board of directors who met in Portland,
Maine. Shortly after becoming majority stockholder, Catron’s nepotistic urge led him to
appoint his brother-in-law Edgar Walz as superintendent of the mine. Though Walz had
badly bungled Catron’s business in Lincoln County, the ringleader habitually supported
his family and friends as they failed upwards. Ed Walz did not remain in control of the
mine for long (though he still managed to disappoint). Instead, Jacob H. Crist executed a
hostile takeover of the property with the support of the eastern stockholders who had
been unsatisfied with Walz and more likely, with the sudden monopoly of control Catron
held over their investments. At the next annual board meeting Catron more forcefully
pressed his interests by using his majority stock to vote in a friendly directorate. This
81
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included bringing in Frank Clancy, the law partner and frequent business associate of
Catron, but as part of a compromise with Nickerson, Catron agreed to retain Crist.83
Whether the MCCC paid out dividends over the next several years under Crist is
unclear, though Frank Clancy later claimed that this period operated at a loss.84 For his
part, Crist lacked the organization and leadership to successfully oversee the mine and the
miners. Deteriorating – and therefore depreciating – grounds at Monero and unclear or
lost books point to weaknesses in the former, while Crist’s inability to check a costly
strike in 1886 highlights the lack of leadership.85 To right the situation, Catron replaced
the poorly performing superintendent in February 1888 with Alex Bowie, an experienced
coal miner.86 In making this otherwise rational management decision, Catron gained a
bitter enemy in J.H. Crist, who would thereafter seek to undercut the efforts of the MCCC
whenever possible. For starters, Crist held copies of the company accounts with
information concerning MCCC credits and debts which he refused to supply Catron or
Clancy. To make matters worse, he left the mines at Monero in lousy condition and the
machinery in need of replacement. Even with an expert coal man at the helm in early
83
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1888, the company owed on unspecified debts, had no consistent income, and required a
substantial influx of capital before it could work efficiently enough to run a profit.87
It is at this moment, like countless others in his life, that Catron was hemmed in
by a confluence of interests dictated by optimism and dreams of empire. The Monero
coal fields and the connection to the Denver & Rio Grande line added to the value of
Catron’s Tierra Amarilla Grant as well as his other lands and grants of the Rio Arriba.
During the late 1880s Catron placed great trust in the proximity of statehood and was not
about to abandon properties or projects that he believed would double in value (at the
very least, he would often claim) upon New Mexico’s full entrance into the Union.88 Nor
did he care to make any moves that would harm New Mexico and its already weak credit
rating and heightened risk profile in national circles. Leveraging current instability
against the potential of a bright future, Catron threw good money after bad in his attempt
to bring the coal company into the black. Instead of growing more profitable, however,
the MCCC became a carbonic money pit. Year after year, Catron funneled personal funds
into the mine and still barely staved off insolvency.
Although the company had extracted coal from its Monero mine since 1883,
ownership of the land and its minerals turned into a costly and time consuming problem.
Because of the immensity of the western territories and states the Government Land
Office dealt with a constant backlog of work to make public lands accessible to
homesteaders and buyers.89 That the government had not yet done this probably worked
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in favor of the mining company. If the MCCC did not officially own the lands, its
valuation by the Territorial Board of Equalization would have been substantially
lessened, a tax loophole that Catron exploited with regularity due to the constant title
disputes surrounding his New Mexico lands. When the land office finally surveyed and
plotted land parcels in remote northern New Mexico, the MCCC was required to file for
its land entry and mining claim. Though Catron was supposedly paying attention, he did
not get a good enough jump on filing for the claim and another man, William Tomlins,
acting for J.H. Crist, filed a competing entry within a week of the MCCC in March,
1889.90 The existence of two claims resulted in a formal hearing in the local branch of the
Land Office. This meant legal fees, the time and energy necessary to compile the relevant
data, and another instance of Crist trying to humiliate the company and its president.
Though Catron had total faith that the decision would be favorable to the MCCC, he
scrambled to find the money needed to buy the 640 acre entry that encompassed his
Monero mines. With inconsistent profits from sales to the D&RG, Catron extended his
debt in the company to make sure that it owned the lands it occupied, writing to a fellow
stockholder that even though its current stock had dropped in value, the MCCC would be
completely worthless if it somehow failed to gain full title to the property.91
By the spring of 1890 most interested parties strove to rid themselves of the
headache that was Monero coal. That May the two largest stockholders, Catron and

90

T.B. Catron to Alex Bowie, 27 August 1889; T.B. Catron to the Board of Directors & Stockholders of the
Monero Coal & Coke Co., 18 October 1889; and T.B. Catron to William E. Webster, Newton Centre,
Massachusetts, 7 April 1890, CP, Series 604, Vol. 1.
Frank Clancy to Alex Bowie, Monero, NM, 24 October 1888, CP, Series 604, Vol. 1. In response
to a letter from Superintendent Alex Bowie, Frank Clancy explained that Thomas Catron was way to busy
in the fall and early winter of 1888 playing politics to pay full attention to the interests of the MCCC. This
is in fact the very time that the Land Office officially surveyed the land in and around Monero.
91
T.B. Catron to Thomas Nickerson, Boston, 11 June 1890, CP, Series 105, Vol. 3.

231

Nickerson, desperately tried to sell each other their MCCC stock.92 Both parties probably
recognized that without a miracle from the D&RG, the question was when, and not if, the
company would fail. In the heated exchange that continued across the summer the
capitalists traded criticism and accusations of blame for their corporate woes. Catron
railed against the “Boston Board” and its brand of favoritism that led to the mine’s
downfall. He referred of course to the placement of Crist as superintendent, but Catron’s
flourish for argumentation faced the reality that Crist had been fired years ago and still
Monero floundered. Nickerson turned around and heaped the fault on Catron, who he felt
had lacked decorum and had “abused” him in their correspondence.93 As a result,
Nickerson turned to a strategy of non-compliance and Catron was left to fume about the
malicious machinations of the railroad and the personal investments that he would surely
forfeit.
These were at least valid complaints. The Denver & Rio Grande may very well
have schemed towards the failure of the MCCC. At the very least the railroad adopted
discriminatory practices towards the New Mexican company with regards to traffic,
tonnage, and rates. Furthermore, the railroad engaged in long periods of “freezing out”
the MCCC, giving it no business, sometimes without notice.94 This tactic made for
serious difficulties at the mine with regard to the management of labor and efficiency of
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operations. Superintendent Alex Bowie, and later his replacement Hugh McGinn,
complained about the combination of sudden halts in D&RG orders for coal set against
short bursts of abundant work. Trying to navigate this haphazard schedule led to costly
labor disputes, a high rate of miner turnover, and chaotic flurries of activity that produced
shoddy work and shipments of poor quality. The railroad would then dock payment on
inferior or dirty loads, cutting into any profits the MCCC might actually have earned. 95
Most financially damning for the coal company, however, were the lapses in payment for
coal actually received by the D&RG. In the last years of his management of the MCCC,
Catron griped continuously about the arrears in payment by the railroad and the resultant
strains placed on his company made worse by their need to take out loans from the FNSF
to cover fixed costs. With interest accruing faster than profit, each new note of the
Monero Coal & Coke Co., cosigned by Catron as President, sapped his credit and brought
the corporation closer to insolvency.96 Each month the railroad ignored the MCCC
(purposefully or otherwise) was one month closer to the company’s ruin.
What appeared to Catron to be a direct attack on him and his interests as carried
out by the D&RG was more likely the progeny of regional competition and a legacy of
fierce railroad wars. Vast hinterlands of the Southwest remained to be incorporated into
the modern industrial economy and urban centers like Chicago, Denver, and El Paso
continued to compete for new markets and new caches of resources. Catron was well
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aware of these motivations, as evidenced by his comment to Edward T. Jeffreys,
President of the D&RG that:
Our people here think that no such discrimination as this should be made in favor
of Denver as against Santa Fe. If that lumber could be shipped to Santa Fe at the
same rate it is shipped to Denver, I am satisfied that quite a large trade would
grow up here. Those saw-mill men [Catron’s men cutting on the TA Grant]
inform me that they are unable to get rid of all their lumber in Denver. Thus by
putting on this heavy rate to Santa Fe your company cuts them off from an
additional market.97
Perhaps this was exactly the plan. Still, Catron kept up a constant stream of
communication with the officers of the railroad, especially the purchasing agent and
president. He cycled between solicitations of fairness for the sake of mutual benefit and
repetitive condemnations against the railroad and its true underlying purpose, to shut
down the mines at Monero.98 At his most irate, Catron threatened to rescind the right-ofway across the Tierra Amarilla grant. But the officers of the D&RG understood exactly
the position that Catron and the MCCC occupied. Catron’s idle threats did not likely
concern them and his usual bluster failed to inspire amicable relations or future
acquiescence. The coal company would certainly fail to exist without the railroad, but the
road had already exploited the potentials of Monero and by the 1890s could more easily
shift its business elsewhere.
In January 1892, with statehood suddenly more uncertain than ever and market
prices dropping, the years of constant debt and the inability of the company to stay in
good business standing with the D&RG had taken their toll. Catron finally moved to rid
himself of the debt trap that was the MCCC. He called upon mine Superintendent Hugh
McGinn to make a full assessment of all company property, improvements, and
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machinery and ready them for sale.99 Not long after, Wilmot Broad and Pascal Craig, the
original incorporators of company, entered into an agreement that transferred ownership
back to them. Catron groaned to an agent on the TA grant that he was “compelled to
dispose of my interests in the MCCC for a mere bagatelle and at a sacrifice of over sixty
thousand dollars.”100 In fact it was even worse than that. He no longer acted as president
or majority stockholder for the coal mine, but its debts continued to hound him. In the
wake of the Panic of 1893 for instance, when Catron was under acute financial stress, the
debts of the MCCC (including those cosigned by him in the process of its transfer of
ownership in 1892) just about tipped him over the edge. He confided to Wilmot Broad
that if the First National of Santa Fe called in his MCCC debts for collection, the usually
wily Catron would simply be unable to pay. If this occurred and the court then ordered
judgment against him it would unleash a torrent of collections that would drown his
finances, send his business interests into disarray, and force him to take shelter in
bankruptcy.101 Only by imploring his associates for more time and by renewing existing
notes did Catron avoid complete embarrassment.
The ultimate failure of the MCCC speaks volumes about Catron’s (in)ability to
successfully profit from selling coal to the D&RG railroad or to open up new markets for
sale and distribution in northern New Mexico. It also highlights the continued
competition that influenced investment and development throughout the Southwest. In a
financial market that charged twelve and sometimes eighteen percent on borrowed
money, to not boom was to rapidly go under. An important factor to a growing capitalist
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system is the steady incorporation of new or broadening markets, something that the
politically powerful ringmen of Santa Fe could not readily accomplish with any amount
of conniving. Within this mindset it is not without reason to find some truth in Catron’s
ranting to and about the D&RG vis-a-vis their purposeful tactics of freezing out the mines
at Monero in favor of others with more directly integrated profit motives. Favoritism
proves to be one of the most potent factors in determining corporate profits in the
Southwest. The key is that someone almost always profited. Who, why, and how much
was less about business acumen and more about business connections. Lastly, Catron’s
ambitious schedule kept him constantly overworked and unable to place proper focus on
his individual enterprises. Tracking his involvement with the MCCC shows a measure in
extremes. On one hand, Catron’s long hours and great energy in maneuvering the
company through its many obstacles paints the picture of an attentive and impassioned
manager. But, his focus rarely remained on Monero for long, and so the company
sometimes suffered from neglect or from the gruff and reactionary decisions that sprung
from the scrambling that followed each crises.
In the end, the real victim in this corporate history was New Mexico. Though the
mine continued some work off-and-on under Broad’s ownership, Monero hardly
presented an example of lasting and meaningful development. Denver and its flagship
road demonstrated market dominance over the southern Rockies while Santa Feans
watched their own economic status weaken. And, as in so many of these cases, the
experience of doing business with Catron soured eastern stockholders toward New
Mexico. While Catron continued to send optimistic reports of the future activity of the
MCCC as late as November 1891, they inspired little confidence upon their reception in
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the east. His speculative designs on risk would return to haunt him later in life, however,
when Catron seethed about the impossibility of attracting eastern capital to New Mexico.
For all the wrong reasons, he was the master of his own destiny.

Optimism & Aggression: Catron’s Blind Spot
Thomas Catron’s experience occurred as part and parcel of an aggressive
capitalist culture that entered the Southwest during the Gilded Age. The enhanced level
of competitiveness had antecedents in the Panic of 1873 and the industrialization of the
Northeast and Midwest, which surely influenced the way market forces met in the West,
when the tactics of ruthless robber barons collided with a new generation of
entrepreneurial upstarts. On top of these cultural influences, the heightened risk for
investments in New Mexico led speculators to attempt to divide or defraud sellers and
partners alike. The goal was often a belligerent entrance and undercutting of market
prices to gain access or assets for as little as possible. Once again, information and
contacts, not inherent business acumen, determined the winners and losers of this
capitalist game. In this context, Catron and his fellow ringmen were as strategically
situated as they could be with embedded ties to the federal government, territorial courts,
Freemasons, regional banks, major railroad companies, and an interlocking jigsaw puzzle
of corporate directorates. And yet, all of the networks in the world could not save these
capitalists from the underwhelming market longevity of Santa Fe and the Hispano
borderlands, where capital’s aggressive entrance was matched by an equally turbulent
exit.
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Though railroads in some ways had just brought the territory face to face with the
technology necessary for modern industrial practices, the technology of finance and risk
management had found its way to New Mexico at least a decade earlier. So for Catron,
the entrance of railroads not only led to speculations in new land, but also to work
towards tapping the resources on already acquired land grants. For many capitalists like
Catron, the new economic formula brought about by the rail revolution placed a much
greater value on the resources of the West.
This is not to say that Catron and the Santa Fe crowd did not attempt to better
position themselves and their home town. The reality is that for years Santa Feans put
forth a steady effort towards gaining direct rail connection and better access to local
markets. They also hoped to bring satellite markets more closely within their orbit as well
as that of local banks. For instance, even before the Southern Pacific entered the
Territory, Catron and a familiar cast, including Stephen Elkins, William Griffin, Henry
Atkinson, William Manderfield, and H.B. Stout, incorporated the New Mexico Railway
Co. with an object to construct a road southward to meet the S&P at its proposed path.
Though capitalized at a hefty figure of $10,000,000 the railway company never appears
to have built anything, and more likely served as a corporate pawn in the right-of-way
wars to follow.102 Catron and friends invested in another project incorporated in Santa Fe
in late February 1880, just a few weeks after the AT&SF reached Lamy. Filed under the
name the New Mexico, Chihuahua, and Southern Rail Road Company, this 1.8 million
dollar organization was led by AT&SF officers from Massachusetts and Kansas,
including President Thomas Nickerson. Ring staples represented the local parties on the

“Record of Incorporation Classified,” 1867-1910, Reel 34, slide 124-25, TANM, Records of the
Secretary of the Territory.
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incorporation papers. Once again, other than its corporate existence, it is doubtful that
this company actually produced anything.103
Not all of the rail schemes of the ringmen were hollow. One example of
development came in the form of the Texas, Santa Fe, and Northern Railway. Because of
the ongoing railroad war between the AT&SF and the D&RG, as well as some tricky
engineering concerns, neither company built to the territorial capital.104 By the early
1880s a boundary agreement between the two major lines further reduced the likelihood
that they would extend to Santa Fe. The Texas, Santa Fe, and Northern emerged then as a
separate corporation with designs to construct a thirty-five mile spur to fill the gap
between Santa Fe and the D&RG at Espanola.105 Under Catron’s leadership as President
of this twelve million dollar company, in January 1887 the Texas, Santa Fe, and Northern
completed its connection. But, instead of working to funnel goods and services into Santa
Fe, the “Chili Line,” as it became known, transitioned ownership to the D&RG, helping
instead to extend the Colorado carrier’s network more so than New Mexico’s.106
This hardly deterred the stubbornly confident Thomas Catron. In the summer of
1888 Catron travelled through Europe in company with English business partner Wilson
Waddingham. The partners sat on similar corporate boards and jointly owned several
properties in New Mexico and Colorado. In general, Catron looked after local interests
103
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while Waddingham, who built a palatial home in New Haven, Connecticut, found the
money. In July and August of 1888, the partners set out for a Grand Tour of Europe with
some stops organized to meet with prospective capitalists on the Continent and in
England. The pair travelled to Moscow, Vienne, Budapest, Constantinople, Switzerland,
Holland, Stockholm, London, and Liverpool, staying in fine hotels all along the way.107
While it is unclear whether their business trip achieved the desired result of obtaining a
large loan mortgaged against New Mexico grant lands, the answer from the Dundee
Mortgage Company identified a real obstacle that set Catron and entrepreneurship in New
Mexico back time-and-time-again. No matter how much of a gentleman of business
Catron presented himself, the Dundee Mortgage Company did not make loans to
residents of U.S. territories or on territorial securities. With the tightened money supply
after the major financial panic, for years after 1893 he could not even secure any money
from the Midwest on thousands of acres of southwestern collateral.108 And yet, the boom
of the 1880s allowed Catron to boast of a rather impressive stature in Santa Fe at the
center of his territorial domain.

107

Reciepts from the following hotels found in this folder: The Midland Grand Hotel, London; Hotel
Dussaux, Moscow; Britannia Hotel, Trondhejm; Grand-Hotel, Paris; Grand Hotel, Stockholm; Grand
Hotel, Christiania; Hotel National, Genève; Hotel Sacher, Wien; Grand Hotel D’Europe, Rue Michel, St.
Petersburg; Hotel D’Angleterre, Constantinople; Hotel D’Angleterre, Copenhagen. CP, Series 801, Box 1,
Folder 4 “Trip to Europe.”
108
Ibid., correspondence between Thomas B. Catron and the Dundee Mortgage Company of Scotland.

240

Catron Building, northwest corner, facing Santa Fe Plaza, New Mexico, c. 1915. Law
Office of Thomas B. Catron, III, Santa Fe.

Thomas B. Catron’s Law and History Library, found in his law office on the Santa Fe
Plaza, c. 1907. Law Office of Thomas B. Catron, III, Santa Fe.

By 1890 Thomas Catron styled himself as a cosmopolitan, modern businessman
of the world. He owned enormous tracts of land valued at millions of dollars (making him
one of the largest taxpayers in New Mexico), hundreds of thousands of dollars in
corporate stock, as well as businesses in all of the major industries of the Southwest. In
Santa Fe, Catron owned his home, several rental properties, and an entire block in his
name on the east side of the Plaza.109 He was also the attorney on record for the Southern
Pacific Railroad and the Western Union Telegraph Co. and so travelled most rail lines as
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a “deadhead” and received “frank” books for free communication, had direct access to
top D.C. circles through his friendship with Stephen Elkins (Sec. of War, 1891-1893),
held influential power in the territorial legislature, Republican Party, Bar Association and
First National Bank of Santa Fe.110 He also claimed ownership of over $300,000 in debt,
a figure that only grew over the proceeding decade, casting a menacing shadow upon his
optimism and ambition.111
The advance of business in the American West drew heavily upon borrowed
capital and evolved attitudes towards risk management. Catron encapsulates this to the
fullest. Catron’s ambitious movements to build his empire in the eighties simultaneously
added sources of equity and accelerated the acquisition of debt. Capital raised for new
concerns often trickled backward to pay older notes. And yet he continued forward in an
endless cycle of debt management that connected his businesses and his lands to creditors
across the country. The basis for much of this liability came from exaggerated claims to
the value of real estate or corporate property that could not stand up to market realities. In
this context, the optimism of Catron and other New Mexico boosters became their most
troublesome blind spot. Their companies held far too much water; the lands that they
owned far too little. Catron’s energy and influence in New Mexico, alongside his
extended network of hopeful friends, led him to believe that he could overcome the
patent insufficiencies of his projects. For the most part, he could not, and his range of
corporations suffered in the process.
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Chapter 5
Fortune and Failure:
Thomas Catron’s Search for Order, 1893-1907
All of these experiments have led to failure and loss. Our only income has been what we have been
able to secure by leasing pasture rights, and that has been insufficient to meet even the accruing
taxes.
John H. Knaebel, President of the Banded Peak Land and Mining Company, February 17, 1903

Of Empire and Debt: Keeping Up with Catron’s Accounts
Thomas Catron owned and controlled more acreage in his name during the first
decade of the twentieth century than during any other point in his long career in
southwestern land speculation. In direct correlation, he also held claim to an astronomical
amount of debt. Catron’s obligations linked his extensive landholding as well as his
myriad corporate securities to capital lenders and money markets around the country and
even overseas. That Catron’s empires of land (which continues by most metrics to
represent the most stable form of wealth) and debt reached their peaks simultaneously
poses no paradox, however. If anything, it points to a real irony that pulses through New
Mexico’s long history of treasure hunters – their grand schemes and their epic failures –
connecting Catron to a line of historical descent going back to Oñate. A breakdown of his
indebtedness, totaling over half a million dollars of borrowed capital for the year of 1903
alone, will help to clarify.1
The following section is derived from Thomas Catron’s incoming correspondence for 1903, spanning the
Catron Papers, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 4 (January 1903) through Box 19, Folder 2 (January 1904).
From Thomas Catron’s incoming correspondence for 1903, I have come to the positive confirmation of
$433,296 in specifically documented loans, notes, and mortgages held by, or signed by, Thomas Catron and
for which he received notices to pay. I reach up to the half-million mark in my estimate by including the
tens of thousands of dollars Catron owed in back taxes in New Mexico and Colorado plus new taxes for
that year alongside unclear statements from at least three lenders, a litany of unspecified personal loans,
and some large settlements that continued to hang over Catron from the Waddy-gate affair. According to
1
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To begin, Catron owed sizeable sums to a half-dozen banks in New Mexico,
Colorado, and Missouri. The presidents of New Mexico’s most stable banks all knew
Catron by name, face, and signature. The most glaring source of his outstanding balance
with these money houses came from the corporate reorganization and business expenses
of the American Valley Company. Catron partnered with Charles Elmendorf to revamp
the ranching outfit starting in 1901. When the AVC remained an operational mess, its
notes with the First National Bank of Santa Fe, First National Bank of Albuquerque,
Albuquerque Bank of Commerce, Silver City National Bank, and Kansas City Bank of
Commerce, secured by the company’s capital stock, bonds, and sheep, went unpaid. By
1903 over $50,000 of liability hung over the finances of the AVC, drawing 8-12%
interest and quickly reaching (or already passed) maturation. When due dates arrived
with unsettled principal, cashiers came to Catron to fix the matter, but he could not
readily do so. Instead, he pled for extensions, offered promises of future responsibility,
and borrowed elsewhere for sufficient funds to make interest payments that satiated his
creditors for the time being. This strategy could not maintain the status quo for long,
however, and three banks filed suit for collection in 1903, targeting Catron, his partners,
and his corporate holdings. These embarrassments brought public attention to Catron’s
troubled finances and in the case of the Banded Peak Land and Mining Co., led to
foreclosure and sale of 60,000 acres in Archuleta County, Colorado. Ever wily, the land
baron managed to legally “redeem” his properties, though this required considerable extra
energy, expense, and frustration.

http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ the historical value of $500,000 in 1903 is comparable to
between $12.8 and $74 million in 2010.
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When the banks of the territory and region refused to lend any more, Catron
solicited the leading merchants, obtaining small-to-midsize pots of money from the likes
of the Ilfeld Co., Gross, Kelly Co., and Burns-Biggs Co. Following their mercantile
arrangements, sheep, wool, and wood represented the securities placed on these loans, as
Catron harnessed the products of his lands to help with his constant resort to band-aid
financing. Through these contracts, the royalties and labor from several of his grants paid
down the balances due banks and trust companies.
Mortgages held by financial institutions represented the largest individual debts.
Charles Catron entered the worst of his father’s structured agreements regarding
mortgages on several grants, including a $250,000 set of loans in Charles’ name with
520,000 acres of the Tierra Amarilla Grant as the security. Just to grease the wheels
enough to obtain the loan, Catron agreed to return a $45,000 commission to Adolph
Jarmuth and his associates at the Continental Trust Co. of Denver.2 Even building debt
cost money. In Kansas City, the Fidelity Trust Co. owned a mortgage on the lands of the
AVC of Socorro County, as well as a large portion of the company’s bonds. Importantly,
while Catron could still effectively blunt some of the worst possibilities of his bank debt
in the territory, the trust companies in Denver, Kansas City, Chicago, New York, and
London found his constant pleadings for more time unprofessional and where more likely
to sink their hooks into him and his property in exchange for leniency.
When these options ran out, the hard-to-hold-down Catron found other sources for
loans from insurance companies and his extensive network of personal friends and
business associates. In his scrambling to repay notes and avoid sacrificing property, he
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Numa Reymond to Thomas B. Catron, 10 January 1902, CP, Series 103, Box 14, Folder 3; and Thomas
B. Catron to Adolph J. Jarmuth, Denver, 23 September 1902, CP, Series 103, Box 15, Folder 5.
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borrowed over $10,000 against his life insurance policies, as well as those of his wife
Julia, through the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Milwaukee and the Mutual
Life Insurance Co. of New York.3 Never enough, Catron borrowed widely from any
friends that were in a position to part with some funds for a time. His correspondence
include balances owed to several parties in connection with the estate of Wilson
Waddingham, as well as personal loans from T.D. Burns, Stephen Elkins, and Numa
Reymond, who alone held a mortgage against the Mora Grant on which Catron still owed
over $30,000 alongside a separate note for $15,000, both of which loomed over Catron
for the remainder of the decade.4
Finally, property taxes. Not to be confused with borrowed debt, Catron’s
assessments in no less than ten counties in New Mexico and Colorado (and maybe as
many as fifteen) required cumulatively substantial biannual payments.5 The land baron
routinely contested his tax bills, successfully early on, but by the 1900s the county boards
of equalization more forcefully compelled Catron to pay assessments, both the new,
quickly rising rates that came with the economic prosperity and bureaucratic order of the
decade, and the old, with numerous years piled together plus penalties and accruing
interest at ten percent.6 And, while not the equivalent of a loan or a mortgage, unpaid
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246

taxes represented a lien against Catron’s holdings just the same, so that counties could,
and did, take possession of his properties and sell them at public auction for arrears.
In light of this cancerous mass of over-extended obligation, Thomas Catron’s
land-based empire proved more risk than reward and even as greater material progress
came to New Mexico, his problems grew more rapidly than his profits. Catron tirelessly
worked towards the advancement of his properties while doing the same for the cause of
New Mexican statehood. He continued to place faith in the ideal that progress for his
adopted home would benefit him for several reasons. At the top of his list was that
statehood would bring migrants and money, both of which would generate substantial
returns on his investment in landed wealth.7 Instead, when New Mexico failed to earn
recognition as a state, Catron’s interests suffered. But, his issues went much deeper than
the Congressional slighting of New Mexico. First and foremost, he simply attempted to
own and operate too much. He had more partners, agents, and enemies than he could
keep track of and he was accumulating debts in the forms of bonds, notes, insurance
policies, personal loans, and property taxes much more rapidly than he could find the
money to pay them. For these reasons, he set out to gain firm control of his lands and to
centralize management of the companies that worked them. His move towards enhanced
order for his New Mexico empire came from a specifically business oriented agenda.

hurled charges of tax evasion against Catron to portray him as a shirker of his duties, his friends could just
as easily publish figures that showed that Catron paid a great amount more in taxes than the average New
Mexican, with numbers that hardly appeared miniscule or dodgy under basic presentation.
7
T.B. Catron to R.C. Kerens, St. Louis, 3 February 1894, CP, Series 105, Vol. 8. Thomas Catron clearly
expressed his belief that statehood would result in great wealth in this letter in which he explains to Kerens
that “The glitter of a United States Senatorship is very little to me. If I can get New Mexico in as a State, be
it Democratic or Republican, my property will be doubled in value, and so will yours and that of Elkins in
this Territory. I would gladly let the Democrats take and keep the State, if I can double the value of my
property.”
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To make matters worse, a stressed business environment after the panic of 1893
prevented capital and credit from entering New Mexico, reinforcing the territory’s
marginal status within capitalist circles. Catron’s business contacts and correspondence
present an insider account of the struggles faced by the leader of the once potent Santa Fe
Ring as he strained desperately to maintain his New Mexican land and resources. But
changing equations of land use and productivity cut to the heart of his troubles. The
change stemmed in large part from an influx of progressive-minded institutions, such as
the Court of Private Land Claims and the U.S. Forest Service, which sought to bring
order to New Mexico’s land and resources.8 Though soft on social policy in the territory,
the managerial, scientific, and bureaucratic reforms spurred forward by progressive
thinking in fact heightened competition over New Mexico’s land grants and public
domain. The transition both helped and hurt Catron. On one hand, greater clarity of title
made the likelihood of a windfall sale that much more possible. On the other, the move
towards order more noticeably imprinted the forces of the market and the state on lands
that for decades had encountered only minor oversight. More and more the County
Collectors, easily embraced by the Santa Fe Ring in the past, functioned outside of
Catron’s control as they raised assessments and denied delays. For Catron, this meant that
his speculative lands and corporations could no longer sit idle as his debt reached a
8

Generally speaking, the Progressive Era in the United States is best known for its shift toward order,
reform, and professionalism, as characterized by Robert Wiebe in The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New
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professionally inspired and managed Court of Private Land Claims set upon the land grants of the Hispano
borderlands with an intensely rigid, ordered, and calculable goal to finally fix New Mexico’s troubles with
land grants and titles, as well as to reduce overall grant acreage.
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crescendo, causing the wily land baron to demand more from his properties, pushing the
limits of land-use and allocation to serve the capitalist engine that he and his cohort
undoubtedly helped to crank. This chapter seeks to navigate Thomas Catron’s fortune and
failing from 1893 to 1907 and by doing so, will help to illuminate the forces that directed
capital, development, and cultural adaptation in New Mexico at the turn of the twentieth
century.
In this accounting, it is important to recognize how meaningfully Catron’s
economic fortunes were tied to those of the Nuevomexicano community. His investment
in New Mexico land greatly relied on Spanish and Mexican land grants, and so
intertwined his interests with those lands and in no small part, with their residents. As
capital moved into New Mexico, especially during the decades of the 1880s and the
1900s, it flowed most obviously into the “new” parts of cities and towns or more recently
settled, Anglo-dominated regions of the territory. Concentrations of capital occurred in
mostly white spaces, marking much of Catron’s empire as continually marginal, even as
the territory and later state grew deeper and deeper connected to international markets.

Panic and Progress: Economic Transition at the Turn of the Century
Catron’s sinking fortunes in the 1890s developed in tandem with a failed push for
statehood and a depressed national economy. After the Panic of 1893 upended railroads,
banks, and the western mortgage market, a great hesitancy developed by lenders outside
New Mexico to direct capital to the territory.9 Whereas the territory fared comparatively

9

The depression of the 1890s was especially hard on the capital markets of the Rocky Mountain West and
Rural South, with a constricted money supply and interest rates well above the averages of the Northeast
and Midwest. See: Lance E. Davis, “The Investment Market, 1870-1914: The Evolution of a National
Market,” The Journal of Economic History 25 (Sept. 1965): 355-99, especially Davis’ tables breaking
down interest rates and monetary exchange by region.
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well during the panic twenty years prior, the depression of the 1890s spread along the
newly constructed railways, transforming the conduits for capital gain into the
forerunners of a depressed business environment that settled on the Southwest with a
disturbing permanency. Both the Territory as a whole and the city of Santa Fe fell on
hard times. At mid-decade, for instance, New Mexico’s territorial government operated at
an annual deficit with “interest and part principal of public debt” as the single largest
item in the “expenditure” column.10 For its part, the capital city ran afoul of its creditors
after distributing several bond issues, only to find itself, like so many others, unable to
make payments. Its bonds drifted into default and as a result, the city’s credit rating,
hardly sterling to begin with, took a major blow. This created another obstacle for Catron,
as Santa Fe’s poor credit represented a black mark that many eastern capitalists then
associated with him and his solicitations for money. 11 Just like his home city, Thomas
Catron’s chief concern was to pay off creditors, especially several banks in New Mexico
that held mortgages to his property as collateral.12

C.H. Coffin to E.L. Bartlett, 11 January 1896, Folder 4, Edward L. Bartlett Papers, 1882-1903, Center for
Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico. The correspondence found in the
Bartlett Papers for the year 1896 include multiple mentions of the stringent money and bond market that
continued through the 1890s. C.H. Coffin, of the Municipal Investment Company with branches in London
and Chicago for instance, wrote to Bartlett from London stating that the market there was “completely
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By early 1893, Catron was already scrambling to obtain loans from Banks or
Trust Companies in Chicago, Cincinnati, Minneapolis & St. Paul, Kansas City, and
Denver. He offered to these different companies various types of securities including
stocks, bonds, corporate property, personal property, and livestock. Replies to Catron’s
aggressive requests indicated that even before the panic started later in the year, money
had grown scarce in New Mexico and that outside sources had grown increasingly
stubborn about lending to the southwestern territory. Though he solicited widely, Catron
recognized that because of his distance from the “money men” his exertions were
ineffective.13 For those who could persuade eastern brokers to furnish some capital,
usually at 6 or 7% interest, the potential to then re-lend the money at the going rate of
12% interest common in the territory showed just how coveted sources of capital
remained for New Mexicans. Catron and other public and private lenders understood the
inflated value of cash in the territory and put other people’s money to use in this regard
often enough. But in the sudden midst of the panic, the ability for most of Catron’s
debtors to pay had diminished and he found himself as another link in too many chains of
bad debt.
Catron wrote to a Cincinnati banker in July of 1893: “The hard times which have
come on have shut down upon us in the west more fearfully than they have on your
industries in the east. We have plenty of property but very little money.”14 Later that year
Catron openly expressed to his lifelong friend Stephen Elkins how the panic had treated
him. He wrote in November that: “These hard times have shut down on me as hard as
they have on anybody on earth and were it not for my strong constitution, energy and
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determination they would carry me under; but that cannot be.”15 To try to right his
sinking ship, Catron started a protracted collection campaign by writing to men and
women all over the territory including Dr. Samuel J. North of Clayton for $250, Don Juan
Navarro of Mora for $226, Sabino Salas of Santa Fe for $350, and A.M. Bergere of Los
Lunas for $750.16 But the scarcity of hard currency in the territory made collecting on
many of these debts a laborious process even when successful. One letter from Catron to
Mr. Ira M. Duckworth of Raton began, “I am in possession of your letter and assure you
that I am disgusted with you.”17 Needless to say, Duckworth could not pay.
New Mexicans were not alone in their inability to furnish the obligated capital.
The severity of the financial panic and the closure of banks across the country created
chain reactions of debt, insolvency, and bankruptcy that choked up the money market. As
Catron wrote to business associate R.C. Kerens of St. Louis, “Your company certainly
cannot appreciate the situation in which I am pecuniarily placed just now…I have worked
too long and too hard to be compelled to sacrifice what I have simply because those who
owe me and who can pay me will not do it.”18 Catron’s following comments presented a
moment of candor regarding the state of the financial market from his point of view. For
all of the value allotted to securities (stocks, bonds), these instruments offered no
salvation when what was needed was currency. In reply to an alternative type of payment,
Catron starkly expressed, “You have asked me if I will take bonds. I could not realize on
the bonds; I cannot borrow money on them - - neither can I eat them.”19 But Catron was
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in no better position himself to pay the U.S. Comptroller of Currency when the Socorro
National Bank, of which he was President, faced government closure and liquidation.
Catron’s original subscription of $10,000 in capital stock of the Socorro National
Bank represented an investment in the incorporated City of Socorro and its growing
attachment to a sizable mineral hinterland. Having learned a great deal about the world of
banking and finance from his continued affiliation with the First National of Santa Fe
where he held the office of VP from 1891 to 1894, Catron surely understood that
influence over a regional bank translated to influence over regional development.
Socorro’s growth at the time looked promising. The start of construction of New
Mexico’s School of Mines would help boost mineral production in the rich countryside
around the growing town of 4,500 that aspired to compete with El Paso as a hub of
mining and ranching business of the Southwest.20 His subscription in May of 1891 gave
him twenty-percent ownership of the bank that opened for business under national charter
that month. An exemplar of synchronization, Catron also established a law office at the
new bank and partnered with bank incorporator and cashier John S. Sniffen.21 Catron
undoubtedly considered the potential of this venture to outweigh the risk involved, but his
trust – in John Sniffen and southwestern economic stability – proved to be misplaced.
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The reality was that the world of finance in New Mexico continued to operate
along the edges of conservative banking principals. Credit and debt in the 1890s still
passed through the hands of local mercantiles, political bosses, personal lenders, and
nationally and privately chartered banks, so that the specifics of federal banking law
could easily get lost in the process.22 The ringmen of Santa Fe knew this and took
advantage of the grey area, though they expressed surprise or indignation when the
peccadillos of others came to light. Catron did just that when a string of bank failures
brought new federal oversight. The inquiry began after the Albuquerque National and the
Albuquerque Savings banks collapsed, tying up over $60,000 of the territorial budget in
receivership hearings. This led the assistant Comptroller of the Currency to instigate a
special round of investigation into the banks of New Mexico, including a pet bank of
Catron’s in Socorro.23 The scrutiny on the Socorro National Bank brought the curious
practices of cashier John Sniffen to the surface. Even though the bank’s finances were not
in total shambles, hazy account activity and an outstanding debt of $12,000 provided
National Bank Examiner E.A. Abrey with sufficient reason to temporarily close the
bank’s doors.24 Catron, who had only recently become president, burst into activity and
correspondence with a zeal (and great concern) to save the bank and his investment. He
managed to persuade several creditors including the Union National Bank of Denver, the
Richard Sylla, “Federal Policy, Banking market Structure, and Capital Mobilization in the United States,
1863-1913” Journal of Economic History 29 (Dec. 1969): 657-686. Specifically, New Mexico bankers did
not always seem to follow the letter of the law regarding the maintenance of reserve funds, of the types of
collateral used to secure notes, and the legal limits on individual loans or individuals’ total credit
allowances.
23
“Official Budget,” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 17 July 1893, p. 4. The City of Albuquerque also
defaulted on an issue of bonds sold in New York in the early summer of 1893. Unclear if the failure of the
banks and the inability to pay on the bonds are connected.
24
T. B. Catron to Neill B. Field, Albuquerque, October 19 1893, CP, Vol. 8. “The Banks,” Santa Fe Daily
New Mexican, 23 October 1893, p. 1. According to the Santa Fe Daily New Mexican the bank had
approximately $8000 in deposits on hand; $51,000 in loans; and another $10,000 in debt. The Comptroller
of the Currency placed the outstanding debt at between $12-15,000.
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First National Bank of Albuquerque, and Numa Reymond to postpone collections against
the Socorro National. To lessen liabilities he (perhaps foolishly) doubled-down by
personally paying thousands of dollars of debt and in so doing, successfully kept the
institution afloat through the winter.
By the time the Socorro National re-opened its doors for business in midNovember the Board of Directors led by bank President Catron replaced Sniffen and
sought to take control of all business. Their plan involved a concerted effort to collect on
all outstanding notes and to bring balance to their accounts.25 But this proved impractical
and largely impossible. Catron and new cashier D.H. Harroun could write letters and
threaten suit all they wanted; the money would not come. By the spring of 1894 the
directors of the Socorro National had not improved their position, and they knew it.
Catron brought up the possibility of voluntary liquidation with U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency James H. Eckels, explaining that “the great trouble is the extreme hard times
which prevail in this territory have made it almost impossible to get money, and people
demand time and when we sue them they avail themselves of every technicality to obtain
delay.”26 I think it is fair to say that he wrote these lines from experience.
Slightly more than a year after being elected president, Thomas Catron presided
over a series of stockholders’ and directors’ meetings to determine the fate of the Socorro
National Bank. With accounts still out of balance and no clear solution in sight after six

“The Socorro National Bank,” Santa Fe Daily New Mexican, 27 November 1893, p. 4. Also see CP,
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months of canvassing accounts and bluffing to sue (many of the outstanding accounts
were worth less than the potential legal fees), the bank decided to voluntarily liquidate its
assets.27 This federally sanctioned corporate cut-and-run allowed the Socorro National to
place its books with the U.S. Comptroller, whose office then presided over the liquidation
of the bank and an equitable disbursement of its credits and debts. Catron made sure to
include the $8,783 that the bank owed him front and center in the statement of accounts
sent to Washington, D.C.28
In light of bank closures, the lack of hard currency, and high interest rates, it is
unsurprising that New Mexicans of all backgrounds participated in barter and credit
economies with regional mercantiles. These general stores and their proprietors continued
to perform the functions of informal localized banks, warehouses, and aggregate dealers
in the products of the countryside well into the period of early statehood. They did so in
no small part because of the personal relationships they maintained with their patrons and
their flexibility to conduct business outside the cash economy.29 Although the banking
practices of territorial New Mexico may not have stood up to national standards, they still
come across as too formal and too insensitive to the financial conditions for many
residents of the Hispano borderlands.
The story of the shortly-lived Socorro National Bank is relevant to the economic
difficulties experienced by New Mexicans. For one thing, in the aftermath of the 1893
panic, the money supply in most of the territory – typically scarce already – severely
constricted, which led to a double-dip formula for middling capitalists like Catron who
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could neither pay nor collect on their accounts. Furthermore, the interconnectivity of New
Mexico’s money supply meant that hard times in one industry quickly bled over to the
next so that the diversification of Catron’s interests, instead of propping him up,
sometimes pulled the whole network down. His failures then, as much as his
achievements, influenced his attitudes towards present and future sales, investments, and
plans for development. Under these conditions, territorial capitalists responded to the
panic following national patterns, including a turn away from an unmitigated market and
a more thorough embrace of risk management.30 In the waning years of Catron’s
financially-wild West, the Panic of 1893 signaled nothing less than an upending of the
old mentality that energy and ambition alone would pave the way to success. In the
rebuilding that followed, the federal government once again asserted its value by
providing new weapons of defense for capitalists to safeguard their interests or at least
lessen the blows.
Even as Catron’s political fortunes looked strong in the fall of 1894, his financial
conditions had not changed. During the summer of that year multiple parties charged
Catron with insolvency and tried to work through the courts to make him file for
bankruptcy. He recognized that if the courts ever set about to make an injunction against
him, it would open the way for his creditors to pounce and would leave him entirely
embarrassed.31 One of the ways that he avoided this end was to write widely to his
friends to postpone his debts. Also, as an active capitalist in the territory, Catron had
aligned his business interests with others through interlocking directorates, so that many
in the territory had no desire to see the old ringleader go bankrupt. Through mixed means
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Catron weathered the financial drought of the 1890s and financed his empire into the
twentieth century.
By 1900 a quick rundown of his achievements shows that in New Mexico, Catron
had already held two appointed positions, won six elected offices, presided over New
Mexico’s Board of Education, its Territorial Penitentiary, and its Republican Party,
served as president of the Territorial Bar Association and as council in one-third of the
Court of Private Land Claims cases. With regards to business, he was a director and
officer in the First National Bank of Santa Fe and the Socorro National Bank, constructed
the Catron Block on the Santa Fe Plaza, incorporated over twenty-five corporations, held
interest in over thirty land grants, controlled title to millions of acres of land, and even
amassed the largest personal library in the territory. And, at the age of sixty, he was not
close to being done with his legal, political, business, and family affairs. Alternatively,
Catron also fought off bankruptcy and dissolution, found himself on the outs with the
leading Republican, Governor Miguel Otero, failed to achieve statehood or the sale of
any of his large landholdings, and watched several of his prized companies go belly-up.
Adding insult to injury, he lost thousands through investment deals with unreliable
partners, was charged and then acquitted from disbarment, and was even censured by the
New Mexico Freemasons. And so, after more than thirty years in the Territory of New
Mexico, Thomas Catron found himself once again playing the part of the speculator as he
continued to gamble on his adoptive home.
The new century marked a sea change in the territory’s economic growth,
prompted by a return of strong eastern markets and the nation’s imperial agenda that
shifted to high gear with the Spanish American War. More stable national markets
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accompanied build-ups in most of New Mexico’s economic sectors. The ranching
industry, both sheep and cattle, received a bump from wartime production needs, some
relief from international gluts due to the Republican tariff schedule of President
McKinley, and plenty of rain. The unusually wet decade also contributed to a raise in
agricultural output alongside the railroad expansion that opened new regional markets.32
Mining and milling fared well with greatly enlarged output, benefitting from the railroad
growth and technological innovation that together reduced shipping costs and raised
value and demand on non-precious metals such as lead, zinc, copper, and coal. For his
part, Thomas Catron tried to take advantage of the upward trend by once again expanding
his incorporated empire. He participated in new irrigation companies, mining companies,
and land development schemes, hardly missing a beat as he continued to chase
speculative opportunities.
A sign of the growth of business in general during this time is that from 1900 to
1910, a total of 2,177 newly organized corporations filed papers with the Office of the
Secretary.33 In this ten-year span the territory brought in almost as many new businesses
as it had from the start of records keeping in 1867 to the end of the nineteenth century.34
(See Appendix, Tables 5-A, 5-B, and 6). Some old patterns of corporate growth
continued, such as in the sectors of mining, milling, smelting, ranching, livestock, and
irrigation. Oil companies, mostly absent until the turn of the century, sprang up with
newfound frequency, especially in 1901 and 1902 as a new round of speculators –
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wildcatters – began to survey more and more of the territory in search of underground
riches. A substantial commercial market for oil did not mature in New Mexico until the
1920s, but these early hopefuls set the precedent for the industry to follow a corporate
model.35 Manufacturing companies also made substantial inroads, increasing by over
150% by 1910 with the heaviest years of growth at mid-decade and then slowing after the
Panic of 1907, marking a notable trend for the period.36
New Mexican industry significantly benefitted from a demographic boom as well.
Between 1890 and 1910, the population doubled from 160,282 to 327,301. More
dramatically, the first decade of the century counted 131,991 new additions to the
territory, a sixty-seven percent increase, and the largest percentage gain since modern
census data.37 New towns sprang up across the territory and with them came new
opportunities for land development and commercial growth. But Catron and the Santa Fe
Ringmen could no longer make a couple backroom deals to direct the economic activity
of New Mexico’s hinterlands. Euro-American migrants, many of whom claimed portions
of the public domain through the process of homesteading, settled with growing
frequency in the San Juan, Pecos, and lower Rio Grande valleys. As the number of farms
and acreage of farm land tripled in the territory, the transportation network that bypassed
Santa Fe twenty years ago once again insured that the multiplying products of the fields
and plains were absorbed by other regional hubs.38
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The territorial records of incorporation provide strong evidence to quantify how
the boom in territorial population impacted New Mexico’s economy. For industries
connected to city, town, neighborhood, or civic development, the period witnessed a
considerable rise in business activity. The number of construction companies reported
over a 400% increase, which also contributed to good markets for timber, milling, and
manufacturing as they overlapped with the housing industry. General mercantiles showed
a similarly fantastic rise, while the categories involving real estate and utilities indicated
growth between seventy-five and one-hundred percent. To complement these figures,
robust numbers for new publishers, banks, abstractors, churches, and fraternal societies
signal attention to town and city development.39 Albuquerque topped 10,000 residents
during the decade and convincingly proclaimed its place as New Mexico’s urban and
commercial center.40 Smaller towns and cities, such as Roswell, Clovis, Farmington, and
Socorro all boasted ample growth, while older New Mexican enclaves like Santa Fe and
Taos virtually stagnated. With the rise in population and its impact on the rise in
commercial activity, many New Mexican towns and cities organized commercial clubs
and regional fairs.41 Events such as the New Mexico Territorial Fair, held annually in
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Albuquerque, came to represent a heightened forum for the exhibition of the region’s
growing market production. New Mexicans also actively participated in the myriad fairs,
exhibitions, and congresses of the age, constantly shifting from regional self-promotion
to national-alignment as they jostled for market and political relevance.42 Catron may not
have been able to pull string quite like the old days, but he remained ensconced in New
Mexico’s political and economic development. His extensive land holdings and large
corporate footprint directly connected him to the mining, ranching, and milling industries
of the region, to which we now turn.

Rents, Royalties, and Hinterland Development
One arena to which Thomas Catron placed increasing emphasis as his holdings
grew was his role as a landlord or rentier. Having amassed a fortune in city properties,
grant lands, mining claims, and sections of the public domain, he effectively removed
lucrative resources from the immediate usage of private enterprise only to make those
same resources accessible, at a price. Catron’s incoming correspondence included
countless requests for the rental, lease, or utilization of one piece of land or another.43
Nuevomexicano men and women, Anglo speculators and homesteaders, and prospectors
and corporate directorships alike coveted the natural resources encompassed within his
holdings. Their solicitations most often focused on one of four interests: mineral, timber,
stock raising, or town site. Catron benefited greatly as a landlord. Lessees added material,
Matthew F. Bokovoy, The San Diego World’s Fairs and Southwestern Memory, 1880-1940
(Albuquerque: Published in cooperation with the San Diego Historical Society by the University of New
Mexico Press, 2005); Bryan W. Turo, “Politics, Identity, and Statehood at the New Mexico Territorial Fair,
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potential, and anecdotal value with which to augment his optimistic abstracts to send to
investors or buyers.44 At the very least they might offset taxes. In the case of his city
rentals in places like Santa Fe, East Las Vegas, and Chama, tenants could also double as
political or business allies. He had no trouble at all, for instance, offering pleasing rental
rates to railroad or telegraph companies. But leaseholders could also become bothersome
thorns, especially when plans ran afoul and expected returns remained just that. The
uncertainties of the land and of profitable development frustrated Catron to no end. 45
Like so many other roles, that of landlord came with a kick. When rents and royalties
flowed in, Catron could think of himself as a stately rentier. But when lessees could not,
or would not pay, he returned to the ranks of those wondering how they would cover their
taxes.
Over the years, Thomas Catron’s ownership of land encompassing mineral
deposits, or his acquisition of specific mines and mineral claims, led to long-term
interaction with the world of prospecting, mining, and smelting in New Mexico and the
surrounding states. In some concerns, such as the Monero Coal & Coke Co. or the Aztec
Mining Co., Catron took a leading role in financing operations and managing the
application of capital.46 In many more ventures, he is better characterized as detached. He
owned or held title for the claims, but participated very little in the decision-making
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process other than to huff, puff, and blow invective at the operators who did not send him
sufficient royalties. For their part, visionary prospectors and engineers generated
contracts and royalty agreements to gain access to mineral claims, hoping for untapped
veins of gold or silver, but just as happy to find coal, lead, zinc, copper or other nonprecious metals. Prospective lessees signed legally binding promises to divide income
gained from successful mining operations with the wealthy landholder. In return, he
provided access to the land for a set period of time. With large interests at his behest and
his signature necessary to open them up, by the turn-of-the-century, private capitalists
like Thomas Catron acted as the gate-keepers to various scales of hinterland development
in the West.47
Even when the contracting miner had done his geologic homework, these deals
offered cases of speculation squared, with both sides placing great hope (and accepting
just as great risk) in natural and market factors. And there was no shortage of risk. For
starters, minerals had to be where the lessee sunk their shaft. Then, skilled and
trustworthy labor made a world of difference, but finding it was up to nepotism or the
open market; applicants from the first pool usually lacked skill, and those from the
second, trust. Next, transportation had to be available to bring crushed ore to smelters,
and railroads were not known for their fair pricing schemas to small operators. Finally,
mining companies required a constant influx of ready cash, necessary to get them through
sections of hard rock or stretches of hard times, while also waiting several months for
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smelter returns while expenses and payroll added up. For all involved, this check list
could easily mark the way towards peril. The combined effect of the many pitfalls that
could, and did, befall Catron the mine owner help explain why by March 1893 he was
already of the spirit to declare to mine operator George H. Bibb, “I am tired of spending
money in mines and getting nothing back.”48
Catron could have pointed to several projects that had already proved more
headache than payload. The Aztec Mining Co., a gold mine that operated in
Elizabethtown, New Mexico, ended each period from 1884 to 1889 in the red.49 The coal
at Monero sat idle as the company folded, which was at least better than the Cerrillos
Coal & Iron Co. whose lands were “plundered” of coal by independent miners and
squatters while its board squabbled in Kansas City.50 Mr. Bibb was no better himself. The
Fairview and Thunder mines that he excavated in search of the silver-rich North Star
Vein that cut through Sultan Mountain near Silverton, Colorado, did little more than tease
at profit. Yet for at least the decade from 1892-1902, Bibb presided over these San Juan
Range claims and convinced his patron, Thomas Catron, to wire money and wait
patiently for the big strike, which according to the diagrams, cross-sections, and

T.B. Catron to G.H. Bibb, 20 March 1893, CP, Series 105, Vol. 6. Catron’s comment about his mines
failing to remunerate came with an apropos $3500 check for George Bibb to use towards the work on the
Thunder Mine near Silverton, Colorado.
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Thomas B. Catron to R.C. Kerens, 13 May 1889, CP, Series 105, Vol. 2. The incomplete story of the
Cerrillos Coal & Iron Co. is pieced together by following the central actors and directors, R.C. Kerens of
St. Louis, Stephen Elkins of West Virginia, and Thomas Catron and Frank Clancy of Santa Fe. In 1892 this
company seems to have changed its corporate name to the Kansas & Texas Coal Co. The directors and
stocks of this new company remained the same with the addition of B.F. Hobart who worked for the Bank
of Commerce of St. Louis. The company also had some connection to the New Mexico Mining Co. that had
its main office at 102 Broadway in New York City with L.M. Lawson the company president. Kerens,
Elkins, and Catron all remained involved.
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professional reports, could only be a matter of time.51 But in the most basic sense, time
was not on the side of business enterprise in the Southwest. Still, Catron held off the sales
of the Fairview and Thunder mines for $10,000 in 1893, trusting in Bibb’s perseverance
to locate the vein and thereafter churn out royalties.
The proceeding years of development of Catron’s mineral claims near Silverton
by George Bibb left behind his record of sincere optimism in himself, his faith in modern
geology and engineering, a speculative streak underscored by an aversion to failure, and
no payload.52 What had started with a basic contract in which Bibb agreed to sink one
tunnel into the Thunder Mine turned into protracted years of mineral hide-and-seek. Low
silver prices and personal instability led Catron to halt development in 1894. But by 1899
the effervescent miner once again set about in search of the elusive strike and convinced
Catron to front monthly installments to pay for supplies and additional labor.53 Bibb drew
on the First National Bank of Santa Fe for his $100-$200 in monthly funds while
constantly spinning his correspondence to somehow transform repetitive letdown into
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George Bibb to Hon. T.B. Catron, 25 April 1900, CP, Series 103, Box 10, Folder 2. This letter included a
hand-drawn map of the Fairview Tunnel and the North Star lead vein as George Bibb believed them to
intersect.
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The development of the Fairview and Thunder mines of Sultan Mountain, near Silverton, CO, illustrates
a microcosm of the structure and movement of a tight money supply for small mining operations.
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assurances for the future. On several occasions, the operator struck small ore bodies of
good value.54 These fleeting samples only compounded the disappointment of the mines,
however, by rearing Bibb’s confidence and his requests for new leases, new contracts,
and of course, more money. And Catron, with lottery ticket dreams checking his better
judgment, assumed the new risks and continued to pay. By the time a thoroughly deflated
Bibb wrote to Catron in April and then November of 1902 to report that the Fairview and
Thunder mines, respectively, were busts, thousands of dollars of irretrievable funding had
seeped through the porous enterprise.55 Far from profiting from leases or from any
royalties, Catron’s Sultan Mountain mines produced plenty of optimism only, but in the
world of southwestern capitalism of the early Twentieth Century, the currency of
confidence held intrinsically less value than it had during the speculative bubbles of the
early Gilded Age.
Beginning in the mid-1890s the practice of contracting leases extended to include
the search for oil, especially near the Navajo River along the northern stretch of the
Tierra Amarilla Grant.56 Even John Rockefeller supposedly gained interest in the
potential oil reserves on the grant. At one point, Catron’s agents explained that
Rockefeller secretly sent land and mineral surveyors to the grant to report on the presence
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and quality of oil found there. When the Rockefeller parties then created exceedingly
negative reports points to either poor conditions on the grant, or a purposeful desire of
Rockefeller to torpedo the oil interests of the grant for competitive purposes.57
Independent parties contracted to drill test sites in exchange for their sole right to
harvest the black gold if successful in locating a well. One such agreement executed on
June 22, 1895 gave J.A. Merrick of Randolph, New York a twenty year lease on 25,000
acres of the grant situated in Colorado. For one-eighth of the proceeds earned of the sale
of oil, Catron opened up the land “for the purpose of boring, drilling, mining and
operating for oil and for the use of erecting any machinery or structures for the purpose of
developing and operating oil on the same.” For his part, Merrick agreed to begin work
within three months and to allocate at least $40,000 towards his purpose.58 Deals such as
this appeared advantageous to Catron for many reasons, creating potential sources of
income, adding value in machinery and improvement to the grant, and accessing valuable
resources that he was ill-equipped to tap. Conversely, when Merrick did not find oil in
significant quantities, his bad fortune metamorphosed into a deficiency of the land. For
the Banded Peak Land and Mining Company that owned the northern 60,000 acres of the
TA grant, poor showings devalued their land and their capital stock, so that by early 1903
the company faced foreclosure in Archuleta County, CO.59 After an unsuccessful sale of
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W.E. Broad to T.B. Catron, June 1, 1901, CP, Series 103, Box 13, Folder 1. Broad explains in his letter
that “Mr. Rockyfeller” organized an official investigatory tour designed to meet with Broad and canvas the
grant, but then secretly sent a man registered as C.W. Thompson from Denver who made a hasty
exploration of the property and then authored a very disappointed report. Broad seemed skeptic as to how
much Thompson could have actually seen and surveyed with the quick visit and so concludes that
Rockefeller had purposefully followed this course of action. Of course, it is entirely possible that
Thompson knew exactly what he was doing and that the oil potential on the grant was in fact quite poor.
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Contract for Lease between Thomas B. Catron of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and J.A. Merrick of Randolph,
New York, 22 June 1895, CP, Series 305, Box 6, Folder 1.
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The Banded Peak Land and Mining Company splintered off from Thomas Catron and Wilson
Waddingham’s US Land and Colonization Co. in 1894 when John Knaebel and James Freeman of Denver
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the property left few options, director John Knaebel broke the bad news in a letter to the
stockholders, explaining that multiple attempts were made to find oil and precious metals,
but “all of these experiments have led to failure and loss.”60 He went on to present the
few possibilities left, which involved scraping together sufficient funds to pay off the
mortgage and judgment against the company or to allow the County to sell the company’s
property and then legally redeem it within six months. Privately to Catron, Knaebel
figured that the latter of the options was actually the most economical.61 Instead of
enriching both parties, contractors like Merrick could easily cut-and-run, leaving a trail of
devaluation and environmental degradation that was the landholders’ problem, and none
of his own.
Although Catron’s involvement with the world of mining unearthed more
disappointment than silver or gold, he had the exact opposite experience with stumpage
royalties collected on lumber cut from his grants. No other extractive process proved as
lucrative for the land baron than his leasing of timber rights, to the extent that without the
royalties paid Catron on his Tierra Amarilla grant alone, his empire would likely have
crumbled on several occasions. His first contracts organized stumpage fees with owneroperator companies that followed the extension of the D&RG railway into northern New
Mexico in the early-1880s. By the turn-of-the-century, market competition left only a few
well-connected and well-capitalized companies operating on the TA grant, while on the

organized with Catron to finance the northern 60,000 acres of the TA grant in Archuleta County, CO as a
separate company.
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John H. Knaebel, President, Letter to the Stockholders of the Banded Peak Land and Mining Co., 17
February 1903, CP, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 5.
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Ibid.; John H. Knaebel to T.B. Catron, 25 February 1903, CP, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 5. The County
of Archuleta went ahead and sold the Banded Peak Company’s property at public auction, where it was
purchased by John E. Law (really!) who represented the interests of William J. Palmer of the Denver & Rio
Grande Railway. Thomas Catron and John Knaebel redeemed the 60,000 acres within the time limit, but
thereafter they had issues making mortgage payments to their new trustee, General Palmer.
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Mora grant, Catron partnered with local mercantiles to arrange, enforce, and collect on
stumpage fees for personal and commercial cutting.62 In true capitalist fashion, Catron
recognized that the steady income from these operations represented another form of
security that he could borrow against. Money may not grow on trees, but credit certainly
did. In accessing it, Catron acted as the middle-man of his own empire, directing
hundreds of thousands of dollars of net income from royalty contracts to regional banks
and trust companies while millions of board feet of lumber and ties left his lands to
service the growing railroad, mining, and construction industries.
The rise of the timber industry in the Southwest is another example of the
significant transformation brought about by the entrance of railroads. Other than some
seasonal flows, few rivers along the New Mexico-Colorado borderland provided the
means to channel logging enterprise towards downstream mills. Expanding railways
opened up the development of forest lands on two fronts: they created local markets for
logging and milling (based in no small part on the production of railroad ties and
telegraph poles), and they supplied the necessary function of transportation to and from
the mills. To no surprise, the companies that contracted with Catron on the TA grant
located their operations with regard to the route of the Denver & Rio Grande railroad
while the railroad company purposefully selected a path that situated their line in
proximity to heavily wooded areas.63 The result was a symbiotic relationship that
generated substantial profits for Thomas Catron, even if they rarely lingered in his hands
for long. For instance, during the well documented period of 1886-1889, Wilmot Broad
reported that Catron earned $153,637.73 from stumpage fees from three companies
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logging on the TA grant. He remitted $147,458.83 of the same, mostly to pay notes held
by the First and Second National Banks of Santa Fe, leaving $6,178.90 to pay grant
expenses, taxes, and Broad’s salary as agent over this four-year period.64 So often for
Catron, these capital gains were akin to blood transfusions, and as such, they kept his
empire alive.
When Catron’s stumpage royalties held strong, his system of collateralizing them
against debts worked to his advantage. But timber stands played out and competition
brought down prices. Contracting companies went through periods of renegotiation that
lessened Catron’s cut and relocation that stopped-up royalties entirely for months at a
time. In general, the clear-cutting of large southwestern timber stands did not present a
concern, except when it came to marketing grant lands. Then, Catron happily directed
buyers’ attention towards the current mills, while instructing his agents to avoid showing
areas that underwent extensive logging. With a potential sale of the TA grant on the line
during the spring of 1901, Catron grew anxious due to the stoppage of work of the BurnsBiggs Lumber Company. The collaborative venture of T.D. Burns (local merchant and
ex-agent for Catron) and J.D. Biggs (the most prominent timber-man on the TA grant)
had used up its current base of operation and so entered negotiations to move elsewhere.
Catron, alarmed at the possibility of losing this revenue source and its associated value
for the property, enticed the Burns-Biggs Co. with a 25-30% discount.65 Though
successfully convinced to remain on the grant, the company explained that it would take
time to construct the new mill and connect it to the nearest rail junction. Similarly, in
“Statement of Remittances made on Royalties earned on lumber sawed at Biggs Bros. and Co. and E.M.
Biggs Mills from Aug. 1886 to January 1st 1890,” and “Statement of Remittances made on Royalties earned
on lumber sawed at A.J. Sullenberger’s Mills from June 1886 to January 1 st 1890,” CP, Series 305, Box 6,
Folder 4.
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1903, Catron lost out on almost a full year of returns when the Burns-Biggs Co. once
again relocated, this time to El Vado where Catron leased them land that had previously
belonged to Refugio Martinez.66 The resumption of ample royalties during the summer of
1904 came none-to-soon for the spiraling Catron, as they meaningfully chipped away at
the $250,000 mortgage held by the Continental Trust Co. of Denver secured by 520,000
acres of the TA grant. Fortunately for Catron, the new mill at El Vado operated by BurnsBiggs worked at a competitive pace. Stumpage fees for 1904, 1905, and 1906 collectively
paid $77,856.09 on his debts and expenses.67 By the first decade of the twentieth century,
Catron had started to look beyond large contracting companies to furnish royalty revenue,
and initiated the collection of timber fees on grants such as the Mora, Bosque del Apache,
and Anton Chico.
The transition from a focus on a few, high-paying contracts, to widespread
commodification of timber resources, marks a larger shift in the attitudes of Catron and
his peers towards land value and land management in New Mexico and the Southwest.68
The exogenous shock of the Panic of 1893 and the protracted nature of the cash-starved
economy led capitalists to seek out new means to exact revenue from their properties. For
Catron, repaying his myriad debts and keeping up with county taxes was enough of an
impetus to capitalize on the traditional economies of his grants. Whereas the schemers of
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the territory managed to dodge or decrease taxes for much of the late-nineteenth century
due to the continued reality of clouded titles, unpatented grants, overlapping interests,
and insider manipulation of the Territorial Board of Equalization, the regime change
brought about by Governor Miguel A. Otero and the rulings of the Court of Private Land
Claims eliminated many loopholes and tax shelters.69 Speculators with large holdings,
like Catron, could no longer sit on their titles indefinitely, defer payments, and hope for a
windfall. The trick here was to transform grant lands, “unproductive” by conservative
capitalists’ standards, into gainful (or at least net-zero) operations. No magic was actually
required. Instead, effecting “productivity” seems to have meant little more than charging
residents for the labor they already performed.
Packaged as modern land control and resource management, Catron and friends
took to the collection of rents, cutting fees, range fees, and lambing fees with a new
vigor. Suddenly, the alienation of the commons perpetrated by the lawyer-speculators of
the 1870s reared its ugly head. Nuevomexicanos that held no title to their land confronted
stark options regarding residency and use-rights: pay or go. In practice, other options
existed for these men, women, and communities.70 One involved the continued patterns
of land allocation and usufruct rights to the commons in disregard (covert and blatant) of
formal postings, cease and desist notices, and ejectment suits. Another comprised the
networks of seasonal migration and wage labor that increased in scope in the early
twentieth century and connected the communities of northern New Mexico to urban and
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hinterland economies of Denver and El Paso.71 These strategies included their own
inherent risks, however, as Euro-American population growth and new enterprise shifted
power further outside of their control. Landowners worked in concert with respected
local leaders and mercantiles to draw dissidents – by carrot or by stick – into their
economic orbit. Catron’s collection of timber royalties and pasture leases on the Mora
Grant illustrates the complexities of this process and the overlapping modes of capitalism
that maintained saliency in the Hispano borderlands of the twentieth century.
Unlike other grants subject to consolidation and incorporation after the Civil War,
the 827,000-acre Mora Grant followed a somewhat unique trajectory because no
individual owner or company gained full title and early efforts at partition languished.72
To the contrary, by the twentieth century distribution of the grant was murkier than ever,
especially with regard to competing, overlapping grant claims and occupancy rights that
badgered the adjudication process.73 Nuevomexicano grant heirs jockeyed for recognition
of their individual or partial interests while the old-time speculators and their estates
communicated through legal counsel to determine how to move forward. The answer for
all in the mid-1890s was to consolidate interests so that the otherwise antagonistic parties
71
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together represented 57/76ths of the Mora Grant (exactly 75% or 620,250 acres), which
they sought to market at a wholesale price.74 But from 1896 to 1899 the Catron-ElkinsButler-Ames party failed to accomplish a sale. They worked primarily through agents in
in Chicago, Milwaukee, and London, including an abortive deal with Mr. Pabst of the
Pabst Brewing Company (back when their “blue ribbon” actually meant something).75
The years after witnessed the entanglement of Catron’s Mora lands in the estate debacle
following the death of Wilson Waddingham as well as the division of the grant along the
36th parallel between Catron and the Butler-Ames interests.76 The potential for a sale
grew less likely as these complications piled up and while land agents continued to try to
sell the grant back east, locally attention shifted to the production of short-term profits,
though this too was fraught with difficulties.77
Of all his properties, Mora most consistently presented challenges to Catron, due
mostly to the adverse actions of the grant’s residents. Situated adjacent to San Miguel
County, the hotbed of Las Gorras Blancas, the Mora Grant witnessed acts of violence and
property destruction in the 1880s and early 1890s, especially against fences and
properties owned by or affiliated with the ringmen of Santa Fe.78 To lessen the hostility,
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Catron attempted to adjudicate land matters outside the court in 1894 by brokering deals
with several local agents on the Grant. To Severiano Trujillo, for instance, appointed by
the people of Mora to meet with the land baron, Catron expressed that he wanted to deal
“fairly and equitably” with the people. He did not want to evict them from their lands, he
urged, but would rather agree to give titles to those that could prove that they had
continuously lived on their land for ten years. If not, fair rents and use fees would allow
all who wanted, to be able to stay.79 With this shrewd, paternalistic move, Catron sought
to clarify ownership by placing specific titles or rental agreements in the hands of Mora’s
residents, to create new profits for himself in the process, and to diminish regional enmity
or even gain new friends. It is not likely that this strategy was very effective at the time.
Instead, Nuevomexicanos from families or communities that supported the White Caps a
decade before did not look well upon Catron’s demands for rents and use-fees after the
turn of the century and so many residents simply refused to pay. On the grant, every step
taken towards asserting his control opened new avenues of resistance that challenged not
only Catron, but also the modern legal and economic rationality he sought to imprint on
Mora’s residents and resources.
As a tactic to avoid implicating his lands in the fierce cycle of estate and debt
issues that plagued him throughout his later life, Thomas Catron transferred ownership of
as I was threatened with violence, paying out a great deal of money to get copies of the records, secure the
attendance of witnesses at Santa Fe, the witnesses being all intimidated, and taking various and sundry
other great risks”
On Las Gorras Blancas see: David Correia, “’Retribution Will be Their Reward,’ New Mexico’s
Las Gorras Blancas and the Fight for the Las Vegas Land Grant Commons,” Radical History Review 108
(2010): 49-72.
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the grant to his twenty-three-year-old son Charles in 1902, charging the young man with
more efficiently directing its affairs, while micromanaging him all the while. The fatherson team made some headway towards the collection of royalties on Mora’s timber by
tapping into the localized markets that circulated through a few powerful mercantile
companies.80 By the twentieth century, these multi-branch mercantiles, such as the
Charles Ilfeld Co., Gross, Kelly Co., and Browne & Manzanares Co., combined the
economic activity of a general store, a commercial bank, and a centralized buyer of wool,
wood, grain, and livestock.81 As territorial population grew, transportation networks
expanded, and competition increased, these enterprises that relied on retail trade and
personal relationships to cement their vital position in the economies of pastoral northern
New Mexico had to shift their focus to embrace a wholesale marketplace. Branch stores
allowed mercantile companies to harness the resources of distant hinterlands, funneling
the resources and raw goods of rural communities into larger and more cost-efficient
commodity flows.82 As part of this larger process, both the Charles Ilfeld Co. and Gross,
Kelly Co. sought to incorporate trees from the Mora Grant into their accounts. The
mercantiles contracted to act as middle-men between land owners like Catron and loggers
such as Ira Hazzard and Richard Dunn, who then benefitted from the close, steady
market, and the credit allowed them and their laborers at the local store.83 It also
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heightened the need for clearer business conditions on the grant, as the companies paying
royalties grew discouraged from accurate reporting due to the presence of many settlers
and squatters who refused to pay. So in the fall of 1902, Catron and Butler made an
agreement with Richard Dunn and the Mora Timber Co. to consolidate the leases of
Chas. Ilfeld, H.G. Coors, The Moore Lumber Co., H.D. Reinken, and the Vorenberg
Mercantile Co. to work towards parity of pricing and better accountability of the cutting
and movement of timber and ties from the Mora Grant.84 Acting upon this new
arrangement, Dunn wrote to Catron in December asking his assistance in bringing suit
against eight parties, Tito Melendez, R.W. Sammon, Louis La Rue, L. Chene, Joseph
Chene, Anto. Ma. Rivera, and Sipio Carrillo. Dunn explained that these groups needed to
cease cutting or apply for a lease by the first of January or he would proceed with the
charges.85 In many ways, the bottom lines brought into the equation by professional
loggers and mercantile institutions forced Catron to belatedly strive toward order and
productivity on the Mora Grant.
A simple account statement from Gross, Kelly & Co. made out to Hon. T.B.
Catron on the fourteenth of July, 1904, tells us a great deal about how development came
to many sections of New Mexico and who benefitted the most. The “Royalty report for
Quarter ending June 30th – 1904, on timber cut from Mora Grant” included two sections,
one for lumber and the next for ties, cut during the months of April, May, and June. In
these three months, the surnames of Chene, Carrillo, Abeyta, and Romero paid Catron
2.25 cents per 100 foot of lumber cut. This amounted to $335.39 in total payment. During
the same time, Abeyta, Cassias, St. Vrain, Coors, Gandert, Lange & Lipton, and Weil &
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G. cut railroad ties at two to four cents in royalty, with a total balance of $999.26 to the
landholder. The combined account of $1334.65 did not then go to Catron, however, as his
debts to the Bank of Commerce of Albuquerque were secured in part by an agreement to
turn over all proceeds of timber and ties from the Mora Grant. In this way, the act of
harvesting small amounts of wood for household use was rationalized into the same
double-column accounting as the cutting of ties to sell in wholesale fashion to railroad
companies. And yet, whether Nuevomexicano or Euro-American, the circulation of
money that began with timber removal from the Mora Grant ended in the ledgers of a
bank in Albuquerque and the Gross, Kelly Co., whose branches in Las Vegas,
Albuquerque, and Tucumcari continued to practice forms of petty capitalism, such as the
supply of credit to locals in exchange for raw materials and tradable commodities.86
These relationships highlight the variable modes of capitalism that existed in New
Mexico well into the twentieth century. They provide evidence in favor of the endurance,
and even escalation, of the region as an economic borderland.

Rationalizing Grant Lands
Collecting royalties on minerals blasted from the earth or cut and milled timber
presented Catron the rentier with clear opportunities to benefit from the growth of
extractive industry on his grant lands. For the most part Euro-American operators entered
these contractual lease or royalty agreements with Catron, and both parties sought to gain
as participants in the capitalist transformation of southwestern landscapes. Their success
or failure depended upon a range of human and natural contingencies, but it is at least fair
to say that Catron and his contractors were willing participants and as such, accepted
86
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certain degrees of risk to carry out their plans and in so doing, embossed the economic
and social structures of American capitalism across New Mexico’s high-desert terrain.
This represents a model of economic synergy that unfolded across the West; the players
agreed not only on the explicit terms of contract, but implicitly on the social order that
upheld those contracts as expressions of the legal, economic, and cultural world
dominated by Euro-American men and an ideology that fused national advancement with
market expansion.87 But alternative systems also emerged, such as the collection of rents
and pasture fees from Nuevomexicano land grant residents and heirs who did not likely
share, or fully partake in, this ideological underpinning. For many of these people and
their communities, capital and national advance could (and often did) take more
pernicious forms and so they responded in innumerable ways that challenged Catron’s
managerial designs toward order and income in New Mexico.
Little record exists (at least within Catron’s papers) to indicate the extent by
which Catron charged formal rents or pasture fees to Nuevomexicano residents of grant
lands prior to the turn-of-the-century. His role as territorial politician and impromptu
patrón required a subtler, more personal approach, which involved an assortment of oral
agreements and partido contracts between Catron, his agents, and Hispano heads of
household.88 During the period of consolidation and early endeavors to flip grant lands,
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During the Gilded Age this fusion of national/capitalist progress took a decidedly inward perspective for
the United States, focusing attention both East and West, but within the boundaries of the nation. The late
nineteenth century marks a shift here as Americans more forcefully shifted attention outwards and
projected visions of American Empire in Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Rim.
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Whereas literature, such as that on Las Gorras Blancas, points to the transition to a cash and wage-labor
based economy in San Miguel County and especially on the Las Vegas Land Grant since the 1880s, there is
little in Catron’s papers or elsewhere to indicate that Thomas Catron pressed Nuevomexicano grant heirs to
pay on a cash basis prior to the economic troubles that unfolded during the 1890s. While there was at least
one formal assassination attempt on Catron’s life in February 1891, there does not seem to be a
groundswell of antagonism towards him by land grant heirs, excepting that found on grants such as Mora
and Anton Chico where support for Las Gorras Blancas was more palpable. Although Catron presented a
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attempts to evict residents turned “squatters” proved untenable and largely impolitic,
especially for the Republican ringmen who substantially benefitted from their
monopolization of the Mexican vote. Even if landlords attempted to assert their
ownership, rural New Mexico remained cash-starved, and so payments in currency could
not be reasonably expected. Catron’s finances themselves tell a story of money moving
from his accounts to the hands of Nuevomexicano/as, and far fewer examples of being
repaid in cash. Instead, symbolic payments and partido contracts more commonly defined
Catron’s bond with his informal tenants. Heads of household sometimes signed notices
agreeing to remit as little as ten cents per year to Catron, an arrangement whereby their
fee secured continued residence and use-rights for them and their family, while the owner
gained tangible documentation outlining the hierarchal relationship and proper line of
title. The partido system presented another means by which Catron, through a local agent,
established his authority and incentivized productive land use without cutting against the
social fabric or power structures of Nuevomexicano families and communities. These
relationships, reminiscent of those linking peon and patrón, built on personal ties,
hierarchies of social class and respect, and a territorial political economy oriented
towards the goals and interests of the Santa Fe clique.
But the tactics of the Santa Fe Ring no longer held the same sway as New Mexico
entered the twentieth century.89 The old ringleader could no longer assert his will by
pulling a few strings or maintaining Nuevomexicano voting patterns in his favor. The

constant target for anti-monopoly, anti-ring, anti-carpetbagger, and anti-Republican presses, in English and
Spanish, there is little evidence of directed resistance against him across many of his northern New Mexico
land grants, which leads to the supposition that he understood and acted within a political economy
mutually defined by himself, his cohort, and Nuevomexicano community leaders.
89
This is not to say that the Santa Fe Ring did not evolve to meet the changing face of territorial New
Mexico or that the turn-of-the-century marked a changing of the guard, but rather, the traditional modes of
control sustained by the ring could no longer operate with impunity.
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territory’s population had grown substantially with much of the new population centered
in regions’ outside of the ring’s control. One of the clearest signs of the waning power of
the Santa Fe crowd was the schism that divided New Mexico’s Republican Party under
the Governorship of Miguel Antonio Otero.90 When Otero gained the appointment of
governor under President McKinley, he and Catron were not initially squared off as
enemies. If anything, Catron supported the newly selected Otero as a proper choice
because of his Mexican background and connection to powerful Nuevomexicano
families.91 But, as Otero distanced himself from Catron and friends, instead of replacing
the system of nepotism and spoils at the center of territorial politics, the parties merely
formed competing factions that often worked to undercut each other.92 One result was a
significant erosion of the political economy that beforehand softened Catron’s, and
capitalism’s, edge toward land grant communities.93
For one thing, time had passed and new generation came of age in a territory very
different from the one Catron moved to after the Civil War. Oral contracts made with
elderly Nuevomexicanos would not pass down to their sons and grandsons, and as lands
passed in-and-out of Catron’s hands, these agreements grew difficult to enforce and
uphold. Another issue was that as Catron’s debt cycles continued, his debtors sharpened
90
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their teeth and the potential for default, foreclosure, or tax sale loomed over robber baron
and his grant lands. In response, Catron sought to make each individual grant or tract
more self-reliant. Rents, pasturage fees, stumpage fees, or royalties became more
common, even on lands that had stood in abeyance for years, as he tried to account for
rising taxes and the ever accumulating bills and interest rates that he so gamely juggled.
A result was that by 1905, Thomas Catron collected fees on a cash basis from
Hispano men and women living on his land grant properties throughout the territory.
Specific agreements, leases, or lists of renters exist in Catron’s land grant papers for the
Tierra Amarilla, Mora, Anton Chico, Antonio Ortiz, Baca Float No. 1, Beck, Piedra
Lumbre, La Majada (Bajada), and Agua Negra grants.94 The change in attitude
represented by increased attention to formal rents can be traced to the litany of setbacks
that influenced Catron’s relationship with his large land holdings and in turn, influenced
the relationship between countless New Mexicans, their land, and their labor. When
statehood never materialized, for instance, neither did the rise in land values Catron so
obviously gambled upon. His inability to sell his large land grants, especially the
numerous misfires of the TA grant sale, meant that taxes piled up and the window for a
windfall shut tight. His inability to steer the Court of Private Land Claims in a direction
favorable to heir and lawyer alike led to a staggering decrease in grant lands and a flurry
of new activity on the federal public domain.95 And finally, Catron’s fall from grace
within territorial Republican circles altered the equation of his political connection to
94
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Nuevomexicano communities. In this light, Catron’s attempt to assert control of his lands
and put his finances in order derived from his explicit inability to do so—made that much
worse by the grinding years of economic depression that characterized most of the 1890s
for New Mexico. Then, just when the territory turned the corner towards growth at the
end of that decade, the estate debacle of Wilson Waddingham prevented Catron, his
properties, and his accounts from climbing up out of the mire. To the contrary, in the
aftermath of Waddy-gate, Catron held more debt and more land than in any other period
of his life. He could no longer afford – literally – to keep up the informal arrangements of
the past decades, and so more and more, sought to rationalize the productive capacity of
his lands within the mode of managerial capitalism that emerged from the corporate
branch of Progressivism.96

“Notice” of ownership of Eaton Grant by C.H. Gildersleeve, T.B. Catron, and N.B.
Laughlin, c.1903. Printed on canvas for posting on grant. Thomas B. Catron Papers,
Series 306, Box 2, Folder 2, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries,
University of New Mexico.

To facilitate this process, Catron continued to rely on local agents to set terms,
enforce boundaries, and gather rents. Some land grant communities elected commissions
96
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to organize seasonal schedules for pasture and forest land, to ensure fair standards of use
and payment, and that doubled as protective associations to prevent non-residents from
encroaching on their range. One result of the reliance upon agents was that the process of
bringing order unfolded differently across Catron’s regionally diverse grants and that
Nuevomexicanos found space to firmly asserted their rights and their interests involving
the nature of lease agreements and rate negotiations. For instance, Francisco C. Chaves of
Abiquiu contracted with Catron to
represent, take, hold and possess all of said interests, rights, titles and estate and land and the
whole of said grant of land [Piedra Lumbre, Rio Arriba County], and as such agent for me…to
cultivate, pasture, rent and use the same and make and make such use thereof in our name, place
and stead as may suited to or fitted to the nature, resources and character thereof, and ever part
thereof.97

Chaves made this deal in the 1890s after Catron and George Hill Howard manipulated a
successful partition and re-consolidation of the grant, whereby the court awarded the
Catron parties about two-thirds of the 49,000 acre property.98
Chaves took his role as agent quite seriously as he worked to preserve the
interests of the communities of Abiquiu, Cañones, and Coyote over those of outside
parties. The most usual point of conflict revolved around issues of land use and access.
Chaves formed the first line of authority regarding land allocation and usufruct rights to
the pastures and woodlands of Piedra Lumbre and the first line of defense against
97
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Decree for Partition in the case of Candalario Martinez et al. v. Jose Maria Chavez et al., 2 June 1894,
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encroachment. As the mouthpiece for “la gente,” Chaves informed Señor Catron about
the “bastantes molestias” (great annoyance) placed upon his communities by outsiders,
especially those from the Rio Puerco, who grazed livestock and cut firewood on the
grant. At one point in March 1903, Chaves included a list with the names of thirteen
trespassers, all of Hispano surname. He requested that Catron take action through the
justice of the peace to file injunction against these individuals to prevent them from
accessing the grant.99 The defensive posture of Chaves and the communities he
represented is unsurprising given the turbulence caused by the rounds of speculation and
court decree that shifted ownership of Piedra Lumbre away from its communal origins
and placed it, by the 1900s, alongside the fee simple properties that could so easily be
bought, sold, and traded with little-to-no regard for the local residents.
The agent and the owner did not always agree on the best course of action. In
response to the continued trouble raised by the presence of Luciano Salazar on the grant,
the difference of perspectives becomes tangible. Chaves felt that Salazar should vacate
the land. Catron preferred an alternative that allowed Salazar and his family to stay, but
under the caveat that they “could not recognize him as being entitled to anything there;
that he must recognize our title and he must take a lease from us for a nominal sum, say
10 cents per annum.” The plan, framed as a testament to Catron’s good will, showed its
true intent when it was explained that Salazar would have no rights and agree to fully
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concede to the rights of the owners.100 Once again, the purpose here stemmed from
greater attention to defining the new legal limits of title and use-rights, implicitly
organized to bolster Catron’s position in the case of a potential real estate sale.
Another model unfolded on La Majada Land Grant of Sandoval County where the
“Comision de la Merced de la Bajada” organized as early as 1890 in Pena Blanca. In the
aftermath of receiving Congressional confirmation and an official survey, completed and
filed in 1899, the commissioners sought to formalize their control over the commons.101
They too wished to harden their borders against encroaching parties of Anglo or
Nuevomexicano settlers and to assert their water rights. In August 1905, under leadership
of Marcelino Baca, president, and Jose Ignacio Dimas, secretary, the commission
established a two-tiered system of fees that differentiated between grant heirs and
outsiders, as well as between personal and commercial use. They posted notice of these
new “impuestos por pasteos” and legitimized their right to do so by retaining the law firm
of Catron & Gortner to defend their ownership rights.102 Catron cared to do so because he
held one-fifth of the “unoccupied and uncultivated lands” of La Majada, or so he argued
in the district court of Sandoval County.103 This case, and the unity of interest organized
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by the grant commission, presents a fairly successful attempt at adapting the shifting legal
and economic landscape to work in their favor.
Nuevomexicano lessees proved just as able to maintain mutually beneficial
business relationships with Catron as their Euro-American peers. Renters like Ramon C.
Montoya actively negotiated for lease terms that worked towards his own best interest
while paying deference to the wishes of the proprietors. Montoya, a dealer in sheep,
cattle, horses, and goats from San Antonio, New Mexico, initiated a deal with Catron in
December 1897, proposing to lease the Bosque del Apache Grant in Socorro County for
four years at $300 per annum. With confidence, Montoya explained that he wanted sole
privilege of the grant to graze livestock, that he wanted a long-term lease so as to best
manage his herds, and that in the case of a sale he agreed to vacate the land to the new
owners. To sweeten the deal, he even offered to dispose of old wood found on the Bosque
del Apache by selling it to mills in San Marcial or Socorro at an agent’s commission of
twenty-five percent.104 Though the wood business turned out little more than an
annoyance for Montoya, citing exorbitant freight rates and theft as major obstacles to a
profitable trade, he continued his work as an agent on the grant and renewed the lease
(that Catron originally made for two years) in January 1900 under the same terms. 105
Montoya remained in charge there until the April 1901 transfer of the Bosque del Apache
from its actual ownership by Stephen Elkins and John Collinson to the American Valley
Company.106 Like many of the land grants Catron grew involved in, its title moved
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several times over the next twenty years, first to the Socorro Company and later to the
Sandoval Grant Company. In the end, Montoya’s prediction as to the timing of a sale
proved correct, but nevertheless, the corporate ownership and its designs to market first
mortgage bonds required the lessee to vacate the Bosque del Apache for good.
Catron’s most successful lease operation unfolded, unsurprisingly, on the Tierra
Amarilla grant where ownership and authority most clearly upheld his position as rentier.
There, the business association between Catron and his agent Wilmot E. Broad of Chama
produced a detailed record of the collection of pasturage dues.107 Starting in 1901, Broad
effectively set and gathered grazing and lambing fees on number of Euro-Americans and
Nuevomexicanos alike. The resultant rental statements help to characterize land use on
the TA grant during the first decade of the twentieth century. For instance, from 1901 to
1907, approximately three-quarters of the tenants had Hispano surnames, and of that
sample, a majority paid fifty dollars or less on an annual basis. For the Euro-Americans
on the lists, only twenty percent paid under one-hundred dollars per year, suggesting
either lessened prices for Hispanos or larger acreage utilized by Anglos.108 More
importantly, the rental statements provide evidence to indicate Catron’s hardening stance
towards managed grant development.
To match rising costs, Catron more than doubled the rent in 1905, privileging
those outfits with greater scale of efficiency. The average amount collected that year was
Memorandum attached to letter: S.B. Elkins to Thomas B. Catron, 15 May 1899, CP, Series 103, Box 7,
Folder 1.
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$237 for Hispanos (whose averages had never even topped $100) and $425 for EuroAmericans. No longer would small-holders represent a majority of his lessees and in
general, the percentage of Hispanos paying grazing fees lessened. By 1907 one-third of
the renters were Anglo and paid a greater total amount to Catron, marking a shift in the
formal use of range lands on the TA grant.109 The allocation of this income went to
paying tax bills, land agents, and Catron’s various debts, so that the funds rarely reached
his pockets and often could not even fulfill the primary goal of self-sustainability. Even
after bumping the price of land in 1905, his end of year statements placed the TA grant
and Catron in the red.110 Still, the money was not insubstantial, nor was the meaning
attached to it. Compared to the late-nineteenth century, potential buyers of the TA grant
requested much clearer operational abstracts of the property, its yearly expenses, and
potential income. These revised requirements of sale pressed Catron to more clearly
articulate the situation on the grant and its remunerative possibilities. So, the land baron
kept grasping at the order and profit that would help to achieve Tierra Amarilla’s
financial stability, while his aggressive use-policy inscribed an unsustainable pattern of
grazing and activity.
In the midst of Catron’s struggle to mend his debt-addled empire,
Nuevomexicanos more decidedly pressed for their own interests on the land grants of
northern New Mexico. They too desired a reorientation of land-use, but one in which
grant residents and their communities asserted first priority. In doing so, they sought to
resist the legal and market forces at the heart of the land baron’s equation of value and
productivity. The most obvious form resistance took involved little more than a
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continuation of residence and resource allocation. Others more forcefully presented their
rights through aggressive land monitoring and through the New Mexico courts.111 Like
the vecinos of the Piedra Lumbre and La Majada grants, Nuevomexicanos on many of
Catron’s grants hardened community barriers and more forcefully guarded grant
boundaries, pasture lands, and timber stands from outside encroachment.
Several conditions added to the defensive posturing of Nuevomexicano
communties. At the top of the list was the recent work of the Court of Private Land
Claims, through which the Supreme Court substantially decreased grant acreage and
transferred millions of acres of ejidos (commons) to the public domain or to federal
agencies.112 The loss of lands was compounded by the dispossession that occurred during
the speculative bubble of the Gilded Age, which had remained dormant until the burst of
activity of the strong economy after the Spanish American War. Finally, a steep rise in
population, including natural growth and Anglo-American immigration, created new
pressures on the land and its utility. The emergent generation of Nuevomexicanos
recognized their precarious situation and so, emboldened and embittered by the already
clear history of double-dealing and manipulation, fought back against any further
alienation of their lands and their social power.113
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In heavily contested regions, such as those surrounding Las Vegas, NM, a
longtime hotbed of land grant activism, residents of the Mora, Anton Chico, Preston
Beck, and Antonio Ortiz grants not only made positive claims to their continued
ownership, but blatantly disregarded Catron’s agents and the notices they posted to set
lease and royalty fees. On these grants, in particular, Nuevomexicanos challenged Catron
and his ability to define ownership and use of his lands.114 Rather than evidence of a
stride towards ordered land development and resource allocation, these places witnessed
a continued social, cultural, and economic clash that surfaced in the towns, the courts,
and on the range. Here, recalcitrance to Catron’s authority over grass and timber doubled
as defiance towards the increasingly formal land system and its ideological underpinning
in American understandings of property ownership and corporate personhood.115
On the 380,000 acre Anton Chico Grant, heirs categorically refused to recognize
the title held by the New Mexico Land & Livestock Co. from 1883 to 1901 and by
Thomas Catron thereafter.116 Residents of the small town of Anton Chico petitioned since
the 1880s for proper delivery of patent to the town itself, but a wholly manipulated quiet
title ruling from 1884 in favor of the livestock company provided firm ground to defend

extrapolate the ways in which Thomas Catron’s interaction with New Mexico lands emphasized a liberal
capitalist model that Nuevomexicano communities dealt with through a range of resistance, response, and
adaptation.
114
Attitudes of land grant heirs in the Las Vegas vicinity influenced Nuevomexicanos on other grants as
well, such as brought to light by Andrieus A. Jones when he wrote to Thomas Catron that residents of the
Perea Grant refused to testify as witnesses without subpoena because of criticism and fear of backlash by
the residents of Anton Chico. See A.A. Jones to T.B. Catron, 11 November 1905, CP, Series 103, Box 24,
Folder 1.
115
Many of the Nuevomexicano ranchers who challenged Catron did not so clearly challenge a capitalist
system or a cash economy in its own right. They participated in the rounds of stocking and overstocking the
range lands, spurred on by a capitalist engine of international perimeters through which many
Nuevomexicanos toiled in vain as the products of their labor lessened in value, leading many to seek wage
labor (often seasonal) outside their home communities.
116
Michael J. Rock, “Anton Chico and Its Patent,” in John R. and Christine M. Van Ness, eds. Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants in New Mexico and Colorado (Boulder: Center for Land Grant Studies and the
Colorado Humanities Program, 1980), 86-91.
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fee simple ownership. Catron looked to do just that after acquiring the grant from the
estate of Wilson Waddingham, relying upon his full title to secure a mortgage with the
Continental Trust Company of Denver for $75,000 on June 1, 1904.117 As usual this
move, which was designed to alleviate Catron’s monetary woes, really added a large
principal to his debt as well as the ten percent interest that required payments of $3750
twice a year. To try to meet this new expense, Catron employed a familiar strategy by
arranging leases for grazing rights on the Anton Chico. Residents of the grant disputed
the owner’s right to make these contracts and thereby, his right to title. In February 1906,
a committee led by Florencio García, Jesús María Rivera, David Marquez, Fernando
Baca, Liberato Aragon, Santiago Parras, and Fidel Gallegos obtained the service of
attorneys Charles Spiess and Stephen B. Davis. Jr. of Las Vegas to bring suit against
Catron and the NMLLSC.118 The prolonged litigation that followed tested the 1884 quiet
title ruling to the limit, as grant heirs pressed their cause and illuminated the manipulation
that resulted in their dispossession in the first place. The Town of Anton Chico Grant
Committee continued to seek legal redress through the 1910s and worked through several
appeals, forcing Catron to return to the courtroom over and over to defend his position.119
More debilitating, the constant legal maneuvering by the Town of Anton Chico and their
outright refusal to pay or honor leases made it that much more difficult to sell the land,
117

Directors Meeting, 8 February 1904, Minute Book, New Mexico Land & Live Stock Co., 1883-1904,
CP, Series 606; W.T. Ravenscroft to Thomas B. Catron, 6 December, 1905, CP 103, B24, F2, CSWR, UL,
UNM. The directors of the New Mexico Land & Live Stock Company in 1904 included Thomas B. Catron,
Charles C. Catron, his son, Willard A. Barney, his nephew, Robert C. Gortner, his law partner, and William
E. Gortner, Robert’s brother and a trusted associate living in East Las Vegas. Their formal meetings took
place in Las Vegas, likely at William Gortner’s law office.
118
Rock, “Anton Chico and Its Patent,” 91; “Abstract of Record,” CP, Series 306, Box 1.
119
CP, Series 306, Boxes 1 and 2; The same group of Nuevomexicano committee members appeared in the
appeal cases that moved from the District Court of Guadalupe County to the Supreme Court of the
Territory of New Mexico. T.B. Catron represented the appelants in these cases that continued from 19061918, acting as counsel for himself, the New Mexico Land and Live Stock Company, the Continental Trust
Company, and all Unknown Claimants against the Town of Anton Chico. See Abstract of Record In the
Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico, January Term, 1917, CP, Series 306, Box 1, Folder 1.
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while court fees, mortgage payments, and tax bills piled up. Like so many of Catron’s
grants, ownership of the Anton Chico came with the dubious reward of extra debt and
remained unprofitable and largely unmanageable through his lifetime.
Hispano ranchers on the Mora and Antonio Ortiz grants lacked the unity of
purpose and collective authority held by the committee members representing the Town
of Anton Chico, but their attitudes overlapped in meaningful ways with their neighbors in
Guadalupe County. They too refused to concede ownership to Catron or other corporate
interests, or at the very least challenged title holders to enforce property rights. Supported
by local and ethnic communities, few, if any, Nuevomexicanos paid usual royalties on the
Mora or Ortiz grants, though they continued to run cumulatively enormous flocks on
these lands.120 Catron’s agents pled with him to remove these “squatters,” citing their
presence as damaging to the land, its potential output, and its sales appeal. Alongside
these requests came those of white entrepreneurs and cattle men who coveted the lands
that “sheep men” – read Mexican – so improperly used. For them, the economic (and
cultural) capital of cattle stood far above that of sheep, and so peaked Catron’s attention
by offering to sign steady grazing leases if the owner could vacate the sheep ranchers.121
But the Nuevomexicano ranchers proved difficult to track down, obscured their activities,
movements, and livestock ownership, and when cornered, often explained (or bluffed)
120

Frank Clark to T.B. Catron, 15 March 1907, CP, Series 103, Box 28, Folder 2. Land agent Frank Clark
corresponded with T.B. Catron regarding the Antonio Ortiz Grant. In March, 1907, Clark explained that
“The resident sheep owners of the Ortiz grant still refuse to pay any rent for pasturage and are holding
meetings all the time for the purpose of deciding on plans and engaging a lawyer to contest your right in the
grant.”
William E. Gortner to Robert, 18 August 1902, CP, Series 103, Box 15, Folder 4; William E. Gortner to
T.B. Catron, 13 October 1902, CP, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 1. William Gortner explained in these letters
that between 50-60,000 head of sheep pastured on at least 130,000 acres of the Mora Grant and so
prevented other ranchers from leasing these lands and prevented Thomas Catron to profit from their usage.
121
W.E. Gortner to TBC, 13 October 1902, CP, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 1; A.A. Jones to TBC, 7
February 1903, CP, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 5; A.A. Jones to TBC, 18 March 1903, CP, Series 103, Box
17, Folder 1; William Gortner to Bob Gortner, 15 October 1904, CP, Series 103, Box 21, Folder 3; William
Gortner to TBC, 21 October 1904, CP, Series 103, Box 21, Folder 3.
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that Catron bestowed personal allowances. They utilized mobility, clouded boundaries,
and feigned ignorance to graze their herds, support their villages, and avoid formal leases.
The rural, pastoral landscape of Las Vegas’ hinterlands allowed these ranchers to fly
under the radar as a means of resistance, a practice that Hispanos carried out to a
modicum of success during this period of heightened attention to land management by
capitalists and federal bureaucrats alike.
Evasion and misdirection represented only one side of the equation for Hispano
ranchers, however, who also asserted usage and possession by their continued presence
on and defense of common lands. If the range lands of eastern New Mexico offered the
space to avoid management from Santa Fe, it also attracted cattle men in droves and by
the early twentieth century already showed signs of overgrazing.122 The cultural contest
that resulted fused the issues of ownership and allocation with race and labor. American
cattle ranchers grew increasingly angered by the land use of grant residents while the
heirs grew increasingly aggressive in protecting their range and their interests.
The success of two men, Mr. Montoya and Alberto Valdez, represents just such a
scenario. When the MaCormick Cattle Company of Cimarron leased the northeastern
corner of the Mora Grant from Thomas Catron in January 1905, the ranch likely expected
to utilize some unclaimed winter grazing land for a herd of five hundred cattle overseen
by a Mr. Strahan. But, when Strahan attempted to run the cattle on the designated portion
of the grant, Montoya and Valdez chased away him and his stock. Both Montoya and
Valdez claimed portions of the common land of the Mora Grant for their sheep, and even

Environmental saturation was already evident on much of New Mexico’s pastoral lands by the first
decade of the twentieth century, but the capitalist engine, instead of throttling to prevent great degradation,
required parties to run more livestock to make up for price differentials and international market gluts that
undercut their ability to keep their bottom line in the black.
122
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though they lacked fences, they protected their plots and their right to graze. Montoya,
who ran approximately 7500 head of sheep alongside his brother-in-law, explained to Mr.
Strahan that he had an agreement with Catron that upheld his use of the range and so
ordered Strahan off the premises. Valdez was not so diplomatic. Every time Strahan
crossed onto Valdez’ land, the sheep rancher set his men and dogs upon the intruders.
The MaCormick Cattle Company quickly tired of the conflict, removing Strahan and
their cattle from the Mora Grant as soon as practical.123 In the shift towards managed land
use, profit, and productivity, Catron and countless others found the grant lands of
northern New Mexico to be troublesome indeed. Nuevomexicanos, on the other hand,
adapted to the new age in a number of informal ways as well as found solace in the legal
chaos and rural lifestyle that continued to shield their communities and their grants.124
Much of the inherent trouble with these lands and these places stems from their
maintained presence as an economic borderland, in which subsistence living, mercantile
capitalism, extractive industry, municipal incorporation, and tourism-oriented capitalism
overlapped with increasing regularity. The early progress of the twentieth century,
including the influx of migrants and the strong growth in most business sectors, largely
took place outside of the Nuevomexicano villages and communities of northern New
Mexico. For this reason, rural Nuevomexicanos could continue a mode of subsistence or
pastoral production, and/or seek wage labor in the capitalist economy. Through their
interaction with mercantile houses, such as those owned by Charles Ilfeld or Gross,
Kelly, & co., Nuevomexicanos and their traditional efectos del pais entered the wider
123

W.E. Gortner to Hon. T.B. Catron, 28 January 1905, CP, Series 103, Box 22, Folder 1.
Clark S. Knowlton, “The Mora Land Grant: A New Mexican Tragedy,” in Malcolm Ebright, Ed.,
Spanish and Mexican Land Grants and the Law (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, in
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marketplace, but in a way, without them having to do so explicitly as business was rarely
conducted in cash and personal relations of fealty and patronage remained essential. The
rural mercantiles represented the economy of the Hispano borderlands in this way, with
one foot squarely set in the hinterland trade, and the other just as firmly planted in the
Euro American world of capitalism as organized around railroads, corporations, banks,
and interconnected money markets. Catron too, lived and worked within this economic
borderland, constantly unable, it would appear, to successfully navigate his way among
international capitalists and Nuevomexicano pobladores alike. In keeping with his
middling path, Catron made quite an empire for himself in territorial New Mexico, but he
no doubt found that time after time, his business in the borderlands failed to make sense
to those on the outside. From this point of view, Thomas Catron’s fortune and failure are
actually one and the same.
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Conclusion:
A Crumbling Empire and Catron’s Capitalist Legacy
As I look back over our forty or fifty years of life in New Mexico and at this outcome, I can
certainly see that we have not done for ourselves what we should have done. We should have
centralized our affairs and our ambition more in the line of adding to our finances; because it
seems to be that money talks more than anything else at this age of our lives. But we are
confronted with crippled finances and a hungry croud of new comers who would swim and ride
over God, Devel and everybody else, for the money there is in it.
Melvin Mills to T.B. Catron, September 12, 1911

Another One Bites the Dust
For all of Thomas Catron’s puppetry of the Gilded Age, the twentieth century and
the arrival of statehood was in many ways sobering for the ringleader and for New
Mexico in general. Modernity, and the managerial order it promised to deliver, left a
bifurcated economy throughout the Hispano borderlands. With great fluidity, the region
split between the competing cultures and values of the corporate world, beholden to the
secular bottom lines of distant stock or bondholders, and the rural village, where
tradition, heritage, and meaningful attachment to the land infused a local, communityfocused adaptation to the hard realities of the marketplace. As a land monopolist,
entrepreneur, lawyer, and local politician, Catron occupied and interacted with both of
these realms. He was well connected with national and international networks of finance,
though from his vantage point in Santa Fe, he too often felt the caustic effect of market
forces well outside his purview for control. The bank panics, stock plunges, and political
wrangling from afar sent shockwaves through western economies so that even New
Mexico’s most iconic land-grabbing robber baron found himself fiscally upended and
scrambling to protect his empire. Catron’s holdings linked him to the region’s hinterlands
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as well, including the rural, village-oriented components of development, fraught with the
issues of land contest, resource allocation, and fragile value, all made especially volatile
due to the earlier cycles of aggressive speculation mixed with the environmental
degradation that crescendoed during the first decades of the twentieth century. Like the
Nuevomexicano communities he systematically dispossessed, who witnessed more and
more of their men journey outside the region to find work and wages, Catron found
respite only through the painful process of leaving the land behind, and not always by
happy choice.1
The collapse of Catron’s once mighty land grant empire took place sporadically
across a decade and a half that otherwise witnessed the transition to statehood, high rates
of incoming migration, and growth in most sectors of New Mexico’s economy. The
circumstances surrounding each sale, repossession, or boundary reduction are indicative
of another significant stage in the already unsettling history of New Mexico’s Spanish
and Mexican land grants. Having owned, controlled, or held partial interest in at least
thirty-eight grants during his half-century of activity, aggregating over 2.5 million acres
(as well as fleeting ownership or control over another two million), it is notable that by
the time of his death, Catron held some claim to only eight (though perhaps as many as
eleven) and that these claims represented no more than 350,000 acres in equity, most of
which he already tapped.2

Deutsch, No Separate Refuge, 41. In Deutsch’s analysis, the maintenance of the village community
developed into a system organized by gender roles in which men seasonally left the village to follow wage
labor positions while women fit at the center of family life, and therefore the networks of villages and
communities that provided communal refuge from the onslaught of capitalism and Euro American
development.
2
Westphall found evidence of continued ownership of the Anton Chico, Bosque del Apache, Eaton, Ojo
del Espiritu Santo, Juan de Gabaldon, Mesita de Juana Lopez, and Santa Teresa grants. Westphall, Thomas
Benton Catron, 385. To this I add the Piedra Lumbre Grant, which Thomas Catron, II still held part of until
1929 when he sold it for $49,500 to Manuel R. Salazar of Canones, Rio Arriba County, New Mexico. Sale
1
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So what happened to all of the grants? While complexity underscores many of the
transactions or conveyances that divested Catron of his titles, the most basic explanation
comes back once again to their continued poor performance as investments and
securities. The corporate debt organized on each grant, in combination with legal fees,
developmental expenses, and annual taxes simply overawed his accounts. In the
aftermath of the Panic of 1907, when the money markets tightened, Catron found
obtaining new loans or mortgages almost impossible. He struggled to sell some of his
lands at strong prices, but real estate and investment agents counseled Catron that large
tracts of New Mexico land stood in a sort of limbo as potential buyers conservatively
waited for statehood to see how prices would pan out. Then, after his agent Don A.
MounDay of Topeka, Kansas, was indicted for false advertising and fraudulent use of the
U.S. mail, Catron finally caught glimpse of the writing on the wall and reduced his per
acre rates to levels that would allow him to pay off his debts, but little more.3
For instance, after two decades of working towards the sale of the Tierra Amarilla
grant with costs ranging from $3 to $5 an acre, he finally departed with the property for
$500,000, or just under a dollar per acre. With the money he paid the $400,000 mortgage
held against the grant and used to rest to cover back taxes and his other corporate debts.
An inglorious end for his prized jewel. The new owners, the Arlington Land Company,
represented a syndicate of Minnesota investors.4 Similarly, he helped to convey the Baca
Location No. 1 in 1910 from his Valles Land Co. to the Redondo Development

Agreement, South Two-Thirds of Piedra Lumbre Grant, 26 October 1929, Folder 13, Ojo del Espiritu Santo
Company Records, 1911-1934, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New
Mexico (OdESCo Records).
3
Don A. MounDay to Thomas B. Catron, 14 July 1909, Thomas B. Catron Papers, 1690-1934, Center for
Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico, Series 107, Box 1, Folder 3; and
Fred Robertson, U.S. Attorney, to Thomas B. Catron, 30 August 1913, CP, Series 107, Box 1, Folder 3.
4
Swadesh, Los Prímeros Pobladores, 88.
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Company. In cases such as these, the land grants moved from one corporate owner to the
next. The Nuevomexicano residents never stood a chance.
Another common situation by which Catron lost acreage developed as part and
parcel of the system of jurisprudence he helped to install in New Mexico.5 Legal contests
and partition suits continued to cloud land grant titles well after 1904 when the Court of
Private Land Claims concluded its business. The new iteration of legal land wrangling
picked up steam in the years following statehood, though many of the main attorneys
involved – A.B. Renehan, N.B. Laughlin, A.B. McMillan, A.A. Jones, and C.C. Catron –
represented a generational bridge back to the territorial days. Still, the New Mexico court
no longer acted as Thomas Catron’s partner in crime as it did during the heyday of the
Santa Fe Ring. In one case, concerning the partition of La Majada grant that came before
Judge Merritt Mechem in 1913, the court ruled to throw out an agreement made in 1890
between Catron and Marcelino Baca stipulating that the lawyer should receive one-fifth
of all uninhabited and uncultivated lands in defense of and successful production of the
grant’s title and patent. Whereas Catron claimed twenty percent of La Majada’s
commons, roughly ten-thousand acres, the 1913 ruling left him with a fractional interest
of less than one-percent of the grant, or about 503 acres.6 For all of the actual legal labor
performed by Catron and his office, this outcome revealed an acute loss. The unending
litigation that enveloped the Anton Chico grant proved even more injurious. Attained in
the estate debacle of Waddy-gate, Catron managed the full title to Anton Chico’s 383,856
5

Indeed, through his efforts as an appointed officer of the courts in the 1870s, elected representative of the
legislature from the 1880s to the 1910s, and as a continuous participant in the courts and Bar Association,
Thomas Catron played an influential role in the evolution of legal code and enforcement in New Mexico.
The legal sphere of his life and the direct impact he had on New Mexico jurisprudence through the
application and setting of precedents as well as his collection of the most substantial legal library in the
region requires further analysis and evaluation beyond the scope of any current work featuring Catron or
Territorial New Mexico.
6
“Judgment of Partition.” 6 June 1913, CP, Series 305, Box 4, Folder 2.
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acres as held by the NMLLSC.7 But two lagging and nagging issues pulled the rug out
from under this corporate design. The first involved the sustained efforts by the residents
of the Town of Anton Chico to prove their continued existence on the grant and regain
ownership and access to its commons. Catron defended his company’s title late into the
1910s, but he steadily lost ground until by the end of the decade, his interest evolved into
claiming sole ownership of about 80,000 contested acres that overlapped between Anton
Chico and the Preston Beck grants.8 The AC-PB overlap (totaling approximately 120,000
acres) grew into the next major thorn for the Catrons. The issue was not fully resolved
until 1928 when the owners of the Beck grant, with precedence as the first of the two
grants to gain confirmation by Congress (by less than a year), and therefore de novo
existence prior to Anton Chico, was awarded ownership of the overlap.9 Another one
bites the dust.

7

Directors Meeting, 8 February 1904, New Mexico Land & Live Stock Co., Minute Book, 1883-1904, CP,
Series 606, Vol. 1. In the minute book, the following passage from the Directors’ Meeting, attended by
Thomas Catron, Charles Catron, William Gortner, Robert Gortner, and William Barney, stated: “Whereas,
the NMLLSC is justly indebted to T.B. Catron in the sum of money in excess of Two Hundred Thousand
Dollars, for money paid, laid out and expended by him for the use and benefit of said company in
perfecting the title of said company to its property, and in correcting and remedying irregularities in its
affairs and in relieving it from various entanglements and difficulties into which it had gotten and for his
services in accomplishing said objects, and Whereas, it is necessary to raise funds with which to reimburse
said Catron for his said expenditures and services so rendered.”
8
Michael J. Rock, “Anton Chico and Its Patent,” in John R. and Christine M. Van Ness, eds. Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants in New Mexico and Colorado (Boulder: Center for Land Grant Studies and the
Colorado Humanities Program, 1980): 86-91, 90-91.
9
While few tears should be shed for the loss of the overlap by the Catron family, the situation was in fact
much more complex by the 1920s (as it always seemed to be). After Thomas Catron had effectively lostout in his attempt to maintain ownership of the entirety of the Anton Chico grant, his position (and
afterward that of Charles and Fletcher) was that the overlap should rightfully belong to Anton Chico as the
elder of the two grants. By right of first possession, the Catrons argued, Anton Chico held title to the
overlapping acreage well before the Preston Beck grant came into existence. Instead, as noted in the text,
the court employed the same precedence and logic as used by the schemers of the 1870s and 1880s to say
that confirmation of land grants by the U.S. Congress represented a de novo existence in the life of the
grant, and therefore, under U.S. statute, a grant’s age or continued presence and residence was effectively
erased and begun anew through the U.S. system that replaced its Mexican and Spanish predecessors. Once
again, Nuevomexicanos must have looked on with astonishment as the basic facts of their history entangled
with the American procedures of land law only to emerge with less land, less faith in the fairness of the
system, and the painful lessons (traumas) regarding their standing and that of their history in American
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Perhaps the most painful loss to Catron’s empire came at the hands of the county
assessor and tax collector. Specifically, the public auction and sale of 250,000 acres of
the Mora grant in 1913 marked the end of Thomas Benton’s tenure of interest in the
area.10 In actuality, this finale came after years of tax troubles and several prior public
auctions and last-minute payments or redemptions. Despite the continued income the
Catrons garnered from the grant as rentiers, including timber royalties, land rents, and
grazing leases, the capitalist order imposed on the property never produced sufficient
income to cover the costs of ownership. So instead, Frank Roy of Las Vegas purchased
the land at a bargain that February, and Thomas Catron was unable to raise the funds to
redeem it.11 Catron’s loss of the Mora Land Grant in many ways marks the botched
ending to a deeply unsettling story of capitalism set loose upon the West. From the
numerous failed sales that followed the aggressive speculation of the late nineteenth
century, to the unrelenting legal conflicts over fee simple title, to the unsuccessful
management of the land’s inhabitants and their relationship to its resources in the early
twentieth century, Mora’s story is one of a miscarriage of economic modernity. And in
this unfortunate tale, Thomas Catron, far from the usual depiction as a mastermind of
southwestern scheming, plays the unmitigated fool. That the federal government, through
the U.S. Forest Service gained control over large swaths of the lost land only adds insult
to injury for the Nuevomexicanos who were slowly and steadily dispossessed,
marginalized, and pressed for the payment of royalties and rents.12

society. Severiano R. Sisneros, Jr., “A Brief History of the Anton Chico Land Grant From Its’ Beginning
Until the Present,” submitted to the New Mexico Land Grant Council.
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Thomas B. Catron to Herbert W. Clark, 1 September 1913, CP, Series 305, Box 1, Folder 5.
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T.B. Catron to Mr. Charles A. Spiess, 5 March 1913, CP, Series 305, Box 1, Folder 5.
12
Shadow and Rodríguez-Shadow, “From Repartición to Partition,” 298, argues that prior scholarship,
presenting dislocation and dispossession as a fait accompli, makes the social justice issue look already
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While his empire crumbled, however, the ever-wily Thomas Catron was not yet
done scrapping and scraping. At public auction in February 1911, for instance, he
purchased the entirety of the Caja del Rio Grande grant for fifty dollars.13 Of note, the
49,322 acres of the grant came up for public auction in 1904, 1906, and then again in
Decmeber of 1910, showing that Catron was not the only owner troubled by the
increasing tax assessments on large tracts of land and the heightened bureaucratic
attention towards collecting these revenues. Nevertheless, his astounding bargain came at
the ridiculous price of just over $1 per 1000 acres of land in Santa Fe County! To no
great surprise, the purchase grew hotly contested, especially as the local bankers and
attorneys put-out by the transaction struck back. They claimed that Catron worked in
underhanded methods to purchase the grant from the courthouse without stirring up
competitive offers and creating a bidding war that would have certainly driven up the
price. The ensuing suit, heard in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the
State of New Mexico in March 1914, brought out a parade of land lawyers and their
collaborating witnesses, including a not so infrequent occasion in which Charles Catron
led the cross-examination of his father, a U.S. senator at the time.14 The Catrons

settled, when in fact, land use and ownership continues to bring to the surface a number of contemporary
social, political, and economic questions and policy issues.
13
The purchase of the Caja del Rio Land Grant by Thomas Catron at public auction came up in the
testimony James M. Norment as examined by N.B. Laughlin in the case of Aniceto Abeytia et al., v. Willi
Spiegelberg et al, No. 4123, District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of New Mexico, County
of Santa Fe, 5 March 1914, Folder 3, Caja del Rio Grande Testimony, Center for Southwest Research,
University Libraries, University of New Mexico (Caja Testimony).
14
The list of witnesses called during the ongoing trials from 1907 to 1914 concerning the Caja del Rio
Grande grant, presents, in and of itself, a curious cross-section of those early-nineteenth-century individuals
who were personally interested in or well-informed about land grants, their histories, and their genealogies
of title. In no particular order, the witnesses included: Clements Ortiz, Aniceto Abeytia, R.B. Willison,
Ambrosio Ortiz, R.J. Palen, Luciano Serrano, Trinidad Alarid, Jose Salazar y Ortiz, Leandra Abeytia de
Angel, Patrocina Abeytia de Sena, Leandro Sena, E.A. Fiske, N.B. Laughlin, E.F. Sidebottom, Jose Ignacio
Dimas, Marcelino Baca, Charles M. Conklin, John Law, F.H. McBride, L.B. Prince, Hilario Baca, P.P.
Stimmell, George A. Riddle, S.S. McBride, T.B. Catron, Amado Chaves, and A.R. McCord. Note that
13/27 of the witnesses had Hispano surnames and that at least six of them (Alarid, Fiske, Laughlin, Prince,
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successfully defended their interests that March, though it is unclear what became of the
grant and their claim to possession. Another example of Catron’s attempt to apply his
position and power took place during the build-up to statehood when he and business
partner William H. Austin of El Paso revamped the Texas-New Mexico boundary
dispute. The stakes centered on roughly 20,000 acres of land along the Rio Grande that
Catron and Austin claimed belonged to New Mexico and therefore to their Santa Teresa
Land Company, owner of the Santa Teresa land grant in Dona Ana County.15
Alternatively, Texas claimants of the Canutillo Grant in El Paso County lobbied their
state legislature to block the boundary change. The affair escalated quickly, with Austin
writing to Hon. Joe Cannon and Catron to President William H. Taft in assertion of New
Mexico’s right to these bottom lands, citing the natural fluctuation of the Rio Grande
itself as the pretext for the Texans’ land grab.16 Ultimately, when his compatriots
implored him to give up the issue as an unnecessary (and self-serving) obstacle to
statehood, Catron backed off. Instead, he used the issue to grandstand against the abuses
suffered by New Mexico at the hands of Texas, an easy sell for much of his constituency.
Alongside the many losses and few gains involving land grants, Catron never
detached himself from an array of business interests linked to land speculation in the
American West. When the Socorro Company, reorganized from the AVC in 1903, had
turned insolvent already by 1906, he traded much of the debt owed him by the company
for the Gibraltar Building, a fixer-upper of an office building in a no-longer-central

Catron, and Chaves) were heavily involved in land grant speculation and adjudication. Aniceto Abeytia et
al., v. Willi Spiegelberg et al, No. 4123, District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of New
Mexico, County of Santa Fe, 5 March 1914, Folders 2 & 3, Caja Testimony.
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district of Kansas City.17 In receivership, the bondholders of the Socorro Co. then
transferred the company’s property, including the American Valley Ranch and Bosque
del Apache grant, to the newly incorporated Sandoval Land Grant Company. 18 Catron
remained marginally involved. In association with his oldest two sons John and Charles,
he also persisted with timber land speculation along the Rogue River and in the Jordan
Valley of Oregon.19 Then there were mining enterprises in New Mexico and Sonora; real
estate deals in Southern California; the purchase of stocks in Texas oil companies; and
through Frank Broad (the son of his old trusted agent Wilmot Broad) an investment in the
Negros-Philippine Lumber Company.20 Maybe nobody told him that his empire was
collapsing; maybe he thought these ventures would turn things around.
When all was said and done the reality is that Thomas Benton Catron was a
gambler—even addicted to gambling. His game was not poker, like his Senatorial partner
Albert B. Fall, nor was it faro or horseracing or boxing. Catron’s game was capitalism,
and he could not stop.21 The American West was his casino, land speculation his favorite
game, and New Mexico his table of choice. The new financial tools of the day, in
combination with his Gilded Age network of friends and associates, provided the means
for his monumental early success. But these methods also caged him in the post-Civil

“Bills, Receipts, and Correspondence, Ed Duncan, Manager, Gibraltar Building, Kansas City,” CP,
Series 611, Box 1.
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$748,088.
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Charles Catron to T.B. Catron, 29 January 1903, CP, Series 103, Box 16, Folder 4; W. Keegin to T.B.
Catron, 8 April 1907, CP, Series 103, Box 28, Folder 5; John Catron to T.B. Catron, 9 January 1910, CP,
Series 103, Box 35, Folder 2.
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21
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War mentality that placed such onus on acquisition and speculation. Then, when the
world—and the markets—evolved around him, he stuck to plan and found succor in his
vast landed empire. The circumstance did not change drastically whether we turn the time
machine dial to 1885, 1895, 1905, or 1915, though the excuses for failure shifted with the
times. Nevertheless, Catron played after the big chance, certain that one big deal could
propel him within reach of the providential end he so ambitiously pursued. Like so many
before him, Thomas Benton Catron came to the country and chased visions of golden
cities in the distance. And just like his predecessors, he never found them. For all of the
time and energy spent building his fortune, the forces of the market dried up capital and
desiccated companies in New Mexico so that Catron’s most lasting legacy for his adopted
home was an empire of dust.

Capitalism and its Discontent in the Hispano Borderlands
In “An Empire of Dust” I have argued that innovative forms of financial and
corporate capitalism transformed parts of the American Southwest after the Civil War
and yet failed to impart prolonged development or sustained economic growth. In the
preceding five chapters, I have shown that in his half century of residence in Santa Fe,
Thomas Catron forged meaningful links between the southwestern periphery and
international centers of power and finance. He and his cohort employed the tools of the
U.S. territorial system, legal system, ring politics, and corporate enterprise to consolidate
and control millions of acres of New Mexico’s land grants and public domain. Catron
could, at moments, personify a Gilded Age robber baron; wealthy, wily, powerful,
cosmopolitan, and respected and feared (in both orders). But all did not go well for
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Catron and like-minded speculators who gambled on an early transition to statehood and
unmitigated economic growth. Their ultimate failure illuminates how and why much of
New Mexico never transformed into the booming extractive landscape they desired.
Instead, by the advent of statehood in 1912, the entrepreneurs of Santa Fe and its
hinterlands shied away from their aggressive speculation in the area’s lands and resources
to embrace a service economy and promote a pre-capitalist southwestern regional
identity.22
For historians looking forward upon the world of capitalism that emerged in New
Mexico after the Civil War, the findings indicate some different possibilities for the
territory’s economic growth and development.23 Though the region never really shook off
the stereotypes and negative impressions cast upon it from the centers of money and
power in the East, the modes of capitalism and finance that arose in New Mexico after
1869 represented the avant-garde of investment techniques, LLC use and personhood,
and global flows of capital and credit. The aggressive attention towards speculation in
land grants, especially in the Southern Rockies and northern New Mexico, set off a burst
of activity spearheaded by international capitalists in collusion with local political
machines and regional boosters. As the “itinerant tycoon of the Rockies,” this was
Waddy’s world.24 The immediate results included an impressive movement of financed
capital to the Hispano borderlands, oriented towards corporations which acted as holding
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The shift to tourism and the commodification of Santa Fe and northern New Mexico was in full force by
1912, shown for instance, in an “old Santa Fe style exhibition” that opened that year. Promoters advertised
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24
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companies for millions of dollars (or pounds, or guilders) in securities, backed by
millions of acres of grant lands and parcels of the public domain. And this transpired
prior to—and in fact a full decade before—the entrance of the railroad. With unbridled
confidence, the investors and stockholders wagered that with all of the attention paid to
the region, and all of the potential value to be found in its untapped mineral, pastoral, and
arboreal industries, all they needed was the technological innovation of a railroad and
telegraph to erase the major issues of time and distance, and the power of the market
would, as it had elsewhere, usher the high desert through the pearly gates of profit and
progress.
But then, in no small part due to the Panic of 1873, the sanguine 1870s turned
sluggish. None of the half-dozen proposed railways constructed their lines. Meanwhile,
high interest rates and constricted money markets funneled capital out of the territories.
Through local politico-speculators best represented by Jerome Chaffee of Colorado and
Stephen B. Elkins of New Mexico, transnational syndicates turned their efforts toward reinvestment, land-staging, and lobbying. Their purpose at the time included obtaining
more land, ballooning boundaries, quieting titles, improving conditions (though just
enough for promotion), enticing white American and European immigrants, and
attracting that long-awaited life-blood of their speculative affairs—a transcontinental
railroad. This period marked a high rate of cooperation between capitalist investors and
the local political machines in Colorado, New Mexico, and much of the American West.
The Santa Fe Ring evolved in direct association with this environment. Through its links
to the most significant regional banks (First National of Denver, First National of Santa
Fe, and the Second National of Santa Fe), the government land office, the office of the
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Surveyor General, the New Mexico courts (at all levels), the territorial legislature, the
appointed governor and attorneys, the press, and of unclear but no doubt relevant
connection to the Freemasons, the Ring offered a clear conduit to the acquisition of land
and power. It was also here, at the intersection of Waddingham’s sly investment schemes
and Elkins’ smooth networking, as represented by the real-politic maneuverings of an
otherwise evanescent political machine, that Thomas Catron cut his teeth to the world of
wealth and its creation. I believe it fair to say that he never looked back. As a steward of
the capitalist order, Catron steered New Mexico into the future, guided by the brash
lessons of his Gilded-age education and its focus on a short-term capitalist economy.
When the railroad belatedly entered the fray, the capitalists once again set off on a
rabid period of consolidation and incorporation. Optimism fueled the furnace as an
explosion of corporate interests set their sights on those regions brought into the market’s
reach by the “iron horse.” Catron actively participated in every major sector of this
frenzy: rail lines to wagon roads; cattle, coal, and coke; lumber and lambs; dams, ditches,
and development companies; banks, trusts, townsites; savings and loan companies,
irrigation companies, oil companies, and utility companies. Between Catron’s vast
landholdings and his involvement in these economic sectors, we can trace the outline of
an impressive southwestern empire unmatched in scale or scope by his contemporaries.
But in many ways this represents an empire on paper only, a fictional façade that
obstructs our view of the insolvency and illiquidity that haunted Catron’s ventures from
the 1880s through the 1910s, and then even that of his sons for decades to come. And yet,
how can historians explain the discrepancy that separates the larger-than-life robberbaron Catron and the real man who, in 1920, at the age of eighty, can honestly be
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represented as having spent the second half of his life barely one step ahead of
bankruptcy and ruin. First, it stands to reason that he made plenty of poor or questionable
business decisions. He too often exaggerated the value of southwestern lands, the strength
of money markets, or the longevity of the national and international economy. Too many
times did Catron set himself up to be “under water” in his enterprises before they were
really afloat. It was close to impossible from his perch in Santa Fe to make back deficits
on capital-intensive projects paying high rates of interest and steep commissions.
Alongside the circumstantial choices of his own making, including his friends, partners,
obligations, and investments, we must also consider the role played by the structural
forces at work that so significantly influenced the onset and evolution of capitalism in the
Hispano borderlands.25
In the post-Civil War social and economic environment, money flowed readily to
exploit the extractive resources of the American West, including New Mexico. The
markets for land speculation and extractive industry generated a truly impressive deluge
of Eastern and European capital that was put to quick work in developing the region’s
latent riches. Caught up in the optimism of the day, boosters from all corners of the West
promoted their local cities and hinterlands as the next big thing. Their mines were the
richest, their forests the most abundant, and their grasslands well-watered and neverending. As part of this international rigmarole, developers directed capital to the
25
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mountains and plains of New Mexico, especially when located on land grants that
allowed them to sidestep the usual procedures and red tape of the government land office.
Once brought into the broader capitalist world, however, the lands of the high
desert proved more troublesome than anyone expected. For the sake of comparison, one
of Andrew Carnegie’s innovations in the iron and steel business involved the use of his
equipment and machinery to capacity until it was technologically surpassed or absolutely
used to margin. In doing so, he created more profitable and efficient factory models than
the English and Scottish manufacturers that he competed against. His factories burned
through equipment, but the scale of production created profits that Carnegie pumped back
into new machinery; the cycle repeated until he stood atop an industrial juggernaut.26
This model utterly fails when employed on southwestern lands. The arid lands of New
Mexico renewed far too slowly, while usage continued to grow from the nineteenth into
the twentieth century. The land was literally overrun within the duration of Catron’s life,
leaving a trail of devaluation that stung patron and partidario just the same.27 In contrast
to the Protestant values attached to business and industry, the arid lands of the Southwest
presented a modern obstacle to the achievement of American concepts of individualism,
self-stability, and democracy through enterprise, in part because neither energy, industry,
or frugality, nor technological innovation, could effectively change the equation. The
West is where American capitalists learned the sober truths about the real
power(lessness) of the almighty dollar.28 But, while entrepreneurs, families, and
Livesay, Andrew Carnegie, 94-95 and 98-99. Also known as “hard driving.”
DeBuys, Enchantment and Exploitation, 218-220.
28
This is intended to read both ways. Many American capitalists really did learn the power of the dollar
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lessons of how cruel the natural world could be, especially when compounded by the ruthless competition
of free market capitalism.
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syndicates alike learned the hard lessons that western ventures had to offer, the expanding
world of investment opportunity in newly opened regions, countries, and hemispheres
meant that failures could be collectively written off as aberrations and that Americans
would only selectively learn the lessons of capitalism and its discontent.
In New Mexico, for instance, the stubborn land and climate refused to be
commercially exploited for steady profit, so the capitalists changed the equation and
exploited its natural stubbornness. The region’s recent flood of corporate activity was
carefully shielded from view, while adobe, that oft-maligned mud and straw, gained a
central place in the new capitalist economy. After half a century of responding to the
invasion of modern markets and progress, Natives and Nuevomexicanos were now touted
and exploited for their connections to a pre-capitalist “American” past.29 Of no little
irony, the very features that made Territorial New Mexico unfit for statehood suddenly
drew tens of thousands of tourists, health seekers, and refugees from urban life to visit
and bask in its seemingly ancient glory.

The Catron Legacy
As New Mexico’s first senators, Thomas Benton Catron and Albert B. Fall
brought a political education to their office that was uniquely territorial in its training.30

Sylvia Rodriguez, “Art, Tourism, and Race Relations in Taos,” in Scott Norris, ed., Discovered Country.
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Investigating Committee of the United States Senate (left to right), Hon. George Chamberlain of
Oregon, Hon. Wesley L. Jones of Washington, and Hon. Thomas B. Catron of New Mexico, c.
1914, Catron Scrapbooks.

They maintained a view of land use and land rights that idealized development and
favored corporate activity. The bills introduced by Catron in the upper house of
Congress, for instance, mostly involved concessions to railroads, or competing claims to
forest or coal lands between companies and federal agencies.31 When World War I
brought new cooperation between extractive industry and federal agencies, New
Mexicans proved well adapted to working with the government and its War Boards.32
Business there had rarely existed outside of the realm of bureaucratic controls and
fluctuations in eastern markets. Yet it is puzzling that during the 1910s and 1920s New
Mexico garnered national attention for its resilience as an isolated, backward place.
31

Bills presented by Catron in the 64th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 5; and Bills presented by Catron in the
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32
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Despite its corporate order, often inscribed on the landscape in the form of railroad
tracks, sawmills, smelters and feed lots, the American people by and large looked to New
Mexico for its local arts and crafts or for its climate and environment. It is this final
irony, of a southwestern state fully enmeshed in the national corporate and political
culture, but with a built environment and regional culture oriented along a pre-capitalist
axis, that has provided the context for New Mexico’s growth over the remainder of the
twentieth century.33
At the age of eighty, and after fifty-five years of residence in New Mexico,
Thomas Benton Catron died in Santa Fe. His passing marks the end of my story, but not
quite the end of an era.34 Although the New Mexico of 1921 was far removed from the
gilded days of ring rule and the unwavering optimism that American industry and
ingenuity would make the desert bloom, the young state would not easily shake its
territorial character. Case in point, just a few months prior to his passing, the New
Mexico Legislature voted unanimously to name the new county carved from the western
half of Socorro County, not Frisco, but Catron County.35 Republican Party bosses
continued to dominate the political arena. Men like Bronson Cutting utilized similar
strategies employed by Catron to build coalitions of English and Spanish speaking
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voters.36 Big business remained the primary driver of the New Mexican economy.
Corporations held the reins to the state’s chief industries, which by the 1920s included
ranching, mining (of non-precious metals), oil and natural gas extraction, dry farming,
and to a growing degree, railroad and motorcar tourism. Chain stores, wholesalers, and
mail-order catalogues presented New Mexican consumers with nationally-oriented
commodity markets, increasingly concentrated in urban spaces such as Albuquerque. The
new retailers, with national supply lines, could offer lower prices and even some early
forms of consumer credit, resulting in a slow undercutting of the business arrangements
of rural mercantiles that continued to employ partido contracts and informal agreements
in the process of accessing the vulnerable hinterland productivity of the Hispano
borderlands.37 The mercantiles, vestiges of a more sober, more symbiotic brand of market
penetration (one that better considered the economic life of Nuevomexicanos and their
system of land use and allocation), also faced disintegration due to ecological collapse
and networks of seasonal and migratory wage labor that carried pobladores away from
their small communities, home plots, and range lands, finding them instead in the rail
yards, lumber yards, and beet and coal fields of urban centers and neighboring states.38
Through his success, his failure, and his personal networks, Thomas Catron
powerfully influenced the face of economic change for New Mexico from the nineteenth
century through the first full decade of statehood. From the processes of land
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consolidation and monopolization of the 1870s, through the effort to incorporate—
markets, companies, and society—in the 1880s, to the traveling circus of debt and asset
juggling that framed the 1890s, and finally the attempt to professionally manage order
and profit on landholdings in the 1900s, Catron left a deep imprint on millions of acres of
the Hispano borderlands. Few others so forcefully chartered the course from communal
land grant to land grant company that shifted the political and economic power in New
Mexico away from its native residents and that created significant connections between
southwestern lands and capital currents. Despite his role as an usher of Gilded Age
business practices and American corporate culture to New Mexico, Thomas Catron’s
final years brought no financial relief. His debts and taxes continued to pile up and he
continued to fight and delay while one-by-one he traded, sold, or lost his once-precious
properties. And yet, even as his empire crumbled around him, the elderly Catron seemed
content, and maybe even happy, for what appeared to be the first time in his life.39
The legacy left by Thomas B. Catron for New Mexico, its land, and its economy
can be traced in part through the activities of his four sons, John, Charles, Thomas II
(born Thom), and Fletcher. The different directions taken by the four Catron heirs
illuminates the genteel quality of life afforded by Thomas Senior, and the opportunities
available to these boys. Though born in territorial Santa Fe, the boys received tutors
while at home and attended schooling outside New Mexico, including university
educations at Yale, Stanford, West Point, and the University of Chicago.40 They all grew
up speaking Spanish and generally excelled in linguistics. The Catron’s were likely well
aware that their southwestern roots set them apart from many of their prep-bred
39
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classmates. At times, their letters home included complaints regarding their lodgings,
their allowances, and their father’s harsh condemnation of discretionary spending or
leisure activities. But, they also embraced their western upbringing and maintained a
lifetime attachment to the wilderness of northern New Mexico where from a young age
they learned to ride, camp, hunt, fish, and sleep under the stars. As adults, two of the four,
Charles and Fletcher, followed in Thomas Senior’s footsteps by passing the New Mexico
Bar and maintaining residence in Santa Fe. As their father did for the territory from the
1870s through the 1910s, the boys continued to do throughout the twentieth century by
sustaining the linkage between the Catron family and New Mexico’s legal, economic, and
social development. Like dad, the boys developed a high degree of self-confidence that,
perhaps also an inheritance, could easily translate into brazenness or arrogance while
dealing with others. Nevertheless, between the four of them, the Catrons came to
represent all of the best—and some of the worst—their father had to offer.
Of the four, Charles most strikingly inherited his father’s business acumen, legal
cunning, and level of involvement in New Mexico’s land grants. This occurred in part
because while his older brother John attended school to become a mining engineer,
Charles’ most significant education came in the form of apprentice, agent, and partner to
his father.41 Already by the age of twenty-one, Charles participated in the family’s
emblematic land grant affairs, including the transfer of land titles, the acceptance of
substantial loans and mortgages, and the collection work of a rentier. What started as a
conveyance of the Tierra Amarilla grant to Charles in 1901, which he used to secure a
41
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$250,000 set of five loans from Denver, escalated quickly and never looked back. Soon
after, he grew gradually more and more active in his father’s business, travelling to places
such as Mora, Chama, Denver, and even Oregon, to take care of land negotiations.42 By
the 1910s, Charles, and increasingly Fletcher (after he completed his education in
Chicago), took over Thomas Benton’s land grant companies and acted as legal counsel in
defense of the family’s land or equity-based interests. During the period from 1912-1917,
for instance, when the elder Catron achieved his life’s goal of sitting in the U.S. Senate,
the boys attended to his local matters. And, just like their distinguished father, John,
Charles, Thom, and Fletcher found the world of western speculation and New Mexico
real estate to be a fraught and frustrating affair.
The difficulties faced by the Catron sons developed in part due to decisions made
by their father and his friends, who, with one leg set squarely in the territorial past, and
the other placed in the young state’s precarious future, directed New Mexico’s course
through its early decades of statehood. The optimism and penchant for risk of Thomas
Benton’s generation, not to mention the fondness for speculative ventures and the ease by
which they employed political grease or simply looked the other way, was not fully
compatible with the operation of the new state, or the western economies and ecologies
of the nineteen-teens and twenties.
More of the same can be seen as Charles, John, and Fletcher worked towards the
development and sale of the Ojo del Espiritu Santo Grant, which transferred to them as
the stockholders and directors of the Ojo del Espiritu Santo Company (OdESCo). The
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grant’s history reads like so many others that were caught up in the speculative frenzy of
the post-Civil War era. Though confirmed by Congress in 1869, the final title and patent
to 113,141.15 acres in Sandoval County was not conferred to Catron and the other
stockholders of the OdESCo until 1916.43 The grant’s early confirmation did help the
speculators, including Catron, who purchased his first partial interest in the grant in 1870,
by keeping the grant from the Court of Private Land Claims’ shrink ray. Then, in the
process of partition in 1903, the court appointed Special Master Pedro Perea to referee
the determination of interests and sale of the estate. Low and behold, later that year,
Perea, Mariano Otero, and Thomas Catron incorporated the Ojo del Espiritu Santo
Company, capitalized at $113,141, representing a reasonable capitalization based on a
dollar an acre of the land the company used as its corporate equity.44 By 1907, Catron
controlled 82,486 shares of the corporate stock (just under 73%), and by November 1915,
the company’s directors included Thomas Catron, Charles Catron (son and law partner),
and Frank Lavan, (nephew and legal apprentice).45 A true Catron corporation, it is not
clear that the OdESCo developed or produced anything in its first twelve years of
incorporated life, or thereafter for that matter. That was not its purpose, anyway. With
three decades of limited liability education behind them, Catron, Perea, Otero and the
other directors fully recognized the power of the shell company to legitimate title, garner
credit, and stage local conditions, especially when the reality on the ground included
imperfect lands with contested rights.
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Like so many other grants, the land was filtered through the process of
speculation, consolidation, partition, and incorporation, while the resident population
slowly and surely lost in the build-up of legal documentation that the company could
bring against them.46 Case in point, in the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico in
1917, the company sued Ciriaco Baca for the cost of damages for him using the grant
lands to graze his sheep. The OdESCo asked the court to render $20,200 in total damages
and costs, producing its titles and tax returns to emphasize the duration of its ownership.
The verdict returned by Justice Reed Holloman favored the company, but for only $800,
which speaks to the legal correctness of the OdESCo’s case as well as the ongoing reality
of more ambiguous use patterns.47 For more evidence of this, Frank Lavan wrote later
that year to the Collector of Internal Revenue, Phoenix, AZ to explain that the company
should not have to pay its taxes because it did not make a profit and instead was run over
by sheepmen and squatters.48 That the Catrons could not find a way to manage the grant
to profit during the years of World War I, when prices surged for wool and fossil fuels,
ominously foreshadowed the strain that would accompany the next decades of
administration.
Like father, like sons. The Ojo del Espiritu Santo grant and the company that
owned it turned into another financial boondoggle that the boys not only inherited, but
perpetuated. In October 1916 Thomas Benton signed his name as President of the
OdESCo to secure a $60,000 mortgage on the land. Through the State National Bank of
Oklahoma City, Bernard B. Jones underwrote the series of thirty-six notes, all at eight
David Benavides, “Lawyer-Induced Partitioning of New Mexican Land Grants: An Ethical Travesty”
(master’s thesis, Department of History, University of New Mexico, 1990).
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percent interest, and all subject to foreclosure if not repaid to contract.49 But, the grant
garnered no profits to pay the loan. Even with rentals bringing in over $5,000 a year after
1916, the company’s expenses, taxes, interest, and principal moved them further into the
red.
At the helm, Charles Catron placed his faith in the oil boom that arose alongside
the Mexican Revolution and the war in Europe. He leased the land to prospectors and
engineers from 1916 through 1925, typically asking one-eighth of net returns on oil or
natural gas as royalty alongside a set annual rental fee.50 With Fletcher they even tapped
their mother’s kinfolk for funds. Cousin Thos. Corry Walz responded for the family to
the affirmative that they would “take a gamble, that the Catron family becomes a factor in
the oil industry.”51 Still, the company could barely tread water. Charles Catron used
20,000 shares of its stock as collateral in 1922 to obtain a $10,000 loan from the Citizen’s
National Bank of Albuquerque in order to pay corporate debts.52 By the end of the
decade, Charles and Fletcher transitioned to a sweeping, and frustratingly slow, sales
process.
Unable to pay off the principal of the mortgage held by B.B. Jones, the directors
of the OdESCo renewed the note in 1928, now for $98,000 secured against the grant.
Charles and Fletcher then set about to sell the land. They hoped to be return a profit at
first, but by the time the Great Depression raged the brothers were just ready to be done
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with it.53 They began by marketing the 113,141 acres of land as great for grazing and
potentially oil rich. Placed with Los Angeles land agents, the Catrons attempted to
capitalize on southern California’s booming oil industry. But after starting at an asking
price of $10/acre, the environmental and economic factors quickly worked against New
Mexico real estate, forcing Charles to cut their price in half, and then half again by 1932.
In 1931, for instance, Charles received word from the Shell Oil Company that regrettably,
they could not purchase the land due to the glut in the oil market created by
overproduction from Texas, Oklahoma, and California.54 And it continued like this for
another two years. One of the brothers even wrote to Will Rogers at Fox Films
Corporation in Hollywood, offering to sell him “113,000 acres of sweet grass and
water.”55 Rogers kindly passed on the proposition.
When their attempts to entice private enterprises all failed, the Catron brothers
turned their attention to the federal government and the New Deal. During a 1934
OdESCo stockholders meeting attended by Charles, John, and Fletcher, they decided to
contact the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) with a proposition to sell
the land at $2.50 per acre. In their appeal to FERA, they explained that they wanted to
sell the land “to assist in the progress of the United States to conserve natural resources
and to rehabilitate people living on submarginal lands.”56 And it worked. FERA
purchased the Ojo del Espiritu Santo Grant at the Catrons asking price of $282,852. From
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the proceeds, the contract included a stipulation to pay B.B. Jones the $123,000 owed
him, and another to pay the County Treasurer of Sandoval County $16,954.62 for back
taxes from 1929 to 1934. Charles Catron, President of the OdESCo, claimed the rest,
which he divided among the corporate stockholders—his brothers.57
With exceptions found in the price setting of the WWI War Boards, the
agribusiness gains affiliated with the 1916 completion of the Elephant Butte Dam, and
the new attention paid to oil exploration and drilling, the prosperity of the Jazz Age
largely eluded the young state. Long term environmental degradation met face-to-face
with a broad climatic transition toward drought so that the 1920s witnessed the rapid
depletion of land productivity. The Hispano borderlands were hit especially hard due to a
general escalation of land use since capitalism’s mid-nineteenth century incursion.58
While some parts of the state shifted to oil production, to open pit mining, or to dry
farming, northern New Mexico had for the most part already been picked through and
discarded by the entrepreneurs of the Gilded Age. No longer would financiers in Scotland
or New York look to the borderlands region and gamble on its hidden holdings. Newer
markets for investment in New Mexico grew in places like Texas, Oklahoma, and
California, especially in association with the oil boom and irrigated farming and
horticulture in the lower Rio Grande Valley. For the Hispano borderlands, the most
notable transformation involved the move toward regional tourism, by rail and more and
more, by automobile.
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For longtime residents, the significant shift to a tourism-oriented economic
landscape simultaneously marked the retreat and the retrenchment of capitalism in their
back yard. Instances of capitalists and lawyers scooping up the land from underneath land
grant heirs abated, while competition over dwindling resources subsided, in part because
development and extractive companies looked elsewhere for profitable venture.
Throughout the Hispano Borderlands a new, repurposed corporate landscape emerged,
led by the likes of the Santa Fe Fiesta and the Fred Harvey Company.59 Rather suddenly,
local communities of New Mexico’s north were told to freeze for the market tastes of an
increasingly mobile population of middle-class American tourists. For many Native
Americans and Nuevomexicanos who faced dwindling alternatives, this new world,
structured upon the superficial maintenance of the old for the enjoyment of outsiders,
fostered a mindset of colonization and dependence for a new generation of economicallymarginalized residents of the Hispano Borderlands.60

Coda: Still Marginal at Midcentury
When a comprehensive economic plan and report conducted for the Santa Fe
Trade area in 1961 indicated findings that between 1910 and 1960 the depressed decade
of the 1930s represented the strongest period of economic growth for the capital city and
59
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its surrounding counties, it said a lot about northern New Mexico’s relationship with
capitalism in the twentieth century.61 This less-than-optimistic report detailed that for
Santa Fe and its surrounding hinterlands at midcentury, the chief industries and sectors of
employment included government work followed by the retail and service trades. State
and federal positions accounted for over half of the jobs in the area, presenting the
increased importance of the public sector to Santa Fe’s economic health. Retail and
service jobs then tallied over another one-quarter of all work, with a clear predominance
of the role of tourism in promoting the seasonal ebbs and flows in these fields. Outside of
these sectors, the comprehensive report showed a general decline in the relevance of the
Santa Fe trade area, not only nationally, but as it factored into New Mexico’s population
levels, output, and GDP since the first decade of statehood.62 Once a continental
crossroad for commerce, finance, and empire – the very engines of nineteenth-century
capitalism – a very different equation marks Santa Fe of a century later, one focused on
competing cultures who together retrofit a mythic southwestern past and unique regional
identity against an atomic modernity and the conformity of the Cold War.

Joe C. Williams, Jr., Chief Resident Planner, “A Study of the Economy: City of Santa Fe, New Mexico,”
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